Catherine Torio Bate v 1. ) Lourdes Medical Centre Sdn Bhd (WA-23NCvC-6-01/2025)

This case came before me for assessment of damages only. Liability is not in issue. A judgment in default had been regularly entered against the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant on 1.7.2025 for special damages in the sum of RM 100,894-00, and for general damages, aggravated damages, costs and interests to be assessed at trial.

Consent judgment was recorded on 27.3.2026 for the sum of RM20,000.00 against the $ 2^{n d} $ Defendant. The settlement between the Plaintiff and the $ 2^{\mathrm{n d}} $ Defendant was confined strictly to costs and was not in regard to damages.

The trial was originally fixed for 25.3.2026. On the eve of trial, at 11:36 p.m. on 24 March 2026, the Plaintiff's solicitors were served with a Memorandum of Appearance filed on behalf of the $ ^{1 s t} $ Defendant.

During the proceedings on 25.3.2026, learned counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant made an oral application for leave to enter appearance, which the Court allowed. The Plaintiff did not object. Counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant expressly confirmed that they had no instructions to apply to set aside the Judgment in Default ("JID") previously entered against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant.

The matter then proceeded to trial on 27 March 2026, confined solely to the assessment of general damages, aggravated damages, interest and costs. The Plaintiff testified as the sole witness. The 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant called no witnesses and tendered no evidence. In the silence of that absence, her testimony stood like a lone tree in an open field—unshaken, unshadowed and uncontradicted.

The river of liability has already found its course; what remains is to determine how deep the waters of loss have run. The Court was therefore confined to assessing:

General damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities;

Aggravated damages;

Interest; and

Costs. Medical Background and Course of Events

The Plaintiff's story is not merely a medical chronology; it is a journey through pain, fear, and betrayal. The Plaintiff had a history of three prior abdominal surgeries undertaken in the Philippines. On 8.8.2018, she attended the $ ^{1st} $ Defendant's Hospital and was examined by the $ ^{2nd} $ Defendant, who diagnosed her with a suspected left endometrial ovarian cyst and advised a laparotomy and cystectomy. The Plaintiff testified that she was unable to proceed immediately due to financial constraints and required time to arrange the necessary funds.

On 30.1.2019, she again consulted the $ 2^{n d} $ Defendant, who this time diagnosed her with a suspected twisted ovarian cyst. The Plaintiff underwent surgery at the $ 1^{s t} $ Defendant's Hospital—a wound opened not to heal, but to reveal a mistake.

During the procedure, the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendant was unable to visualise the left fallopian tube and ovary and instead performed an adhesiolysis and abdominal washout, without undertaking the intended cystectomy.

The Plaintiff was discharged on 1.2.2019, but returned to the hospital on multiple occasions—11th February, 22nd February, 23rd February, 25th February, 17th April, and 20th April 2019—complaining of persistent abdominal pain. She was prescribed oral analgesics and administered painkiller injections. She was only reviewed by the 2nd Defendant on 11th February, 28th February, and 20th April 2019; on the other visits, she was attended solely by nurses who administered injections without further assessment.

On 29.2.2019, the $ 2^{nd} $ Defendant referred her to the University of Malaya Medical Centre ("UMMC"). The Plaintiff testified that UMMC declined to treat her and directed her to return to the $ 2^{nd} $ Defendant for continued management.

On 19.3.2019, she sought treatment at Subang Jaya Medical Centre ("SJMC"), where she was diagnosed with adenomyosis and an endometrial cyst on the left side of her uterus, and was subsequently referred to Ampang Hospital.

On 6.10.2020, the Plaintiff underwent major surgery at Ampang Hospital, involving the removal of her uterus, remaining fallopian tube and ovary, appendix, and omentum. She has since made a good recovery.

For ease of reference, the particulars of injuries are reproduced below:- "Particulars of Injuries

1 Undetected and unresolved adenomyosis, adenomyoma, endometriotic cyst, chronic cervicitis and right cystic follicles and its sequelae including chronic and severe abdominal pain and discomfort, dysmenorrhoea, heavy menstrual bleeding, symptomatic anaemia secondary to menorrhagia, dyspareunia, restraint on normal activities and significant reduction in quality of life from 20.1.2019 to 6.10. 2020;

2 additional laparotomy and its sequelae including increased abdominal adhesions and their long terms sequelae including those requiring further surgery;

3. prolonged administration of pethidine from February to April 2019;

4. mental distress and anxiety from physical injuries."

The 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant is liable, inter alia, for: - failing to properly diagnose adenomyosis and the endometrial cyst; - wrongly diagnosing a left ovarian cyst; - failing to conduct adequate pre-operative investigations, including determining the presence or absence of the left ovary and fallopian tube; - performing an unnecessary surgery; - exacerbating the Plaintiff's condition; - causing a permanent abdominal scar; - delaying the Plaintiff's access to appropriate treatment; and - the pain, suffering, and loss of amenities arising from the unnecessary surgery.

Given that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant has elected not to apply to set aside the JID, liability is not in dispute. It is therefore not open to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant to challenge the injuries pleaded and particularised in the Statement of Claim.

A default judgment is not a hollow shell. It is a door the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant chose not to open, and once closed, it seals the findings within. Liability and causation are no longer living issues; they are settled stones in the foundation of this case.

The 1st Defendant's attempt to reopen liability at the assessment stage is akin to trying to unring a bell—the law does not permit it. The Plaintiff's special damages are fixed. The only remaining task is to assess the human cost of what she endured.

PW1 gave her evidence in a calm, measured, and straightforward manner. She confirmed her Witness Statement (Enclosure 34) in full, and I accepted it as her evidence-in-chief. Throughout her testimony, she remained consistent despite extensive cross-examination, and her demeanour reflected sincerity rather than exaggeration.

PW1 described the period following the negligent surgery of 31.1.2019 as one marked by severe, unrelenting pain and profound functional impairment. Her testimony was vivid and aligned with her earlier written account.

She stated: "I was always in a wheelchair... I cannot walk on my own... I have to lie down every day." "It was very hard for me to go to the toilet... I cannot take a bath alone."

These descriptions were consistent with her answers in Q&A 12 and 13 of her Witness Statement, where she explained that she was in such constant pain that she required daily hospital visits, during which nurses would administer injections without inquiry into her condition.

PW1 also gave compelling evidence of the emotional trauma she suffered. She described a deep loss of trust in doctors, fear of undergoing further surgery, and a sense of betrayal arising from her experience at the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant's Hospital.

She testified: "I felt neglected... they just injected me and told me to go." "I felt very betrayed by the doctor... I didn't have trust anymore."

This evidence was consistent with her account in Q&A 13, where she explained that the nurses did not ask her about her pain and simply administered injections before sending her away.

Her emotional reaction was also evident when she testified that she felt "so bad and angry" upon learning that the hospital had failed to enter an appearance and only appeared at the eleventh hour to dispute quantum.

PW1 further explained the 21-month delay before undergoing corrective surgery at Ampang Hospital on 6.10.2020. Her explanation was detailed and credible. She testified that the delay was caused by: - Trauma and distrust following the negligent surgery; - Fear of further pain, having endured severe suffering after the first operation; - Financial constraints, as she could not afford immediate treatment; and - Confusion arising from multiple referrals, including being turned away by UMMC and told to return to the $ 2 ^{n d} $ Defendant (as reflected in Q&A 16 of her Witness Statement).

Her explanation was consistent with the chronology in the medical records and with her oral testimony that she "felt very disappointed with the doctors" and needed time before she could bring herself to undergo another operation.

PW1's evidence remained consistent, coherent, and unshaken throughout cross-examination. Although she struggled with precise dates—an unsurprising difficulty given the trauma, the passage of time, and her background—her core narrative never wavered.

Her account of the pain, the repeated hospital visits, the lack of proper medical attention, and the emotional impact of the negligent surgery was not contradicted by any evidence from the 1st Defendant, who called no witnesses. Her testimony carried the weight of lived truth. It was the voice of someone who had walked through fire and remembered every burn. Finding Of facts The Plaintiff underwent an unnecessary and traumatic surgical procedure on 31 January 2019.

The evidence establishes that the laparotomy performed by the 2nd Defendant did not address the pathology for which it was advised and was undertaken without adequate pre-operative investigation into the Plaintiff's true anatomical condition. The surgery was therefore not only unwarranted but exposed the Plaintiff to avoidable pain, risk, and emotional distress. The Plaintiff suffered severe and persistent pain, a marked loss of mobility, a loss of independence in performing basic daily activities, and a substantial loss of amenities of life for an extended period following the surgery.

Her testimony-describing reliance on a wheelchair, inability to walk unaided, difficulty bathing and using the toilet, and the need to lie down daily due to pain-was consistent with her Witness Statement and with the chronology of repeated hospital attendances. This suffering was not transient; it endured for many months and significantly impaired her quality of life. The Plaintiff's delay in undergoing corrective surgery was attributable to trauma, fear, and a profound loss of trust in medical practitioners, rather than any unreasonable conduct on her part.

Her explanation was coherent and supported by the surrounding circumstances: the shock of the unnecessary surgery, the severity of her post-operative pain, her negative experiences during follow-up visits, her financial limitations, and the confusion arising from multiple referrals. These factors collectively provide a credible and compelling account of why she did not immediately pursue further treatment. The 1st Defendant's post-operative management aggravated the Plaintiff's suffering.

The Plaintiff's unchallenged evidence was that she was repeatedly injected with painkillers by nursing staff without proper assessment, without meaningful inquiry into her symptoms, and without continuity of care. The absence of explanation, reassurance, or proper follow-up compounded her physical pain and deepened her emotional distress. This conduct fell short of the standard of care expected of a hospital entrusted with the ongoing management of a post-operative patient. The Plaintiff is a truthful and a reliable witness

Having observed the Plaintiff's demeanour and considered her evidence in its entirety, I find her to be a credible, truthful, and reliable witness, and I accept her evidence in full.

Her account was internally consistent, aligned with the documentary chronology, and unshaken in cross-examination. Minor inconsistencies in dates unsurprising given the passage of time and her circumstances did not detract from the clarity and coherence of her core narrative. In contrast, the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant adduced no evidence to rebut her testimony.

In Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 751 the Federal Court held as follows at p 75:- "In these circumstances it was the duty of the judge to have accepted her evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the first respondent going the other way"

The defence's challenges to the Plaintiff's case ultimately carry no weight. Their attempt to attribute her post-operative pain to her long-standing dysmenorrhea and prior surgeries is legally irrelevant, as liability and causation are conclusively fixed by the default judgment.

In any event, the Plaintiff's unshaken evidence was that the pain she experienced after the negligent surgery was of an entirely different and far more debilitating magnitude, and this was never contradicted by any medical witness.

The defence's effort to impeach her credibility through age discrepancies and minor memory lapses also fails; she provided a plausible explanation for the altered ages in her documents, and such inconsistencies are unsurprising given her trauma, background, and the passage of time. Her core narrative remained coherent and consistent.

The suggestion that she unreasonably delayed corrective surgery is rejected; her explanation—rooted in fear, trauma, loss of trust, financial constraints, and confusion from multiple referrals—was entirely credible and unchallenged by any contrary medical evidence.

In Jaafar Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693, the Federal Court had said as follows:- "For, once a defendant in civil proceedings elects not to call evidence, then all the evidence led by the plaintiff must be assumed to be true. In this context, it is sufficient to refer to the following passage in the judgment of Elphinstone CJ Wasakah Singh v Bachan Singh [1931] 1 MC 125 at p. 128: "If the party on whom the burden of proof lies gives of call evidence which, if it is believed, is sufficient to prove his case, then the judge is bound to call upon the other party, and has no power to hold that the first party has failed to prove his case merely because the judge does not believe his evidence. At this stage, the truth or falsify of the evidence is immaterial. For the purpose of resting whether there is a case to answer, all the evidence given must be presumed to be true... (emphasis added)." See also: Irwanbudiana Amsah (suing as the administrator of the estate of Muhammad Uwais Irwanbudiana, deceased) v The Government of Malaysia [2023] 3 CLJ 526 Yusnita bt Johari (suing through her husband and litigation representative Khairil Faiz bin Rahamat) v Dr Jerilee Mariam Khong & Ors [2023] 9 MLJ 629

The defence's selective reliance on isolated portions of her expert report is misplaced, as the same report expressly acknowledges deficiencies in her care and confirms that her suffering could have been shortened, thereby supporting her claim.

Finally, the attempt to use the 2nd Defendant's RM20,000.00 consent judgment as a benchmark for damages is misconceived; that settlement did not compromise or quantify the Plaintiff's damages claim and cannot limit this Court's independent assessment.

In determining the appropriate award for general damages, the Court must assess the nature, severity, and duration of the Plaintiff's pain, suffering, and loss of amenities, guided by established principles and comparable Malaysian authorities.

In Adam Bin Hamil v Dr Chiam Tee Kiang [2025] 8 MLJ 691, the defendant, an aesthetic medical practitioner, performed a nose implant trimming and ear cartilage grafting procedure that were outside his licensed scope. The court found that not only were the procedures unauthorised, but they also failed to resolve the plaintiff's condition and instead aggravated it, causing prolonged infection and pain. The court awarded general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life in the sum of RM 150,000-00, special damages, future medical expenses, and exemplary damages, specifically noting that the procedures were unnecessary and did not address the plaintiff's medical issues.

In Dr Wan Himratul Azna binti Wan Harun v Dato' Dr Rohan Malek Johan& Ors (Civil Suit No.: 21-NCVC-197-08-2012, Rosnani binti Saub,J (as her Lordship then was) had awarded RM400,000-00 as damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life for failing to provide advice and information and the delay in diagnosing and treating the plaintiff for her endometriosis that had led to her undergoing a total abdominal hysterectomy with bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy.

In our instant case, the evidence establishes that the Plaintiff underwent an unnecessary and traumatic laparotomy on 31.1.2019, a procedure which ought never to have been performed had proper pre-operative assessment been undertaken. This unnecessary surgery set in motion a prolonged period of significant physical and emotional suffering.

The Plaintiff's evidence which I have accepted in full, demonstrates that she endured severe and persistent pain, a marked loss of mobility and a profound loss of independence in performing basic daily activities.

She required assistance to walk, bathe and use the toilet, and was frequently confined to lying down due to unrelenting pain. This state of functional impairment continued for approximately 21 months, until she finally underwent corrective surgery at Ampang Hospital in October 2020.

In Sheela Christina Nair v Regency Specialist Hospital Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 9 CLJ 267, the claimant had undergone a surgery for the removal of fibroids, but the surgery had gone wrong. As a result of an undiagnosed bowel perforation, the claimant had to undergo several repair operations and also undergo a prolonged period of convalescence from the injuries she suffered. Nazlan Ghazali JC (as his Lordship then was) in awarding the sum of RM 240,000-00 for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life had stated as follows:- "Considering the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff, and the pain and suffering as well as the deprivation of the amenities of life resulting therefore as well as from the scars, which continue till presently, including mental distress, a lump sum award of RM 240,000 was a reasonable and fair amount"

The Plaintiff's delay in seeking corrective treatment was not due to any unreasonable conduct on her part. Rather, it was the natural consequence of the trauma, fear, and loss of trust arising from the negligent surgery and the manner in which she was subsequently treated.

The hospital's post-operative management-consisting of repeated injections administered by nursing staff without proper assessment, the absence of meaningful explanation, and the lack of continuity of care-aggravated her suffering and deepened her psychological distress.

In assessing general damages, I have considered the totality of the Plaintiff's experience: - the unnecessary nature of the surgery; - the exceptional duration of her pain and disability; - the loss of mobility and independence; - the psychological trauma, including fear of further medical intervention; and - the eventual need for major corrective surgery involving removal of multiple organs.

In Norizan Abd Rahman v. Dr Arthur Samuel [2013] 2 MLRH 658; [2013] 9 MLJ 385; [2013] 4 CLJ 275 - where the Kuala Lumpur High Court awarded general damages of RM120,000.00 for laparotomy injuries, hysterectomy, loss of right ovary, inability to conceive and for pain and suffering suffered by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff in the present case did not suffer permanent reproductive loss as a result of the negligent surgery, as her left ovary had already been removed in 2006 and the later TAHBSO was performed for independent medical reasons. Her injuries, though severe, were therefore not permanent.

However, the 21-month duration of her pain, immobility, and loss of independence was exceptionally serious. The fact that the laparotomy was entirely unnecessary significantly aggravates the harm suffered. This was further compounded by grossly inadequate post-operative care, where she was repeatedly injected without proper assessment, given no explanation of her condition, and denied continuity of care.

Accordingly, I assess general damages at RM120,000.00, which I consider fair, proportionate, and commensurate with the gravity of the Plaintiff's pain, suffering, and loss of amenities.

Aggravated damages are warranted where the defendant's conduct increases the plaintiff's distress or amounts to oppressive or insulting behaviour. It is trite law that aggravated damages may be awarded as a separate head of damages in medical negligence cases.

In the case of Broome v Cassel and Company [1972] AC 1021 where Lord Diplock described aggravated damages as; "Compensation for the injured feelings of the Plaintiff where his sense of injury resulting from wrongful physical act is justifiably heightened by the manner in which or motive for which the defendant did it."

In Dr Hari Krishnan & Anor v Megat Noor Ishak bin Megat Ibrahim & Anor and another appeal [2018] 3 MLJ 281, the Federal Court held as follows at paragraph 99:- "It can be seen from the above cases that aggravated damages can be and have been awarded as a separate head of damage in tort."

The way the plaintiff was treated after the surgery was mechanical and dismissive, reflecting a complete absence of clinical assessment or meaningful engagement with her condition.

She was repeatedly injected with painkillers without inquiry into her symptoms, without examination, and without any attempt to understand the severity of her suffering. This mode of treatment fell markedly below even the most basic standards of post-operative care.

Such conduct was not merely negligent; it was emotionally degrading, particularly for a patient who was already in significant pain and in a vulnerable state. The plaintiff's evidence shows that she felt ignored, dehumanised, and treated as an inconvenience rather than as a patient deserving of dignity and proper care.

This disregard for her wellbeing amounted to a breach of her personal dignity, a factor which this Court has consistently treated with seriousness when assessing aggravated damages. The hospital's conduct intensified her distress, deepened her anxiety, and contributed to a profound sense of abandonment. In these circumstances, the behaviour is emblematic of the type of conduct for which aggravated damages are properly awarded.

In Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors and another appeal [2018] 1 MLJ 784, the Court of Appeal held as follows at paragraph 32:- "Now, aggravated damages are classified as a species of compensatory damages, which are awarded as additional compensation where there has been intangible injury to the interest or personality of the plaintiff, and where this injury has been caused or exacerbated by the exceptional conduct of the defendant."

The Defendants' litigation conduct also materially aggravated the plaintiff's distress. After failing to enter an appearance within the prescribed time and allowing a default judgment to be entered, the hospital only surfaced on the eve of trial for the sole purpose of disputing quantum.

This last-minute appearance, unaccompanied by any explanation, apology, or attempt to engage constructively with the claim, conveyed an attitude of indifference towards the plaintiff's suffering and towards the court's process.

For a litigant who had endured prolonged pain, trauma, and uncertainty, the defendants' sudden re-entry into the proceedings after months of silence—was understandably upsetting and destabilising.

Such conduct is recognised in Malaysian jurisprudence as capable of supporting an award of aggravated damages. Thus, post-tort behaviour, including high-handed, dismissive, or oppressive litigation tactics, may intensify the plaintiff's sense of humiliation, anxiety, and emotional injury.

In Ahmad Radhiq Arbee bin Ahmad Rejal Arbee (as a husband and dependant of Sharifah Shalihah bt Sayed Abdullah, deceased) & Ors v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2020] 10 MLJ 459 the court held as follows:- "Aggravating features can also include the way the litigation and trial are conducted."

Here, the hospital's procedural indifference, followed by a last-minute attempt to minimise compensation without addressing liability or offering any remorse, plainly added insult to injury. In these circumstances, the conduct is properly treated as an aggravating factor warranting an award of aggravated damages.

The plaintiff's evidence demonstrates that she endured not only physical pain but also a profound sense of humiliation, indignity, and emotional betrayal throughout her interactions with the defendants.

She described feeling ignored, dismissed, and treated as though her suffering was inconsequential. The repeated experience of being injected without assessment, without inquiry, and without even the courtesy of a conversation left her feeling stripped of dignity and reduced to a mere object of routine. This was compounded by the shock and emotional injury of discovering that the surgery performed on her was unnecessary and failed to address her condition, deepening her sense of violation and betrayal by those entrusted with her care.

Her testimony reveals a patient who felt abandoned by the very institution meant to protect her, and who carried the emotional weight of that betrayal long after the physical wounds had healed. The resulting loss of trust in doctors, the fear of further medical intervention, and the prolonged delay before she could bring herself to undergo corrective surgery all underscore the depth of the emotional harm inflicted. These are precisely the types of injuries-humiliation, indignity, and emotional betrayal—that this Court recognise as aggravating factors warranting an

The fact that the Plaintiff has now substantially recovered does not extinguish the claim for loss of amenities. The law compensates not only permanent disability but also the period during which the Plaintiff was deprived of the ordinary enjoyments of life.

For the duration of the impairment when she could not walk unaided, perform daily tasks, or participate in the normal activities that constitute the amenities of life. The Plaintiff suffered a real and compensable diminution in her quality of living.

Recovery affects only the quantum, not the availability, of this head of damages. Though strength has returned to her, the months of suffering remain etched in the narrative of her life: a time when each day felt like travelling through a landscape where colours had drained away, where even the smallest movement required the resolve of a traveller pushing against an unseen wind. Health may have lifted her back into the sunlight, but the long passage through that muted world is a loss the law must still honour.

Having regard to the totality of the plaintiff's experience, including the unnecessary surgical intervention, the prolonged period of pain and functional impairment, the dismissive and degrading post-operative treatment, and the Defendants' high-handed litigation conduct, this is an appropriate case for a meaningful award of aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal in Bukit Tinggi Hospital Sdn Bhd & Anor V Navin Sharma Al Karam Chand (Suing As Administrator Of The Estate Of Suman Rampal Ap Hardyal Rampal, Deceased) & Anor And Another Appeal [2026] 1 MLJ 172, pg 146] held: "[77] In this regard, it is perhaps apt for us to also refer to Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 (HL), where Lord Diplock said (p 1124) that aggravated damages are a form of 'Additional compensation for the injured feelings of the plaintiff where his sense of injury resulting from the wrongful physical act is justifiably heightened by the manner in which or motive for which the defendant did it'. [78] But, it is of critical importance that we should not lose sight of the cardinal principle of aggravated damages as enunciated in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC1129 that aggravated damages may be awarded when the manner in which the wrong was committed resulted in injury to the plaintiff's dignity, selfrespect, or emotional well-being. The phrase 'the manner in which the wrong was committed' must surely be in reference to the tort, which in the present case is the issue of (medical) negligence levelled against D1 and D2. [79] Thus, leaving aside for the moment the question of whether any aggravating circumstances have been proven in the present case, the important and imperative question is whether the award of aggravated damages is meant only to compensate the person (the victim of the tort) who, because of the aggravating conduct by the tortfeasor, has suffered distress, anguish, misery, hurt and/or injury to his/her feelings. In other words, if the victim is deceased, and the tortfeasor exhibits aggravating conduct after the death of the deceased (whether before or during the litigation), can aggravated damages be awarded because of the distress and anguish caused to the relatives of the deceased who now claim through the estate of the deceased?" (emphasis is mine).

The plaintiff's evidence demonstrates that her suffering was compounded not only by the clinical negligence itself but by the way she was subsequently treated—both medically and procedurally.

In these circumstances, an award of RM50,000.00 under the head of aggravated damages is justified and proportionate, reflecting the additional humiliation, indignity, and emotional injury inflicted upon her beyond the ordinary parameters of general damages.

The general principle is that costs follow the event, and the successful party is ordinarily entitled to its costs unless there are circumstances justifying a different order. In the present proceedings, liability against the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant stands by virtue of the Judgment in Default, and the matter proceeded solely for the assessment of damages.

The assessment hearing was conducted over a short sitting, with the Plaintiff as the sole witness. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant did not call any witnesses and did not challenge the Plaintiff's factual evidence.

