Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd [in Receivership] v 1. Gae Technical Services Sdn Bhd (WA-12BC-16-12/2016)

GAE TECHNICAL SERVICES SDN BHD (Company No.: 95472-W)

ISYODA (M) SDN BHD (Company No.: 53013-W) … RESPONDENTS (In the matter of Civil Suit No. WA-B52C-9-01/2016 In the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur) (Company No.: 95472-W) 2 (Company No.: 53013-W) (Company No.: 616008-T) Heard together with CIVIL APPEAL NO.: WA-12BC-13-10/2016 (Company No.: 616008-T)

GAE TECHNICAL SERVICES SDN BHD (Company No.: 95472-W) 3

ISYODA (M) SDN BHD (Company No.: 53013-W) … RESPONDENTS (In the matter of Civil Suit No. WA-B52C-9-01/2016 In the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur) (Company No.: 95472-W) (Company No.: 53013-W) (Company No.: 616008-T) Heard together with CIVIL APPEAL NO. WA-12BC-8-02/2017 4 (Company No: 53013-W) (Company No: 95472-W) … RESPONDENT (In the matter of Civil Suit No. WA-B52C-9-01/2016 In the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur) (Company No: 95472-W) (Company No: 53013-W) BRAMPTON HOLDINGS SDN BHD (IN RECEIVERSHIP) (Company No: 616008-T) 5 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Three appeals were filed against the ruling/ decision of the learned Judge of the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur (‘SCJ’) in Civil Suit No. WA-B52C-9-01/2016 (‘SC Civil Suit’) arising from a dispute involving the developer, Brampton Holdings Sdn. Bhd. (‘Brampton’), the main turnkey contractor, Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd (‘Isyoda’) and the sub-contractor appointed to carry out works for the air-conditioning and ventilation system (‘ACVS’), GAE Technical Services Sdn. Bhd. (‘GAE’), for a commercial and retail development project on a “Design and Build” basis at Jalan Loke Yew, Kuala Lumpur known as ZON.e@Frase.Bix.Park. [2] By consent of the parties, these three appeals were heard together before this Court. [3] To set the tone of the approach taken in this judgment, I should, at the outset, state the following: 6

in arriving at a decision and in writing this judgment, I have been greatly assisted by the two following factors:

the comprehensive and well-argued submissions by learned counsels representing all three parties; and

(ii) the fact that these three appeals are part of a series of litigation arising from the same development project and that written judgments have been given in the previous suits involving the developer, the main contractor and other subcontractors. The said judgments are by Mary Lim J (now JCA) in Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd v Isyoda

(M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] 10 MLJ 635 and Lee Swee Seng J in Bond M & E (KL) Sdn Bhd v Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd and Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd as Third Party [2017] MLJU 376, the latter being affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 29.1.2018. It is undisputed that the appeals by Brampton (No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016) and Isyoda (No. WA-12BC-8-02/2017) involve, to borrow the words of His Lordship Lee Swee Seng in Bond’s case, the “same 7 factual substratum” as in that case and in Sigma Elevator where Bond M & E (KL) Sdn Bhd was the sub-contractor for electrical services whilst Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd was the sub-contractor for vertical transportation services;

although only Brampton has filed a Notice of Appeal on 6.7.2018 against my decision delivered on 8.6.2018, for the sake of completeness and a holistic appreciation of the issues and submissions raised in the appeals before me, the reasons for the decision in each appeal will be set out in this judgment, albeit in a condensed form for Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC- 02/2017. In consonant with the hearing of the appeals, I will first discuss the appeal filed by Brampton on the ruling or decision (whether it was indeed one or the other was one of the points of contention in the appeal) made by the learned SCJ in the midst of trial (Civil Appeal No: WA-12BC-13-10/2016), followed by the appeal after full trial at the Sessions Court filed by Brampton (Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016) and lastly, the appeal filed by Isyoda (Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-8-02/2017); and 8

for ease of reference, the parties will be referred to as ‘Brampton’, ‘Isyoda’ and ‘GAE’ in this judgment. Background facts [4] Brampton appointed Isyoda as the main contractor in respect of a project known as “Cadangan Pembangunan Enterprise Komersial Dan Perdagangan (Parcel B) Yang Mengandungi: i) ‘Retail’, ‘Supermarket’, ‘Foodcourt’ & ‘Café’, ‘Techno Centre’ Dan ‘Mega Tutorial’ Di Tingkat Sub-Basement Hingga Tingkat 7, ii) Pangsapuri Servis, iii) Hostel, iv) Tempat Letak Kereta Di Tingkat Basement Dan Sub-Basement Di Atas Sebahagian Lot 365, 262 Dan 174, Seksyen 92, Jalan Loke Yew, Kuala Lumpur – ZON.e @ FRASER.BIZ.PARK” (‘the Project’) via a Letter of Award (‘LoA’) dated 27.11.2006 and a main agreement dated 11.12.2006 consisting of three volumes of Contract Documents including the Articles of Agreement, Conditions of Contract and Contractor’s Proposals (collectively referred to as the ‘Main Agreement’). 9 [5] In turn, Isyoda appointed GAE as the sub-contractor to carry out the ACVS works via a LoA dated 7.2.2007. The specifications and the scope of works for the sub-contract were extracted from the Main Agreement and formed part of the specifications and scope of the contract between Isyoda and Brampton. [6] Disputes being inevitable, and could even be said to be the norm in the world of business and commerce with the construction industry being no exception, several disputes arose in relation to the execution of the Project. As a resolution to these disputes, Brampton and Isyoda entered into a Settlement Agreement dated 4.2.2013 (‘Settlement Agreement’). [7] The salient terms of the Settlement Agreement are as follows:

Clause 1 provides that as at the date of the Settlement Agreement, Isyoda fully, finally and forever releases, acquits and discharges Brampton and Brampton fully, finally and forever releases, acquits and discharges Isyoda in respect of all claims, obligations, and liabilities whether contractual, tortious 10 or otherwise, that any of them ever had, now has, or may have in the future have, whether known or unknown (except for any obligation arising from the Settlement Agreement) in connection with or arising from, among others, the Project;

Clause 5 provides that Isyoda assigns all its rights and benefits and remedies in, to and under the five Mechanical and Electrical (‘M&E’) Subcontracts with Enmac Sekutu Sdn Bhd, Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd, Bond M & E (KL) Sdn Bhd, GAE and Duodex Engineering & Trading Sdn Bhd to Brampton so that Brampton shall be entitled to enforce the M&E Subcontracts in Isyoda’s name and Isyoda shall, upon Brampton’s request and direction, take all necessary steps and action as permitted by law and/ or under the M&E Subcontracts to enforce its rights and remedies under the M&E Subcontracts for the benefit of Brampton;

Clause 11 provides that Brampton shall directly liaise with the M&E Subcontractors and CP Consutants Pte. Ltd. (one of the consultants appointed for the Project) with a view of rectifying 11 the defects in respect of the M&E Works of the Project and shall make direct payment to them of the sums remaining due under the M&E Subcontracts and the Consultancy Contracts which included a sum of RM1,268,402.43 due to GAE; and

