Interlocutory judgments and orders. An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed ‘interlocutory’. An interlocutory order, even though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Shortly stated, what the amendment means is that a judgment or order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but is made pendente lite, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, is not a “decision” within the meaning of that word in the current version of s. 3 Courts of Judicature Act, and therefore is not appealable. It makes no difference that such a judgment or order is final, that is to say conclusive, as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. For instance, an order granting or refusing bail is final (conclusive) as to the application with which it deals but it is still an order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties. Such an order is made before judgment or sentence and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute. A judgment or order, even though not conclusive (final) of the main dispute, may be conclusive (final) as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. In this way, an interlocutory judgment or order may be conclusive (final) as to the subordinate matter with which it deals even though it is not conclusive (final) of the main dispute. The real distinction is between, (for want of a better word) what is called final judgments and orders and interlocutory judgments and orders. In general, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed “final”: see 26 Halsbury’s Laws of England, supra, para. 505, p. 238. Actually, the use of the term “final” is tautological as all judgments and orders are final. The term (“final”) is used for the purpose of distinguishing between judgments and orders and “interlocutory” judgments and orders. The difference is that judgments and orders which are not termed “interlocutory” judgments and orders are appealable under the new meaning of the word “decision” as defined in s. 3 by the 1998 amendment. In other words, judgments and orders which determine the principal matter in question are termed “final” judgments and orders, and they are appealable. But, those judgments and orders which give no final decision on the matters in dispute (which are termed “interlocutory” judgments and orders) are now no longer appealable.” So that the question in the instant appeal is: Is the order of the High Court as the court of first instance refusing bail appealable to the Court of Appeal in the present case? The answer will depend on whether the order refusing bail to the appellant is a “ruling made in the course of a trial or hearing of any cause or matter which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties If the bail was refused during the process of the appellant’s trial, then, it is not appealable as such refusal would not have the effect of finally determining his rights. A decision made pending the trial of the charges against the appellant is not, in our considered opinion, a decision (ruling) that had the effect of finally determining the rights of the appellant. It is only the outcome of the trial that would have the effect of finally disposing of his rights. A decision on bail (by the court of first instance), whether the grant or refusal of it, will not finally determine the rights of the appellant in the outcome of his trial. That being so, the order of the High Court in refusing to admit the appellant to bail was not appealable to the Court of Appeal. [15] Justice NH Chan JCA judgment was quoted with approval in Ahmad Zubair Hj Murshid v. PP [2014] 9 CLJ 289, where Raus Sharif PCA (as he then was), delivering the judgement of the court, stated as follows: [37] The position on the newly amended s. 3 of the CJA has been clearly set out in the decision of this court in the case of Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP [2010] 9 CLJ 625 at p. 636 where the court pointed out the underlying reasons for the amendment to the definition of “decision” in s. 3 of the CJA which came into effect on 31 July 1998 in the following manner: [24] The underlying reason behind the amendment to the definition of “decision” in s. 3 of the CJA is to stop parties from stalling a trial before the trial court by filing appeal after appeal on rulings made by the trial court in the course of a trial. Apart from that, the definition of “decision” by itself is sufficiently clear and it is the court’s duty to give effect to the same. Justice demands that cases should move without unnecessary interruption to their final conclusion. [38] From the above explanation given by this court in the case of Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP (supra) it is obvious that Parliament is not oblivious to appeals which tend to stall of Dato Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP (supra) it is obvious that Parliament is not oblivious to appeals which tend to stall proceedings and delay speedy disposal of cases. The new definition of the word decision in the amended s.3 of the CJA which we have laid emphasis to in the preceding paragraph does not include a judgment, order or ruling which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties on the matters in dispute. With the amended s.3 of the CJA, appeals filed based on technical rulings which are interlocutory in nature are now things of the past. Such appeals are incompetent to be laid before the appellate court as it is clearly precluded by law. [ 39] In this instant case the appellant had applied before the High Court to quash the charges and order an acquittal against him. The application was dismissed. The appellant had also applied before the Sessions Court for the charges to be quashed and prayed that a discharge not amounting to acquittal to be ordered against him. The application was also dismissed. The way we perceive it, the orders of the courts below would connote that the matter should proceed for trial as the charges preferred against the appellant still stand. Clearly the decision not to strike out the charges before the commencement of the trial as was done in this instant case does not amount to disposal of the rights of the parties. Since the order gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, it is not a “decision” within the definition under s. 3 of the CJA and therefore is not appealable. [40] It was for the above reasons we are hold that this appeal is on a matter which is incompetent to be laid before this court and was therefore struck out.” [16] Guided by the above authorities, the order of the High Court to allow the prosecution's application for review and further order to set aside the Sessions Court’s ruling that the appellant's passport be temporary released, does not amount to disposal of rights of the parties. Clearly, the orders of the High Court are not “decision" that has the effect of finally determining the rights of the appellant within the definition under section 3 of the Court of Judicature Act 1964 and therefore is not appealable. [17] Reverting back to the instant case, the application for temporary release of the passport is to enable the appellant to travel to Singapore on 13/7/2023 to 18/7/2023. When the notice of appeal was filed to the Court of Appeal on 8/7/2023, the appeal has become academic at the time the hearing came before us on 27/10/2023 by virtue of effluxion of time. [18] The respondent argued that the order sought by the appellant would be an exercise of futility as there is no longer any "live" issue before this Honourable Court. Hence, there is no compelling justification for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction to hear the appeal on its merits. [19] The respondent further contended that there was only a bare averment in the appellant's affidavits that he would be travelling to Singapore on the given dates, without any flight itinerary or accommodation particulars attached. Failure to furnish such important particulars may not satisfy the Court on possible concerns on flight risk. Even though, the appellant is presumed innocent until proven guilty, the fact remains that the appellant is facing not only serious but numerous charges involving huge amount of money for making false claims under the Goods and Services Tax Act 2014. On that score alone, the appeal should be struck out or dismissed in limine. [20] On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant submitted at length to persuade us that the High Court sitting on appeal had fallen into error in dismissing the decision of the Sessions Court when he fail to consider the concept of the appellant business in feng shui where the appellant will be required to be at the location in person for professional consultation or advised. The ground for the application is set out in his affidavit in support affirmed on 28/3/2023 (enclosure 6 RR Vol. 2 pages 7- 13) [21] Having considered the submissions and the authorities, we find that there are compelling justification for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction to hear the appeal on its merits. The court can use its own discretion to make such an order when it consider appropriate, perhaps in exceptional circumstances, bearing in mind the purpose or object behind the insertion of the newly amended section 3 of the Court of Judicature Act 1964. We therefore find that the preliminary objection raised by respondent is without merits and accordingly, we dismiss the respondent’s objection. [22] It is undeniable that the learned appeal judge had dealt extensively on the issue throughly to support his finding. Whilst we could not disagree with what the learned appeal judge had said in his judgment that with the help of modern technology, the appellant can be at his location without actually being in person at the site. With respect, we find that the learned judge had failed to sufficiently consider the significance concept of the appellant business in feng shui. The appellant as an expert adviser will have to be on-site survey to visualise, gather external surrounding information for a better engagement, advice, analysis, recommendations and to avoid any pitfalls as much as possible. Engagement in meeting with clients is vital in order to lay out strategic and development plan in bringing successful positive outcome for their clients. [23] We takes cognisance that the charges preferred against the appellant still stand. However, the appellant has never failed to appear in court for his ongoing criminal trial. We also recognised that the order sought by the appellant has gone stale. [24] Nonetheless, the learned counsel for the appellant informed us that the appellant need to travel to Singapore from November 1 to 5, 2023 on a business trip. He then orally applied for the appellant passport to be temporarily released on the given dates and undertakes to returned the document a few days after the trip. Learned Deputy, however objected to the appellant’s application. [25] In this situation, all relevant factor, established legal principles as well as prevailing circumstances must properly be considered and evaluated to ensure fairness. In exercising its discretion judiciously, it is important for us to strike a balance between the risk of the appellant fleeing when he is still on trial facing criminal charges and his fundamental right under the Federal Constitution to the freedom of movement, liberty and presumption of innocence. Each case is to be decided on a case to case basis. [26] In balancing the rights of the applicant and the interest of the State, we wish to refer to the dictum of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the case of Lee Kwan Woh v. PP [ 2009 ] 5 CLJ 219 where His Lordship held: [8]…In our view, it is the duty of a court to adopt a prismatic approach when interpreting the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part II of the Constitution. When light passes through a prism it reveals its constituent colours. In the same way, the prismatic interpretive approach will reveal to the court the rights submerged in the concepts employed by the several provisions under Part II. Indeed the prismatic interpretation of the Constitution gives life to abstract concepts such as "life" and "personal liberty" in art. 5(1). [12] …The effect of art. 8(1) is to ensure that legislative, administrative and judicial action is objectively fair. It also houses within it the doctrine of proportionality which is the test to be used in determining whether any form of state action (executive, legislative, or judicial) is arbitrary or excessive when it is asserted that a fundamental right is alleged to have been infringed. [27] And for ourselves, we are prepared to say that being a feng shui expert, who depend on his professional skill for his livelihood, he has a business duty to perform but these duties must not clash with the duty of court to proceed with the trial. Hence, to bar him now from leaving the country when he has shown to us valid and legitimate reason to be in Singapore for a feng shui business plan would be unfair to him. The ends of justice will not be met by preventing the appellant from leaving Malaysia at this stage. In addition, the respondent has not shown any evidence of him being a flight risk when he is out of the court’s jurisdiction. [28] Having appraised ourselves of the relevant provision of the law, the documentary evidence before us, the oral and written submission made by the both parties, objectively and from all angles, we unanimously find that the learned High Court Judge has not given sufficient judicial appreciation when exercising its revisionary jurisdiction that warrants appellate intervention. We therefore, set aside the decision of the learned High Court Judge. The appeal is allowed subject to the following condition: