Boilermaster Sdn Bhd v Tandex Chemicals Sdn Bhd (WA-22NCvC-688-12/2025)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR CIVIL SUIT NO: WA-22NCvC-688-12/2025 BETWEEN BOILERMASTER SDN BHD ...PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO.:199401042406 (328094-A)) AND TANDEX CHEMICALS SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.:198601000718(149859-A)) ... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Striking-Out Application-Enclosure 7) Introduction

1. This is the Defendant's application under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a)-(d) and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 to strike out the Plaintiff's action. The Plaintiff seeks, through this writ action, to impeach an adjudication decision, nullify an enforcement order, and pursue a catalogue of damages.

2. As the Plaintiff itself pleads, the suit is an attempt to revisit the adjudication decision dated 26.12.2024 and the consequences flowing from it. As stated in the uploaded document, "This application... invites the Court to consider whether the Plaintiff's claim... is one that the law permits to proceed, or whether it is, in truth, a structure erected on foundations already occupied, litigated, and exhausted."

3. The Defendant contends that the Plaintiff's action is res judicata, duplicative and a misuse of the Court's process, given the existence of an earlier Sessions Court suit (BLA52-NCC-7304/2025) involving the same parties, the same adjudication decision, and substantially the same reliefs.

4. The Plaintiff resists, asserting that the causes of action differ, that the adjudication decision was tainted by jurisdictional error and that the High Court retains supervisory authority notwithstanding parallel proceedings.

5. The central question is whether this Court should permit a proceeding that, on close inspection, fractures the unity of litigation into multiple suits, each seeking a second or third bite at the same cherry. Background Facts

6. The Plaintiff engaged the Defendant under two Purchase Orders: (a) 21.10.2019-OSBL steam-blowing works (RM180,000.00); (b) 27.01.2022-ISBL steam-blowing works (RM151,200.00).

7. The OSBL works were carried out between 05.11.2021 and 05.12.2021 and were fully settled, with the final payment made on 29.04.2024. The ISBL works were undertaken in April 2022, completed on 08.09.2022, and were fully prepaid prior to commencement.

8. On 07.05.2024, the Defendant commenced CIPAA Adjudication No. AIAC/D/ADJ-5508-2024, claiming RM3,340,000.00 as standby charges. On 26.12.2024, the Adjudicator awarded the Defendant RM3,308,000.00 together with costs.

9. On 22.04.2025, the Plaintiff filed Suit 73 in the Sessions Court seeking, inter alia, declarations relating to the validity of the adjudication decision and damages arising from the same project.

10. On 23.04.2025, the Defendant applied in the High Court to enforce the adjudication decision under s.28 CIPAA. The Plaintiff filed a stay application under s.16 CIPAA on 24.06.2025.

11. On 04.11.2025, the High Court allowed the enforcement application and dismissed the stay application. The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on 06.11.2025.

12. Notwithstanding the pending appeal and Suit 73, the Plaintiff commenced the present action on 02.12.2025, again seeking to impeach the same adjudication decision and claiming damages arising from the same factual matrix.

13. On 15.01.2026, the Defendant filed the present striking-out application. On 16.01.2026, the Plaintiff filed an application to consolidate Suit 73 with this suit. Case management directions were issued on 26.01.2026, with hearing fixed for 30.03.2026. The Issues

14. The Defendant's striking-out application raises four issues:

1. Whether the present claim is res judicata.

2. Whether the action constitutes a multiplicity of proceedings and an abuse of process.

3. Whether the pleadings disclose a reasonable cause of action.

4. Whether the Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to prevent misuse of process. Analysis Res Judicata

15. Having examined the pleadings in Suit 73 and Suit 688, it is evident that both actions involve the same parties, arise from the same adjudication decision dated 26.12.2024, and seek substantially overlapping declaratory reliefs.

16. In Suit 73, the Plaintiff expressly seeks a declaration that the adjudication decision is "invalid" and invites the Sessions Court to determine the parties' rights afresh.

17. In the present Suit 688, the Plaintiff seeks the very same outcome, namely, a declaration that the adjudication decision is "null and void" albeit framed under the rubric of "jurisdictional error" and "lack of core jurisdiction". The distinction is one of form, not substance.

18. As the Court of Appeal held in Penang Port Commission v Kanawagi [2009] 1 CLJ 169, the Court must look to the true nature and effect of the reliefs sought, and not merely the linguistic packaging in which they are presented.

19. The Plaintiff contends that Suit 688 raises "jurisdictional errors" which were not raised in Suit 73. This argument is untenable.