Clause 12 provides that Brampton shall indemnify and save harmless Isyoda from all and any claims made by the M&E Subcontractors and CP Consultants Pte. Ltd. or any of them but the liability of Brampton in respect of those claims shall be limited to those amounts remaining due to them. [8] GAE commenced an action against Isyoda by filing the SC Civil Suit on 21.1.2016 (‘2016 Suit’) claiming for outstanding monies amounting to RM898,402.43 at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court (‘Sessions Court’). [9] Isyoda had then obtained leave from the Sessions Court to issue a Third Party Notice against Brampton for, inter alia, an order of indemnity on 30.3.2016 pursuant to Clause 12 of the Settlement Agreement. 12 [10] Brampton made a counterclaim against Isyoda on the ground that there were defects in GAE’s works and Brampton wanted to compel Isyoda to take action against GAE for those defective works. [11] It is to be noted that in August 2014, GAE had commenced civil suit No. B52NCvC-249-08/2014 (‘2014 Suit’) against Brampton alleging that Brampton was liable to pay GAE for the outstanding sums under the sub-contract. Brampton had also filed a counterclaim against GAE for defective works in the event that privity of contract was established. [12] The 2014 Suit was premised on the contents of a letter dated 16.8.2011 from Brampton to Isyoda and copied to GAE whereby Brampton had made representations that it would be making direct payments of the sums which were due and payable to the M&E Subcontractors of the Project which includes GAE. This direct payment arrangement was described by Isyoda as a “Direct Dealing and Payment Agreement” although there was no separate written agreement with such title signed between Brampton and Isyoda. In this context, Clause 5 of the Supplemental Agreement provides for 13 the assignment of all of Isyoda’s rights, benefits and remedies in, to and under, the M&E Subcontracts to Brampton. [13] To substantiate its claim in the 2014 Suit, GAE had averred that it had received several payments directly from Brampton, though irregular. A total of RM370,000.00 was received by GAE leaving an outstanding sum of RM898,402.43 which was the sum claimed in the 2014 Suit. [14] Brampton had filed its defence (essentially that there was no privity of contract between Brampton and GAE) and counterclaim for non-compliance with temperature specifications and/ or breach of contractor’s design warranty and defective works. In its counterclaim, Brampton sought for an order that GAE attend to build and/ or rectify all defects at its own cost to the satisfaction of Brampton in ensuring, inter alia, that the temperature in the complex will achieve the specifications. Brampton also prayed for a sum of RM63,903.00 being the costs incurred for taking remedial action in installing glass partitions and tempered glass, and an additional RM3,200.00 being cost for the “non-return dampers”. 14 [15] After a full trial of the 2014 Suit, the learned SCJ found in favor of GAE and dismissed Brampton’s counterclaim. Dissatisfied with the decision, Brampton appealed to the High Court vide Civil Appeal No. 12NCvC-43-06/2015 against the whole of the learned SCJ’s decision. [16] Upon hearing the parties, the High Court allowed the appeal in part. The appeal against the learned SCJ’s decision in allowing GAE’s claim was allowed but the appeal on the dismissal of Brampton’s counterclaim was dismissed. [17] Subsequently, GAE filed the 2016 Suit and Isyoda later filed a third-party proceeding against Brampton, with a counterclaim made by Brampton against Isyoda. [18] On the first day of trial of the 2016 Suit on 11.10.2016, GAE had called its Executive Director Mr. Lim Tau Kiang, as a witness (PW1). In the midst of Brampton’s cross-examination of PW1, counsel for GAE raised an objection as to Brampton’s line of questioning as it touched on issues of non-compliance with temperature specifications and/ or defective works which, in the view of counsels for GAE and 15 Isyoda, had been fully ventilated and decided on its merits in the 2014 Suit. [19] A ruling/ decision was then sought from the learned SCJ as to whether questions related to the issues of non-compliance with temperature specifications and/ or defective works may be posed to PW1. [20] The Learned SCJ ruled/ held that Brampton could not proceed with any cross-examination regarding the defective ACVS works and that the Sessions Court would not be making any decision on the said issue because this had been decided in the 2014 Suit. [21] Further, the learned SCJ directed that parties submit on how the Court’s ruling/ decision on res judicata would affect the rights of the parties. [22] On the second day of trial of the 2016 Suit on 12.10.2016, the learned SCJ heard submissions of counsels on how the Court’s ruling/ decision would affect the rights of the parties. Thereafter, the learned SCJ ruled/ held that questions related to the issues of non- 16 compliance with temperature specifications and/ or defective works cannot be posed in the 2016 Suit on grounds of res judicata and reaffirmed that the Sessions Court would not be making any decision on this matter. [23] Brampton then, on its own volition, decided not to proceed any further with the trial by concluding that the learned SCJ’s ruling/ decision had effectively and finally disposed of Brampton’s defence and counterclaim against Isyoda. [24] The trial then continued with the re-examination of Isyoda’s first witness. The remaining witnesses who were due to give evidence on the issue of defects (Isyoda’s second witness and Brampton’s two witnesses) were not called and so the trial ended there. [25] Unhappy with the said ruling/ decision by the learned SCJ, Brampton had, on 21.10.2016, appealed to the High Court against that ruling/ decision vide Civil Appeal No: WA-12BC-13-10/2016. Counsels for GAE and Isyoda had indicated that they would be raising preliminary objections since the first case management before the Senior 17 Assistant Registrar on 24.11.2016, on the basis that rulings made in the course of a trial that do not finally dispose of the parties’ right is a non-appealable decision. Hence, the validity and/ or competency of the appeal filed by Brampton is a preliminary issue that has to be considered and decided by this Court. [26] Upon the conclusion of the 2016 Suit, Brampton had filed another appeal on 2.12.2016 vide Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016 with reference to Order 55 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘RoC 2012’) (appeal after full trial). [27] Following suit, Isyoda had also filed an appeal under the same provision of the RoC 2012 on 13.2.2017 vide Civil Appeal No. WA- 12BC-8-02/2017. [28] When the appeals came up before me on 16.4.2018, counsels had addressed the Court on the sequence of proceedings and thereafter I directed that the preliminary objections by GAE and Isyoda in relation to Brampton’s Civil Appeal No: WA-12BC-13-10/2016 be heard first. 18 Civil Appeal No: WA-12BC-13-10/2016 [29] The preliminary objections raised by GAE and Isyoda were premised primarily on the ground that the appeal filed by Brampton was not an appeal against an appealable decision under section 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91] but essentially involved rulings made in the course of trial, particularly on the issue of admissibility and acceptability of evidence. These rulings did not dispose of Brampton’s final right in respect of the action which occurred only on 21.11.2016 when the learned SCJ gave the final judgment. The judgments in Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd v Takang Timber Sdn Bhd [2003] 2 MLJ 495, Datuk Seri Tiong King Sing v Datuk Seri Ong Tee Keat & Anor [2015] 1 MLJ 847 and Christopher ak Bandi @ Josny v Tumbung ak Nakis & Anor (Jamil bin Sindi, third party) [2015] 11 MLJ 597 were relied upon as authorities by learned counsels. [30] Furthermore, since Brampton had filed Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC- 16-12/2016 against the said final decision, it was submitted that Brampton would have the opportunity to ventilate on the issues arising and to seek appropriate relief from this Court at the hearing of that appeal. 19 [31] The other ground of objection which was raised by counsel for Isyoda was that the Record of Appeal was not in order. It was submitted that Brampton has included the witness statements of Ir. Ng Lai Hock (Isyoda’s witness) and that of Brampton’s witnesses, Mr. Lim Loke Choy and Mr. Tan Yee Wei, in the Supplemental Record of Appeal (Part B, at pages 101-112, 113-166 and 167-195) whereas none of them had given evidence in the Sessions Court. Analysis & findings [32] The decision on the preliminary objections by GAE and Isyoda was handed down by the Court on 4.5.2018 whereby I allowed the said objections and ordered that Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-13-10/2016 be struck out with costs of RM5,000.00 to GAE and Isyoda respectively. [33] My full grounds of decision and the relevant excerpts from the Notes of Evidence at the Sessions Court are set out rather extensively herein although no appeal has been lodged by Brampton because these will have bearing in the Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016. 20 [34] The relevant part from the Notes of Evidence which pertain to Brampton’s cross-examination of PW1 on the first day of trial of the 2016 Suit on 11.10.2016 is as follows: “TPC: So I put it to you that the temperature, the specification temperature has never been achieved because the testing that shows that the specification temperature has been achieved has never been given to Brampton nor shown in any of these bundle of documents? You can agree or disagree. PW1: I do not agree. PC: I think I have to object this line of question. Saya terpaksa membuat bantahan sebab sebarang persoalan non compliance with specification atau kerja-kerja defektif telahpun menjadi res judicata sebab dua tahun sebelum ini, dalam tahun 2014, terdapat satu suit seperti yang ditunjukkan tadi, bahawa Mahkamah Sesyen telahpun 21 mempertimbangkan isu ini. The court had actually decided on this point. Non compliance with specification and defective works. So after the full trial, the court had decided to dismiss the counterclaim. It was brought by way of counterclaim, di antara pihak ketiga dengan pihak plaintif. … di dalam tindakan itu, pihak plaintif adalah plaintif dan pihak ketiga adalah defendan dan perkara ini telahpun dipertimbangkan Mahkamah kerana terdapat tuntutan balas daripada pihak Brampton terhadap defendan dan isu ini adalah isu yang sama. Dan selepas itu, pihak Brampton telapun membuat rayuan terhadap keseleruhan penghakiman Mahkamah Sesyen. … dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi adalah bahawa tuntutan plaintif tidak dibenarkan ataupun rayuan dibenarkan; dan keduanya rayuan terhadap penolakan tuntutan balas, ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Jadi perkara ini telahpun menjadi res judicata. … So I think if we are going to move on to this direction it will be res 22 judicata and wasting the court’s time. Unless my learned friend would tell me that this has nothing to do with non specification, non compliance and defectives works then its fine. But it appears that the Third Party’s counsel is leading to that. Sekiranya, Puan merujuk kepada muka surat 796 Ikatan E … perhaps Puan could make a ruling on this point so that it would be easier.” Mah: 796 ya? PC: Sebenarnya ianya dari muka surat 793. 796 is the relevant page. This is the grounds of judgment of Tuan Timothy Finlayson Joel, the trial judge. After that…if Puan were to refer to … Penghakiman oleh Mahkamah Sesyen dalam First Suit or the 2014 Suit, di muka surat 899 di paragraph perenggan terakhir. “Dan adalah selanjutnya dihakimkan bahawa tuntutan balas Defendan bertarikh 09.12.14 ditolak dan Defendan dikehendaki membayar kos. Itu merupakan penghakiman Mahkamah Sesyen. Itu 23 merupakan findings of the Trial Judge. Tetapi seperti yang sedia maklum, pihak Brampton tidak berpuas hati dan memfailkan rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi … di muka surat 828 sehingga 829 … merujuk kepada perintah tersebut, dan di perenggan kedua … “adalah diperintahkan bahawa rayuan defendan, perayu defendan mengenai tuntutan responden plaintif dibenarkan supaya tuntutan respondan plaintif terhadap perayu defendan kini dibatalkan dan selanjutnya diperintahkan rayuan perayu ataupun Defendan mengenai tuntutan balas perayu defendan ditolak”. So in the appeal, the High Court has decided on two matters. Number one, they allowed the appeal with regards to the judgment, to the claim of the money. But however, they disallowed Brampton’s appeal on the dismissal of the counter claim. So the judge has actually decided on the merits of the case; it is not as simple as no privity of contract, so therefore there is no claim, it wasn’t that way. Dan apa yang lebih penting saya raya, di perenggan yang terakhir terhadap kos. I think this is very 24 important “dan akhirnya diperintahkan kedua-dua pihak menanggung kos masing-masing”. This will tell us a story in the sense that, normally sekiranya menang dalam sesuatu rayuan, kos akan diberi kepada perayu. Tetapi dalam kes ini, each party to bear its own kos because although Brampton got their appeal, but their appeal on the counter claim was disallowed. That was why the cost ditanggung oleh kedua-dua pihak. So Puan, I believed that this line of questioning is really res judicata. We are going to re-litigate the same matter in this court before Puan and the matter has already been decided by the Sessions Court and decided by the High Court. This is especially between pihak ketiga dan plaintif.”. [35] Learned counsels for Brampton and Isyoda had then made oral submissions on the objection as to the line of questioning of PW1 by counsel for Brampton. The learned SCJ adjourned proceedings and when the court convened in the afternoon, this is what transpired: “Mah: Ini keputusan oleh Mahkamah mengenai bantahan yang ditimbulkan oleh peguam Plaintif dan disokong 25 oleh peguam Defendan dan Mahkamah juga telah mendengar jawapan daripada Pihak Ketiga dan Mahkamah dalam membuat keputusan tentang bantahan tersebut telah melihat kepada penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah tidak melihat diluar penghakiman tersebut dan Mahkamah mendapati isu berkenaan kecacatan tersebut telah diputuskan secara jelas oleh Mahkamah Sesyen dan Mahkamah Tinggi juga telah mengesahkan keputusan ini dan apa-apa keputusan berkenaan dengan kecacatan tersebut tidak lagi akan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini kerana ia telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen sebelum ini. TPC: Puan adakah kami boleh meneruskan dengan tuntutan balas kami terhadap pihak Defendan. Mah: Itupun masih terpulang kepada jenis soalan dan jenis isu yang ditimbulkan. Saya kena tengok kalau ikutkan 26 pada alasan Mahkamah apa pun saya tidak boleh lari dari alasan Mahkamah ini kerana ia sudah jelas di alasan penghakiman. Dalam alasan ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen mengatakan bahawa defect tu adalah difikirkan kemudian jadi saya tidak boleh beri keputusan yang berbeza. Counter claim berkenaan defect saya tidak boleh putuskan atas isu yang sama. Mungkin saya setuju atau tidak setuju tapi perkara yang sama juga timbul apa yang telah diputuskan oleh hakim sesyen terdahulu yang mana dilarang oleh undang-undang. Penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi telah menyatakan bahawa rayuan terhadap tuntutan balas ditolak. TPC: Saya faham tapi ini tidak begitu adil bagi Pihak Ketiga sebab pada takat Mahkamah Sesyen kami ada ground iaitu apa alasan penghakiman itu adalah telahpun dalam bundle tapi malangnya kami tidak dapat alasan penghakiman dari Mahkamah Tinggi. Tapi itu tidak adil untuk Pihak Ketiga jika begitu 27 kerana perintah Mahkamah Tinggi tidak memihak kepada Pihak Ketiga. Mah: Jika penghakiman Hakim terdahulu dia cakap berkenaan kontrak dia tidak sentuh pasal defect tetapi sekarang dia sentuh pasal defect dan defect itu tiada. TPC: Tetapi bagaimana dengan tuntutan Plaintif kerana dia juga ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Mah: Ya, ditolak terhadap siapa? TPC: Sekarang dia boleh litigate claim but we cannot allowed litigate same think that I think not even handedness as Puan doing between the Plaintiff and the Third Party because Puan is allowing the Plaintiff to re-litigate the same claim at different party and Puan not allowed us to re-litigate the same and against the another party or same party. 