Chan Kok Choong v Citibank Berhad (WA-12ANCC-30-06/2025)

This is the Appellant ppeal against a direction of the learned Sessions Court judge, which allowed an extension of time for the Respondent to file an affidavit in reply affidavit in support.

my reasons. Background facts

The Appellant was a customer of the Respondent. At the request of the Appellant, the Respondent approved two credit card facilities. Namely Visa Cash Back Platinum Account No. 4365 0100 0180 2115 and Citi Prestige Mastercard Account No. 5268 9950 0008 3185, subject to the terms and conditions of the said credit card facilities.

The Appellant utilized the said credit cards. T cards accounts were debited with various sums of money arising from the usage of the said credit cards on the respective dates of usage. The Appellant breached the terms and conditions of the said credit card facilities by failing to repay as agreed.

under the said credit card facilities, the Respondent, through its former solicitors, Messrs Soon Gan Dion & Partners, issued a letter of demand demanding repayment of the sums owed by the Appellant.

As the Appellant failed to pay the outstanding sums under the said credit card facilities, the Respondent, through its former solicitors, filed a writ of summons and statement of claim. The cause papers were served on the Appellant via certificate of posting.

No appearance was filed by the Appellant within the prescribed time following service of the writ. On 21.7.2021, the Respondent entered a judgment in default of appearance against the Appellant. The said judgment in d former solicitors.

The Appellant issued a letter dated 21.1.2025 to the Respondent concerning his credit card accounts. Following thereto, Messrs Azhar & Wong were appointed by the Respondent for the purpose of replying to

On 29.5.2025, the Appellant filed a notice of application to set aside the judgment in default. The said notice of application was served on Messrs Azhar & Wong on 3.6.2025.

However, at that time, Messrs Azhar & Wong had not been instructed by the Respondent to accept service of any cause papers. Messrs Azhar & Wong therefore informed them to serve directly on the Respondent.

The Appellant served the said notice of application on the Respondent on 4.6.2025 by hand.

On 16.6.2025, Messrs Azhar & Wong were appointed by the set aside the judgment in default. A notice of change of solicitors dated former solicitors.

During case management on 17.6.2025 via e - Review, Messrs Azhar & Wong requested from the learned Sessions Court judge for fourteen days to file an affidavit in r affidavit in support in notice of application to set aside the judgment in default. Given that Messrs Azhar & Wong had only just been appointed to represent the Respondent in the said action, replacing the

The learned Sessions Court judge exercised her discretion and issued the following directions to the parties :

affidavit in reply to be filed and served on or before 1.7.2025;

affidavit in reply to be filed on or before 15.7.2025;

parties to file written submissions simultaneously on or before 29.7.2025;

parties to file submissions in reply simultaneously on or before 12.8.2025; and

the decision was fixed on 25.8.2025 via e - Review.

The Appellant was dissatisfied with the directions given by the learned Sessions Court judge. He was of the view that the Respondent ought to file the affidavit in reply 14 days from the date it was served on the Respondent. He informed the learned Sessions Court judge that he intended to appeal to the High Court against the said directions of the learned Sessions Court judge.

The Appellant then applied for an interim stay pending filing of his notice of application to stay the proceedings. The learned Sessions Court judge granted the interim stay. The learned Sessions Court judge told the parties to disregard the directions which she had given regarding the filing of affidavits, submissions, and decision date pertaining notice of application to set aside the judgment in default.

On 18.6.2025, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the High Court to appeal against the learned Sessions Court j directions dated 17.6.2025.

On 24.6.2025, the Appellant filed an application to stay the appeal to the High Court. The stay application was allowed by the learned Sessions Court judge on 10.9.2025. Principles of appellate intervention

I am mindful that the principle on which an appellate court could interfere with the decision of the court below principle. (See the Federal Court case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd (2015) 2 CLJ 453 at 476). An appellate court would be slow to interfere unless it was shown that the decision was plainly wrong. (See the Federal Court case of Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee lng Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 at 320). A plainly wrong decision happens when the court below is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence. (See the Federal Court case of UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor (2010) 9 CLJ 785 at 800).

Concerning the review of discretion by an appellate court, I am guided by the Federal Court case of Vasudevan v T. Damodaran & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 150 at 151, which said: Review of discretion by an appellate court There is a catenation of cases on this point and it will suffice to cull and refer to a few which restate the well - settled principles. An appellate court can review questions of discretion if it is clearly satisfied that the judge was wrong but there is a presumption that the judge has rightly exercised his discretion and the appellate court must not reverse the judge s decision on as the mere idea of discretion involves room for choice and for differences of opinion (Charles Osenton & Co v Johnston [1942] AC 130 (at page 148) per Lord Wright). The Privy Council held in Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 228 that an appellate court will not interfere with the discretion exercised by a lower court unless it is clearly satisfied that the discretion had been exercised on a wrong principle and should have been exercised in a contrary way or that there has been a miscarriage of justice, referring to Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473. The House of Lords, approving the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273, held to the same effect in Birkett [1978] AC 297 (at pages 317, 326). For good measure, we would refer to the felicitous expression of Goulding J., in Re Reed (a debtor) [1979] 2 All ER 22 on this point (at page 25): ... the duties of an appellate court in such a matter as this are, in my judgment, confined to those normally exercisable where the lower court has a discretion, that is to say, we are not justified in setting aside or varying an order simply because we may think we might have come to a different conclusion ourselves on similar material. We can only interfere if either we can see that the court below has applied a wrong principle, or has taken into account matters that are in law irrelevant, or has excluded matters that it ought to have taken into account, or otherwise that no court, properly instructing itself in the law, could have come to the conclusion which in fact was arrived at.

It is my finding that the learned Sessions Court judge is not wrong, let alone plainly wrong, in allowing an extension of time for the Respondent to file an affidavit in reply. The learned Sessions Court judge is not guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence. The learned Sessions Court judge has not misapprehended the facts or applied the wrong principles of law. (See the Court of Appeal case of Yoong Sze Fatt v Pengkalan Securities Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 CLJ 484; [2010] 7 AMR 80; [2010] 1 MLJ 85 at 106 - 107).

I therefore see no reason to interfere with the directions given by the learned Sessions Court judge or her decision in that regard. Here is my explanation. The directions given by the learned Sessions Court judge is a non - appealable matter

At the outset, I consider that the directions given by the learned Sessions Court judge on 17.6.2025 is a non - appealable matter.

I refer to section 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which reads: Civil appeals from subordinate courts

No appeal shall lie to the High Court in any of the following cases :

subject to any other written law, from a decision of a subordinate court in any civil cause or matter where the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter is ten thousand ringgit or less except on a question of law;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application for a summary judgment;

where a subordinate court dismissed any application to strike out any writ or pleading; and

where a subordinate court allowed any application to set aside a

I also refer to section 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which reads : Interpretation does not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties

I am guided by the Federal Court case of Kempadang Bersatu Sdn Bhd v Perkayuan OKS No 2 Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLRA 429 at 436; [2019] 4 MLJ 614 at 623, which said: On the interpretation of the word decision , the relevant paragraph in s 3 is divided into two parts. The first part identifies decision in the form of judgment, sentence or order of the court. It provides an extensional definition of the word decision by listing instances of the set of things included therein. In other words the concept of decision is not explained but the objects that fall under this word are listed. [29] The second part of the paragraph qualifies that these forms of decision do not include any ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties . It is noted that the second part was inserted in s 3 by Act A 1031 which came into effect on 31 July 1998. Based on the said provision, at what juncture a ruling is issued plays a vital role in determining whether such an order is a ruling within the context of s 3. There must be a trial in existence or a hearing and that the order is issued in the course of that trial or hearing. Secondly, the ruling must not have the effect of disposing the final rights of the parties

I am further guided by the Federal Court case of Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd (registered owner and licensee of the higher learning institution Lincoln University College) v Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 3 CLJ 153; [2020] 2 MLJ 1 at 57, which held : Accordingly, I have no difficulty in holding that the present position in the law clearly shows that an appeal does not lie against a decision in an amendment application made in the course of trial as is in the instant action, and moreover, such a decision does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. There decision is appealable as it is a ruling made in the course of hearing the interlocutory application but rather a decision made at the conclusion of the hearing of the said application on its merits. Yet to my mind the respondents have the Act. What characterises as being a decision as being appealable or otherwise is not only confined to a question of whether a ruling has disposed of the final rights of the parties but also whether it is a decision made in the course of a trial or matter. Therefore, it matters not if the decision is made at the conclusion of the interlocutory application. The plain fact is that such interlocutory application was indisputably made and heard in the course of the trial of the instant suit. It was decided before the High Court delivered its judgment on liability. [150] It does not escape my notice that the argument advanced by the respondents also harps on the issue of the alleged prejudice and grave injustice damages since the High Court had already decided in favour of the appellant on Presently, the assessment of damages proceeding has not been heard yet. The matter thus far remains at the stage of case management only. In the event the back to the High Court for the hearing of the assessment of damages where the appellant would be required to prove their claim for the quantum of damages as stated in the amended pleading. The respondents would surely have the full sought by way of the amendments allowed by the High Court. [151] The exclusion of appeals against non - final decisions is intended to prevent delays to trials occasioned by appeals of this nature during the course of trial. Both learned counsel will realise of course that an aggrieved party would not be prejudiced or be deprived of any right to appeal by the filtering effect of the respondent, being the aggrieved party, to raise the impugned ruling in the appeal proper which is pending before the Court of Appeal.

Here, the Appellant categorised the matter as appealable simply because the directions given on 17.6.2025, which then converted into a form of sealed order dated 17.6.2025, is not listed in section 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. However, the Appellant should not read section 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 on its own and in isolation.

In determining whether the directions given by the learned Sessions Court judge is appealable, section 3 and section 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ought to be read together with the relevant case law as a whole. Pursuant to the aforementioned case law, the directions given on 17.6.2025 by the learned Sessions Court judge did not finally dispose the rights of the Appellant.

Importantly, the directions of the learned Sessions Court judge merely allowed an extension of time to the Respondent to file an affidavit in reply on or before 1.7.2025 (i.e. 14 days from the date of the case management on 17.6.2025). Once the affidavit in reply is filed, the Appellant will have the opportunity to reply to the said affidavit and subsequently file submissions in court in respect of his application to set aside the judgment in default.

er his application to set aside the judgment in default is heard and determined by the application to set aside the judgment in default, only at that point of time, said to be finally disposed of, which then would entitle him to appeal to the High Court.

The Appellant relies on the Federal Court decision in MT Ventures Sdn Bhd & Anor v QM Print Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2025] 6 MLRA 595; [2025] 6 MLJ 471. The Appellant submits clauses cannot be read as blanket bars shutting out all appeals within a Federal Court in coming to such decision that the matter is appealable, ruled that the decision on the dismissal of a striking out in that case had

In the premises, it is my finding that the learned Sessions Court j , which allowed the Respondent to file an affidavit in reply on or before 1.7.2025 (i.e. 14 days from the date of the case management on 17.6.2025), is a non - appealable matter as it does not dispose the final rights of the Appellant. The learned Sessions Court judge has the power and discretion to give any directions as she deems appropriate

Even if I am wrong and the matter is appealable, I consider that the learned Sessions Court judge has the power and discretion to give any directions as she deems appropriate. Here, the learned Sessions Court judge did not exercise her discretion wrongly. There was material upon which the learned Sessions Court judge could exercise her discretion to grant time for the Respondent to file an affidavit in reply.

I refer to Order 32 rule 13 (2) (c) of the Rules of Court 2012, which reads :

Save as otherwise provided in these Rules, or unless otherwise directed by the Court -

a party intending to reply to an affidavit served on him shall file his affidavit and serve it on the other party within fourteen days from the date

I also refer to Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012, which reads: Court (O. 92, r. 4)

For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the

Based on the above provisions, the learned Sessions Court judge has the power and discretion to give any directions as she deems appropriate to the parties. In hastily filing the notice of appeal due to his dissatisfaction with the learned Sessions Court j the Respondent 14 days from the date Messrs Azhar & Wong were appointed to represent the Respondent in respect of the application to set aside the judgment in default, the Appellant had failed to take into account the power and discretion of the court.

notice of application to set aside the judgment in default was served directly on the Respondent on 4.6.2025, Messrs Azhar & Wong were only appointed by the Respondent to represent them in resisting the said application on 16.6.2025. Whereupon a notice of change of solicitors dated 16.6.2025 was filed by citors on the c

The Respondent, through its solicitors, had informed the court during the case management via e - Review on 17.6.2025 that after the notice of application to set aside the judgment in default was served by hand on the Respondent on 4.6.2025, it is a standard business practice of financial institutions to obtain legal advice and a quotation from their panel solicitors. Accordingly, the Respondent, through its solicitors, requested 14 days affidavit in support in notice of application to set aside the judgment in default.

Furthermore, the Appellant failed to appreciate the provision under Order 32 rule 13 (2) of the Rules of Court 2012. That provision provides that a party intending to reply to an affidavit shall file his affidavit and serve it on the other party within 14 It cannot be any clearer that the court can give such directions as it deems appropriate.

On the question of discretion exercised by the lower court, the Privy Council in Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Anor [1964] CLJU 237; [1965] 31 MLJ 228 at 229 observed : The principles upon which a Court will act in reviewing the discretion exercised by a lower court are well settled. There is a presumption that the judge has rightly exercised his discretion (Charles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston (1942) A.C. 130 per Lord Wright at 148). The Court will not interfere unless it is clearly satisfied that the discretion has been exercised on a wrong principle and should have been exercised in a contrary way or that there has been a miscarriage of justice (Evans v. Bartlam (1937) A.C. 473). Upon questions of procedure the Board is slow to interfere with the discretion exercised by a local Court (Mayor of Montreal v. Brown and Another (1876) 2 App. Cas. 168). The Rules of Court must prima facie be obeyed, and in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken there must be some material upon which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation. The only material before the Court of Appeal was the affidavit of the appellant. The grounds there stated were that he did not instruct his solicitor until a day before the record of appeal was due to be lodged and that his reason for this delay was that he hoped for a compromise. Their Lordships are satisfied that the Court of Appeal were entitled to take the view that this did not constitute material upon which they could exercise their discretion in favour of the appellant. In these circumstances their Lordships find it impossible to say that the discretion of the Court of Appeal was exercised upon any wrong principle."

The court will only interfere with the discretion exercised by the court below if the discretion has been exercised on a wrong principle or there is a miscarriage of justice. Such is not the case here.

The Respondent has at all material times been ready to comply with the learned Sessions Court j a notice of application to set aside the judgment in default. Non - compliance of the Rules of Court shall be treated as an irregularity

In the present case, there was no non - compliance with the Rules of Court on the part of the Respondent. Even if there was, any such non - compliance does not invalidate the proceedings.

I refer to Order 2 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012, which reads : - compliance with Rules (O. 2, r. 1)

1.(1) Where, in beginning or purporting to begin any proceedings or at any stage in the course of or in connection with any proceedings, there has, by reason of anything done or left undone, been non - compliance with the requirement of these Rules, the non - compliance shall be treated as an irregularity and shall not nullify the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings, or any

In Tan Chwee Geok & Anor v Khaw Yen-Yen & Anor [1975] 2 MLJ 188 at 189, the Federal Court remarked : administration of civil justice. In the bad old days in England from where we took our Rules, if you put a comma wrong you were thrown out of court, so strict were they about technicalities. But over the years this strictness gave way to common sense, and every time the Rules were amended it was with the object of removing fussy technicalities, and making it easier for parties to get justice. This changed attitude was reflected in the remarks of Lord Collins M.R. about 70 years ago in Re Coles and Ravenshear [1907] 1 K.B, 1, 4 : the relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress; and the court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules, which are after all only intended as general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do what will cause injustice Today O.70 r. 1 of our Rules explicitly states that non - compliance with our Rules - The A reliminary objection

Lastly, I will deal with notice of preliminary objection Azhar & Wong, do not have locus standi to represent the Respondent.

The Appellant claims that the intitulement for P in the Sessions Court below is and has always been Citibank Bhd, which Messrs. Azhar & Wong do not act for. Instead, Messrs. Azhar & Wong acts for United Overseas

inary objection, which is devoid of merit. The reason is because there is a vesting order dated 12.10.2022 vesting order Citibank Bhd (as transferor) was transferred to and vested in UOB (as transferee).

Section 5.13 of the vesting order reads: That in respect of any right or liability of the Transferor transferred to the Transferee pursuant to the Order, the Transferee shall have the same rights, powers and remedies (and in particular the same rights and powers as to taking and resisting legal proceedings or making or resisting applications to any authority) for ascertaining, protecting or enforcing that right or resisting that liability of the Transferor, as if it had at all times been a right or liability of the Transferee (including those rights or liabilities in respect of any legal proceedings or applications to any authority pending immediately before the Closing Time by or against the Transferor).

Further, section 5.14 of the vesting order states : That any judgment or order or award of any arbitration or any other tribunal or administrative body in respect of the Assumed Assets or the Assumed Liabilities obtained by or against the Transferor and not fully satisfied before the Closing Time shall be enforceable by or, as the case may be, against the

Section 5.15 of the vesting order also states : That any legal proceeding, arbitration tribunal and other proceeding in respect of the Assumed Assets or the Assumed Liabilities (excluding the Non - VO Transferring Third Party Agreements) in which or where the Transferor is a party shall be continued as if the Transferee were a party in place of the

Finally, section 6 of the vesting order provides : That the transfer and vesting of the Consumer Business (comprising the Assumed Assets and the Assumed Liabilities) constituting part of the business of the Transferor, to and in the Transferee, shall have effect on and from the Closing Time according to its terms notwithstanding anything in law or any rule of law, or notwithstanding any restriction, prohibition or impediment of whatsoever nature (whether in a form of any order, injunction, directive, direction, instruction, condition, provision, requirement, agreement or arrangement) against such transfer or vesting, and shall be binding on any person thereby affected, regardless that the person so affected is not a party to these proceedings or any other related proceedings or had no notice of the

Reference is made to section 104 (2) of the Financial Services Act 2013, which reads : Where the order for confirmation of the High Court under subsection 102

provides for the transfer of any business, including assets and liabilities, vested in or held by the transferor, either alone or jointly with any other person, then, by virtue of the order, that business, including assets and liabilities, shall, on and from the transfer date, become vested in or held by the transferee either alone or, as the case may be, jointly with such other person, and the order shall have effect according to its terms notwithstanding anything in any law and shall be binding on all persons affected by it, regardless that the person is not a party to the proceedings under this Division or any other related proceedings, or had no notice of the proceedings

On this aspect, the Court of Appeal case of Leong Moh Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) v Standard Chartered Bank & Ors [1996] 2 MLJ 614 is instructive. In that case, the predecessor bank (Standard Chartered Bank, a foreign bank) had transferred and vested all its banking business to the successor bank (Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd). The applicable statute then was the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA), which is now superseded by the Financial Services Act 2013.

The Court of Appeal found that :

The vesting order was such that there was no requirement in law to effect a substitution of the plaintiff, and its effect was that the successor bank was deemed to be a party in all proceedings that were initiated by or commenced against the predecessor bank. This meant that the successor bank was very much a party to the order of sale obtained.

Section 50 (3) of BAFIA provides that the transfer of any property or business pursuant to the order of the High Court under sub - section (1) shall on and from the transfer date become vested in or held by the transferee, and the order shall have effect according to its terms notwithstanding anything in any law or in any rule of law. Thus, by virtue of the vesting order, there had been a transmission of interest from one legal entity to another.

Under the provisions of Order 15 rule 7 (2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980, there may be a substitution of the proper party to continue with the proceedings. However, by virtue of the qualifying words notwithstanding anything in any law or in any rule of law appearing in section 50 (3) of BAFIA, there was no necessity for a formal order under Order 15 rule 7 (2) to regularize the position of the successor bank.

Leong Moh Sawmill (supra) was followed in cases such as the Court of Appeal case of Chong Chee Chung v Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia & Anor [2012] 5 CLJ 161 and the High Court case of Kenanga Investment Bank Bhd v Sio Ming Chuan [2017] MLJU 752.

Also in Pantai Bayu Emas Sdn Bhd & Ors v Southern Bank Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ 649 at 657, the Court of Appeal held : In our judgment, the intention of the law expressed in s 50 (1), (3), (4), (6) and (7) as a whole is to regulate the application for a vesting order and to facilitate the effectual transfer of the whole or part of the business, assets, rights and liabilities from the predecessor bank to the successor bank, and not to set up obstacles to stand in the way of substantial justice. [22] By way of amplification, so far as material, s 50 (1) provides as follows : ferred (hereinafter referred to as the transferor ) and the licensed institution or other person to whom the transfer is to be made (hereinafter referred to as the transferee ) may make a joint application to the High Court by way of an ex parte originating summons for such order of the Court as may be required by them to facilitate or enable the agreement or arrangement being given effect to, and in such application there may be sought all or any of the following orders : [24] Section 50 (3) provides for the mechanism of vesting the assets and business of one entity in the other by the making of one order of the High Court. The vesting order shall have effect according to its terms notwithstanding anything in any law or rule of law as enacted in the following relevant portion:

Where the order of the High Court under subsection (1) provides for the transfer of any property or business vested in or held by the transferor, shall, on and from order shall have effect according to its terms notwithstanding anything in any law or in any rule of law, and shall be binding on any person thereby affected, regardless that the person so affected is not a party to the proceedings under this section or any other related proceedings, or had no notice of the proceedings under this section or of other related proceedings.

By virtue of the vesting order dated 12.10.2022, the consumer banking business of Citibank Bhd has been transferred to and vested in UOB account. Hence, the Appellant is bound by the terms of the vesting order, despite not being a party to the said proceedings or having no notice of the same.

In this matter, the legal proceeding was initiated by way of a writ on 6.5.2021. A judgment in default of appearance was subsequently entered against the Appellant on 21.7.2021. All these happened before the vesting order dated 12.10.2022.

In accordance with the vesting order and the authorities cited above, since the civil proceedings were initiated before the vesting order was recorded, there is no requirement to substitute the party from Citibank Bhd to UOB. By operation of law (the Financial Services Act 2013), UOB shall have the same rights, powers and remedies for protecting or enforcing that right of Citibank Bhd, as if it had at all times been a right of UOB.

Even though Order 15 rule 7(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 provides for a substitution of the proper party to continue with the proceedings, however, by virtue of the qualifying words notwithstanding anything in any law or in any rule of law appearing in the vesting order and affirmed by section 104 (2) of the Financial Services Act 2013, there is no necessity for a formal order under Order 15 rule 7(2) to regularize the position of UOB being the successor bank. Hence, Messrs Azhar & Wong has the locus standi to represent the Respondent in this appeal.

On top of being baseless, t notice of preliminary objection dated 4.1.2026 is an afterthought. Such objection should have been taken in the court below, when the proceedings were afoot in the Sessions Court.

For the reasons above, appellate intervention is not warranted in the present case. I therefore dismissed the appeal. I awarded costs of RM 5,000 to the Respondent. Dated 19 February 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Chan Kok Choong (Messrs. K C Chan & Partners) for the Appellant Shireen Munira binti Saiful Madzi (Messrs. Azhar & Wong) for the Respondent Case reference 1. Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd (2015) 2 CLJ 453 2. Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee lng Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 3. UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor (2010) 9 CLJ 785 4. Vasudevan v T. Damodaran & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 150 5. Yoong Sze Fatt v Pengkalan Securities Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 CLJ 484; [2010] 7 AMR 80; [2010] 1 MLJ 85 6. Kempadang Bersatu Sdn Bhd v Perkayuan OKS No 2 Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLRA 429; [2019] 4 MLJ 614 7. Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd (registered owner and licensee of the higher learning institution Lincoln University College) v Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 3 CLJ 153; [2020] 2 MLJ 1 8. MT Ventures Sdn Bhd & Anor v QM Print Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2025] 6 MLRA 595; [2025] 6 MLJ 471 9.

Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Anor [1964] CLJU 237; [1965] 31 MLJ 228

Tan Chwee Geok & Anor v Khaw Yen-Yen & Anor [1975] 2 MLJ 188 Leong Moh Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) v Standard Chartered Bank &

Ors [1996] 2 MLJ 614 Chong Chee Chung v Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia & Anor [2012] 5 CLJ 161

Kenanga Investment Bank Bhd v Sio Ming Chuan [2017] MLJU 752

Pantai Bayu Emas Sdn Bhd & Ors v Southern Bank Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ 649 Legislation reference 1. Sections 3 and 28 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 2. Section 104 (2) of the Financial Services Act 2013 3. Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 4. Order 2 rule 1; Order 15 rule 7(2); Order 32 rule 13 (2) (c) and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 5. Order 15 rule 7 (2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980