20. The Supreme Court in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783 made clear that res judicata extends not only to matters actually litigated, but also to matters which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the party, exercising reasonable diligence, could and should have raised earlier.

21. This principle is further reinforced by the classic formulation in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, where a party is barred from raising in subsequent proceedings matters that could have been brought forward in the earlier action, and that failure to do so whether by negligence, inadvertence, or tactical choice does not entitle the party to a second opportunity.

22. The Plaintiff's own conduct further undermines its position. In the Plaintiff's application for transfer and consolidation (OS No. WA-24NCvC-390-01/2026), the Plaintiff expressly asserts that Suit 73 and Suit 688 share common issues of fact and law and ought to be heard together. This is a tacit admission that the suits overlap in substance.

23. As the Court of Appeal observed in Frankey Leong Pit Fui v Foong Da Realty Sdn Bhd [2020] CLJU 2212, emphasise that a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate—asserting in one forum that two suits are identical for consolidation purposes, while simultaneously asserting in another forum that they are distinct to avoid the bar of res judicata.

24. In the circumstances, the present action is barred by cause of action estoppel, because the Plaintiff seeks to challenge the same adjudication decision on grounds that arise from the same factual matrix and the same alleged wrong. It is also barred by issue estoppel, because the validity of the adjudication decision is already directly in issue in Suit 73.

25. Finally, the action is barred by the extended Henderson doctrine because the Plaintiff could and should have raised all jurisdictional objections in Suit 73, and its failure to do so cannot justify a second suit.

26. The High Court in Daewoo Corporation v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (No.2) [1999] 7 CLJ 23 applied this very principle in striking out a subsequent suit where the plaintiff attempted to raise issues that could have been ventilated in earlier proceedings.

27. Accordingly, Suit 688 constitutes a textbook example of the mischief that the doctrines of res judicata and Henderson abuse are designed to prevent, namely, the fragmentation of litigation, the re-litigation of issues in multiple forums and the pursuit of a second bite at the cherry after electing not to raise all relevant matters in the first suit. Multiplicity of Proceedings and Abuse of Process

28. The present action also falls squarely within the doctrine prohibiting multiplicity of proceedings, which is a distinct but related facet of the Court's supervisory jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process.

29. The Plaintiff has commenced two separate suits, Suit 73 in the Sessions Court and Suit 688 in this Court and both of which challenge the same adjudication decision dated 26.12.2024, arise from the same factual matrix, and seek substantially overlapping declaratory reliefs. The maintenance of parallel proceedings on identical subject matter is not merely procedurally inefficient; it is legally impermissible.

30. The Court of Appeal in Penang Port Commission v Kanawagi s/o Seperumaniam [2009] 1 CLJ 169 emphasised that where a litigant initiates a second proceeding that traverses the same issues already placed before another court, such conduct constitutes a misuse of the Court's process, as it risks inconsistent findings and undermines the orderly administration of justice. The Court emphasised that litigants are not permitted to "pre-empt" or "circumvent" issues pending in another forum by commencing a parallel action.

31. A multiplicity of proceedings arises where two suits involve the same parties, the same subject matter, and the same issues. Such duplication is inherently abusive, for it invites inconsistent outcomes and undermines the orderly administration of justice. See: Hondaafushi Investments Pvt Ltd v EXIM Bank Malaysia Bhd [2023] 10 CLJ 955

32. The Court stressed that the rule against multiplicity is grounded in public interest: judicial resources must not be squandered on duplicative litigation, and parties must not be subjected to the burden of defending the same allegations in multiple forums.

33. The mischief identified in these authorities is precisely what has occurred here. Suit 73 challenges the adjudication decision and seeks a declaration that it is invalid. Suit 688 challenges the same adjudication decision and seeks a declaration that it is null and void.

34. The Plaintiff's attempt to maintain both suits simultaneously is not merely inefficient; it is abusive, as it forces the Defendant to defend the same challenge twice, in two courts, under two procedural regimes.

35. The Plaintiff's own conduct further reinforces the conclusion that the suits overlap. In the Plaintiff's application for transfer and consolidation (OS No. WA-24NCvC-390-01/2026), the Plaintiff expressly asserts that Suit 73 and Suit 688 share common issues of fact and law and ought to be heard together. This is a tacit admission that the suits are duplicative.

36. As the Court of Appeal observed in Frankey Leong Pit Fui v Foong Da Realty Sdn Bhd [2020] CLJU 2212, a litigant cannot approbate and reprobate—asserting in one breath that two suits are identical for consolidation purposes, while in the next breath asserting that they are distinct to avoid the consequences of multiplicity.