28 DC: I think all these argument ventilated before lunch, Puan make a ruling and we are bound by it and we just proceed with the matter as the ruling issued to the defect no longer be litigated and how would that impact on the counter claim. I think for the Third Party to make a submission at the submission stage, otherwise its not going to end. TPC: We are not been given any notice that Plaintiff is object to our claim on defect throughout pliding we not given any notification and we are taken by surprise today this is the first time Plaintiff raising about the defect that we are bring in against Isyoda actually we are not even suing GAE because this is by surprise. This is unfair for Third Party. Mah: This is my decision dan satu lagi kalau saya buat keputusan yang berbeza maka dia tidak stabil sebab itu adanya prinsip res judicata itu … sebab Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dah sebut tiada defect bagaimana 29 saya hendak putuskan lagi. Kalau saya kata ada defect, dah berbeza, so dia tak stabil. Bukan dia sebut pasal parties ya. Berbeza. Ini pasal crux of the claim, defects. Itu telah diputuskan. DC: It has been pleaded in our reply in the Bundle Pliding A page 171 cannot be said taking by surprise. At Bundle of Pleadings at page 171 Ikatan A. TPC: I’m saying that Plaintif never raised this against Third Party I not say anything about Defendant. Mah: En. Michael ada apa-apa nak cakap? PC: My objection is against the Third Party in asking questions on the same issues, non compliance with specifications dan juga defective works dari pihak Ketiga terhadap Plaintif sebab perkara ini telah pun diputuskan Mahkamah, that’s all. So to ask the witness the same questions and the Court having to decide the same thing 30 when both the Sessions Court and High Court has decided back in 2015 and early this year is res judicata because its going to be re-ligating the same thing. That was the basis of my abjection, from the Third Party against the Plaintif. Mah: Itulah…makna sekarang ini, Third Party against Plaintif I have made my decision. Tentang concern Puan Chong terhadap tuntutan balas Pihak Ketiga nanti, pihak-pihak tengok pada undang-undang dan hujahkan nanti ya … sekarang ini terhadap saksi ini tak perlu. … teruskan dengan pembelaan yang lain. TPC: Boleh Puan bentangkan keputusan pada petang ini is it possible you give it at the end of the trial sebab we don’t know how to appeal against it. Unless it is made at the end of the trial then we can have an appeal. Right now in the middle of the trial… 31 Mah: But you did not say it before… now only after I have delivered my decision you say it but I have delivered my decision and remained delivered. TPC: Then can we record it at the end of the trial… DC: I think it’s just ruling and a ruling can always be eventually part of the decision eventually appeal against. I think the law is clear on that. It cannot be every single thing the judge decides during the trial has to go on appeal. It can be part and parcel of the eventual decision to be appealed against. … Mah: … saya harap pihak-pihak balik dan submit sekali lagi tentang tuntutan Pihak Ketiga terhadap Defendan, adakah ruling saya ini atas bantahan peguam Plaintif tadi itu, dia sekaligus … mengikat pihak-pihak lain. … 32 TPC: Is this submission to be made at the end of the trial together with the other submissions or Puan asking us to make submission in this point of time. Mah: Sebenarnya kalau at the end of the trial, dia punya kebaikannya ialah you boleh appeal dan sebagainya, kebaiknya jika submit awal, Mahkamah ruling kita tidak perlu buang masa hanya drop terus isu itu. TPC: So when Puan would aspect the submissions to be given to Puan? Mah: Selepas habis kes Plaintif. Boleh? TPC: We going to finish today now. Mah: So do you want to submit later or the Plaintif case tomorrow? TPC: We need a bit of time to prepare for such submission. 33 DC: I don’t think it’s a lengthy submission so we are prepared to submit anytime of course we need cases then we need time but if just to submit on the principle of law and relevant considerations then we are prepared to do it anytime. Mah: By tomorrow boleh? It is possible? Pasal res judicata itu dah settled. Tapi facts dalam pliding dan sebagainya. Boleh teruskan dengan soal balas, saksi ini. Jadi kita selesaikan saksi ini hari ini. TPC: So Puan, can we take it as a result of Puan’s ruling, we are not to across-examine the Plaintif as far as the defects are concerned. Is that your ruling, Puan? Mah: Yes, yes.” [36] Having directed counsels to be ready for submission on the next day regarding the issue as to whether the same ruling/ decision would apply to Brampton’s counterclaim against Isyoda, the trial continued 34 with the cross examination of PW1 by Brampton’s counsel without touching on the issue of defective works. [37] Isyoda then called its witness and he was cross-examined only by GAE’s counsel. The proceedings were then adjourned to enable counsels to prepare their respective submissions. [38] During the second day of trial on 12.10.2016, the learned SCJ heard submissions by all counsels on the issue of whether the evidence in relation to the defective or non-compliance work by GAE should be allowed in the third party proceedings between Isyoda and Brampton (the said submissions are enclosed to Isyoda’s Written Submissions for Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-13-10/2016 dated 16.2.2017 as ANNEXURE A). [39] Upon hearing the parties and a short adjournment to deliberate the matter, the court re-convened in the late morning and the learned SCJ delivered her ruling/ decision as set out below: “Mah: Keputusan – terhadap permohonan dan hujahan Defendan dan juga hujahan Pihak Ketiga berkenaan 35 isu res judicata. Saya telah mendengar hujahan peguam Defendan dan peguam Pihak Ketiga dan juga hujahan peguam Plaintiff dan sekali lagi saya telah melihat kepada dokumen-dokumen yang relevan, terutamanya pliding Pihak Ketiga di muka surat 91 hingga 144 ikatan A dan pliding Pihak Ketiga di Mahkamah Sesyen terdahulu di muka surat 847 hingga 860 ikatan E dan sekali lagi saya telah membaca dengan teliti keputusan dan alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen terdahulu yang kekal berkuatkuasa kerana gagal diketepikan oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga di Mahkamah Tinggi. Walaupun saya ingin membuat keputusan sebaliknya, namun setelah saya membaca undang-undang berkaitan dengan prinsip res judicata dan apa yang telah berlaku dalam kes ini terutamanya setelah melihat kepada alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang secara jelas membuat dapatan fakta yang positif dan tanpa ragu di mana beliau mengatakan bahawa secara ringkasnya, tidak 36 berlaku kecacatan tersebut. Maka, peruntukan undang-undang mewajibkan saya untuk tidak membuat dapatan fakta yang sebaliknya. Apabila dilihat kepada plidingpliding Pihak Ketiga, seperti yang telah saya sebutkan tadi jelas menunjukkan bahawa dakwaan-dakwaan kerja-kerja cacat tersebut adalah dakwaan kerja-kerja cacat Plaintif yang telah diputusakan secara jelas tanpa ragu oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen sebelum ini. Oleh itu, seperti yang telah saya putuskan semalam, saya tidak boleh membuat dapatan fakta lain di mana dapatan fakta itu telah pun diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang kompeten iaitu Mahkamah Sesyen sebelum ini. Dapatan ini juga telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dengan menolak rayuan Pihak Ketiga. Malangnya, dalam kes ini tiada alasan penghakiman Mahkamah Tinggi untuk dirujuk oleh Mahkamah dan pihak-pihak pada hari ini kerana pihak-pihak dalam rayuan tersebut tidak merayu kepada keputusan 37 Mahkamah Tinggi. Oleh demikian, dapatan fakta Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut adalah dapatan fakta yang kekal berkuatkuasa. Mahkamah ini tidak akan pergi jauh daripada apa yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah ini atau cuba mengandaikan mengapa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan sedemikian kerana fakta itu tiada di hadapan Mahkamah pada hari ini. Oleh demikian, Pihak Ketiga tidak boleh lagi menimbulkan isu berkenaan kerja-kerja defek yang dikatakan yang dilakukan oleh Plaintif dan Mahkamah juga tidak boleh memutuskan berkenaan isu itu kerana ia telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah yang mempunyai bidangkuasa yang kompeten. Berkenaan hujahan Pihak Ketiga, Mahkamah telah menentukan pembelaan dan tuntutan balas Pihak Ketiga. Mahkamah ingin menyatakan bahawa setelah meneliti pembelaan Pihak Ketiga selain daripada isu-isu defect yang dikemukakan terdapat isu-isu lain yang telah ditimbulkan oleh Pihak Ketiga untuk meneruskan pembelaannya. Namun begitu, 38 berkenaan dengan isu-isu defek yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen terdahulu seperti yang telah saya katakan. Ia tidak akan diputuskan sekali lagi oleh Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah juga tidak akan memutuskan berkenaan hujahan res judicata antara tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan kerana ia bukan isu pada hari ini. Itu adalah keputusan Mahkamah.”. [40] Following from the above ruling/ decision, Brampton’s counsel then informed the court that they were unable to proceed with the trial as a result of the learned SCJ’s ruling. The learned SCJ advised Brampton’s counsels to defend the claim and allowed time for them to consider and seek instruction. However, they chose to abandon the trial. The following is the excerpt from the Notes of Evidence on this part of the proceedings: “Mah: Boleh kita teruskan dengan…………. DC: Terima kasih Puan. 39 TPC: We are unable to proceed puan because the basis of our claims against or of our defense is that there are defects and because there are defects then the Defendant has to take action against the Plaintiff but since they have failed to take action, that is why there is a breach and that’s why we said they are not entitled to indemnity. As far as our counter claim is concerned, our counter claim is totally based on the defects which puan now says that the court is bound by the findings of the Sessions Court in the previous case. So, as a result of that our stand is that we are unable to proceed because the court in so giving its decision today has actually dispose of the Third Party’s rights in this action. And hence, we can no longer proceed with the trial because it is pointless. The Mahkamah has already decided on where the parties… Mah: Puan Chong saya mengatakan bahawa this is my stand. Looking at your defense there are other 40 issues, other than the defects. I would not force you but I advise you to be here to at least defense the claim from the Defendant against the Third Party but it’s up to you. Mah: Saya tangguh sekejap, 10 minit, fikir dan saya akan naik balik. Pada hari ini kita sampai pukul 3. Kalau Puan Chong masih lagi tak nak berada di sini, if you say that you tidak lagi, you said pointless to be here, I will take it and we will proceed with the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s case dan saya akan buat keputusan yang seadanya tuntutan Defendan terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Itu adalah kedudukan Mahkamah, saya tidak akan memaksa tetapi saya menasihatkan kerana melihat kepada pembelaan, memang ada lagi isu-isu yang boleh ditimbulkan untuk membela tuntutan pihak Defendan kepada Pihak Ketiga. Jadi, saya bagi masa fikirkan dan buat keputusan. t.t. Roszianayati Binti Ahmad 41 Mah: Kes sambung bicara di panggil semula jam 11.30 pagi Mah: Bagaimana? TPC: Puan, we have considered…tadi puan mengatakan bahawa puan mengalakkan kami bertimbang semula regarding our defence, as from what we can see, as far as the defence is concerned it is on two broad limbs, one is that there is no direct dealing and payment agreement made between all three parties and the other part is that breach of the settlement agreement by Isyoda, as far as the breach of the settlement agreement by Isyoda, puan has already agreed with us once the defects has been established that there are no defects, then that part fails all together, the other part would be the direct dealing and payment agreement. Now as far as the direct dealing and payment agreement is concerned, it is actually has also been decided by the High Court that GAE cannot claim against Brampton meaning that there is no direct dealing and payment 42 agreement between GAE and Brampton, so since this has been already decided by the High Court, by the High Court dismissing GAE’s claim against Brampton, so we don’t see what there is to seek any further because just one decision of Puan has extinghuish the basis of our counter clain as well as basis for our defence which is mainly that Isyoda has defaulted their obligations under the Settlement Agreement which is based on the defects and the works they did not conform with specifications as far as ACVS works are concerned puan. So because of that we feel that we are unable to well, I don’t see what evidence we can bring because everything is tied back to defects puan and puan has already make it very clear that she is bound by the findings of fact of the Sessions Court in the previous case. So we maintained that we are unable to proceed as Puan has disposed of Third Party’s right by making such a decision as what was pronounced yesterday puan. 43 Mah: I respect your decision, Puan Chong. Mahkamah akan teruskan kes antara Plaintif dengan Defendan dan juga akan membuatkan perintah yang sewajarnya terhadap Pihak Ketiga.”. [41] The trial then continued with the re-examination of Isyoda’s witness and it was then concluded. [42] Section 3 Act 91 provides as follows: “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires – … “decision” means judgment, sentence or order, but does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties; …”. [43] In the case of Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd v Takang Timber Sdn Bhd [2003] 2 MLJ 495, Justice PS Gill JCA held as follows: 44 “… any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause and matter, which did not finally dispose the rights of the parties, did not constitute a decision for the purpose of s 3 of the Act, as amended. … what must be asked is not only whether a ruling does not dispose the final rights of the parties but also the question whether it was a ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter.... the ruling by the learned deputy registrar on the admissibility of the documents made in the course of a hearing, was … a ruling on an issue other than the ultimate question, and is thus excluded by the exclusion clause in the definition of ‘decision’ in s 3 of the Act, as amended. … the said ruling was not appealable … the High Court judge was correct in upholding the preliminary objection of the respondent’s counsel, that the said appeal was not competent.”. [44] The Court of Appeal in the case of Datuk Seri Tiong King Sing v Datuk Seri Ong Tee Keat & Anor [2015] 1 MLJ 847 had explained the reason as to why appeals against rulings are not permissible in the following words: 45 “If appeals are permitted against rulings made in the midst of a trial, this will affect a fair and expeditious disposal of court proceedings due to the likelihood for untimely and academic appeals as well as possible stays of proceedings pending such appeals. By staying the proceedings pending the disposal of the appeal, the final decision of the court on the action will also be held up. In any event, in the context of the present case, if the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the final outcome of his action against the fourth defendant, he may still raise the ruling of the learned High Court judge as part of his grounds of appeal.”. [45] Similarly, the High Court in the case of Christopher ak Bandi @ Josny v Tumbung ak Nakis & Anor (Jamil bin Sindi, third party) [2015] 11 MLJ 597 struck out the appeal on the ground that – “It was obvious that the SCJ’s decision was made in the course of a trial or hearing which did not have the effect of finally disposing the rights of the parties. As such this 46 decision did not constitute a ‘decision’ for the purpose of s 3 of the CJA and would render it to be non-appealable.”. [46] It is apparent that at the time when this appeal was filed on 24.10.2016 by Brampton, the learned SCJ had not rendered her full decision in Civil Suit No. WA-B52C-9-01/2016. When she did do so on 21.11.2016, Brampton had also filed another appeal on 2.12.2016 against the final decision viz. Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016. Hence, this Court was faced with a situation of having two appeals filed by Brampton originating from the same suit at the Sessions Court and involving similar issues. [47] Under the circumstances, I agree with the submissions of counsels for GAE and Isyoda that if this appeal was allowed to be heard on its merits together with Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016, Brampton would effectively be having two bites at the cherry. Brampton can, and should, ventilate all its grievances in Civil Suit No. WA-B52C-9-01/2016 in Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016. This appeal should have been withdrawn. Brampton’s insistence in having its two appeals before this Court, to my mind, amounts to an abuse of process. 47 [48] It also my finding that the learned SCJ had made mere rulings which did not finally dispose of Brampton’s rights in the course of trial on 11.10.2016 and 12.10.2016. Brampton had chosen to leave the proceedings in the midst of trial on its own volition despite being advised against it by the learned SCJ and hence, this election was made at its own peril. [49] As regards the objection on the inclusion of the statements of witnesses for Isyoda and Brampton in the Record of Appeal, I am of the view that the cases submitted by learned counsel for Brampton, namely Kemajuan Hunda Kredit (Kuching) Sdn Bhd v Titus Chua Mui Ing [1995] 2 CLJ 102 and Rapain Bin Jerin@Jerim & Others v Kong Siew Lien [2009] 1 LNS 63 can be distinguished on its facts because the documents sought to be included in the appeal records in those cases were the notes of evidence, grounds of judgment, memorandum of appeal and exhibits, and documents ruled inadmissible. Such documents are surely relevant for the purposes of appeal whereas in the appeal before this Court, the documents are statements of witnesses who were not even called to give evidence at the Sessions Court. 48 [50] Therefore, I allowed the preliminary objections by GAE and Isyoda. I then heard oral submissions by counsels for Civil Appeal No. WA- 12BC-8-02/2017. Due to constraint of time, oral submissions for Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016 was adjourned to 16.5.2018. The decision on both appeals was then delivered on 8.6.2018. Civil Appeal No: WA-12BC-16-12/2016 [51] As explained above, this was the second appeal filed by Brampton (against the same ruling/ decision made by the learned SCJ in the course of trial) after the SC Civil Suit had concluded. [52] The issues which arose for decision in relation to this appeal are set out below. First Issue: Whether the learned SCJ had made a correct ruling in disallowing any questions regarding the defective ACVS – res judicata against Brampton 49 [53] It is Brampton’s contention that the crux of its case in the SC Civil Suit rested on the allegation of defective ACVS works. Whether the learned SCJ had made a ruling or a decision is irrelevant because in effect, the prohibition of questions being posed on the defective ACVS works had effectively disposed of Brampton’s case and was seriously prejudicial to Brampton. [54] Further, it was submitted that the learned SCJ had erred in law and in fact when she held that res judicata was applicable against Brampton resulting in the final decision where Isyoda’s claim against Brampton was allowed and Brampton’s counterclaim was dismissed. There are two sub-sets to this argument, namely –

res judicata is not applicable against Brampton; and

even if res judicata is applicable, it should not be applied as it would not achieve a fair and just result. Is res judicata applicable against Brampton? [55] Brampton does not dispute that its counterclaim against GAE in the 2014 Suit relate to the same defects as its counterclaim against 50 Isyoda in the 2016 Suit. Brampton had explained that its counterclaim in the 2014 Suit was so as to protect Brampton’s interest in the event that the court held that there was in fact privity of contract between GAE and Brampton. [56] The learned SCJ in the 2014 Suit decided that Brampton was liable to pay GAE. However, upon appeal, the High Court allowed Brampton’s appeal on the ground that there was no privity of contract between GAE and Brampton. As for Brampton’s counterclaim, Mr. Lim Tsu Ming, learned counsel for Brampton submitted that the High Court did not make any finding on the merits of the counterclaim. [57] On the contrary, GAE and Isyoda contended that the issue of whether there were defects of the ACVS works by GAE had been decided on merits after completion of the full trial. In the absence of any grounds of judgement, it was submitted that one should not speculate as to the reasons for the decision of the High Court. What is important is the fact that the High Court did not disturb, set-aside or reverse the findings made by the learned SCJ on the issue of counterclaim and 51 thus, the factual finding by the learned SCJ remains as the final judicial determination and pronouncement on this issue. [58] A comparative analysis of Brampton’s counterclaim in the 2014 Suit and the 2016 Suit can be found in Isyoda’s Written Submissions as learned counsel attempted to show that all complaints raised by Brampton in the 2016 Suit were actually directed against GAE, and not Isyoda, and that the current allegations were exactly the same as the allegations in the 2014 Suit. Therefore, the stand of GAE and Isyoda is that res judicata is clearly applicable against Brampton and the ruling by the learned SCJ was absolutely correct. Analysis & finding [59] The relevant part of the judgment of the learned SCJ in the 2014 Suit dated 22.5.2015 is as follows: “In respect of the counterclaim, I regret to say that the Defendant seemed to be uncertain of the alleged defects, and they failed to quantify them save for saying that all defects to be remedied by the Plaintiff at all costs. It is also 52 inconceivable that such claim should be entertained now. For one thing, though there seems to be complaint forwarded to Isyoda, there was no evidence of follow up by the Defendant. Not only that, there were no reports of actual defects except for the testimonies of their two witnesses. As for the defects found by investigation of Joint Management Board, that seemed to be done after the Defective Liability Period had lapsed. As for the testimony of DW2, as I said earlier it was unsupported by cogent evidence of report by consultant or any expert witness. But even if the two witnesses’ evidence were accepted, the fact remains that the project site was already handed over to the Defendant and approved by its own consultant. It does not make sense why the Defendant now is making the counterclaim as there appeared to be that the complaints, if any, were made past the expiry date of the Defecting 53 Liability Period. Ultimately, it tends to show that it is just delaying tactic or excuse for not paying. Its such, for the reasons or grounds aforesaid, I allow the Plaintiff’s claim of RM898,402.43 with costs of RM20,000.00 and interest of 5% p.a. until full satisfaction. I dismiss the counterclaim of the Defendant’s with costs of RM8,000.00 with interest at 5% paid until full satisfaction.”. [60] The second paragraph in the Order of the High Court dated 5.1.2016 (‘High Court Order’) on the determination of Brampton’s appeal states that – “ADALAH DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa Rayuan Perayu/Defendan mengenai tuntutan Responden/Plaintif dibenarkan supaya tuntutan Responden/Plaintif terhadap Perayu/Defendan adalah kini dibatalkan DAN SELANJUTNYA DIPERINTAHKAN bahawa Rayuan 54 Perayu/Defendan mengenai tuntutan balas Perayu/Defendan ditolak.” (Note: “Perayu/Defendan” refers to Brampton while “Responden/Plaintif” refers to GAE). [61] No appeal was filed against the High Court Order and thus, all parties do not have the benefit of a written judgment by the High Court. Under the circumstances, the High Court Order has to be read on the face of the words appearing therein. [62] The learned SCJ in the 2016 Suit was of the view that the decision of the Sessions Court in the 2014 Suit on the issue of defective works was upheld by the High Court. In her Grounds of Judgment dated 21.11.2016, the learned SCJ had opined as follows: “[23] Setelah Mahkamah mendengar hujahan pihak-pihak dan otoriti yang dikemukakan, mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa dakwaan kerja-kerja defek yang dilakukan oleh Plaintif telah diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di 55 dalam kes 2014. Dapatan fakta yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut adalah positif dan tanpa ragu…. [24] Jelas dari alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut menyatakan bahawa tiada kerja-kerja defek seperti yang didakwa oleh Pihak Ketiga. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di dalam alasan penghakimannya, setelah meneliti keterangan dua saksi dan keterengan yang dikemukakan tidak mempercayai kes Pihak Ketiga bahawa wujudnya kerja-kerja defek tersebut sehingaa beliau menyatakan di dalam alasan penghakimannya bahawa pemfailan tuntutan balas adalah satu taktik Pihak Ketiga untuk melambat-lambatkan pembayaran. [25] Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen ini telah dirayu di Mahkamah Tinggi dan rayuan tersebut telah ditolak. Pihak Ketiga telah tidak merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi ini. Justeru, ia kekal berkuat kuasa semasa ruling ini dibuat. Malangnya, Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam mengekalkan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen ini tidak membekalkan apa- 56 apa alasan penghakiman. Oleh itu Mahkamah tidak boleh memberikan tafsiran dan andaian mengapa Mahkamah Tinggi mengekalkan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen ini. Apabila rayuan tersebut ditolak, ia bermakna keputusan dan alasan Mahkamah Sesyen dikekalkan. Hujahan Pihak Ketiga yang mengatakan bahawa ia adalah disebabkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa tiada kontrak priviti antara Plaintif dengan Pihak Ketiga, adalah tanpa merit kerana ia tidak disokong dengan apa-apa dokumen khususnya alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut. [26] Dapatan fakta yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bagi kes 2014 ini tidak syak lagi adalah hasil dari fakta-fakta yang sama dengan kes ini. Ini dapat dilihat dari fakta-fakta yang dikemukakan di dalam Tuntutan Balas Pihak Ketiga Terhadap Defendan (di dalam kes ini) dan dibandingkan dengan Tuntutan Balas Pihak Ketiga Terhadap Plaintif di dalam kes 2014 – fakta-fakta yang diplidkan adalah fakta-fakta yang sama. Oleh kerana 57 dapatan fakta Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan kerja-kerja defek ini adalah jelas dan tanpa ragu, Mahkamah ini tidak akan membuat apa-apa dapatan dari isu dan fakta yang sama.”. [63] Upon a close reading of both grounds of decision in the 2014 Suit and the 2016 Suit, I am satisfied that the learned SCJ in the 2016 Suit did not err in fact and in law in concluding that the learned SCJ in the 2014 Suit had made a finding of fact in respect of the defective works. The underlined parts of his judgment as quoted in paragraph 59 above clearly show that the learned SCJ in the 2014 Suit had considered the oral and documentary evidence produced before him on the issue of defective works and concluded that Brampton’s counterclaim was baseless since the complaints regarding works completed by GAE were made too late in the day i.e. after the expiry of the Defects Liability Period. [64] Brampton’s appeal to the High Court on its counterclaim having been dismissed on 5.1.2016 thus meant that the learned SCJ in the 2016 Suit was bound by the decision in the 2014 Suit. 58 [65] Several cases were relied upon by all counsels in their respective submissions on the legal principles on the doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel; Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189; Manoharan Malayalam v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [2009] 2 CLJ 839; Malayan Banking Berhad v Orbtech Engineering Corporations Sdn Bhd & Ors (KLHC Suit No. D12-22-45-2009); Low Eng Yew v Chandra Sekaran Murugesu (Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia Rayuan Sivil No. C-02(1M)(NCvC)- 172-01/2015) and Ibig @ David Rampas & Anor v Terisah Bahan & Ors [2016] 4 MLJ 682. For purposes of this judgment, I think it is suffice for me to cite these following passages:

the Court of Appeal in Ibig’s case which adopted the following passage in North West Water Ltd v Binnie & Partners (a firm) [1990] 3 All ER 547: “Where an issue had for all practical purposes been decided in a court of competent jurisdiction the court would not allow that the issue to be raised in separate proceedings between different parties 59 arising out of identical facts and dependent on the same evidence, since not only was the party seeking to relitigate the issue prevented from doing so by issue estoppel but it would be an abuse of process of allow the issue to be relitigated.”; and

the Federal Court case in Manoharan Malayalam which held as follows: “[6] Res Judicata is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 7th edn as follows:- [literally in Latin 'a thing adjudicated] 1. An issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision.

An affirmative defence barring parties from litigating a second lawful lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transactions and that could have been - but was not raised in the first suit. The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the issue (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the involvement of 60 the same parties, or parties in privity with the original parties.”. [66] Although learned counsel for Brampton attempted to persuade this Court that the essential elements as laid down in Manoharan Malayalam have not been fulfilled, I am of the opinion that the opposite is actually the case. There is indeed an earlier decision by the Sessions Court in the 2014 Suit on the issue of Brampton’s counterclaim which was subsequently affirmed by the High Court. Thus, there is a final judgment on the merits of the counterclaim. [67] As regards the involvement of similar parties, Isyoda was not a party in the 2014 Suit. However, learned counsels for GAE and Isyoda had convincingly argued, based on the authority of a line of cases such as Government of Malaysia v Dato Chong Kok Lim [1973] 2 MLJ 74, Goh Keat Poh v Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [2009] 5 MLJ 449, Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Badan Perhubungan UMNO Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur [2010] 8 MLJ 57 and Dato’ Sivananthan a/l Shanmugam v Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 122 that – 61

the prayers sought in Brampton’s “Defence & Counterclaim by Third Party to Claim by Defendant dated 15/06/2016” against Isyoda in the 2016 Suit are exactly the same as the prayers in Brampton’s counterclaim against GAE in the 2014 Suit;

the similarity of parties is not a mandatory pre-requisite in all cases; and

the decision in the 2014 Suit must be binding on Brampton. [68] Therefore, the basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata against Brampton has been made out and this brings us to the next question as follows. Should res judicata not be applied against Brampton to avoid an unjust outcome? [69] Brampton’s counsel relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 321 for the proposition that even if this Court concludes that res judicata applies, 62 the Court should exercise its discretion not to apply res judicata against Brampton as the outcome would not achieve justice. This is because, as a result of the learned SCJ’s decision in applying res judicata against Brampton, Brampton was unable to -

present its case and any evidence on its counterclaim on the defective and non-compliant ACVS works by GAE and Isyoda’s subsequent breach of the Settlement Agreement; and

proceed with its defence and show that Brampton was not liable to indemnify Isyoda under the Settlement Agreement. [70] In reply to the above, learned counsels for GAE and Isyoda forcefully submitted that-

from the Notes of Evidence, it is crystal clear that the learned SCJ had allowed Brampton to proceed with the trial as long as issues on the defects were avoided; 63

there were still other defences that could have been raised by Brampton during the trial of the 2016 Suit, however, Brampton had decided on its own volition (and against the caution given by the judge) to walk out of the trial, while the trial was still in progress;

at best, Brampton’s case may have been weakened by the ruling made, but in no way did it effectively dispose of Brampton’s rights;

Brampton has abandoned its defence and counterclaim against Isyoda whereby, applying the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ord v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 770, -

all evidence produced by Isyoda against Brampton must be treated as unchallenged and accepted;

(ii) Brampton’s choice of not cross-examining Isyoda’s witness shall be treated as Brampton having accepted the truth of the evidence given by Isyoda’s witness; and 64

(iii) Brampton had not adduced any evidence or called any witness to prove its case. [71] I am of the view that the position as expounded by learned counsels for GAE and Isyoda is an accurate reflection of what had transpired during the trial of the 2016 Suit, as shown in the following extract from the judgment of the learned SCJ, and its legal consequences: “[27] Apabila Mahkamah membuat ruling bahawa Mahkamah tidak akan membuat apa-apa dapatan fakta berkenaan kerja-kerja defek oleh Plaintif memandangkan ia telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen di dalam kes 2014, Pihak Ketiga telah mengambil kedudukan bahawa Mahkamah telah memutuskan dan melupuskan secara terus pembelaan dan tuntutan balas Pihak Ketiga. Walau pun dinasihatkan oleh Mahkamah untuk terus hadir di dalam prosiding ini dan mengemukakan pembelaan mereka, tetapi peguam Pihak Ketiga tetap dengan keputusan mereka untuk meninggalkan prosiding 65 tersebut. Dalam keadaan itu, Mahkamah telah meneruskan perbicaraan kes ini tanpa kehadiran Pihak Ketiga dan pihak-pihak telah dimaklumkan bahawa keputusan dan perintah akan dibuat mengikut peruntukan undang-undang yang ada. [28] Di dalam kes ini Defendan telah membawa Pihak Ketiga di dalam prosiding ini agar Pihak Ketiga menanggungrugi jumlah RM898,402.43 atau apa-apa jumlah yang diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah dibayar kepada Plaintif. Defendan telah memanggil seorang saksi bagi membuktikan kes mereka. Sebelum saksi ini sempat disoal balas oleh peguam Pihak Ketiga, peguam Pihak Ketiga telah bertindak meninggalkan prosiding ini. Oleh yang demikian, apa-apa keterangan saksi Defendan terhadap Pihak Ketiga kekal tidak dicabar dan Mahkamah dengan ini menerima keterangan tersebut sebagai benar. 66 [29] Bukan itu sahaja, Pihak Ketiga atas ketidak hadiran mereka telah juga gagal menawarkan sebarang saksi untuk menangkis keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi Defendan dan saksi Plaintif. Pihak Ketiga tidak memfailkan apa-apa hujahan untuk membantu Mahkamah dalam mencapai keputusannya. Oleh yang demikian, apa-apa keterangan terhadap Pihak Ketiga yang gagal dicabar, Mahkamah akan terima sebagai benar. (Rujuk kes Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 4 CLJ ms. 509); IB Builders Sdn Bhd v. Kheng Bee Company Sdn Bhd & Other Case [2015] 1 LNS 41).”. [72] As regards the advice given by the learned SCJ, I had read the “Defence and Counterclaim By Third Party To Claim By Defendant” dated 15.6.2016 and find that Brampton had indeed raised several issues in its pleadings pertaining to its defence, inter alia –

Brampton’s denial that with the Supplemental Agreement (Issues) and Supplemental Agreement (M&E) signed between 67 Brampton and Isyoda on 15.6.2011, Brampton had assumed the obligation to pay GAE. At the material time, Brampton believed that it could deduct from the sums due to Isyoda, the amounts which were due to the M&E subcontractors, including GAE, and pay such amounts directly to the subcontractors;

Isyoda’s filing of two civil suits in the Kuala Lumpur High Court No. D-22NCC-1366-2011 and No. 22NCvC-87-01/2012 claiming that Brampton should not pay the subcontractors directly and should pay to Isyoda so that Isyoda can then make direct payment to the subcontractors. Following from the summary judgement entered against Brampton in the two civil actions, Brampton ceased to make further payments directly to

Isyoda being in breach of its duties under the Supplemental Agreement. [73] The learned SCJ had made a correct ruling in disallowing any questions regarding the defective ACVS and in applying the doctrine of res judicata against Brampton. However, that ruling did not prevent 68 Brampton from producing the necessary evidence in support of its defence. Brampton now has to live with the decision taken by its counsels on 12.10.2016 to abandon the trial. [74] Under the circumstances, I am not convinced that this is a fit and proper case for this Court to exercise its discretion not to apply res judicata against Brampton in so far as the issues on the defective ACVS and Brampton’s counterclaim are concerned. Second Issue: Whether res judicata should be applied against GAE [75] Learned counsel for Brampton submitted that the learned SCJ had erred in law and in fact when she failed to consider or sufficiently consider that res judicata should be applied against GAE to prevent GAE from bringing its claim against Isyoda in the SC Civil Suit. [76] In the 2014 Suit, GAE is said to have taken the position that it was Brampton, and not Isyoda, which was liable to GAE for the outstanding sums and hence, GAE had elected not to commence proceedings against Isyoda and/ or sue Isyoda as a co-defendant. 69 [77] It was contended by counsel that GAE’s action in the SC Civil Suit is so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation in the 2014 Suit and so clearly could have been raised that it is an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a new proceeding in the form of the SC Civil Suit to be instituted. Res judicata should therefore be applied against GAE to prevent GAE from bringing the SC Civil Suit. [78] In reply, Mr. Michael Lee, learned counsel for GAE submitted that the facts as they stood at the time when GAE commenced the 2014 Suit and the 2016 Suit have to be differentiated and understood. GAE was not aware of the Settlement Agreement before the commencement of the 2014 Suit. Subsequently, following the disclosure of the Settlement Agreement, whatever issues or defences that Isyoda had put up in relation to the amount claimed by GAE had been negated. In other words, GAE’s claim is a debt due to it, pure and simple. [79] The learned SCJ had addressed her mind to the issue of the applicability of res judicata against GAE in the following paragraphs of her grounds of judgment: 70 “[41] Defendan mengatakan bahawa Plaintif telah diestopkan dari memfailkan tuntutan ini terhadap Defendan kerana Plaintif di dalam kes 2014 telah memfailkan tuntutannya terhadap Pihak Ketiga. Setelah saya meneliti fakta-fakta kes yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan saya, saya mendapati doctrine of estopple tidak terpakai di dalam kes ini. Jelas bahawa penggunaan doctrine of estopple adalah untuk menguatkuasakan keadilan dan mesti digunakan dengan mengikut budi bicara mahkamah dengan melihat kepada fakta sesuatu kes itu. Ini diputuskan di dalam kes Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn. Bhd. v. Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) Gopal Sri Ram HMR menyatakan bahawa:- The time has come for this Court to recognise that the doctrine of estoppel is a flexible principle by which justice is done according to the circumstances of the case. It is a doctrine of 71 wide utility and has been resorted to in varying fact patterns to achieve justice. Indeed, the circumstances in which the doctrine may operate are endless. [42] Namun begitu, jika mahkamah membenarkan doktrin ini terpakai di dalam kes ini, ia akan menyebabkan ketidakadilan yang nyata kepada Plaintif yang telah melakukan kerja-kerja sub kontrak untuk kepentingan Defendan namun tidak mendapat bayaran bagi satu jumlah yang besar. Di dalam kes ini, memang benar Plaintif telah menuntut jumlah tersebut dari Pihak Ketiga di dalam kes 2014. Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Pihak Ketiga adalah berdasarkan kepada representasi yang dibuat oleh Pihak Ketiga sendiri kepada Plaintif. Namun demikian, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan rayuan iaitu menolak tuntutan Plaintif ini dengan alasan tiada priviti kontrak antara Plaintif dan Pihak Ketiga. 72 [43] Jika diteliti fakta kes ini, bukan hanya satu Perjanjian Tambahan yang telah dimasuki oleh Defendan dan Pihak Ketiga tetapi ia melibatkan dua Perjanjian Tambahan dan satu Perjanjian Penyelesaian yang bukan hanya meliputi hak-hak Defendan dan Pihak Ketiga tetapi juga menyentuh hak-hak sub kontraktor lain termasuk Plaintif. Walhal mereka bukanlah pihak di dalam Perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut. Dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah memahami bagaimana kerumitan telah timbul bagi kontraktor-kontraktor kecil seperti Plaintif untuk menguatkuasakan hak mereka. Jika mahkamah membenarkan pemakaian doctrine of estopple, ia bermakna mahkamah telah menindas hak Plaintif untuk menuntut bayaran bagi kerja yang telah mereka lakukan. [44] Pendek kata, walau pun jumlah yang dituntut oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan adalah jumlah yang sama dituntut oleh Plaintif dari Pihak Ketiga, namun demikian, kausa tindakan Plaintif terhadap Defendan 73 adalah timbul dari Perjanjian Sub Kontrak yang masih berkuatkuasa. Terdapat juga fakta-fakta lain yang berbeza yang tidak timbul di dalam kes 2014. Contohnya, adalah keterangan yang tidak dicabar bahawa Perjanjian Penyelesaian hanya timbul di dalam kes ini dan hanya diketahui kewujudannya oleh Plaintif apabila kes difailkan. [45] Saya juga mengambil kira bahawa keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah diketepikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dan tiada rayuan yang telah difailkan. Justeru, tidak timbul isu bahawa terdapat kemungkinan dua dapatan fakta yang bercanggah yang akan diputuskan di mahkamah ini dengan keputusan mahkamah di dalam kes 2014. Dari penelitian saya, Plaintif tidak seharusnya disekat dari memfailkan tuntutan ini terhadap Defendan.”. [80] Having read the judgment of the learned SCJ several times, I do not see that there is any basis for appellate intervention. The learned 74 SCJ had given due consideration to the relevant questions in arriving at the conclusion as she did, including GAE’s position as a subcontractor (which is akin to a mouse deer trapped between two elephants – see paragraph 67 of His Lordhip’s Lee Swee Seng’s judgment in Bond’s case). [81] For myself, I would just add that res judicata should not apply against GAE because as submitted by Brampton’s counsel himself, the 2014 Suit had been decided on the basis that there was no privity of contract between Brampton and GAE and hence there was no final decision on the merits of GAE’s claim. Even if res judicata is applicable, this is a situation which warrants the Court’s discretion to be exercised in favour of GAE since the outcome would be unfair to GAE. Again, if I may borrow the words of His Lordship Lee Swee Seng in Bond’s case, “Surely both main contractor and employee cannot enter into an arrangement where the sub-contractor would not be paid at all…”. 75 WA-12BC-8-02/2017 [82] This is Isyoda’s appeal against the decision of the learned SCJ in allowing GAE’s claim of RM898,402.43 against Isyoda. It is Isyoda’s contention that the learned SCJ had erred when she decided that-

the sub-contract between Isyoda and GAE prevails over the subsequent conduct and correspondences between the parties including the alleged “Direct Dealing and Payment Agreement” whereby Isyoda is said to be no longer liable to GAE;

GAE’s letter dated 12.10.2012 and the direct payment of RM370,000.00 by Brampton to GAE did not affect the enforceability of the sub-contract between Isyoda and GAE; and

the issue which Isyoda attempted to raise regarding the absence of Payment Certificates No. 25, 26 and 27 was without merit. 76 [83] Simply put, when striped of all the allegations and counter-allegations, the central question in this dispute is who should pay the outstanding amount of RM898,402.43 to GAE for the ACVS works for the Project. [84] Since 6.6.2008, Isyoda had been making payments to GAE in accordance with the Sub-Contractors Interim Payment Certificates. After almost three years, these direct payments ceased with the final payment made was by way of a cheque for the sum of RM194,383.94 which was received by GAE on 24.6.2011 in relation to the Sub-Contractors Interim Payment Certificate No. 24. [85] Thereafter, GAE received three payments directly from Brampton for a total amount of RM370,000 paid in the following manner: OCBC Bank cheque dated 5.8.2011 : RM200,000.00 Credit into GAE’s bank on 26.1.2012 : RM150,000.00 OCBC Bank cheque dated 19.4.2013 : RM 20,000.00 [86] These payments from Bampton were as a result of the Supplemental Agreement which GAE claimed to have no knowledge about until two 77 months after its signing whereupon GAE received the following copy of the letter from Brampton to Isyoda dated 16.8.2011: “BRAMPTON HOLDINGS SDN BHD (Company No. 6126008-T) Date: 16th August 2011 Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd Wisma Isyoda No. 9, Jalan 1/168E Off Jalan Sentul Manis 51000 Kuala Lumpur Attn: Mdm Soh Yoke Yan Dear madam, “CADANGAN PEMBANGUNAN ENTERPRISE KOMERSIAL DAN PERDAGANGAN (PARCEL B) YANG MENGANDUNGI “RETAIL, SUPERMARKET, FOOD COURT & CAFE, TECHNO CENTRE” Dan “MEGA TUTORIAL” Di TINGKAT SUB-BASEMEN HINGGA TINGKAT 7, PANGSAPURI SERVIS (251 YUNIT) DI TINGKAT 4 HINGGA 14, “HOSTEL” (950 YUNIT) DI TINGKAT 8 HINGGA 14; TEMPAT LETAK KERETA DI TINGKAT BASEMEN DAN SUB-BASEMEN DI ATAS SEBAHAGIAN LOT 365, 262 & 174, SEKSYEN 92, JALAN LOKE YEW, DALAM BANDARAYA KUALA LUMPUR-Payment of Interim Certificate No 42(A) Supplemental Agreement (M&E Issues) dated 15.6.2011 Between Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd and Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd [“M&E Agreement”] 78 Supplemental Agreement (Contract Issues) dated 15.6.2011 Between Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd and Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd [“Supplemental Agreement”] _______________________________________________________ We refer to your letter dated 11 August 2011 in respect of the above matter. As you are well aware, besides the Supplemental Agreement, the parties had also entered into the M&E Agreement whereby you are to be released and discharged from the liabilities in respect of the M&E Works ... In view thereof, we have to be certain that all the M&E subcontractors who were to be paid by Isyoda ... will be paid ... thereto. ... In the circumstances, as it is clearly stated in the Interim Certificate No 42(A) and duly certified by Davis Langdon & Seah the various sums which are due and payable to the M&E Subcontractors we are now making direct payment of these sums due to the Subcontractors from the total amount certified. You will note that we are in essence not making any deductions or withholding of the sum due to you ... It is noted with regret that you choose to return the cheque of RM1,147,325.33. ... Yours faithfully, For BRAMPTON HOLDINGS SDN BHD - signed- ....................................... Lim Loke Choy, Director … c.c. Mr TK Lim, GAE Technical Services Sdn Bhd ...”. 79 [87] Pursuant to the above letter, GAE then issued a letter to Isyoda dated 22.8.2011 which is reproduced below: “GAE Technical Services Sdn Bhd (95472-W) Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd Date: 22 August 2011 Wisma Isyoda No. 5, 7&9, Jalan 1/68E Off Jalan Sentul Manis 51000 Kuala Lumpur Attn: Ir Tan Kok An / Mr. Lau Lek Seng Dear Sirs, PERDAGANGAN (PARCEL B) DI ATAS SEBAHAGIAN LOT 365, 262 & 174, SEKSYEN 92, JALAN LOKE YEW DALAM BANDARAYA KUALA LUMPUR UNTUK TETUAN BRAMPTON HOLDINGS SDN BHD - Final Payment We refer to the above and Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd’s letter ref: BHSB/Isyoda/Contract Payment/LLC/11/0025 dated 16 August 2011. We wish to highlight that the project had been handed over to the Client since 1 October 2010. To-date, our payment outstanding inclusive of retention sum amounting to RM1,284,218-62 (96% of our revised contract value). We had been extended a copy of Supplemental Agreement (M&E Works) dated 15 June 2011 between Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd and Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd. In this agreement, GAE Technical Services Sdn 80 Bhd had been referred to as one of the parties under “M&E Third Parties”. Under Clause 4 of the said agreement, Brampton had agreed to discharge and release Isyoda from all liabilities arising from or in connection with any of the M&E Works that have been performed or default of performance by any of the M&E Third parties with effect from 15 June 2011. Isyoda had also assigned absolutely all rights and remedies into and under the M&E Contracts to Brampton, thus allowing Brampton to step into their position vis a vis in their dealings with the M&E Third Parties. Given the above situation, we shall deal directly with Brampton on all matters pertaining to our contract under these M&E Works with Brampton. We shall also demand payment to be made directly to us subject always to your claim for profit and attendance for the M&E Works. We would have appreciated very much that a copy of this agreement should have been extended to us much earlier. Thank you. Yours faithfully-signed - T K LIM Executive Director Cc: Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd - Attn : Mr Lim Loke Choy”. 81 [88] Subsequently, Isyoda replied to GAE’s letter on 24.8.2011and assured GAE that the subcontract between them is still binding and enforceable and that GAE’s contractual right has not been affected. The said letter reads as follows: “ISYODA (M) SDN BHD (Co. No. 53013-W) Our ref: ISB/F&N/GAE/014 24 August 2011 By Fax & A.R. Registered 2, Jalan SS13/3E 47500 Subang Jaya Tel : 03-5633 8585 Selangor Darul Ehsan Fax : 03-5633 3773 Attn: Mr. TK Lim Dear Sir PERDAGANGAN (PARCEL B) DI SEBAHAGIAN LOT 365, 262 & 174, SEKSYEN 92, JALAN LOKE YEW DALAM BANDARAYA KUALA LUMPUR-SUB-CONTRACT NO. : ISB/F&N/006 -SUB-CONTRACT WORKS: AIR-CONDITIONING VENTILATION SYSTEM-Supplemental Agreement ________________________________________________________ We refer to your letter dated 22 August 2011. 82 Please be informed that the Supplemental Agreement between us and Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd is strictly a contractual matter between the two parties. As such, we are not obliged to inform you nor extend a copy of the said agreement to you. In this regard, your interpretation of clause 4 of Supplemental Agreement is erroneous. As you may recall, we have previously suggested having a tri-partite agreement with you, us and Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd to novate our agreement to Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd. However, such suggestion had been rejected by Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd. In any event, the subcontract between you and us is still binding and enforceable. Your contractual right has not been affected and there is also no anti-assignment clause in our contract. As such, we do not see what grounds of complaint you have in this matter. Thank you Yours faithfully, -signed - IR. TAN KOK AN Executive Director (Operations)”. [89] This payment arrangement encountered problems when GAE was left unpaid for works done, and both Brampton and Isyoda alleging that the other has the responsibility to make payment. 83 [90] Letters of demand were issued by GAE’s solicitors to Brampton and Isyoda on 5.12.2013 for the outstanding amount of RM898,402.43. Isyoda’s reply through its solicitors on 18.12.2013 stated that –

from August 2011 onwards, GAE is aware that all payments were to be made by Brampton to GAE pursuant to the

subsequent payments were made by Brampton directly to GAE and GAE had accepted those payments without protest;

if there is any amount due or payable, the demand should be addressed to Brampton;

by a letter dated 12.10.2012, GAE has agreed to hold Brampton, liable; and

in any event, Isyoda has not received any payment from Brampton in respect of the payment that GAE is now 84 demanding. Hence, the alleged outstanding amount is neither due nor payable by Isyoda to GAE. [91] The letter as mentioned in subparagraph 90(d) above is the Letter of Release and Waiver (‘LRW’) issued by GAE which is reproduced below: “GAE Technical Services Sdn Bhd (95472-W) YOUR REF OUR REF: GTS/12/1175(B) DATE: 12 October 2012 BRAMPTON HOLDINGS SDN BHD 3A-12, Service Apartment Kompleks Metro Pudu No. 1, Jalan Metro Pudu 2 Fraser Business Park 55200 Kuala Lumpur Wisma Isyoda No.9, Jalan 1/68E Off Jalan Sentul Manis 51000 Kuala Lumpur Dear Sir PERDAGANGAN (PARCEL B) YANG MENGANDUNGI “RETAIL 85 SUPERMARKET”, FOOD COURT DAN CAFÉ, TECHNO CENTRE” DAN “MEGA TUTORIAL” DI TINGKAT DI TINGKAT SUB-BASEMEN HINGGA TINGKAT 7; “PANGSAPURI SERVIS (251 YUNIT) DI TINGKAT 4 HINGGA 14, “HOSTEL” (950 Yunit) DI TINGKAT 8 HINGGA 14; TEMPAT LETAK KERETA DI TINGKAT BASEMEN DAN SUB-BASEMEN ATAS SEBAHAGIAN LOT 365, 262 & 174, SEKSYEN 92, JALAN LOKE YEW DALAM BANDARAYA KUALA LUMPUR (“Project”) - Owner/ Developer : Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd - Main Contractor : Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd - Sub-Contractor :GAE Technical Services Sdn Bhd - Sub-Contract No : ISB/F&N/006 - Sub-Contract Works : Air-Conditioning and Ventilation System ________________________________________________________ We refer to the above Project where we have been appointed as a sub-contractor by Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd by way of the Sub-Contract. We acknowledge that there is a sum of RM1,268,402.43 which is due and owing to us under the Sub-Contract. We hereby agree to comply with the instructions and supervision of Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd who has agreed to pay us all sums that are due and owing under the Sub-Contract. We also agree to hold Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd liable for payment of all outstanding payments under the Sub-Contract instead of Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd. We hereby fully and forever release Isyoda(M) Sdn Bhd from all and any liability to us whatsoever and howsoever arising from or in connection with the Sub-Contract and the Project. Thank you. Yours faithfully - signed- ............................................................. TK LIM Executive Director 86 We, BRAMPTON HOLDINGS SDN BHD agree to the above arrangement ………………………………………. Director We, ISYODA (M) SDN BHD agree to the above arrangement ………………………………………. Director”. [92] GAE then filed the 2014 Suit and the chain of events thereafter which led to the 2016 Suit is as narrated in the preceding paragraphs in this judgment. [93] During the trial, one of several submissions by learned counsel for GAE was that even though GAE is not a party to the Settlement Agreement, Clause 11(d) in the said Agreement is conclusive evidence that sum remaining due and payable to GAE. GAE’s stand is that the Direct Dealing and Payment Agreement is an afterthought on the part of Isyoda to deflect its liablility to pay the amount of RM898,402.43 or any part thereof to GAE. 87 [94] Isyoda admitted that there is no written document signed by all three parties titled “Direct Dealing and Payment Agreement”. Nevertheless, it was submitted that if the entire series of conduct and correspondences between the parties is considered in its totality, this will clearly show that the parties wanted, and had in fact implemented, such an agreement. Analysis & finding [95] A useful starting point would be to briefly discuss the judgments in Sigma Elevator and Bond’s case since these involve, among others, the same Project, the same Project owner (Brampton), the same main contractor (Isyoda), the same Settlement Agreement and the same “Direct Dealing and Payment Agreement”. The issues raised in the two cases were ventilated by way of full trials. [96] In Sigma Elevator, the Plaintiff, Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd was one of the subcontractors, like GAE, who was appointed by Isyoda. The Plaintiff claimed for a sum of RM1,180,291.52 being balance 88 payments for work done. Isyoda’s defence was very similar to this present appeal i.e. -

under Clause 3.0 of the subcontract, the Plaintiff is only entitled to payment after Isyoda received payment from Brampton. Since Isyoda has not received from Brampton, there is no obligation on Isyoda to pay the Plaintiff;

the Plaintiff had agreed to release Isyoda from its obligations to pay vide letter dated 11.10.2012 and had waived all sums due and owing by Isyoda under the subcontract (akin to the LRW in this appeal); and

by the LRW, a statutory declaration dated 15.10.2012 signed by the Plaintiff’s Managing Director, e-mails dated 23.10.2012, the Settlement Agreement and a meeting on 9.5.2014, it was agreed between the Plaintiff, Isyoda and Brampton that all sums due and owing under the subcontract will be paid by Brampton directly to the Plaintiff. 89 [97] Isyoda had also taken Third Party Proceedings against Brampton based on the Settlement Agreement alleging that payment should be made by Brampton. Likewise, Brampton denied liability and counterclaimed for damages against Isyoda for defective works. [98] High Court Justice Dato’ Mary Lim (as she then was) allowed the Plaintiff’s claim and dismissed Isyoda’s and Brampton’s counterclaim against the Plaintiff. In relation to the Third Party claim, it was held that Isyoda had proved its claim but only to the extent under the subcontract i.e. Brampton is to indemnify Isyoda for the sum of RM1,180,291.52. In particular, Her Ladyship found as follows:

the subcontract contained all the terms and conditions governing the relationship of the Plaintiff and Isyoda. Since the Plaintiff was engaged by Isyoda, it was Isyoda that had to pay for all services and work rendered by the Plaintiff;

The issue or defence of pay when paid under the subcontract was not available to Isyoda. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Isyoda will never be paid by Brampton for work 90 done by the Plaintiff since Brampton was to pay the Plaintiff directly whereas the argument of a back to back agreement was that Isyoda will only pay the Plaintiff when it was paid by Brampton. Isyoda could not hold on to both arguments which were inconsistent with one another;

the LRW bore only the signature of the Plaintiff. Both Brampton and Isyoda did not sign the letter. The affixing of a signature by the contracting party is important and material as it signifies agreement and commitment to the terms as appearing in the relevant document upon which the signature appears. When Isyoda amended the LRW instead of signing it, it showed that both parties had actually not reached any consensus ad idem on the matter. In the face of such non-agreement, Isyoda could not possibly rely on the LRW which Isyoda itself wanted amended; and had not signed; 91

the Settlement Agreement was intended to end and settle all disputes between Brampton and Isyoda. It was an agreement that did not involve the Plaintiff. By no means was it a tripartite agreement between the three parties before the court where it was agreed that the Plaintiff was to be paid directly by Brampton. The existence of the Settlement Agreement did not absolve Isyoda from its obligations to pay the Plaintiff for work done under the subcontract. For that, Isyoda remained very much liable under the subcontract to pay the Plaintiff for work that Sigma had completed; and

Isyoda’s agreement with Brampton that Brampton will pay the Plaintiff directly did not discharge Isyoda from its obligations to pay the Plaintiff. This is because the Plaintiff was not a party to the arrangements under the Settlement Agreement. [99] Moving on to Bond’s case, amost all of the contentious issues that were raised by Isyoda and Brampton (as the Third Party) in that case, where Bond M & E (KL) Sdn Bhd (‘Bond’) was the subcontractor for electrical services, were also raised in this current appeal. High Court 92 Justice Dato’ Lee Swee Seng upon conclusion of the full trial held that Bond is allowed to enter judgment against Isyoda for the balance sum of RM1,271,043.96 with interest and cost, and Isyoda is allowed to enter judgment against Brampton with interest and cost. [100] His Lordship’s reasoning in Bond’s case is, inter alia, as follows:

the Supplemental Agreement and Settlement Agreement is between Isyoda and Brampton. Whilst such an agreement may confer a benefit to Bond, it does not allow Bond to sue for that benefit and Bond would still have to look to its contracting party Isyoda to demand for payments;

Isyoda had, at all material times, in writing and by conduct, represented and maintained that the sub-contract remained binding and enforceable. Isyoda’s last letter stating the same was dated 24.8.2011 and there was no further correspondence by Isyoda to indicate otherwise; 93

even by conduct of the parties, it could not be inferred that Bond had agreed to the “Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement” and if at all estoppel does apply, Isyoda is estopped from contending that there was such an agreement;

there was no concluded contract between all parties regarding the Assignment Agreement which Isyoda asked Bond to prepare with respect to a release and waiver whereby Bond will release Isyoda from all and any liability under the sub-contract in return for payment from Brampton; and

