CHAI SENG KUEY v GINA CHAN CHING PENG sebagai ibu yang sah dan penanggungan kepada ELISA TAN XIN ER simati, untuk diri sendirir (JA-12B-32-05/2023)

Ini adalah rayuan dari Mahkamah Sesyen Johor Bahru oleh Perayu (Defendan) spesifik terhadap kuantum gantirugi am bagi kehilangan kebertanggungan (loss of support) yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) kepada Responden (Plaintif).

Secara ringkasnya, Plaintif yang merupakan ibu yang sah dan tanggungan kepada Elisa Tan Sin Er (simati) memfailkan tuntutan gantirugi terhadap Defendan yang berbangkit daripada satu kejadian kemalangan jalan raya melibatkan Si Mati dan Defendan.

Rayuan Perayu yang terhad kepada isu kuantum sahaja ini adalah berdasarkan Notis Rayuan bertarikh 25.05.2023 dan hujah-hujah peguam Perayu ketika rayuan ini didengar. Sementara itu dan atas dasar melengkapkan perimeter rayuan ini, isu liabiliti pula telah dipersetujui antara kedua-dua pihak di mana Defendan bertanggungan cuai sebanyak 90% sementara Plaintif bertanggungan 10% atas dasar sumbang cuai (“contributory negligence”).

Mahkamah ini setelah mendengar hujahan pihak-pihak dan meneliti rekod rayuan dan hujahan bertulis difailkan memutuskan untuk menolak rayuan Perayu dan mengekalkan keputusan HMS.

Perayu telah memfailkan rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan ke atas keputusan Mahkamah ini.

Bagi tujuan kemudahan rujukan, pihak-pihak akan dirujuk seperti mana mereka ketika prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen, dan berikut adalah alasan-alasan penghakiman Mahkamah ini. Fakta kes

Pada 27.12.2018, satu kemalangan jalan raya telah berlaku di kawasan lampu isyarat Jalan Mutiara Emas, Johor Bahru pada jam lebih kurang 3.05 pagi melibatkan kenderaan motokar kereta (nombor pendaftaran JMJ 6944) yang dipandu oleh Si Mati Elixa Tan Sin Er dengan sebuah kenderaan motokar kereta (nombor pendaftaran JRS 1379) yang dipandu dan dimiliki oleh Defendan.

Si Mati telah kemudian meninggal dunia.

Plaintif merupakan ibu Si Mati dan membawa tindakan ke atas Defendan sebagai ibu yang sah dan penanggungan kepada Si Mati di bawah Seksyen 7 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 (pindaan 1984). Plaintif memohon untuk ganti rugi am, gantirugi khas, kehilangan tanggungan, faedah dan juga kos disebabkan oleh kehilangan dan kerugian yang dialami Plaintif akibat kemalangan tersebut.

Ketika perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen, saksi-saksi berikut telah memberikan keterangan: -

Gina Chan Ching Peng (Plaintif) - SP1;

Soo Lay Ngeen (Pemilik Medan Selera Happy Soo Kopitiam di mana Si Mati menyewa salah sebuah gerai) - SP2;

Chong Chee Wai (Pemilik My Orchid Beauty Spa & Massage di mana Si Mati bekerja secara sambilan sebagai pembantu tadbir) - SP3;

Di akhir perbicaraan, Mahkamah Sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa Defendan bertanggungan untuk membayar kepada Plaintif: -

Ganti rugi am pada kadar 90:10 sebanyak RM939,729.60 yang meliputi kehilangan kebertanggungan dan kehilangan caruman

Gantirugi khas pada kadar 90:10 sebanyak RM10,859.98 untuk upacara pengebumian;

Faedah ke atas ganti rugi am dan ganti rugi khas sebanyak RM157,670.13; dan

Kos sebanyak RM42,278.60. Tugas Mahkamah di peringkat rayuan

Prinsip asas mengenai Mahkamah Tinggi dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuannya adalah Mahkamah Tinggi hanya akan campur tangan ke atas keputusan hakim bicara di mahkamah bawah jika keputusan hakim bicara secara terang-terangnya salah (plainly wrong) dan tidak wujudnya pertimbangan kehakiman (judicial appreciation) ke atas keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan.