37. The High Court in Stesyen Minyak Kuala Nerus Sdn Bhd v Khairul Anuar Muda [2019] 8 CLJ 547 struck out a subsequent suit where the issues raised were "no more than a repetition, in thinly veiled new guise" of issues already pending in earlier proceedings.

38. The same reasoning applies here: Suit 688 is, in substance, a second attempt to challenge the adjudication decision already placed before the Sessions Court in Suit 73.

39. The Court of Appeal in Srijang Indah Sdn Bhd v Royel Departmental Stores Sdn Bhd [2023] CLJU 545 further held that litigants must not pursue two suits in parallel on the same subject matter, and must elect between them. The Plaintiff has not withdrawn Suit 73, nor has it confined its challenge to that forum. Instead, it seeks to run both suits concurrently, thereby engaging the very mischief the doctrine seeks to prevent.

40. In light of these authorities, the present action constitutes a clear abuse of process. The Plaintiff is attempting to litigate the same challenge in two courts simultaneously, thereby fragmenting the dispute, multiplying proceedings and exposing the Defendant to duplicative litigation.

41. The Court's inherent jurisdiction under Order 92 rule 4 ROC 2012 must therefore be invoked to prevent misuse of its process and to uphold the integrity of judicial proceedings. Whether the Plaintiff's Pleadings Disclose a Reasonable Cause of Action

42. The Plaintiff's claim is fundamentally defective because it seeks to impeach an adjudication decision through a writ action, a procedural route wholly unknown to the statutory framework governing adjudication under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA").

43. The Plaintiff invites this Court to declare the adjudication decision "null and void" and to revisit the merits of the adjudicator's findings. Such relief is not cognisable in a writ action. Challenges to adjudication decisions must be brought only through the mechanisms expressly provided by CIPAA, not through collateral suits.

44. The Federal Court in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 made clear that an adjudication decision is binding unless and until it is set aside through the statutory avenues provided under CIPAA. These avenues are limited and exclusive: - an application to stay the adjudication decision under s.16 CIPAA; - an application to set aside the enforcement order under s.28 CIPAA; or - in exceptional circumstances, judicial review.

45. A writ action is not among the recognised mechanisms. The Plaintiff's attempt to create a new procedural pathway is, in legal terms, a structural impossibility akin to carving a door into a load-bearing wall. The architecture of CIPAA does not permit such an opening and the Court cannot allow litigants to invent procedural routes that the statute does not contemplate.

46. The Plaintiff's approach is improper. Where Parliament has prescribed a specific statutory avenue for challenging a decision, that mechanism must be invoked and followed with precision. A party cannot sidestep the statutory scheme by launching collateral proceedings. A writ action in such circumstances is not merely irregular—it is legally impermissible. See: Daewoo Corporation v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (No.2) (supra)

47. The Plaintiff's claim for damages arising from the adjudication decision is equally unsustainable. CIPAA adjudication is not a tortious wrong, nor does it give rise to a cause of action for damages. The Plaintiff's attempt to frame the adjudicator's alleged jurisdictional error as a basis for monetary compensation is legally incoherent.

48. As the Supreme Court held in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, a pleading must disclose a cause of action recognised by law; where it does not, it is liable to be struck out under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a).

49. The Plaintiff's pleadings therefore fail at the threshold. They do not disclose any cause of action known to law, they seek reliefs that cannot be granted in a writ action and they attempt to circumvent the statutory framework governing adjudication challenges. The defects are not mere technicalities; they are foundational, and no amendment can cure them.

50. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff's action falls squarely within the category of cases contemplated in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7, where the Supreme Court held that pleadings which are "obviously unsustainable" must be struck out at an early stage to prevent unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources.

51. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action, and the action is liable to be struck out under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a). Whether the Court Should Invoke Its Inherent Jurisdiction

52. Even if the matter did not fall squarely within the express limbs of Order 18 rule 19(1), the Court's inherent jurisdiction under Order 92 rule 4 would nevertheless be engaged. That provision preserves the Court's residual power to prevent its procedures from being used in a manner that is oppressive, duplicative or otherwise inconsistent with the proper administration of justice. The jurisdiction is not ornamental; it exists to ensure that the Court's processes are not distorted into instruments of unfairness. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court is a "deep-rooted and essential power" enabling the Court to prevent misuse of its machinery.

53. The Plaintiff's conduct in the present case commencing duplicative suits, seeking overlapping declaratory reliefs, and raising in Suit 688 issues that could and should have been raised in Suit 73—falls squarely within the category of conduct that engages this jurisdiction.

54. As the Court of Appeal observed in Srijang Indah Sdn Bhd v Royel Departmental Stores Sdn Bhd [2023] CLJU 545, litigants cannot maintain parallel suits on the same subject matter and must elect their forum; to do otherwise is to invite conflicting findings and to burden the opposing party with repetitive litigation.

55. Where a subsequent suit is "no more than a repetition, in thinly veiled new guise" of issues already pending in another court, the Court must intervene to prevent its process from being misused. See: Stesyen Minyak Kuala Nerus Sdn Bhd v Khairul Anuar Muda [2019] 8 CLJ 547

56. The Plaintiff's present suit is precisely such a repetition: Suit 73 already challenges the adjudication decision; Suit 688 seeks to challenge the same decision again, merely dressed in the language of "jurisdictional error".

57. The Plaintiff's own application for consolidation further underscores the overlap. A party does not seek consolidation of suits that are genuinely distinct. Consolidation is sought only where the suits share common issues of fact and law. The Plaintiff's application is therefore a tacit admission that the suits traverse the same terrain.

58. The cumulative effect of the Plaintiff's conduct fragmenting its challenge into two suits, duplicating reliefs and attempting to litigate in instalment constitutes a misuse of the Court's process. The Court's inherent jurisdiction exists precisely to prevent such procedural manoeuvres from undermining the integrity of the judicial system.

59. In the circumstances, even if the matter did not fall within the strict confines of res judicata or the express limbs of Order 18 rule 19, the Court would be compelled to act under Order 92 rule 4 to prevent its process from being used in a manner that is duplicative, oppressive, and contrary to the orderly administration of justice. Conclusion

60. In the architecture of justice, every proceeding is a structure erected upon foundations of coherence, discipline and finality. Courts are not open plains upon which litigants may construct endless annexes, extensions and parallel corridors in the hope that one pathway may eventually lead to a favourable outcome. They are, instead, carefully designed edifices each doorway purposeful, each staircase leading to a defined destination, each chamber intended for a singular deliberative function.

61. The Plaintiff's litigation strategy in this matter has strained that architecture. By erecting two suits upon the same factual foundation, seeking the same declaratory reliefs and traversing the same terrain under different labels, the Plaintiff has attempted to build parallel staircases to the same landing. Such duplication does not merely clutter the judicial blueprint; it threatens the structural integrity of the entire edifice.

62. The doctrines of res judicata, multiplicity and abuse of process are not technicalities. They are the load-bearing beams that preserve the stability of the judicial structure. Without them, litigation would sprawl without boundary, corridors would loop endlessly and the architecture of justice would collapse under the weight of repetition and inconsistency.

63. The Court's inherent jurisdiction exists as the master key to this structure an authority invoked not frequently, but necessarily, to close doors that ought never to have been opened and to prevent the construction of chambers that the law does not permit. It is a jurisdiction exercised not to deny justice, but to preserve it.

64. In this case, the Plaintiff's attempt to reopen, reframe and re-litigate the same challenge in multiple suits cannot be permitted. The judicial building must remain coherent. Its corridors must not be duplicated. Its foundations must not be undermined by piecemeal litigation. Litigation, like architecture, must have an end. This is that end. Orders

65. Upon reading the Defendant's Notice of Application dated 15 January 2026 (Enclosure 7), the affidavits filed herein, the written and oral submissions of learned counsel for the parties, and upon due consideration of the applicable law, it is hereby ordered and directed that:

1. Enclosure 7 is allowed.

2. The Plaintiff's Amended Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 2 December 2025 are struck out in their entirety.

3. The Plaintiff's action is dismissed with finality.

4. Costs of RM5,000.00 are awarded to the Defendant subject to 4% allocatur. I hereby order so. Date: 14.5.2026 NIXON ANAK KENNEDY KUMBONG Judicial Commissioner High Court 4 Kuala Lumpur PARTIES For the Plaintiff: Solicitor: Cheong Yuan Rong Messrs Yuan Law Chambers B-21-06, Sunway Avila Residence 2, Jalan Seri Wangsa 2, Taman Sri Rampai, 53300 Kuala Lumpur For the Defendant: Solicitor: Dinesh Nandrajog Messrs Nandrajog 3-9-9, Tower 3, UOA Business Park, No. 1, Jalan Pengaturcara U1/51A, Seksyen U1, 40150 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan