Based on all of the above I hold that the Petitioner knew at all material times of the true effect and orders given in the Suit 660 Judgment but that he had intentionally and dishonestly concealed the said true facts from the Court hearing the Petition. The Petition and the subsequent orders emanating from it are therefore a blatant abuse of court process and void ab initio. In the circumstances, this Court has the inherent jurisdiction to set aside the Winding Up Order will thus rely on the authority of Sibu Slipway Sdn Bhd v Yii Chee Ming & Ors and other appeals [2017] 1 MLJ 368 where Justice Nallini Pathmanathan JCA (as Her Ladyship then was) delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal held: “[31] We conclude that this court has the inherent jurisdiction to intervene and set right or remedy an abuse of process in winding up proceedings, notwithstanding the lack of an express provision in the Act. In the case of Megah Teknik Sdn Bhd v Miracle Resources Sdn Bhd [2010] 4 MLJ 651; [2010] 6 CLJ 745 (‘Megah Teknik’) this Court recognised, albeit by way of obiter, that the winding up court has inherent jurisdiction. At para 25 of the judgment, Abu Samah Nordin JCA (now FCJ) stated, inter alia, as follows: [25] There is no express provision in the Companies Act 1965 or the Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1972 similar to r 7.47(1) of the Insolvency Rules 1986. In the United Kingdom, before the S/N /k6ufFb1pkudAWjITLbHkg Insolvency Rules 1986 came into force a winding up order could not be rescinded after it had been drawn up. The only remedy was to apply for a stay: … or appeal … Until a similar provision is introduced into our Companies Act 1965 or Companies (Winding-Up) Rules 1972 we are of the considered view that a winding up which has been perfected and duly sealed cannot be set aside or rescinded save in those circumstances where the court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction … (Emphasis added.) [32] Clearly therefore this court recognised that notwithstanding the lack of express statutory provisions in the Act and the Rules, this did not affect the inherent jurisdiction of the court to intervene and provide redress even in respect of a winding up order that had been perfected and sealed.”