Blue Deebaj (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Hsbc Bank Malaysia Berhad (WA-22NCC-574-08/2024)

This is an action by the Plaintiff P against the Defendant D -

allegedly wrongfully terminating a receivables financing (factoring) facility in the sum of RM 12 million ( facility ) granted by D to P; and (ii) Information System ( CCRIS ) two months after the termination of the facility. As a result, P claims that it had difficulty securing funding from other financial institutions and proceeding with its contracts and tenders.

After a full trial, I dismissed s claim. Here are my reasons.

set out below.

In the course of its business operations and to support its cash flow requirements, P applied to D for a financial facility. D subsequently offered to P a financial facility known as a Factoring Facility : Receivables Purchase (Recourse) in the sum of RM 12 million, vide a l facility letter

Pursuant to the facility letter, P and D entered into a Receivables Purchase (Recourse) Agreement dated 13.12.2022 ( facility agreement

Under the facility agreement, P was required to fulfil certain conditions precedent prior to any disbursement of the facility by D. This included preparation and submission of customer aging reports and borrowing base certificates, which serve as the basis for determining the amount to be disbursed for each drawdown.

customers were to be credited.

P avers that it has duly complied with all conditions precedent imposed by D, including notifying its customers of the designated account opened with D.

customer aging reports and borrowing base certificates, the facility would be disbursed within two working days, in accordance with the amount requested for the first drawdown.

However, D failed to disburse the facility in accordance with the customer aging reports and borrowing base certificates submitted by P, which ought to have been disbursed on 10.4.2023.

D failed to provide any explanation to P regarding the status of the disbursement of the facility, until a meeting was convened on 2.5.2023 between the representatives of both parties.

During th namely DW1 (the Relationship Manager of D involved in the portfolio) and one Mr. Brian Chong (the then Senior Team Manager, Business Banking KL Headquarter of D), one Mr. Mohd Raflee (director of P) and PW1 (Financial Controller of P), that D was unable to proceed with the facility and would be terminating the facility agreement.

Subsequently, D issued a formal notice of termination via email dated 31.5.2023, which took effect on 30.6.2023.

P avers that the termination of the facility agreement came as a that the facility would be disbursed within two working days upon receipt of the requisite documents. No prior notice was provided before the 2.5.2023 meeting. The termination was wrongful, as P had fully complied with all conditions precedent.

commercial commitments, including undertaking existing and terminating the facility agreement constitutes a breach of duty and negligence, which has caused P to suffer losses, including loss of profits and business opportunities.

P contends that the termination of the facility agreement is invalid. It obligations, including applicable guidelines relating to financial conduct and fair treatment to bank customers.

P contends that D owed a duty of care to P as its customer. D was under a fiduciary duty not to act in a manner that would cause harm to P. D has breached such duty.

financial loss, hardship and reputational damage. This included being adversely listed in the CCRIS report, notwithstanding that the facility a ability to secure alternative financing, until the facility amount of RM 12 million was removed from the CCRIS report.

At paragraph 25 of the statement of claim, P prayed for the following reliefs : a) A declaration order that the Letter of Offer dated 27.9.2022 and the Receivables Purchase (Resource) Agreement dated 13.12.2022 are still valid and binding on the Plaintiff and Defendant; b) A declaration order that the termination notice dated 31.5.2023 is invalid and unenforceable; c) If prayers (a) and (b) above are allowed, the Defendant shall release the financing amount of RM 12,000,000.00 in accordance with the terms agreed in the Letter of Offer dated 27.9.2022 and the Receivables Purchase (Resource) Agreement dated 13.12.2022 within seven (7) days from the date of judgment; d) Damages for loss of income / assessed by this Honourable Court; e) assessed by this Honourable Court; f) Aggravated damages for the unilateral termination of the financing facility by the Defendant; g) General damages; h) Special damages amounting to RM 2,454,117.36;

this. 2) At the request of the Plaintiff, by a Facility Letter dated 27th September 2022 receivables financing (factoring) facility in the sum of RM 12,000,000.00 which was accepted by the Plaintiff. 3) Following acceptance of the Facility Letter, on 13th December 2022, at the request of the Plaintiff, the Defendant agreed to make available to the Facility to the Plaintiff and entered into the Receivables Purchase (Recourse) Agreement with the Plaintiff ( the Facility Agreement ). 4) The Facility Letter read with the Facility Agreement provide, inter alia, as follows : i) Clause 7 of the Facility Letter provides that the Facility is subject always withdrawal and repayment on demand (which in context, may require provides that other terms may apply which allow the Defendant to cease providing the Facility to the Plaintiff and that for as long as the Facility is made available by the Defendant, it will be subject to review by the Defendant at any time. ii) By Clause 2.1 of the Facility Agreement read with Clause 14.1 of the Facility Agreement, the Plaintiff acknowledges and agrees that the Facility is provided by the Defendant on an uncommitted basis. Further, the Defendant is not obliged to offer or make available the Facility. iii) Clause 2.2 of the Facility Agreement provides that the Defendant may at any time in its sole discretion, cancel, withdraw or suspend the Facility and / or vary any terms in the Schedules. It further provides that the Defendant will notify the Plaintiff when such changes are effected without any obligation to give prior notice thereof. iv) Clause 14.3 of the Facility Agreement provides that the Defendant may at any time terminate the Facility with immediate effect upon giving written notice of termination to the Plaintiff. 5) At the meeting held on 2nd May 2023, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff acility. Upon being not object to the proposed termination of the Facility. At the material time, the Plaintiff did not inform the Defendant of any planned projects and / or tenders that would be impacted by the termination of the Facility, and only requested for reimbursements for wasted expenses incurred in preparing the documents or information required or requested by the Defendant to utilise the Facility. 6) On 31st May 2023, the Defendant issued a termination notice terminating the Facility with effect from 30th June 2023. 7) The Plaintiff submitted the requests for reimbursement of wasted expenses eration, nd May 2023. 8) On or about 5th requests for reimbursement of wasted expenses arising from the termination of the Facility on a without prejudice basis for commercial reason and relationship management with the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff remained, at the material time, a customer of the Defendant notwithstanding termination of the Facility. 9) On or around 25th October 2023, the Plaintiff reneged on the agreement for reimbursement of wasted expenses and notified the Defendant for the first time of its intention to undertake further assessment of alleged losses arising from the termination of the Facility. 10) The Defendant contends that the Facility was duly terminated pursuant to the Facility Agreement read with the Facility Letter : i) The fulfilment of the condition precedent for the utilisation of the Facility, if any and which is denied, does not thereby entitle the Plaintiff to the release of the Facility, whether under the Facility Agreement read with the Facility Letter or in law, as alleged or at all. ii) Notwithstanding the submission of such documents or information as may be required or specified by the Defendant, the Plaintiff acknowledges and agrees that the Facility is provided by the Defendant on an uncommitted basis and that the Defendant is in any event not obliged to offer or make available the Facility, whether under the Facility Agreement read with the Facility Letter or in law. iii) The Defendant was at all material times entitled to review, suspend and / or withdraw the Facility at its sole discretion and to effect termination of the Facility without providing prior notice or reason to the Plaintiff. iv) At all material times, there was no purported confirmation and / or representation by the Defendant to the Plaintiff that the Facility would be made available to the Plaintiff regardless of the terms and conditions of the Facility Letter read with the Facility Agreement. 11) / Plaintiff since March 2023 and as of 30th June 2023, i.e. the date of termination CCRIS. The reported CCRIS credit position by the Defendant did not prevent the Plaintiff from obtaining other alternative facilities from other financial instructions and did not cause the alleged loss or damage to the Plaintiff, as alleged or at all. Based on the CCRIS reports available to the Defendant, the Plaintiff was able to obtain facilities of RM 95 million from other financial institution(s). 12) The Defendant contends that there was no basis in law and in fact for the / or negligence or at all : i) The Defendant does not owe any fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff and as such, the question of the Defendant allegedly breaching such duty does not arise. ii) The Defendant does not owe duty of care in the manner alleged to the Plaintiff. If at all the Defendant did owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff in respect of the availability of the Facility, the Defendant will contend that the Defendant has acted to the standard expected of a reasonable, competent and prudent banker and had discharged its obligations with all due integrity, honesty, skill and diligence and was not or could not have been expected to do anything more. 13) There is no basis in law or in fact for the relief and / or any purported loss and damage by the Plaintiff. Issues to be tried

