Chai Chen Yik v Yip Kwan Mun (AA-24F-44-04/2025)

High Court of Malaysia28 Apr 2026

The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.

Open official source PDF Report an issue

Content

1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT IPOH 5 IN THE STATE OF PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: AA-24F-44-04/2025 Dalam Perkara S88, 89 & 92 Undang-Undang 10 Membaharui (Perkahwinan Dan Perceraian) 1976 Dan Akta Penjagaan Kanak-Kanak 1961 15 Dan Dalam Perkara Hak Penjagaan Anak Chai Cheng 20 Shin (No. Sijil Kelahiran: DAG 51040) BETWEEN 25 CHAI CHEN YIK (NRIC NO.: 930402-08-6099) … APPLICANT AND YIP KWAN MUN (NRIC NO.: 930819-14-6480) …RESPONDENT 30 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 35 [1] This is the Applicant’s application by way of Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) under sections 88, 89, and 92 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“LRA 1976”) read together with the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961, seeking custody, care and control, guardianship, and 40 consequential access orders in respect of the minor child, presently aged four years. [2] The respondent opposes the application and contends that the child has always been under her care and that the existing arrangement ought to be maintained. 45 [3] Having considered the affidavits, contemporaneous documents, the evidence of the welfare officer, and the submissions of both parties, this court finds that intervention is necessary in favour of the applicant. BACKGROUNDS FACTS 50 [4] This application arises from a dispute between the parties, who are the biological parents of a minor child, Chai Cheng Shin, born on 6 April 2022. The parties are currently undergoing divorce proceedings. The child has, since birth, primarily resided with the mother in Ipoh, together with the maternal 55 grandparents, while the father resides separately in Tanjung S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg Malim. An interim arrangement had previously allowed the father limited access to the child during specified periods. [5] The present dispute intensified following events on 28 November 2025, when the child was under the father’s care 60

Preamble

pursuant to the interim order arrangement. Upon being returned to the mother, the child was observed to have bruising and swelling on parts of his body. This prompted the mother to seek medical attention and lodge a police report, raising concerns of possible physical and sexual abuse. The child was 65 subsequently examined at Hospital Raja Permaisuri Bainun, Ipoh (“HRPB”), and later at Hospital Taiping, and was also referred for psychiatric evaluation. The matter was further investigated by the Social Welfare Department (“JKM”), which prepared a detailed welfare report based on medical findings, 70 interviews, and observations. [6] Notwithstanding these investigations, the medical and police findings were ultimately inconclusive, and the case was classified as ‘No Further Action’. Meanwhile, the father contends that since January 2025, he has been effectively 75 denied meaningful access to the child, leading to the present application for custody, care and control, and access orders. [7] Further facts unfold as the court was due to deliver its decision on 22 April 2026. It was brought to the attention of the court that the child is admitted to hospital. Hence, the court 80 adjourned the case to the next date (23 April 2026) to visit the S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg child in the HRPB. The child was admitted to the hospital after concerns were raised by the mother, again alleging possible abuse. As a result of these allegations, the child was brought to the hospital for observation and assessment. However, 85 during the court’s visit, the attending medical officer informed the court that the child was medically and physically well. The child was eating and sleeping normally and behaving like a normal child. No serious medical condition was detected, and no blood investigations had been carried out. The admission, 90 therefore, appeared to be precautionary following the allegations rather than due to any confirmed medical emergency. [8] On 23 April 2026, when the case was called, counsel informed the court that the child’s mother had been charged in the Ipoh 95 Magistrate’s Court under section 182 of the Penal Code for providing false information to a public servant. The alleged false report was intended to cause the authorities to act to the injury of the applicant, which constitutes an offence punishable by law 100 [9] In the circumstances, the court, on 23 April 2026, was of the view that it was not appropriate to deliver its decision when the cause of the child’s admission to the hospital would have a direct bearing on the issues of custody, care and control, and access. The court therefore adjourned the matter to 28 April 105 2026 for decision pending the hospital report. However, counsel for the applicant, vide a letter dated 24.4.2026 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg addressed to the Welfare Office and copied to the court, informed that the medical report would take about a month to be obtained from the hospital. In the circumstances, this court 110 delivered its decision without further delay. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [10] The issues for determination are: a) whether the statutory presumption in favour of the mother applies and whether it has been rebutted; 115 b) whether the applicant was unjustifiably denied access; c) whether the respondent’s conduct raises concerns affecting the welfare of the child; and d) what orders best serve the welfare and best interests of the child. 120 APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES [11] The applicable legal principles are well established. Section 88(1) LRA 1976 provides that the welfare of the child is the first and paramount consideration. This requires the court to consider not only the child’s physical needs but also his 125 emotional, moral, and psychological well-being, as recognised by the Federal Court in Mahabir Prasad v Pushpa Mahabir