Isyoda’s reliance on the back to back clause in the sub-contract was self-contradictory and should be struck down. [101] In view of the rehashed arguments put forth by the parties in this appeal and having read the well-reasoned analysis and application of the legal principles by the learned judges in Sigma Elevator and Bond, I find no compelling reason for me to come to a different 94 conclusion from the decisions in those cases, in so far as where there are similarities in the factual matrix and issues. [102] However, learned counsel for Isyoda had sought to distinguish the facts in this present appeal with the facts in Sigma Elevator in that the Plaintiff there–

did not receive direct payments from Brampton; and

did not make any direct claims against Brampton, whereas GAE had received three direct payments from Brampton amounting to RM370,000.00. Mr. Choon Hong Len further submitted that the enforceability of the sub-contract between Isyoda and GAE had been affected since it then became the intention of the parties to alter the contractual relationship between them. [103] On this point, I am in agreement with the submission by learned counsel for GAE that the learned SCJ did not err in law and/ or in fact when she decided that the correspondences and conduct between 95 Isyoda and GAE did not override (“mengatasi”) the sub-contract that they had signed. In the letter dated 24.8.2011 to GAE, Isyoda had reiterated that the sub-contract remains binding and enforceable. This remains the key consideration in the myriad of submissions by all counsels. [104] The relevant excerpt from the learned SCJ’s grounds is reproduced below: “[33] Dari keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh seorang saksi Plaintif dan seorang saksi Defendan, jelas menunjukkan bahawa terdapat perjanjian sub kontrak antara Plaintif dan Defendan untuk melakukan kerja-kerja sub kontrak M & E. Kedua belah pihak tidak menafikan bahawa terdapat Perjanjian Sub Kontrak yang telah dimasuki oleh Plaintif dan Defendan bagi kerja-kerja M & E tersebut. Tiada apa-apa dokumen lain atau perjanjian lain yang telah dimasuki oleh pihak Defendan dan Plaintif bagi mengubah atau membatalkan Perjanjian Sub Kontrak ini. Justeru, Perjanjian Sub Kontrak antara Plaintif dan Defendan kekal berkuat 96 kuasa. Saya merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan NO: B-02-1288-08/2014 Lim Ban Kay @ Lim Chiam Boon v Kilang Kelapa Sawit Morib Sdn Bhd & 2 Yang Lain dimana HMR David Wong Dak Wah memutuskan:

With respect, had the learned Judge considered the provisions set out above by us, we had no doubt that he would come to a different conclusion. This case was simply a construction of written agreements reached by the contracting parties and our duty was to give the words employed in those documents their natural meaning which was the four agreements could only be superseded by another written document. As there was no such document in this case, the full force of the four agreements remained intact. [34] Defendan mengatakan terdapat urusan dan perhubungan secara terus antara Plaintif dan Pihak Ketiga bukan sahaja sebelum Perjanjian Sub Kontrak dimasuki tetapi juga selepas perjanjian tersebut ditandatangani. Ini termasuklah 97 surat-surat dan bayaran terus yang telah dibuat oleh Pihak Ketiga secara terus kepada Plaintif. Mahkamah dalam memutuskan isu ini telah melihat surat-surat tersebut dan memutuskan bahawa surat-surat tersebut tidak boleh mengatasi Perjanjian Sub Kontrak yang telah dimasuki oleh Plaintif dengan Defendan yang secara jelas menggariskan tanggungjawab pihak-pihak yang berkontrak. Malah jika dilihat kepada surat-surat dan dokumen yang dirujuk oleh Defendan, ia tidak lain adalah surat yang telah dibuat secara unilateral oleh satu atau dua pihak tanpa mendapat persetujuan dari pihak yang lain yang berkepentingan. Malah, jika dilihat kepada surat Defendan sendiri di mukasurat 559 Ikatan D mengakui bahawa Perjanjian Sub kontrak itu masih berkuat kuasa. Ia menyatakan seperti berikut: As you may recall, we have previously suggested having a tri-partite agreement with you, us and Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd to novate our agreement to Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd. However, such 98 suggestion had been rejected by Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd. In any event, the subcontract between you and us is still binding and enforceable. Your contractual right has not been affected and there is also no anti assignment clause in our contract. As such, we do not see what grounds of complaint ypu have in this matter. [35] Terdapat juga cubaan untuk mengikat pihak Plaintif, Defendan dan Pihak Ketiga di dalam satu kontrak berdasarkan surat Plaintif bertarikh 12 Oktober 2012 kepada Pihak Ketiga dan Defendan agar urusan dan bayaran secara terus dibuat oleh Pihak Ketiga dan Plaintif. Namun begitu, usaha tersebut gagal memandangkan Pihak Ketiga enggan untuk menandatangani perjanjian tersebut. (Rujuk mukasurat 132 dan 133 Ikatan F). Justeru, Perjanjian Sub kontrak antara Plaintif dan Defendan masih kekal berkuat kuasa. 99 [36] Tindakan Pihak Ketiga yang telah membayar sejumlah RM370,000.00 secara terus kepada Plaintif tidak menafikan tanggungjawab Defendan di dalam Perjanjian Sub Kontrak itu. Malah pembayaran secara terus itu tidak menimbulkan apa-apa hubungan kontrak antara Plaintif dengan Pihak Ketiga. Pembayaran terus itu adalah persetujuan antara Defendan dan Pihak Ketiga di dalam Perjanjian Tambahan (Isu) dan (M & E). Perjanjian Tambahan tersebut tidak melibatkan Plaintif sebagai pihak yang berkontrak. Justeru ia tidak mengikat Plaintif. Apa-apa remidi yang boleh diambil oleh Plaintif adalah melalui kontrak yang Plaintif sendiri menjadi pihak didalamnya. Di dalam kes ini kontrak tersebut adalah Perjanjian Sub kontrak antara Plaintif dan Defendan. [37] Defendan bergantung kepada klausa 2.0 Perjanjian Sub kontrak yang mengatakan bahawa bayaran hanya akan dibuat oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif apabila terdapat bayaran oleh Pihak Ketiga kepada Defendan. Namun demikian, jika dilihat kepada Perjanjian-Perjanjian Tambahan dan Perjanjian Penyelesaian yang telah dimasuki oleh 100 Defendan dengan Pihak Ketiga jelas menunjukkan bahawa klausa 2.0 Perjanjian Sub Kontrak telah menjadi hampa. Di dalam Perjanjian-Perjanjian tersebut telah menyatakan secara jelas bagaimana bayaran-bayaran kepada sub kontraktor M & E akan dibuat. Oleh itu isu bahawa bayaran akan dibuat oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif hanya selepas Defendan mendapat bayaran dari Pihak Ketiga bukan menjadi isu lagi. Apatah lagi fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan di dalam kes ini, kerja-kerja sub kontrak tersebut telah pun disiapkan oleh Plaintif dan projek itu telah diserahkan kepada Pihak Ketiga. [38] Saya juga mendapati Klausa 2.0 tidak digubal untuk mengecualikan libiliti Defendan untuk membayar kepada Plaintif bagi kerja-kerja sub kontrak yang telah dijalankan oleh Plaintif untuk Defendan. Defendan tetap bertanggungan untuk membayar Plaintif bagi kerja-kerja tersebut. Saya merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan, Globe Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Bina Jati Sdn Bhd [2014] 7 CLJ 1 yang telah memutuskan bahawa jika pun terdapat terma 101 pay-when-paid, ia tidak melupuskan tanggungan untuk membayar bagi kerja-kerja yang telah dilakukan. YA Jeffrey Tan menyatakan:

Hence, in answering the leave questions, the court held that:

upon the proper construction, the pay-when-paid clause was a provision that merely fixed time for payment but did not absolve the respondent of liability to pay the amount certified and attributable to the works executed by the appellant;

(ii) upon termination of the sub-contract, all rights and liabilities were governed by cl. 19; and

(iii) upon termination of the sub-contract, the entitlement of the appellant to be paid in accordance with cl. 19 was not contingent upon actual receipt by the respondent of such payment from the employer. (para 34) 102 [39] Melalui Perjanjian Tambahan dan Perjanjian Penyelesaian, Pihak Ketiga telah berjanji untuk berurusan terus dengan pihak sub kontraktor termasuk Plaintif untuk membuat bayaran bagi kerja-kerja sub kontrak tersebut. Namun begitu perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut tidak privi kepada Plaintif. Oleh yang demikian Plaintif tidak boleh menguatkuasakan perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut yang mereka bukanlah pihak kepada perjanjian itu. Yang mempunyai kapasiti untuk menguatkuasakan perjanjian tersebut adalah Defendan sendiri. Justeru, selaras dengan Perjanjian Sub Kontrak yang dimasuki oleh Plaintif dengan Defendan, Defendan adalah bertanggungan untuk membayar untuk kerja-kerja sub kontrak yang telah dijalankan oleh Plaintif. Justeru, Mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan di perenggan 22 Penyata Tuntutan Plaintif sub perenggan (a) untuk jumlah sebanyak RM898,402.43, sub perenggan (b) bagi faedah yang dituntut dan sub perenggan

iaitu kos sebanyak RM20,000.00 dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. Dan selaras dengan Perjanjian Penyelesaian yang dimasuki oleh Defendan dengan Pihak 103 Ketiga, Pihak Ketiga diperintahkan untuk menanggung rugi Defendan terhadap jumlah tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan beserta faedah dan kos yang dituntut. Ini adalah seperti yang mahkamah telah nyatakan di alasan penghakiman mahkamah di atas.”. [105] Further, learned counsel for Isyoda also sought to distinguish the facts in this present appeal with the facts in Bond’s case in that Bond did not sign the LRW. Instead, Bond prepared their own Assignment Agreement but it was not signed by Brampton and Isyoda. Thus, there was no concluded contract between all parties regarding the said Assignment Agreement. [106] In this appeal before the Court, only GAE signed the LRW. Therefore, the situation is similar to the Sigma Elevator case. On this point, I only need to refer to paragraphs 46 – 54 of the decision by Her Ladyship Mary Lim in Sigma Elevator and paragraphs 22 – 33 of GAE’s written submission to conclude that the format of the LRW itself required the signature of all three parties. In the absence of the 104 signatures of representatives from Brampton and Isyoda, there was no agreement on the matters as set out in the LRW. [107] One final point relating to this appeal is that, in view of the decision by the Court of Appeal affirming the High Court decision in Bond, Brampton has to indemnify Isyoda under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Conclusion [108] Based on the foregoing, Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16-12/2016 and Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-8-02/2017 was dismissed. Following brief submissions by counsels on the issue of costs, I ordered costs of RM15,000.00 for Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-16/2016 to GAE and Isyoda, respectively, and the sum of RM30,000.00 held by Brampton’s solicitor as security for cost to be released within 14 days from the date of decision. 105 [109] As for Civil Appeal No. WA-12BC-8-02/2017, cost of RM8,000.00 was ordered to be borne by Brampton. (ALIZA SULAIMAN) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER CRIMINAL HIGH COURT 4 KUALA LUMPUR Dated: 30 August 2018 Counsels: For GAE Technical Services Sdn Bhd: Mr. Michael Lee (Messrs. YM Chin & Partners) For Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd : Mr. Choon Hon Leng & Ms. Magdalene Soon (Messrs.Raja Darryl & Loh) For Brampton Holdings Sdn Bhd : Mr. Lim Tsu Ming (Messrs Ong, Chong & Tan) 106

4.5.2018 for WA-12BC-13-10/2016

8.6.2018 for WA-12BC-16-12/2016 & WA-12BC-8-02/2017