The agreed issues to be tried are : 1) Whether the termination of the financing facility by the Defendant through the termination notice dated 31.5.2023 is wrong and invalid? 2) Whether the termination of the Facility is in breach of the Facility Letter and / or the Facility Agreement? 3) Whether the termination of the Facility breached the Defendant's fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff, as alleged? 4) Whether the termination of the Facility was made negligently as alleged? 5) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought if the Defendant is found to have acted improperly, negligently and failed to discharge its fiduciary duties towards the Plaintiff? Issues to be Tried (Plaintiff) 6) Whether the Defendant failed to discharge the duty of care towards the Plaintiff in the bankers - client relationship? 7) Whether the Defendant negligently and intentionally gave the Plaintiff a legitimate hope and expectation that the financing of the facility would be released by the Defendant? 8) Whether the Defendant s failure to remove the reporting in the Central termination of the Facility Letter was a breach of the Defendant's fiduciary duty to the Plaintiff? Issues to be Tried (Defendant) 9) s obligations to the Plaintiff, as alleged?

It seems to me that this matter can be decided based on the principal issue of in the negative. Here is my explanation. No wrongful termination of the facility

By the facility letter, D offered the facility in the sum of RM 12 million, which was accepted by P. This was followed by the facility agreement, by which D agreed to make the facility available to P. Both the facility letter and the facility agreement are intended to be read together.

At the trial, in the course of cross - examination of DW1, the counsel for P appeared to suggest that the facility took effect by reason of the facility letter, as opposed to the facility agreement, and the facility letter did not have similar suspension or withdrawal clauses as contained in the facility agreement. It was even suggested to DW1 that clause 7 of the facility l only arises if the facility has been drawn down.

However, this clashes with the following clauses in the facility letter, requiring both the facility letter and the facility agreement to be read together.

The opening paragraph of the facility letter states that D is pleased to offer to P a factoring facility, subject to the terms and conditions set out in this letter (as the same may be revised, amended, supplemented and / or replaced in writing from time to Purchase .

The suggestion by the counsel for P that the facility took effect by reason of the facility letter alone, as opposed to the facility letter read with the facility agreement, cannot stand. This is because by definition, greement within the meaning of the facility letter, means the agreement between P and D constituted by the terms of this Facility Letter (as amended, supplemented and / or replaced from time to time), and the RPA . (Se

Clause 17 of the facility letter provides that This Facility Letter and the RPA together constitute the entire agreement between the Bank and the Seller in respect of the matters set out herein, and no other terms and conditions shall be included or implied .

The facility letter read with the facility agreement provide as follows :

Clause 7 of the facility letter stipulates that the Facility is subject always to the suspension, withdrawal and repayment on demand (which in financed). Other terms may also apply which allow the Bank to cease providing the Facility to the Seller. For as long as the Facility is made available by the Bank, it will be subject to review by the Bank at any time .

By clause 2.1 of the facility agreement read with clause 14.1 of the facility agreement, P acknowledges and agrees that the facility is provided by D on an uncommitted basis. Further, D is not obliged to offer or make available the facility.

Clause 14.1 of the facility agreement reads : The Facility is made available by the Bank on an uncommitted basis. The Bank may decide whether or not to make available the Facility in its sole discretion. Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to impose on the Bank any obligation to make or to continue to make available the Facility.

Clause 2.2 of the facility agreement provides that D may at any time in its sole discretion, cancel, withdraw or suspend the Facility and / or vary any terms in the Schedules . It further provides that D will notify P when it effects any such changes without any obligation to give any prior notice thereof .

Clause 14.3 of the Facility Agreement provides that D may at any time terminate the Facility with immediate effect upon its giving written notice of termination to P.

The facility letter and the facility agreement, both read together in the manner they were intended to be read, must not be read in a selective manner. Rather, the facility letter and the facility agreement must be read holistically, not in isolation. The interpretation that would be harmonious would be that D is entitled to withdraw the facility by giving a written notice, since the facility was granted on an uncommitted basis.