326

Prasad [1981] CLJ 124A; [1981] 1 MLRA 80; [1981] 2 MLJ The court must therefore undertake a holistic evaluation of all surrounding circumstances to determine which 130 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg arrangement best serves the child’s long-term welfare and stability. The Federal Court states: “It is the law of this country … that the welfare and happiness of the infant must be the paramount consideration in child custody adjudication. … We cannot regard that order as 135 rendering it in any way improper or contrary to the comity of nations if the Courts in this country consider what is in his best interest” … there should be comprehensive information; information 140 not only dealing with the merit or otherwise of the parents involved in the dispute, but also information related to the infants. Only after a hearing in which all the aspects of the case had been gone into would [the court] been able to arrive at a firm finding as to what are for their benefit.” 145 [12] While section 88(3) LRA introduces a rebuttable presumption in favour of the mother where the child is of tender years, such presumption is not absolute. It may be displaced by strong and cogent evidence showing that the child’s welfare would be 150 better served otherwise, as affirmed in Melissa Marie Albert v Malcolm Fernandez & Another Appeal [2019] 8 CLJ 181; [2019] 2 MLJ 290; [2019] 1 AMR 229; [2019] 5 MLRA 214. The presumption is therefore only a starting point and cannot override clear evidence demonstrating that another 155 arrangement better promotes the child’s welfare. Her Ladyship Yeoh Wee Siam JCA quotes a passage from the case Thanaletchimy Batamallai v. Vijaya Kumar Kassinathan S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg [2018] 8 CLJ 61; [2018] 4 MLJ 557; [2019] 1 MLRA 575, which states: 160 “The law presumes (albeit rebuttable presumption) that it is in the best interest of the child aged seven years and below to be under the care and custody of the mother unless it can be proven to the court that the child would be better off with someone else.” 165 [13] Further, section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961 affirms that both parents stand on equal footing in law. It follows that one parent cannot unilaterally exclude the other from the child’s life without justification. The court must be vigilant 170 against such conduct, as it may adversely affect the child’s right to maintain a meaningful relationship with both parents. [14] At the same time, the court is not concerned with judging a parent’s private moral conduct unless it has a direct impact on the welfare of the child. As observed in Tang Heng Kit v Cindy 175 Ong Pik Yin [2023] 3 CLJ 291; [2023] 10 MLJ 44; [2023] 2 AMR 624; [2022] MLRHU 2713, private behaviour does not warrant censure unless it intrudes into the child’s environment and affects his well-being. Ultimately, the court’s duty is to balance all relevant factors and arrive at a decision that 180 promotes the child’s welfare above all else. Justice Evrol Mariette Peters in Tang Heng Kit (supra) observes: “The private conduct of a person, which does not affect the community, society or public, does not warrant sanction or S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg censure and definitely not by the court… it should not 185 assume the role of moral police and judge any litigant for moral transgressions, committed in private, save except where such moral transgression descends into the arena of the child’s life and, as a result, compromises the child’s welfare” 190 COURT FINDINGS A) Denial of Access [15] The evidence before this court demonstrates that, from January 2025, the applicant was effectively denied any 195 meaningful access to the child for a prolonged period. This finding is supported by a series of contemporaneous correspondence issued by the applicant seeking access, all of which were met with refusals premised on vague claims that the child might be harmed, without giving any clear explanation 200 or details. Such conduct, in the court’s view, is inconsistent with the principle that both parents stand on equal footing in matters relating to the upbringing of a child, as recognised under section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961. [16] Crucially, the respondent has failed to substantiate these 205 allegations with any objective evidence. There is no medical evidence or independent evidence placed before the court to support the alleged harm to the child. In this regard, the court is guided by the principle articulated in Melissa Marie Albert (supra), where uncorroborated allegations of abuse, 210 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg unsupported by independent evidence or police action, were held to carry little weight. Similarly, in Tang Heng Kit (supra), the court cautioned against reliance on unproven and contentious allegations, particularly where they are not supported by cogent and admissible evidence. Applying these 215 principles, the respondent’s assertions cannot be relied upon to justify the denial of access. Further, the respondent has now been charged with lodging a false report against the applicant concerning the alleged abuse of the child. Although the respondent has not been found guilty of the charge, it is 220 sufficient to warrant caution in placing reliance on these unproven allegations. [17] The respondent’s attempt to characterise an incidental sighting of the child outside the house as “access” is wholly untenable. Meaningful parental access entails real interaction, 225 engagement, and the opportunity to maintain a relationship with the child. A mere chance encounter falls far short of this standard and cannot be regarded as compliance with the applicant’s parental rights. [18] In custody matters, the court must always be guided by the 230 paramount consideration of the child’s welfare under section 88 LRA 1976. As emphasised in Melissa Marie Albert (supra), the welfare of the child includes maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents wherever possible. The unjustified exclusion of one parent from the child’s life is 235 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg therefore harmful to the child’s emotional and psychological well-being. The Court of Appeal states: "While every parent has a right to custody of a child, it is also the right of the child, and for the welfare of the child, to be well cared for and loved by both parents. Thus, it was wrong 240 of the Father to deprive the Child from the care and love of his Mother, which only the Mother could give. It was therefore wrong for the Father to deny access to the Mother." 245 [19] In the circumstances, and in the absence of any credible justification, this court finds that the respondent has unjustifiably deprived the applicant of access to the child, and such conduct weighs significantly against her in the assessment of the child’s best interests.

(B) Evidence of Welfare Officer (JKM) [20] The court places considerable weight on the independent evidence of the welfare officer from Jabatan Kebajikan Masyarakat, Ms. Loh Bee Lay, who conducted investigations following reports of alleged injuries to the child. Her evidence 255 is particularly significant because it is derived from a neutral statutory body tasked with safeguarding children’s welfare and is supported by medical reports, interviews, and direct observations of the child’s condition and interactions. S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg [21] Although injuries were initially observed on the child, the 260 medical findings from HRPB, Ipoh, and Hospital Taiping did not establish that the injuries were caused by abuse. The medical assessments were inconclusive and expressly indicated that the injuries could be consistent with accidental causes. Importantly, no clinical or forensic evidence was found to 265 substantiate allegations of physical or sexual abuse, and the matter was ultimately classified as “No Further Action” by the authorities. In this regard, the court is again guided by the principle in Melissa Marie Albert (supra), where the Court of Appeal observed as follows: 270 “[19] …Despite all the negative evidence that each party had adduced against each other, including allegations of abuse of the child by the other party, medical reports on the child, and police reports lodged by both parties, the learned JC concluded that without corroboration, the allegations 275 merely remain as bare allegations.” [22] The above passages support the proposition that uncorroborated allegations of abuse, unsupported by objective evidence and not resulting in police action or prosecution, carry 280 little weight in determining custody disputes. [23] Further, Ms. Loh observed that the child continues to maintain a relationship with both parents. During supervised access, the child interacted comfortably and appropriately with the father, indicating that there was no persistent fear or dislike towards 285 him. This observation is material, as it reflects that the father-S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg child relationship remains intact and capable of development, which is an important aspect of the child’s emotional welfare. [24] In evaluating such evidence, the court is mindful of the caution expressed in Melissa Marie Albert (supra) that serious and 290 contentious allegations, such as abuse, must be supported by cogent and reliable evidence and should not be lightly inferred from inconclusive material. The welfare report and medical findings in the present case fall far short of establishing any such wrongdoing. 295 [25] Accordingly, the independent evidence of the welfare officer not only fails to support the respondent’s allegations but, in fact, undermines the justification advanced for denying the applicant access. On the contrary, it demonstrates that continued, structured involvement byboth parents would better 300 serve the child’s welfare and best interests.

(C) Respondent’s Conduct and Evidence [26] A substantial portion of the respondent’s affidavits consists of bare denials without adequate particulars, particularly in response to serious and specific allegations raised by the 305 applicant. The court notes that several material matters were not satisfactorily addressed. In particular, the respondent failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for matters referred to in the paragraphs above such as the prolonged denial of the Applicant’s access to the child, despite repeated requests by 310 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg the applicant. The respondent also failed to substantiate the allegations of abuse relied upon to justify such denial of access. Further, to above the respondent did not adequately explain her living arrangements and association with another man before her divorce. Also, the circumstances under which 315 the child was introduced to him. While maintaining that she was the child’s indispensable primary caregiver, the evidence also showed that the child was frequently under the care of the maternal grandparents, a matter which was likewise not satisfactorily addressed. 320 [27] These are not peripheral matters but issues that go directly to questions of custody, care and control, access, and the child’s overall welfare. In Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd; [1995] 1 MLJ 281; [2000] 1 CLJ 503; [1995] 1 AMR 622, the court recognised that where material allegations are not 325 properly answered, the court may take that failure into account in assessing the evidence. While the court does not accept every allegation merely because it is inadequately denied, the respondent’s failure to meaningfully engage with these material issues inevitably diminishes the weight to be attached to her 330 evidence. [28] That said, the court reiterates that personal beliefs, religious practices, or aspects of a parent’s lifestyle are not, in themselves, determinative of custody. The court is not concerned with moral judgment. As observed in Tang Heng 335 Kit (supra), the private conduct of a parent does not warrant S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg censure unless it intrudes into the child’s environment and has a direct bearing on the child’s welfare. However, where such matters raise legitimate concerns as to the child’s stability, supervision, or emotional environment, the court is entitled and 340 indeed obliged to scrutinise them in the context of the child’s best interests. [29] In the present case, the respondent has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation regarding her living arrangements and her association with a third party. Evidence of photographs 345 placed before the court points to cohabitation and conduct indicative of a romantic relationship prior to any formal dissolution of the marriage. These are not viewed from a moral standpoint, but rather from the perspective of the child’s welfare. In the absence of a proper explanation, such 350 circumstances raise legitimate concerns as to the stability and consistency of the environment in which the child is being raised. [30] Further, the evidence suggests that the child is frequently under the care of the respondent’s parents, while the 355 respondent travels between Ipoh and Penang for work. While there is nothing inherently improper in grandparents assisting in caregiving, it nonetheless weakens the Respondent’s assertion that she alone is the indispensable primary caregiver. As observed in Melissa Marie Albert (supra): 360 “Even if the paternal grandmother and a maid… were to take care of the child, we do not think that such care can S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg substitute for the mother’s own consistent care of the child at home.” 365 [31] Therefore, care provided by the respondent’s parents, even if well-meaning, does not necessarily substitute for the respondent’s own consistent care as a parent. [32] The respondent’s repeated conduct in making serious allegations, including sexual abuse against the applicant in 370 relation to the child, raises grave concern as to her judgment and its impact on the child’s upbringing. Such allegations, made without substantiation, reflect respondent’s conduct that is not conducive to the child’s welfare. The surrounding circumstances suggest that these allegations were advanced 375 to justify the denial of the applicant’s access. If this is left unchecked, such conduct would undermine the child’s right to maintain a meaningful relationship with both parents and is plainly contrary to the child’s welfare. The court cannot permit one parent to exclude the other based on unproven allegations. 380 In these circumstances, judicial intervention is necessary to restore balance and to safeguard the child’s long-term welfare and stability. [33] Taken together, these factors are relevant in assessing the overall stability, continuity, and welfare of the child. 385 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg REBUTTAL OF TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION [34] Taking the totality of the evidence, this court is satisfied that the statutory presumption in favour of the mother for a child of 390 tender years under section 88(3) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 has been rebutted. While the presumption operates as a starting point, it is well established that it may be displaced by strong and cogent evidence demonstrating that the welfare of the child would be 395 better served by an alternative arrangement, as affirmed in Melissa Marie Albert (supra). The court must therefore look beyond the presumption and undertake a holistic evaluation of all relevant circumstances. [35] In the present case, several factors cumulatively justify the 400 displacement of the presumption. a) First, the prolonged and unjustified denial of access to the father is a significant consideration. A child’s welfare ordinarily lies in maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents, and the unilateral exclusion of one 405 parent undermines that fundamental interest. b) Second, the allegations of harm relied upon by the respondent are unsupported by any objective evidence. As emphasised in Melissa Marie Albert (supra), uncorroborated allegations of abuse, particularly in the 410 absence of police or medical confirmation, cannot be relied upon to determine custody. In this respect, a S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg criminal charge has been preferred against the respondent for making a false report against the applicant. 415 c) Third, the respondent’s conduct in assuming a gatekeeping role and excluding the applicant from the child’s life is inconsistent with the principle of equal parental responsibility under section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961. Such conduct, if left 420 unchecked, risks impairing the child’s emotional development and relationship with the other parent. d) Fourth, the applicant has demonstrated both the willingness and the capacity to care for the child, which is a relevant consideration in assessing the child’s best 425 interests. [36] In this regard, the court is guided by the principle in Mahabir Prasad, (supra), that the welfare of the child encompasses not only physical care but also long-term emotional stability and 430 happiness. A parent who, without justification, excludes the other parent from the child’s life acts contrary to that welfare. The court cannot sanction or perpetuate such conduct under the guise of the tender years presumption. WELFARE AND BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 435 [37] The welfare and best interests of the child remain the paramount consideration of this court under section 88 of the S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976. The child in the present case is of tender age and is at a formative stage of development, where stability, continuity of care, and the 440 preservation of meaningful relationships with both parents are critical. As recognised in Mahabir Prasad (supra), the welfare of a child extends beyond physical needs and encompasses emotional security, long-term happiness, and a balanced upbringing. 445 [38] In assessing the present circumstances, the court finds that the existing arrangement, characterised by prolonged denial of access, ongoing parental conflict, and instability in contact, is not conducive to the child’s welfare. A child should not be placed in a situation where one parent is effectively excluded 450 from his life, as this may adversely affect his emotional development and sense of security. The court is also guided by the principle in Sia Lee Fei v Soh Kok Kong [2010] 8 CLJ 492; [2010] 1 MLRH 546, that a stable and consistent environment is fundamental to a child’s upbringing, and any 455 arrangement must promote such stability. Yeoh Wee Siam JC (as she then was) states: “However, the paramount consideration was the three children’s welfare and, for their good, it would be undesirable to disturb their life by changes of custody. The 460 lives of the three children with the respondent seemed to be very stable, which was conducive to their upbringing” S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg [39] In the circumstances, granting custody, care and control to the applicant, with structured and meaningful access to the 465 respondent, would best restore balance in the child’s life. Such an arrangement ensures that the child is not monopolised by either parent and is afforded the opportunity to maintain a continuing relationship with both parents. This, in the court’s judgment, is for an arrangement most consistent with the 470 child’s welfare, emotional well-being, and long-term best interests. [40] Having considered the totality of the evidence and guided by the paramount consideration of the welfare and best interests of the child, this court finds that the applicant has been 475 unjustifiably excluded from the child’s life for a prolonged period without a proper basis. The evidence further shows that serious allegations, including sexual abuse, were made against the applicant on more than one occasion, yet remained unsubstantiated. 480 [41] Such conduct, if left unchecked, would undermine the child’s right to maintain a meaningful relationship with both parents and is plainly contrary to the child’s welfare. The court cannot condone a situation where one parent seeks to exclude the other through unproven allegations. In these circumstances, 485 judicial intervention is necessary to restore balance and to safeguard the child’s long-term welfare and stability S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg CONCLUSION [42] Accordingly, the Applicant's application is allowed. It is 490 therefore ordered that custody, care, and control, as well as guardianship of the minor child, be granted to the applicant. The respondent shall be accorded reasonable and structured access to the child, with liberty to apply in the event that any variation or clarification becomes necessary. 