Sesuatu keputusan hakim bicara juga dikatakan sebagai secara terang-terangnya salah apabila tidak ada penilaian kehakiman yang mencukupi (insufficient judicial appreciation) ke atas keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan mengikut kes UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2019] 9 CLJ 785 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - “Thus, the prime issue in respect of Questions 1 to 3 is whether the Court of Appeal had erred in interfering with the findings of facts of the trial judge. It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking, intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence.”.

Selain itu, analisis yang salah ke atas keterangan ataupun salah tafsir ke atas keterangan penting juga boleh mengakibatkan keputusan hakim bicara diubah di peringkat rayuan mengikut Azman Bin Mahmood & Anor v SJ Securities Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 CLJ 573 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - “[25] The law on appellate intervention on findings of fact by a trial Judge is trite. In this context it may be useful to refer to the case of Multar v. Lim Kim Chet and Anor [1982] CLJ Rep 237; [1982] 1 MLJ 184 (FC), wherein it was held that an appellate court will interfere and disturb the finding of fact by the trial judge if crucial evidence had been misconstrued resulting in the uncertainty on one party's evidence" - and the consistency of the other party's evidence being disregarded. In the Privy Council case of Choo Kok Beng v. Choo Kok Hoe and Ors [1984] 1 LNS 40; [1984] 2 MLJ 165 it was held that when a trial judge had so manifestly failed to derive proper benefit from the undoubted advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses at the trial, and in reaching his conclusion, has not properly analysed the entirety of the evidence which was given before him, it is the plain duty of the appellate court to intervene and correct the error lest otherwise the error results in serious injustice.”.

Untuk itu juga, rujukan seterusnya boleh dibuat kepada Lee Ing Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan di muka surat 116 seperti berikut:- “Suffice to say that we re-affirm the proposition that an appellate court will not, generally speaking, intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. But appellate interference will take place in cases where there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence. It is, we think appropriate that we say what judicial appreciation of evidence involves.”.

Seterusnya, Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lee Ing Chin yang sama telah memperincikan apa yang dimaksudkan sebagai pertimbangan kehakiman sebagaimana berikut: - “A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving his evidence. If there are contemporary documents, then he must test the oral evidence of a witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular witness against the probabilities of the case. A trier of fact who makes findings based purely upon the demeanour of a witness without undertaking a critical analysis of that witness' evidence runs the risk of having his findings corrected on appeal. It does not matter whether the issue for decision is one that arises in a civil or criminal case: the approach to judicial appreciation of evidence is the same. There are a number of important and leading cases in which the point has been considered.”.

Mengenai isu kuantum ganti rugi, ianya undang-undang matan bahawa Mahkamah ini dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuan hanya akan campur tangan berkenaan awad ganti rugi sekiranya perayu dapat menunjukkan bahawa hakim bicara telah bertindak atas prinsip undang-undang yang salah ataupun telah salah tafsir fakta yang dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan ataupun membuat perkiraan salah atas kerosakan dan kecederaan yang dialami.

Perkara ini telah diperjelaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 seperti berikut: - “So far as this Court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer LJ in Flint v. Levell [1935] 1 KB 354, 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial Judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the Courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate Court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.”

Rujuk juga kes Sambaga Valli K R Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors & Another Appeal [2017] CLJU 500 (Mahkamah Rayuan): - [7] Before we dwell upon the competing submissions advanced by the parties, it would be useful to remind ourselves of certain trite principles. [8] First, the Court of Appeal may interfere with the decision of a judge in chambers (in relation to an appeal from the Registrar) but only on well-established principles of appellate intervention (See C.M Van Stillevoldt BV v. E L Carrier Inc[1983] 1 WLR 207 at 208 - 209.) The Court of Appeal may interfere with the quantum of damages awarded by the judge only if it is shows that the latter:-

acted on the wrong the principles;

misapprehended the facts; and

had for these or other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of his damages. [9] In Singapore case of Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Soh Seow Poh [2009] 4 SLR (K) 525, the Court held that the Court of Appeal can only interfere to overrule the discretion of a judge in awarding damages where: -

the judge was misguided with regard to the principle under which his discretion was to be exercised;

the judge took into account matters which he ought not to have or failed to take into account matters which he ought to have; or

the judge's decision was plainly wrong. Analisis dan keputusan

Berbalik kepada rayuan Defendan, setelah meneliti Alasan Penghakiman adalah jelas HMS telah membuat dapatan fakta bahawa sebelum kemalangan, Si Mati bekerja dan mempunyai dua sumber pendapatan. Mengikut HMS: - “Di dalam kes ini, sebelum kemalangan tersebut berlaku Mahkamah mendapati bahawa simati bekerja dan mempunyai dua sumber pendapatan iaitu:-

Pekerjaan sebagai Admin di My Orchid Beauty Spa and Massage;

Perniagaan gerai makan di Happy Soo Kopitiam.”

Bagi menyokong dapatan di atas, HMS telah mempertimbang keterangan SP1, SP2 dan SP3.

Berkenaan SP1, keterangan beliau telah diterima HMS berkenaan pekerjaan dan sumber pendapatan Si Mati seperti berikut: - “Seterusnya, SP-1 (Gina Chan Ching Peng) (Ibu kepada Si Mati) telah menyatakan bahawa selain bekerja di My Orchid Beauty Spa And Massage, Si Mati juga ada menjalankan perniagaan gerai makan di Happy Soo Kopitiam. SP-1 menyaakan bahawa dia ada menolong simati di gerai makan tersebut. Akaun perniagaan gerai makan Si Mati di Happy Soo Kopitiam tersebut telah ditenderkan kepada Mahkamah sebagai ekshibit P-3. Begitu juga, SP-1 menyatakan bahawa pendapatan perniagaan gerai makan simati adalah lebih kurang RM4,000.00 sebulan secara purata. Keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP-1 ini adalah disokong oleh Ekshibit P-3 (Akaun Perniagaan) yang menunjukkan bahawa purata keuntungan bersih (net profit) setelah tolakan modal adalah sebanyak RM4,053.63 sebulan secara purata.”.

Keterangan SP2 pula telah dipertimbangkan HMS mengenai penyewaan gerai oleh Si Mati di Happy Soo Kopitiam seperti berikut:- “Selanjutnya, SP-2 (Soo Lay Ngee) yang merupakan pemilik Happy Soo Kopitiam tersebut telah hadir di Mahkamah dan mengesahkan bahawa simati memang ada sewa gerai makan dengannya dan menjalankan perniagaan gerai makan pada masa kemalangan tersebut.”.

Ianya perlu diperhatikan yang keterangan berkenaan Si Mati mempunyai perniagaan gerai makan seperti mana keterangan SP1 dan SP2 tidak dicabar melalui pemeriksaan balas oleh Defendan.

HMS juga telah menerima keterangan SP3 iaitu majikan Si Mati di My Orchid Beauty Spa and Massage yang mana Si Mati mendapat gaji bulanan RM2,652.58 sebulan.

HMS kemudian mempertimbang keterangan SP1 yang beliau menerima RM5,000.00 daripada Si Mati yang mempunyai pendapatan bulanan sebanyak RM6,700.00. Perbelanjaan SP1 secara bulanan pula ialah RM4,947.33. Mengikut HMS Sesyen: - “Seterusnya, SP-1 (ibu kepada Si Mati) telah memberi keterangan kepada Mahkamah bahawa simati telah memberikannya sebanyak RM5,000.00 pada setiap bulan untuk perbelanjaan dia. SP-1 menyatakan bahawa wang yang diberikan oleh simati ini adalah untuk kegunannya sahaja. SP-1 juga memberi keterangan bahawa pendapatan bulanan simati adalah RM6,700.00 sebulan pada purata dengan bekerja di MY Orchid Beauty Spa dan berniaga di Happy Soo Kopitiam dan SP- 1 tahu kerana simati pernah memberitahunya tentang gajinya. SP-1 menyatakan bahawa simati balik ke rumah setiap hari dan simati tidak ada perbelanjaan untuk makan dan minum pada hari bekerja kerana SP- 1 akan sediakan bekal untuk simati bawa ke tempat kerja. SP-1 menyatakan bahawa simati memberikannya wang secara tunai pada setiap awal bulan. SP-1 juga telah menyenaraikan dan menerangkan kepada Mahkamah jumlah perbelanjaan SP-1 pada setiap bulan iaitu yang berjumlah sebanyak RM4,947.33 sebulan. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa berdasarkan kepada keterangan SP-3 (majikan simati di My Orchid Beauty Spa dan Massage), keterangan SP- 2 (pemilik Happy Soo Kopitiam) dan akaun perniagaan gerai Si Mati yang ditenderkan sebagai ekshibit P-3, jumlah pendapatan simati secara purata adalah sebanyak RM6,706.21. Oleh itu, Si Mati adalah mampu untuk memberi sebanyak RM5,000.00 kepada ibunya (SP-1) setiap bulan.”.

Maka, fakta pemberian RM5,000.00 oleh Si Mati kepada SP1 jelas telah diterima oleh HMS seperti dapat dilihat di atas.

Akan tetapi Defendan berhujah di hadapan Mahkamah ini yang:

Si Mati bukan pemilik perniagaan gerai di medan selera Happy

Si Mati bekerja sepenuh masa di My Orchid Beauty Spa & Massage yang mana masa bekerja Si Mati bertindan dengan masa pembukaan gerai di Happy Soo Kopitiam;

Si Mati berdasarkan kerja lebih masa di My Orchid Beauty Spa & Massage mustahil untuk menguruskan gerai makanan di

SP1 gagal untuk memberikan nama gerai di Happy Soo Kopitiam dan hanya ada keterangan lisan berkenaan gerai tersebut;

Happy Soo Kopitiam sebenarnya dimiliki oleh SP1 dan bukannya Si Mati yang hanya membantu SP1 sahaja; dan

Tiada bukti keterangan RM5,000.00 diberikan Si Mati kepada SP1.

Mahkamah ini tidak dapat menerima hujahan Defendan berkenaan perkara di atas. Defendan dalam hal ini tidak ada mencabar melalui pemeriksaan balas mengenai isu perniagaan gerai makan di Happy Soo Kopitiam. Lihat keterangan SP3 dalam hal ini: - “18. Selain daripada bekerja di syarikat kamu, adakah kamu tahu sama ada Elisa Tan Xin Er mempunyai kerja lain? Saya tahu bahawa Elisa Tan Xin Er juga mempunyai satu gerai dan berniaga di satu food court di Taman Molek dan menjual chee cehong fan, rojak, chicken chop rice, nasi goreng.”.

Isu pemberian wang RM5,000.00 sebulan telahpun diterima oleh HMS yang telah berpuas hati dengan keterangan SP1. Dalam hal ini, tanpa apa-apa material yang boleh membuktikan sebaliknya, dapatan HMS sewajarnya tidak diganggu. Rujukan untuk perkara ini boleh dibuat kepada kes Superintendent of Lands and Surveys Kuching Division & Anor v Mohamad Rambli Kawi [2014] 1 LNS 851 (Mahkamah Rayuan) perenggan 11: - “The standard of proof in civil cases is upon a balance of probabilities. This balance of probabilities is not the proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. This balance of probabilities may be visualised as a scale with the plaintiff placing his evidence on one side and the defendant likewise on the other. The court evaluates the evidence as to the weight it carries. Of course incredible evidence carries no weight. Denials without evidence to justify the denial likewise can carry no weight, and hence the term "bare denial". At the end of the case, the court determines who, between the plaintiff and the defendant, has placed such evidence that the scale tilts in his favour. Sections 101 and 102 mean that to succeed, the scale must tilt in his favour.”.

Defendan mempertikai yang gerai makan tersebut tidak wujud tetapi kemudian mendakwa ianya dimiliki SP1 tetapi kemudian mendakwa SP1 tidak tahu apa-apa butiran mengenai gerai makan tersebut. Pendirian Defendan yang berubah-ubah ini tidak dibenarkan di sisi undang-undang. Lee Loy & Ors v Poh Kam Sang & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 240 (Mahkamah Rayuan) muka 252: - “We further agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents that it is clear that the appellants are approbating and reprobating at the same time. While on the one hand the appellants are resisting the summary application and contesting that they are more than squatters who have a right to stay, they are on the other hand, applying to the court to compel the respondents to sell the subject land or be given time to move. In Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) and other appeals [2012] 1 MLJ 761, the Court of Appeal explained the principle of approbation and reprobation: [105] We categorically say that the liquidator cannot blow hot and cold to suit him whenever he feels like it. He cannot approbate and reprobate in the same breath. On the one hand, he claims that the High Court order dated 16 July 2001 overrides or displaces a statute which render the said order invalid and yet he has the audacity to continue to act as a liquidator by virtue of the said order. In the words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others [1990] 3 All ER 376 at pp 383-384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.”.

Pada masa yang sama, Mahkamah ini tidak ada lain-lain sebab untuk menggangu dapatan-dapatan HMS seperti di atas. Mahkamah Sesyen jelas mempunyai kelebihan audio visual untuk meneliti kredibiliti keterangan SP1, SP2 dan SP3. Rujuk kes Beldeu Singh v Dr Kenneth Andrew [2011] 4 MLJ 769 (Mahkamah Rayuan) muka 775: - “[18] We are mindful of the fact that an appellate court does not have the audio visual advantage which the trial court has, in seeing, hearing and assessing the witnesses at the trial. Hence, an appellate court is not likely to reverse or depart from the trial judge's finding save where he has misdirected himself: see eg Owners of Steamship Hontestroom v. Owners of Steamship Sagaporack [1927] AC 37, 47 (HL); China Airlines Ltd v. Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd (formely known as Maltran Air Services Corp Sdn Bhd) and another appeal [1996] 3 CLJ 163; [1996] 2 MLJ 517, 527E, 527I and 528A-B (FC); Powell and Wife v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243 at p 250 (HL) which was followed in Chow Yee Wah & Anor v. Choo Ah Pat [1978] CLJU 32; [1978] 1 LNS 32; [1978] 2 MLJ 41 at p 42 (PC).”.

Pada masa yang sama, dapatan-dapatan fakta yang dibuat HMS seperti yang dinyatakan di atas juga adalah konsisten dengan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan secara keseluruhan dalam kes ini serta konsisten dengan perjalanan kes secara keseluruhan. Rujuk kes Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Anor [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (Mahkamah Persekutuan) muka 19: - “It was a long settled principle, stated and restated in domestic and wider common law jurisprudence, that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusion on primary facts unless satisfied that he was plainly wrong.”.

Defendan juga gagal menunjukkan keterangan SP1, SP2 dan SP3 adalah secara semula jadinya tidak munasabah (inherently improbable) untuk kredibiliti dan seterusnya keterangan mereka diragui. Rujuk Md Zainuddin Bin Raujan v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 773 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - “It is trite that the inherent probability or improbability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration in deciding whether a witness is credible or not. It is the duty of the court to sieve the evidence and to ascertain what are the parts of the evidence tending to incriminate the accused which he accepted. In Public Prosecutor v. Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 CLJ 215; [1999] 2 MLJ 1 at p 79 Augustine Paul J (as he then was) summed up the tests for determining the credibility of a witness as follows: The Privy Council has stated that the real tests for either accepting or rejecting the evidence of a witness are how consistent the story is with itself, how it stands the test of cross-examination, and how far it fits in with the rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case (see Bhojraj v. Sitaram [1936] AIR PC 60)....It must, however, be observed that being unshaken in cross-examination is not per se an all-sufficient acid test of credibility. The inherent probability or improbability of a fact in issue must be the prime consideration (see Muniandy & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [2016] 1 LNS 592; [1966] 1 MLJ 257)...”

Seterusnya, terhadap isu kehilangan kebertangggungan, Seksyen 7(3)(iv)(d) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: - “(3) The damages which the party who shall be liable under subsection

to pay to the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought shall, subject to this section, be such as will compensate the party for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought for any loss of support suffered together with any reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the party liable under subsection (1): …

(iv) in assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall - …

take into account that in the case of a person who was of the age of thirty years and below at the time of his death, the number of years' purchase shall be 16; and in the case of any other person who was of the age range extending between thirty one years and fifty-nine years at the time of his death, the number of years' purchase shall be calculated by using the figure 60, minus the age of the person at the time of death and dividing the remainder by the figure 2.”.

Dalam menentukan isu kehilangan tanggungan, HMS memutuskan:- “Di dalam kes ini, pada masa kemalangan tersebut berlaku simati berumur 27 tahun iaitu di bawah 30 tahun. Menurut Seksyen 7(3)(iv)(d) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956, “purchase years” atau “multiplier” yang digunakan adalah untuk tempoh selama 16 tahun. Oleh itu, untuk gantirugi kehilangan tanggungan ini, Mahkamah memberikan jumlah berikut kepada Plaintif:- RM5,000.00 x 12 bulan x 16 tahun=RM960,000.00. Mahkamah berpendapat award sebanyak RM960,00.00 ini adalah logik, munasabah, berasas dan berpatutan serta tidak berlebihan untuk diberikan kepada Plaintif di dalam kes ini di bawah item kehilangan tanggungan tersebut. Sila rujuk kes Mohamad Khirul Mizan Bin Shafie lwn Yue Ah Kai (2002) 6 MLJ 471, kes Latif Bin Che Ngah lwn Maimunah bte Zakaria (2002) 4 MLJ 266, kes Lim Ah Chi lwn Tan Ah Mui & Anor (1969) 1 MLJ 215, kes Thean Chew lwn The Seaport (Selangor) Rubber Estate Ltd (1960) 1 MLJ 166 dan kes Saripah Mahmud lwn Govindaraju Venkatachalan (2011) 1 LNS 828.”.

Mahkamah tidak ada sebab untuk mengubah dapatan di atas kerana multiplier 16 tahun tidak dipertikaikan dan pemberian wang sebanyak RM5,000.00 sebulan oleh Si Mati kepada SP1 telah diterima oleh HMS sebagai satu dapatan fakta. Mahkamah juga tidak ada sebab untuk mengubah dapatan HMS berkenaan dengan kehilangan caruman Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP) Si Mati yang turut menggunakan kaedah pengiraan sama.

Mahkamah ini oleh yang demikian tiada sebab untuk campur tangan ke atas kuantum ganti rugi yang diberikan oleh HMS. Rujuk kes Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani Angasamy [1985] 1 CLJ 429 (Mahkamah Persekutuan): - “The principle that should guide this Court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore it is for the appeal Court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purpose of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the Court is satisfied or convinced that the Judge has acted upon wrong principle of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed, it is its duty to reverse the finding of the trial Judge.”.

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah ini berpuashati bahawa HMS yang bijaksana tidak terkhilaf dalam mencapai keputusan memberikan award gantirugi kehilangan kebertanggungan Plaintif kepada Si Mati anaknya.

Maka dengan itu, rayuan Defendan adalah dengan ini ditolak dengan kos tertakluk fi alokator. Tarikh: 24hb Oktober 2025 t.t. …………………………………………. (NOOR HISHAM BIN ISMAIL) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Johor Bahru Peguamcara Perayu/Defendan : Ashraf Hafiz Tetuan Othman Hashim & Co Johor Bahru Peguamcara Responden/Plaintif :