I refer to the following authorities. In SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 464 at 485, the Federal Court held : [51] Thus in addition to the above in interpreting the contract, the court must approach it holistically. No term is to be taken or interpreted in isolation. This canon of construction is so long established, it is almost banal. See for instance Chamber Colliery Ltd v Twyerould [1915] 1 Ch 268 : - known (sic) rule that a deed ought to be read as a whole, in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses; and that the words of each clause should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the deed, if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible.

The Federal Court in SPM Membrane (supra) followed the approach to interpretation of contract as set out in another Federal Court decision in Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v M - Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ

There, the Federal Court stressed that the role of the court is to interpret a contract is a sensible fashion, as the law favours a commercially sensible construction.

In Berjaya Times Square (supra), the Federal Court held (at page 606 - 607) : [10] accordance with the doctrine of freedom of contract to agree on any terms they thought fit. The role of the court is to interpret the contract in a sensible fashion. See Loh Wai Lian v SEA Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ

As Lord Steyn said in Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749 771 : In determining the meaning of the language of a commercial contract, and unilateral contractual notices, the law therefore generally favours a commercially sensible construction. The reason for this approach is that a commercial construction is more likely to give effect to the intention of the parties. Words are therefore interpreted in the way in which a reasonable commercial person would construe them. And the standard of the reasonable commercial person is hostile to technical interpretations and undue emphasis on niceties of language. In contradistinction to this modern approach, Lord Greene M.R s judgment in Hankey v. Clavering [1942] 2 KB 326 is rigid and formalistic.

Interpretation of the terms governing the facility is a question to be decided by the court, as interpretation is a matter of law. Interpretation of the terms of the facility is not, and should not be, decided by reference to oral testimony of factual witnesses.

In the Court of Appeal case of Majlis Agama Islam Selangor & Anor v Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd [2021] 6 MLJ 301 at 312 - 313, the role of the court is explained as follows : [28] In matters of construction of contracts, this court had in NVJ Menon v The Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd [2004] 3 MLJ 38; [2004] 3 CLJ 96 held that: It would be noticed that we have in arriving at our aforesaid conclusion made no reference to the oral evidence led at the trial as to the meaning and interpretation of the contract between the parties. This is because the construction of a contract is a question of law for determination by the court and not by witnesses through their oral evidence. As Lord Diplock observed in Bahamas International Trust Co Ltd v Threadgold [1974] 1 WLR 1514 : In a case which turns, as this one does, on the construction to be given to a written document, a court called on to construe the document in the absence of any claim to rectification, cannot be bound by any concession made by any of the parties as to what its language means. That is so even in the court before which the concession is made; a fortiori in the court to which an appeal from the judgment of the court is brought. The reason is that the construction of a written document is a question of law. It is for the judge to decide for himself what the law is, not to accept it from any or even all of the parties to the suit; having so decided it is his duty to apply it to the facts of the case. He would be acting contrary to his judicial oath if he were to determine the case by applying what the parties conceived to be the law, if in his own opinion it were erroneous. When it comes to the meaning of words, it does not matter whether they appear in a contract or written law, the result is the same. The point is illustrated by the judgment of Thompson J, (as he then was) in Reynolds v Public Prosecutor [1956] [2021] 6 MLJ 301 at 313 MLJ 101 at p 103; [1956] 1 LNS 1 : It may be that the learned President accepted the evidence of the various functionaries of the Police Department who gave evidence as to what they considered to be the meaning of the relevant Orders as conclusive. If so, I think he was wrong. Whatever may be the attitude of Government functionaries who have to deal with these Financial General Orders there is nothing sacrosanct about them. They were not brought down from Pisgah by any bureaucratic Moses. They are written words and like any other written words what they mean is a matter of construction. It is no concern of mine as a Judge what civil servants do among themselves. As far as a Judge is concerned, they can say that black is white and for the purposes of their own activities black is white. But when the criminal law and its sanctions are invoked and any question of construction is involved then that is a question for the Court to decide and not any Financial Assistant or even any Superintendent of Police who happens to be in charge of records. So too here. It matters not a jot to us what the plaintiff thought his entitlements under the contract with the defendant were. Neither does it matter to us what the defendant s witnesses thought of the way in which that contract ought to be interpreted. Their views are entirely irrelevant; as irrelevant as the views of the witnesses who gave their interpretation of the Financial Orders in Reynolds. In the instant case, the learned judge referred to the oral testimony and relied upon it for the interpretation of the agreements and circulars. That, in our view is clearly an [29] Similarly, in ascertaining the true intention of the parties, we have scrutinised the payment guarantee agreement by giving the words used their contextual natural and ordinary meaning taking into account the relationship between the parties and all relevant facts surrounding the transaction. In doing so of mind.

Between the period of March 2023 to 11.4.2023, P submitted the following documents to D to facilitate the drawdown of the facility:- (a) a .2.2023 on 27.3.2023, anticipated debts; and (b borrowing base certificates on 4.4.2023 and 11.4.2023, respectively. The borrowing base certificates documents to support the 1st drawdown (only) from the facility.

PW1 admitted, under cross - aging list and borrowing base certificates, respectively, submitted during the period of March 2023 to 11.4.2023 for the 1st own aging list and borrowing base certificates, purportedly compiled by P for the period between May 2023 to October 2023 and supposedly for the 2nd to 8th drawdown, were submitted to D prior to the termination of the facility. D has not sighted these documents prior to the trial. In the absence of any supporting and verifiable underlying documents, such as project or tender documentation, the purported documents for the 2nd to 8th drawdown ought to be disregarded.

At the trial, during the cross - examination of DW1, the counsel for P tried However, w documentation or otherwise, is irrelevant. By the terms of the facility letter read with the facility agreement, in particular clause 14.1 of the facility agreement, D remained at liberty to decide whether or not to make or continue to make available the facility at its own discretion. Clause 14.1 of the facility agreement further provides that nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to impose on D any obligation to make or continue to make available the facility. Surely documentation. The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is contractual, not fiduciary

By paragraph 24 to 24.3 of the statement of claim, P suggests that the submissions of documentation by P to D signified that D must exercise facility. Here, it bears reiterating that clause 14.1 of the facility agreement provides that nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to impose on D any obligation to make or continue to make available the facility, and this must include

By an email dated 7.4.2023, D informed P that the facility may be made available within two working days. In this regard :

By paragraph 9 of the statement of claim, P alleges that upon aging l borrowing base certificate, D represented to P that upon the original borrowing base certificate being received, D shall release the funding within two working days. However, no particulars were pleaded as to how the alleged representation was made, or who made the alleged representation on behalf of D, and to whom the alleged representation was made.

s to be rel dated 7.4. that the funds shall be released within two working days upon receipt of the original borrowing base certificate. The basis of the alleged representation was indeed narrowed down during the cross - dated 7.4.2023.

On that basis, if indeed there was such a representation, by borrowing base certificate was delivered to D on 3.4.2023. confirmation of funding disbursement by 10.4.2023. Yet, when no such confirmation of funding disbursement was forthcoming from D, there was no contemporaneous documentary evidence to indicate that P questioned the delay in funding disbursement

There was nothing to even suggest that P followed up with D on funding disbursement. None of the contemporaneous email exchanged at the of funding disbursement. Thus, an inference may be drawn that no such representation was made.

DW1 explained that ordinarily, the facility may be made available within two s email dated 7.4.2023 was merely to give an indication of timing, as DW1 clarified during re - examination that it may take shorter or longer than two working days.

In Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd v Shencourt Sdn Bhd v Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 619, the Court of Appeal explained that the relationship between D and P (in the present context) as banker and customer is contractual in nature, not fiduciary in nature. The court said (at page 713) : [290] To recapitulate the point made earlier in this judgment, the Respondents have conceded that this issue was not pleaded, and it is thus necessary to only on the law a banker - customer relationship in a lending transaction is purely contractual and not fiduciary. Murphy and another v HSBC (formerly known as the Midland Bank plc) and Another [2004] EWHC 467 is cited in support : a relationship between a banker and customer is not a fiduciary relationship ... The basic banking transaction of lending is not fiduciary in nature and so in the ordinary course of events, a bank which lends to a customer does not owe the customer a fiduciary duty. The mere fact that the claimants trusted the Bank does not give rise to a fiduciary duty when, as in the present case, first the claimants had their own paid advisers, second the claimants had freely chosen to enter into contracts of loan and insurance with the Bank when they could have gone elsewhere to obtain the services and third, the Bank were not the paid or the unpaid advisers of the claimants but merely a lender of money to them.

In Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd v Khee San Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] MLJU 1050, the High Court held that a financing bank is merely a lender, not an advisor, and its relationship with the borrower is purely contractual. The court cited the Federal Court case of Chang Yun Tai & Ors v HSBC Bank (M) Bhd and other appeals [2014] 1 MLJcon 134 (at paragraph 90) : It is also our considered view that the respondent has no duty to advise the appellants as borrowers in the present case because it is merely a financing bank and not an advisory bank. Generally speaking, in a commercial loan a lender is entitled to seek and obtain the best terms it can. It may have regard solely to its own commercial interest. It is not the lender s obligation to ensure that the borrower has made a correct or wise commercial decision based upon a full understanding of all risks unless the borrower has specifically sought the lender .

The High Court in Alliance Bank (supra) distinguished the Quincecare duty (relied upon by P) and held that it applies only in a specific context. The court said (at paragraph 98) As I had stated earlier in this judgment there are qualifications for the applicability of the Quincecare duty placed by Quincecare (supra) itself. The Quincecare duty does not apply in all situations where there is banker - customer relationship. Justice Steyn made this clear when he limited the application of the Quincecare duty to apply only to a bank acting on the with the bank or in other words, the where it pertains to money moving out of that account

The cases below cited by P are distinguishable.

P s reliance on the case of Public Bank Bhd v Exporaya Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 507 is misplaced. Exporaya concerned a bank s duty when executing a customer s mandate on a current account. The Quincecare duty which requires a bank to refrain from executing an order if put on inquiry as to possible fraud applies only in that context. It has no application to a lender s decision to terminate a facility under an express contractual clause.

agent. Clause 14.3 of the facility agreement entitled D to terminate the facility at any time upon written notice. Exporaya is of no assistance to the Plaintiff.

Likewise, the case of Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v Public Bank Bhd [2024] MLRHU 16 is also of no assistance to P. That case concerned a bank s duty in executing a customer s mandate on a current account, specifically the payment of cheques with forged signatures. Similarly, Bukit Baru Villas has no application to the present case.

I see no evidence to suggest any representation on the part of D by reason of its email dated 7.4.2023. The question of P being induced by the alleged representation does not arise. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that D s email dated 7.4.2023 did not feature prominently in P s dealings with D. There was no evidence of P supposedly waiting for or following up on the alleged confirmation of funding by D. Even when there was seemingly a delay in the disbursement of funding, there was no evidence to suggest that P questioned the delay in disbursement. Thus, the question of P having any legitimate expectation of funding disbursement or being in a fiduciary relationship with D to expect such disbursement also does not arise. The termination of the facility

Contrary to the impression which P tried to belatedly portray, there was no urgency for the funding to be disbursed at that time. There is no evidence of P questioning D on the delay in funding disbursement post -

10.4.2023. Instead, the next communication between the parties was a meeting held on 2.5.2023 between the representatives of D and P Mr. Brian Chong (the then Senior Team Manager, Business Banking KL Headquarter of D) and DW1 attended the meeting as the representatives of D. Whilst Mr. Mohd Raflee (director of P) and PW1 attended as the representatives of P. At this meeting, D notified P regarding its intention to terminate the facility.

By paragraph 14 of the statement of claim, P complains that D terminated the facility without providing any reasonable explanation to P. Nevertheless, under clause 14.3 of the facility agreement, all that was required of D to effect termination of the facility is the issuance of a written notice. With the issuance of the written notice, the facility should thereby be terminated with immediate effect. There is no obligation on the part of D to provide any reason for termination.

Notwithstanding that it was not obliged to give a reason for the termination of the facility, D did, through its representatives at the 2.5.2023 review of its business strategy and risk appetite, and that D could no nceded under cross - examination that they were given a reason; they were told that the termination of the facility

At the material time, there was no protest by P that the termination of the facility was wrongful. The call report template, being the only contemporaneous document evidencing the 2.5.2023 meeting, recorded that the client (i.e. P) expressed their disappointment, however understood that it is outside of their control. PW1 eventually conceded during cross - examination that P did not expressly protest the termination of the facility at the time. T

All that P requested for, at the time, was for reimbursement of wasted expenses incurred in preparing the documents to utilise the facility; and nothing else. P did not mention any planned projects or tenders that would be impacted by the termination of the f immediate written reaction was a follow up email to D dated 15.5.2023, approximately two weeks after the 2.5.2023 meeting. Insofar as relevant to the facility, P only requested for:- (a) notification of receivables financing status; and (b) compensation cost on legal documentation fee, the latter of which relates only to actual wasted costs.

By a notice issued to P on 31.5.2023 at 2:18 pm, D gave a prior 30 facility. By this notice, D confirmed that P has been informed of the reasons for exiting the business arrangements with P during the meeting of 2.5.2023.

Even after receipt of the notice of termination from D, P did not protest the termination of the f 31.5.2023 at 4:58 pm, was to request for compensation cost for legal and documentation costs incurred for the facility. P repeated this request on three different occasions, i.e. on 14.6.2023, 3.7.2023 and 7.8.2023. Nothing was mentioned about the termination being wrongful, or P having suffered losses as a result of the termination of the facility.

By an email dated 5.10. reimbursement amounting to RM 40,395.02. Meantime, on 26.10.2023, D refunded the service fee of RM 1,200 for the months of April to July 2023 at RM 300 per month, to P.

Approximately five months after the issuance of the notice of termination of the facility, by an email dated 25.10.2023, P mentioned, for the first time, that it has allegedly suffered losses. By this email, P also purported to withdraw the email of 31.5.2023 following receipt of the notice of termination. The losses allegedly suffered were particularised for the dated 7.12.2023 to D.

I consider that the reason why P did not object to the termination of the facility at the meeting of 2.5.2023 and after receipt of the notice of termination dated 31.5.2023, is because P was aware and accepted that by the terms governing the facility, the facility was given on an uncommitted basis. Hence, D was at liberty to terminate the facility the way it did. PW1 conceded this under cross - examination. The P regarding the termination of the facility

Although P has pleaded multiple causes of actions comprising of:- (a) breach of contract; (b) negligence; and (c) breach of fiduciary duty against D in relation to the termination of the facility, the particulars of breaches pleaded are the same. It would be convenient to deal with the composite causes of action together.

To recapitulate, by the terms and conditions governing the facility, the facility was offered to P on an uncommitted basis. It was customary overriding right of suspension and withdrawal. As such, D was at liberty to terminate the facility at any time with immediate effect upon giving a written notice of termination.

Accordingly, D was at liberty to terminate the facility at any time, and termination can be effected by an immediate written notice. termination on 31.5.2023, ample time in anticipation of the eventual withdrawal of the facility.

Whether P has indee ntation aging list and borrowing base certificate) or otherwise, is irrelevant. By the terms of the facility letter read with the facility agreement, in particular clause 14.1 of the facility agreement, D remained at liberty to decide whether or not to make or continue to make available the facility at its own discretion. Clause 14.1 of the facility agreement makes it plain that nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to impose on D any obligation to make or continue to make available the f

dated 7.4.2023 does not give rise to a representation of funding disbursement within two working days from submission of the original borrowing base certificate, supposedly leading P to expect funding disbursement by 10.4.2023. The contemporaneous documentary evidence demonstrates that P made no attempt to question the delay in funding disbursement on account of D supposedly having made such representation.

relationship, P made no such claim. The reasonable conclusion is that no such representation was made; the allegation of representation is a convenient dated 7.4.2023, at its highest, is only an indication of operational timing as to when funding may be expected.

By clause 14.3 of the facility agreement, D is at liberty to terminate the facility at any time, and termination can be effected by a written notice to P. Here, P was duly notified of the termination of the facility by a 30 .5.2023.

By clause 14.3 of the facility agreement, all that was required of D to effect termination of the facility is the issuance of a written notice. With the issuance of the written notice, the facility should thereby be terminated with immediate effect. There was no obligation on the part of D to provide any reason for termination.

Notwithstanding that, D did, through its representatives at the 2.5.2023 internal review. PW1 conceded under cross - examination that they were termination dated 31.5.2023 sets out the reasons for termination.

disbursement or being in a fiduciary relationship with D to expect such disbursement, does not arise. Such expectation or relationship as alleged by P clashes with the terms governing the facility. In particular, clause 14.1 of the facility agreement, which provides that nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to impose on D any obligation to make or continue to make available the f documentation. Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) guidelines

P made a vague plea that the termination of the facility constitutes an alleged breach of the BNM guidelines on stable financing. It was pleaded as . (See paragraph 17 of the statement of claim). However, no particulars were given by P as to the specific guideline referred to, or the date on which this guideline was made publicly available by BNM. Nor was the guideline produced in the trial bundle of documents.

While the counsel for P attempted to cross - examine DW1 on the basis of the guideline alleged, without the guideline being shown to DW1 for consideration, DW1 could not be expected to provide any helpful the alleged breach of this elusive guideline must therefore be disregarded.

In post - guidelines relating to financial conduct and fair treatment to bank customers. P, for the first time, identified a BNM policy said BNM policy document . A copy of the said BNM policy document was

As alluded to earlier, the said BNM policy document was not produced in the trial bundle of documents. It was not pleaded, thus depriving D of the opportunity to properly address the said BNM policy document at the trial. D did not have the opportunity to explain its adherence (or otherwise) to the said BNM policy document. reference to the said BNM policy document must therefore be disregarded.

Even if I were to consider the said BNM policy document selective reference to the said BNM policy document is inaccurate. First of all, the said BNM policy document , within the meaning of the said BNM policy document. Clause person who uses the financial service or the meaning of the said BNM policy document. P is not an individual using Hence, the said BNM policy document is not applicable to P.

Next, P refers to clause 13.1 of the said BNM policy document to the effect that a financial service provider is obliged to act honestly, fairly and professionally having regard to the interests of financial consumers that the staff and representatives of a financial service provider ought to carry out their duties with due care, skill and diligence . Nevertheless, that must be read with clause 13.3 of the said BNM policy document, which requires that the staff and representatives of a financial service do not recklessly, negligently or deliberately mislead financial consumers. email dated 7.4.2023 was an operational indication of timing, not a reckless or deliberate misrepresentation. PW1 admitted that he did not follow up in writing after 10.4.2023. If he genuinely believed it was a binding promise, he would have done so.

Finally, the question of the facility agreement being unfair within the meaning of the said BNM policy document does not arise. Appendix 4 of the said BNM policy d Here, D s termination right under clause 14.3 of the facility agreement does not fall within any of those examples. Crucially, P was aware that the facility was given on an uncommitted basis. In terminating the facility, D has duly given notice of termination to P. Despite not being required to provide a reason, D has indeed explained the basis of the termination of the facility to P.

To sum up, by the terms governing the facility, the facility was granted on an uncommitted basis. D had an overriding right of suspension and withdrawal of the facility at any time. As such, D was at liberty to withdraw the facility in the manner that it did. No liability should attach to D for withdrawing the facility in accordance with the terms of the facility agreement. The CCRIS entry

I move on to the next entry. After the notice of termination of the facility dated 31.5.2023 was issued, by an email dated 1.6. e from the CCRIS. By an email dated 13.7.2023 issued by DW1 to PW1, DW1 confirmed that the facility had been cancelled internally and removed from the CCRIS reporting as at 12.7.2023.

This is corroborated by to the CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) system as at 13.7.2023, D has updated the CCRIS and reflected the facility as having been DW2 is the Chief Control Officer & Business Regulatory Risk Lead of D. He oversees the daily operations of the team managing the upload of the CCRIS information via the CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) system. The P regarding the CCRIS entry

By paragraph 19.5 of the statement of claim, the pleaded claim against D was simply the CCRIS two months after the termination of the facility. No exact date was pleaded by P. It is apparent that only the timing of the removal of the CCRIS entry was in issue, as opposed to the fact of removal itself. As the the CCRIS was not in issue, in defence, D took the position that the credit information was correctly reflected in the CCRIS as having nil or zero outstanding amount / utilisation.

Paragraph 19.5 of statement of claim reads : The Defendant was wrongful, negligent and failed when it only removed the Plaintiff s name from the CCRIS Report approximately two (2) months after the financing of the facility was unilaterally terminated by the Defendant.

At paragraph 21 of statement of claim, P again accepted that its data has been removed from the CCRIS : updated after the Plaintiff submitted a notice to the Defendant to remove it from the said list.

In defence, the Defendant responded as follows at paragraph 13 of the statement of defence : With specific reference to paragraph 19.5 and 21 of the Amended Statement of Claim, the Defendant s report in the Central Credit Reference Information / th June 2023, i.e. the date

By paragraph 15 of the Reply, P claimed that its credit limit under the facility as reflected in the Credit Tip - Off Service (CTOS) as at 17.7.2024 / utilisation. At the trial, no such CTOS report of 17.7.2024 was adduced. P was relying on the CTOS report of 17.7.2023.

Be that as it may, the line of questioning taken by the counsel for P during the cross - alleged failure to call the relevant officer handling the removal of credit information from the CCRIS. A e relevant CCRIS entry showing facility was removed from the CCRIS.

the CCRIS two months after the termination of the facility, the fact of removal should no longer be an issue. As such, the question of D having to prove the exact the CCRIS does not arise.

In Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152 at 154, the Supreme Court cited : The court is not entitled to decide a suit on a matter on which no issue has been raised by the parties. It is not the duty of the court to make out a case for one of the parties when the party concerned does not raise or wish to raise the point. In disposing of a suit or matter involving an disputed question of fact, it is not proper for the court to displace the case made by a party in its pleadings and give effect to an entirely new case which a party has not made out in its own pleadings. The trial of a suit should be confined to the pleas which the parties are at variance.

limit under the facility from the CCRIS, it should be assessed on the basis that D only removed the credit data two months after the termination of the f , without reference to P and the facility. The question of requiring D to establish the exact timing of removal does not arise.

In any event, there was no such delay as alleged. DW1 confirmed that he informed PW1 on 13.7.2023 that the facility had been cancelled. T which reflected that D has updated the status of the f the CCRIS.

The only document produced by P for this claim is the CTOS report dated 17.7.2023. But that is of no assistance to P to prove the timing of the the CCRIS. The CTOS report is not the same as the CCRIS report, in that the latter is a database managed by BNM. P is at liberty to take steps to secure such evidence if it was so minded, but none was taken.

All that the CTOS report showed, insofar as the facility is concerned, was that P had a facility of RM 12 million, in respect of which there was zero outstanding / utilisation. No evidence of CTOS reports between July and December 2023 was produced by P. Certainly, by December 2023, entry relating to the facility was removed.

Since the burden of proof is on P to prove alleged delay or inaccuracy in the CCRIS data, the question of requiring D to produce any officer or documents to that effect does not arise. DW2 explained that CCRIS extractions are generally performed as and when necessary. There was no necessity then requiring further CCRIS checks on P, given that the facility has been terminated.

the CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) system accessed by D, as a reporting financial institution which reports credit information to the CCRIS. D adduced two credit reports of 13.7.2023 and 27.12.2023, respectively, extracted from the CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) system. The CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) credit report of 13.7.2023 correctly reflected the facility as having zero outstanding / utilisation. Certainly by 27.12.2023, the facility was no longer reflected in the CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) system.

CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) system, which reflected D having updated the status of the f .7.2023, meaning the facility has been settled. The status of the facility as reflected in the CCRIS was consistent with the status of the f informed PW1 on 13.7.2023 that the facility has been cancelled from the

Thus, as at 12.7.2023 and 13.7.2023 or if reference is to be made to .7.2023, the status of the facility in the CCRIS was correctly reflected as having zero outstanding / utilisation. The question of attaching any liability to D in relation to the CCRIS entry does not arise. No loss proven

In the circumstances, I find :- (a) alleged wrongful termination of the facility; or (b) the CCRIS entry, cannot be sustained. The issue of whether P suffered any loss therefore does not arise. Nevertheless for completeness, it is my finding that even if liability P has not proven damages.

In the seminal case of Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 15 at 20, the Federal Court set out this principle : arise for decision, there are three preliminary matters which, at the outset, require emphasis. Firstly, that part of the judgment of the judge which provides that the vendor shall pay to the purchaser damages to be assessed for wrongful termination of the agreement with costs and that Tan Sri Khoo and the vendor shall pay to the purchaser damages to be assessed for breaches of the undertakings, even though affirmed on appeal, can in no way relieve the purchaser of satisfying the fundamental requirement of having to prove its loss (if any) arising from those breaches. To hold otherwise would amount to dispensing with proof of quantum altogether, and that cannot be the law. In so saying, we are reminded of the words of Lord Goddard in Bonham - Carter v Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 at p 178 : if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying : This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages . They have to prove it. This dictum was referred to and applied by our Court of Appeal in John v Dharmaratnam [1962] MLJ 187. And, in Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360, the court had occasion to say this (at p 367) : It is axiomatic that a plaintiff seeking substantial damages has the burden of proving both the fact and the amount of damages before he can recover. If he proves neither, the action will fail or he may be awarded only nominal damages upon proof of the contravention of a right. Thus nominal damages may be awarded in all cases of breach of contract And, where damage is shown but its amount is not proved sufficiently or at all, the court will usually decree nominal damages.

In similar vein, the Court of Appeal in Ban Chuan Trading Co Sdn Bhd v Ng Bak Guan [2004] 1 MLJ 411 stressed that a plaintiff must prove

the fact that it suffered loss and (b) the amount of losses suffered, before the court can consider an award of damages. The court said (at page 417) : [10] The burden of proving the damages is always on the parties claiming the damages. In Tan Geok Khoon & Gerard Francis Robless v Paya Terubong Estate Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 672 at p 680, Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he was then) said : This brings to my mind the famous words of Lord Goddard in Bonham - Carter v Hyde Park Hotel (1948) 64 TLR 177 : for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars and, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: This is what I have lost, I ask you to gi Thus, in Ashcroft v Curtin [1971] 1 WLR 1731, a plaintiff claiming for diminution in the profits of his one man business could not succeed in this claim though the evidence pointed to a decrease in profitability which was due to the injury , the records kept being too rudimentary and the accounts too unreliable to quantify the loss.

P alleges facility and consequently, refusal in funding disbursement, P had difficulty securing funding from other financial institutions, and to proceed with its contracts and tenders, and to proceed with the purchase of materials and goods. Nonetheless, facility and the manner in which the CCRIS entry was reflected, caused the loss alleged.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ngan Siong Hing v RHB Bank Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 449 at 486 captured the explanation of the as follows : [38] but for test plays an important part. In the recent case of Chua Seng Sam Realty Sdn Bhd v Say Chong Sdn Bhd & Ors and other appeals [2013] 2 MLJ 29, the Court of Appeal on but for test made the following observation : [44] In this regard, the but for test is important in determining whether or not the defendants act was the main factor causing the damage suffered by the plaintiffs. The text in para 2 - 09 in Clerk & Lindsell states that : The first step in establishing a causation is to eliminate irrelevant causes, and this is the purpose of the but for test. The courts are concerned, not to identify all of the possible causes of the particular incident, but with the effective cause of the resulting damage in order to assign responsibility to that damage. The but for test asks : would the damage of which the claimant complains have occurred but for the negligence (or other wrongdoing) of the defendant?

Here, there is no evidence adduced by P that there was any urgency or necessity for the funding to be disbursed at the material time, whether for the projects and tenders or the purchase of materials and goods, and consequently, the impact on P as alleged. It is not open to P to say that it need not show any of the documents relating to its alleged losses, as D supposedly should be aware of them as they were submitted to D prior to the grant of the facility. It is irrelevant whether these documents were submitted to D at the time P applied for the facility or whether D should s projects and tenders at that time, both of which in any event were denied by D.

P did not question D on the delay in funding disbursement post -

10.4.2023. The next documented substantive communication between the parties was the meeting of 2.5.2023, where D informed P of its decision to terminate the facility.

All that P requested for at the time was for reimbursement towards wasted expenses incurred in preparing the documents to utilise the facility; and nothing else. P did not mention any planned projects or tenders, that would supposedly be impacted by the termination of the facility. Nothing was mentioned about materials and goods requiring immediate purchase.

dated 15.5.2023, approximately two weeks after the 2.5.2023 meeting. Insofar as they are relevant to the facility, where P only requested for:- (a) notification of receivables financing status; and (b) compensation cost on legal documentation fee, the latter of which relates only to actual wasted costs.

Crucially, P has not adduced any such contracts and tenders or evidence of materials and goods needed, to enable the court to make any assessment. In the absence of such evidence, either P did not have such contracts and tenders or require any materials and goods, that necessitated funding at the material time. Or and tenders or purchasing of materials and goods at the material time.

profits seems to be predicated upon pre - planned projects and tenders. In the absence of any evidence of such pre - planned projects and tenders, it must follow that there is no basis for the claim for loss of profits.

No evidence was adduced by P that it had any difficulty in securing funding at the material time. There is no evidence of P other financial institutions for any borrowing at the material time, or why these applications as alleged were delayed or refused by these financial institutions.

On the contrary, the evidence reveals that P has no difficulty securing funding from other financial Straight Through Processing (STP) extract as at 27.12.2023 showed, under the section of that P had on 17.10.2023 taken five loan facilities from other commercial banks, 95 million; far in excess of the facility of RM 12 million granted by D to P.

In the face of Straight Through Processing (STP) extract of 27.12.2023 was put to PW1 during cross - examination, he eventually conceded that P obtained funding to the tune of RM 69.5 million as at December 2023.

I allegation that its ability to procure funding was adversely impacted by the manner in which the facility was reflected in the CCRIS, I refer to the Court of Appeal case of CTOS Data Systems Sdn Bhd v Suriati bt Mohd Yusof [2024] 5 MLJ 811 at 835, which held : [70] Notwithstanding, even assuming that there was an implied reference to it, we find that there was no breach of any statutory duty at all. There was also no connection proven between the rejection of her car loan application and the contents of the credit report. Furthermore, the plaintiff had also admitted in cross - examination that there was no evidence of any rejection by banks of facilities having been applied. This can be seen from the oral evidence given by her in court.

on and secondly, the CCRIS data as at 12.7.2023 and 13.7.2023 in fact reflects zero outstanding / utilisation of the facility. This is substantiated by:- (a) the CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) credit report extracted by D on 13.7.2023; and (b) the Experien report extracted by D on 12.7.2023. The CCRIS data reflects P as having zero amount outstanding to D; the credit limit as granted was therefore not utilised.

DW2 testified that the information provided in the CCRIS database is only one part of the entire lending decision process and could be viewed differently by financial institutions. DW2 explained that generally speaking, different financial institutions have different lending policies and risk appetite. In other words, the information provided in the CCRIS database is only to help the participating financial institutions to make more informed lending decisions. Ultimately, it is the financial institution that makes the final decision on whether to approve a loan application depending on the with the fact that P was able to secure financing after all, to the tune of RM 96 million as at December 2023.

There must be causal connection between the alleged delay or rejection of funding from other financial institutions, to the contents of the CCRIS / CTOS reports. None was proven. P was not even in a position to prove any error in the CCRIS / CTOS reports. The facility was correctly identified as having zero outstanding / utilisation.

In the premises, there is no evidence of P having suffered any loss or aging list and borrowing base certificates. Those are self - serving and insufficient for the purposes of proving:- (a) the fact of damage; and (b) the quantum of damage.

I end this discussion concerning damages with an observation. I observe that or damages is largely reliant on the oral evidence of PW1, whose testimony of alleged losses is not supported by any contemporaneous documents. PW1 has been shown to have the tendency to be reluctant in confirming factual positions favourable to D, despite the existence of contemporaneous documents favourable to D and the absence of supporting contemporaneous documents favourable to P. As the Financial Controller of P, PW1 can be presumed to be

The Federal Court in Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co. [1979] 2 MLJ 229 at 234 emphasised the importance of relying on contemporaneous documents, as opposed to oral testimony of witnesses. The court explained that it is safer to refer to and rely on the acts and deeds of a witness which are contemporaneous with the event and to draw the reasonable inferences from them, subsequent recollection or version of it, particularly if he is a witness with a purpose of his own to serve and if it did not account for the statements in his documents and writings. The court emphasised that judicial reception of evidence required that the oral evidence be critically tested against the whole of the other evidence and the circumstances of the case, and plausibility should never be mistaken for veracity.

The court when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness must test it against relevant criteria. Thus, the court must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. The court must test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. (See the Court of Appeal decision in Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng v Gan Yook Chin [2003] 2 MLJ 97 at 116).

In Tan Cheng Hock v Chan Thean Soo & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 479, the High Court cautioned against relying solely on the demeanour of witnesses when making a finding on the credibility of the witnesses. The court said (at pages 479 - 480) : It may be well to remember what was said by Lord Wright and often quoted from his judgment in Powell & Wife v Streathem Manor Housing Home of the possibility of judges being deceived by adroit or plausible knaves or by apparent innocence. Much to the same effect though in more illustrative terms, is what 9) at page 63 and which I now reproduce : gives to the judge to tell from the demeanour of the witness whether or not he is telling the truth. I think that this is over - rate entirety (this being the highest form of judicial concurrence) the words of Mr Justice MacKenna I question whether the respect given to our findings of fact based on the demeanour of the witness is always deserved. I doubt my own ability and sometimes that of other judges, whether he is telling the truth. He speaks hesitatingly. Is that the mark of a cautions man, whose statements are for that reason to be respected or is he taking his time to fabricate? Is the emphatic witness putting an act to deceive me, or is he speaking from the fullness of his heart, knowing that he is right? Is he likely to be more truthful if he looks at me straight in the face than if he casts his eyes on the ground perhaps from shyness or a natural timidity? For my part I rely on these considerations as little as I can

The Federal Court in Muniandy & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 257 at 258 referred to the judgment of the House of Lords in Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 at 19 to the following effect : The most experienced judge may, albeit rarely, be deceived by a clever liar, or led to form an unfavourable opinion of an honest witness, and may express his view that his demeanour was excellent or bad as the case may be. Most experienced counsel can, I have no doubt, recall at least one case where this has happened to their knowledge. I may further point out that an impression as to the demeanour of a witness ought not be adopted by a trial judge without testing it against the whole of the evidence of the witness in question.

In conclusion :

In respect of the claim for alleged wrongful termination of the facility, the facility was offered to P on an uncommitted basis and withdrawal. D was entitled to terminate the facility and did duly terminate the facility by a notice of termination dated 31.5.2023.

CCRIS two months after the termination of the facility. Hence the not be an issue.

P later claimed by way of Reply that its credit limit under the facility as reflected in the Credit Tip - Off Service (CTOS) as at 17.7.2023 was supposedly inconsistent wit position of zero outstanding / misconstrued the CTOS report it is seeking to rely on and secondly, the CCRIS data as at 12.7.2023 and 13.7.2023 in fact reflects zero outstanding / utilisation of the facility.

This is substantiated by:- (a) the CCRIS Straight Through Processing (STP) credit report extracted by D on 13.7.2023; and

the Experien report extracted by D on 12.7.2023. The CCRIS data reflects P as having zero amount outstanding to D; the credit limit as granted was therefore not utilised.

There is therefore no basis in law and in fact for damages to be awarded to P.

For the reasons above, I dismissed I awarded costs of RM 50,000 to D. Dated 5 May 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2) Counsels Dato Jasbeer Singh Kaura, Noor Syakirah binti Khalil and Adieba Aqiela (Messrs. Jasbeer Nur & Lee) for the Plaintiff Lai Wai Fong, Kate Yong Weng Kei, Charmaine Chin Min Ying and Haseena Kaur (Messrs. Shearn Delamore & Co.) for the Defendant Case reference 1. SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 464 2. Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v M - Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 MLJ 597 3. Majlis Agama Islam Selangor & Anor v Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd [2021] 6 MLJ 301 4. Aseambankers Malaysia Bhd v Shencourt Sdn Bhd v Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 619 5. Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd v Khee San Food Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] MLJU 1050 6. Chang Yun Tai & Ors v HSBC Bank (M) Bhd and other appeals [2014] 1 MLJcon 134 7. Public Bank Bhd v Exporaya Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 507 8. Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v Public Bank Bhd [2024] MLRHU 16 9.

Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152 Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 CLJ 15

Ban Chuan Trading Co Sdn Bhd v Ng Bak Guan [2004] 1 MLJ 411

Ngan Siong Hing v RHB Bank Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 449

CTOS Data Systems Sdn Bhd v Suriati bt Mohd Yusof [2024] 5 MLJ 811

Tindok Besar Estate Sdn Bhd v Tinjar Co. [1979] 2 MLJ 229

Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng v Gan Yook Chin [2003] 2 MLJ 97

Tan Cheng Hock v Chan Thean Soo & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 479

Muniandy & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1966] 1 MLJ 257

Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15