495 ORDER a) An order for sole custody, care and control, and guardianship of the minor child, Chai Cheng Shin (born 6 April 2022), be granted to the applicant. b) The applicant is granted access for four (4) days each week, 500 commencing on Thursday and ending at 10.00 p.m. on Sunday, after which the child shall be brought to Kampung Rapat Police Station to be handed over to the respondent. The respondent is granted access for three (3) days each week, commencing on Monday ending at 9.00 p.m. on Wednesday, 505 and upon the expiry of that period, the applicant shall collect the child from Kampung Rapat Police Station. c) In respect of public holidays, both parties are granted access on an alternating basis by day throughout the duration of the public holiday, commencing first with the applicant. The access 510 period for public holidays shall be from 10.00 a.m. until 10.00 p.m. This arrangement shall also apply to any ad-hoc public holidays declared by the Government. S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg d) In respect of Chinese New Year celebrations, access shall alternate between the parties every year. In even-numbered 515 years, the child shall be with the applicant at the commencement of the celebrations and thereafter with the respondent. In odd-numbered years, this arrangement shall be reversed. e) In respect of birthdays, the child shall be with the respective 520 mother or father on each parent's own birthday. In respect of the child's birthday, the respondent is granted access from 10.00 a.m. until 10.00 p.m., on the condition that the applicant is permitted to participate in the birthday celebration. f) Each party shall bear the child’s living costs and daily expenses 525 for the duration the child is in their respective care. The medical costs, insurance and educational costs of the child shall be borne jointly by both parties by mutual agreement. g) Both parties are ordered to undergo mental health assessments at the Department of Psychiatry and Mental 530 Health, HRPB, Ipoh, and each party shall individually bear the costs of such assessment. h) In the event the respondent fails to comply with the Order of the court, enforcement proceedings may be instituted. i) The costs of these proceedings shall be borne by each party 535 respectively. j) A further order that the respondent and the applicant, upon exercising access to the child, shall also hand over the child's medical records, MyKid, and birth certificate. S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg [43] For the avoidance of doubt, both parties are strictly directed not 540 to deny, frustrate, or obstruct the access rights granted pursuant to this Order. Each parent shall also conduct themselves in a manner that promotes the welfare, emotional well-being, and best interests of the child, and shall refrain from any conduct that may expose the child to conflict or tension 545 between them. [44] Custody orders here are not intended to punish either parent, but to protect and promote the welfare of the child, which remains the court’s paramount consideration. The court’s role is to ensure that the child is placed in an environment that best 550 supports his emotional, physical, and developmental needs, free from unnecessary conflict and instability. Dated : 10 Jun 2026 555 [MOSES SUSAYAN] JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT IPOH, PERAK 560 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg Counsel : 565 For the Applicant : Lau Jia Hui (together with Ng Kee Way) Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs Edward Ng & Partners] 570 Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent : Wong Vivien Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs Boey & Khoo] 575 Bukit Mertajam, Pulau Pinang (Notice: This Grounds of Decision is subject to official editorial revision) 580 Headnotes: FAMILY LAW: Custody, care and control – Child of tender years – Application by father for custody, care and control and guardianship – Whether statutory presumption in favour of mother under s 88(3) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 rebutted – Prolonged 585 denial of meaningful access to father – Allegations of physical and sexual abuse unsupported by medical, welfare or independent evidence – Welfare report finding no clinical or forensic evidence of abuse and matter classified as “No Further Action” – Respondent charged under s 182 Penal Code for allegedly lodging false report – 590 S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg Whether unilateral exclusion of father contrary to child’s welfare – Whether Respondent’s conduct affected child’s emotional welfare and stability – Paramount consideration of welfare and best interests of child – Whether custody with father and structured access to mother best promoted child’s long-term welfare, stability and 595 meaningful relationship with both parents. S/N gWIZpilpi023i9aYbFscVg