Nevertheless, the Plaintiff was required to prepare a witness statement, supporting documents, and written submissions addressing both quantum and the legal issues raised by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant.

The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant appeared only shortly before the assessment hearing and filed submissions raising several legal arguments, including issues relating to joint tortfeasor release, the effect of the expert report, and the scope of aggravated damages.

These matters required the Plaintiff to prepare a considered response. While the hearing itself was not lengthy, the preparation undertaken by the Plaintiff was not insignificant.

In determining an appropriate award of costs, the Court must consider the nature of the proceedings, the limited scope of the assessment, the conduct of the parties, and the work reasonably undertaken.

The assessment did not involve expert cross-examination or complex interlocutory disputes, but it did require the Plaintiff to address substantive legal issues and to prepare written submissions in reply.

In determining how much cost I should award, I cannot deny that certain amount of times, works and efforts should have been allocated by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff to peruse and/or to prepare the relevant documents for the purpose of the hearing though no time sheets or work sheets tendered to indicate time/hours expended by the Plaintiff's solicitors.

As was said by his Lordship Chong Siew Fai J (as he then was) in Lloyds Bank Plc v. Ang Cheng Ho Quarry & Ors (1993)1 MLJ 127, " an advocate and solicitor should not be precluded from preparing his client's case in greater depth to enhance chances of success."

The true test to apply is not only whether an issue has proceeded for trial but whether an advocate and solicitor has acted reasonably and properly in getting up his client's case in readiness for hearing. If he has done so, then he is entitled to it.

Having regard to the overall circumstances, including the procedural history, the limited factual disputes, and the extent of preparation reasonably required, a moderate award of costs is appropriate. Such an award recognises the Plaintiff's success while ensuring that the costs remain proportionate to the nature of the assessment proceedings.

In the circumstances, a sum of RM10,000.00 represents a fair and reasonable award of costs for the assessment of damages.

There are distinct principles governing the award of interest for the pre-judgment and post-judgment periods. Section 11 of the Civil Law Act 1956 permits the Court to award interest on damages for the period between the accrual of the cause of action and the date of judgment. The rate of such pre-judgment interest lies within the discretion of the Court. This approach was affirmed in Lau Kung Kai v Abu Serah Bol [2008] 10 CLJ 245.

It is settled law that aggravated damages form part of general damages. Accordingly, aggravated damages attract the same rate of pre-judgment interest as general damages. This principle is supported by Bohjaraj a/l Kasinathan v Nagarajan a/l Verappan [2001] 6 MLJ 497 at 508.

As for post-judgment interest, the judgment sum carries interest at the statutory rate of 5% per annum from the date of judgment until full satisfaction. This is mandated by Order 42 rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012 and reinforced by Practice Direction No.1 of 2012.

The same rate applies to interest on costs, which also accrues at 5% per annum from the date of judgment until payment, pursuant to Order 59 rule 24 of the Rules of Court 2012.

For the reasons above, the Court awards the Plaintiff: General Damages : RM 120,000.00 Aggravated Damages : RM 50,000.00 Cost : RM 10,000.00 Out-of-pocket expenses: RM 3,333.00 4% per annum on special damages from 30.1.2019 up to the date of judgment; 5% per annum on general damages from date of service of summons until date of judgment; 5% per annum on total judgment sum from date of judgment to date of realisation of judgment.

The award is against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant, with the 2nd Defendant bound by the earlier consent judgment. The plaintiff has endured a long and painful journey. This judgment recognises the suffering she endured and the dignity she lost. The law cannot undo the harm, but it can acknowledge it. I hereby order so. Date: 5.06.2026 Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff: Solicitor: Alicia Chin Messrs P S Ranjan & Co. Plaintiff's Solicitors 17th Floor, Wisma Lee Rubber, No.1, Jalan Melaka, 50100 Kuala Lumpur For the First Defendant: Solicitor: K. Murali & Amir Mukhlis Messrs Wong & Kiu 1st Defendants' Solicitors D-05-04, Pusat Komersial Southgate, No. 2, Jalan Dua, Off Jalan Chan Sow Lin, 55200 Kuala Lumpur