Something wrong on this page?

Wrong text, a broken link, out-of-date content, or a removal request — tell us and we'll check it against the official source.

Report an issue Request removal

Malaysian judgment

Case metadata

Court: High Court of Malaysia
Decision date: 28 Apr 2026
Case number: AA-24F-44-04/2025
Coram: YA Tuan Moses Susayan
Practice area: FAMILY LAW: Custody, care and control – Child of tender years – Application by father for custody, care and control and guardianship – Whether statutory presumption in favour of mother under s 88(3) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 rebutted – Prolonged denial of meaningful access to father – Allegations of physical and sexual abuse unsupported by medical, welfare or independent evidence – Welfare report finding no clinical or forensic evidence of abuse and matter classified as “No Further Action” – Respondent charged under s 182 Penal Code for allegedly lodging false report – Whether unilateral exclusion of father contrary to child’s welfare – Whether Respondent’s conduct affected child’s emotional welfare and stability – Paramount consideration of welfare and best interests of child – Whether custody with father and structured access to mother best promoted child’s long-term welfare, stability and meaningful relationship with both parents
Version: Alasan Penghakiman 1
Published: 10 Jun 2026
Source ID: a6196281-6929-4d8b-b78b-d6986c5b1c56

Catchwords

FAMILY LAW: Custody, care and control – Child of tender years – Application by father for custody, care and control and guardianship – Whether statutory presumption in favour of mother under s 88(3) Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 rebutted – Prolonged denial of meaningful access to father – Allegations of physical and sexual abuse unsupported by medical, welfare or independent evidence – Welfare report finding no clinical or forensic evidence of abuse and matter classified as “No Further Action” – Respondent charged under s 182 Penal Code for allegedly lodging false report – Whether unilateral exclusion of father contrary to child’s welfare – Whether Respondent’s conduct affected child’s emotional welfare and stability – Paramount consideration of welfare and best interests of child – Whether custody with father and structured access to mother best promoted child’s long-term welfare, stability and meaningful relationship with both parents

Parties

CHAI CHEN YIK - applicant - ejudgment_parties
YIP KWAN MUN - respondent - ejudgment_parties

Primary source

Compare this reader text against the official judgment source.

Open source PDF

Catchwords

Chai Chen Yik v Yip Kwan Mun (AA-24F-44-04/2025)

How this case connects

Cited by

Authorities cited

Something wrong on this page?

Chai Chen Yik v Yip Kwan Mun (AA-24F-44-04/2025)

How this case connects

Cited by

Authorities cited

Something wrong on this page?