Chan Kok Seng v Chin Miew LIM (BA-23NCvC-29-07/2023)

CHIN MIEW LIM

CHIN MOLY

NG AH CHAN

NG WENG WOY@NG WING WAI

TEH KOK MENG (NRIC NO.: 600924-10-5961) …DEFENDANTS 04/06/2026 08:21:54 BA-23NCvC-29-07/2023 Kand. 84 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction

This action concerns a claim in defamation brought by the Plaintiff against the five Defendants arising from the publication of the minutes of the 9th Annual General Meeting (AGM) of Perbadanan Pengurusan Apartment Bunga Raya held on 20.5.2023.

The Plaintiff’s case is that the Defendants altered the original draft minutes prepared by him or his firm, inserted false and pejorative statements concerning his conduct during the meeting, and then published those altered minutes on the apartment notice board and to the Commissioner of Buildings.

The Defendants deny liability. They say the minutes accurately reflected what transpired during the meeting, and they rely on justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege. The Defendants also contend that they acted in the course of their duties as committee members of the management corporation.

After considering the pleadings, the documentary evidence, the written submissions by the parties, I allow the Plaintiff’s claim. I find that the impugned statements are defamatory of the Plaintiff and direct that damages be assessed. Salient facts – Pleadings and Evidence

The Plaintiff, Chan Kok Seng, pleads that he is the principal and sole proprietor of KS Property Management, a sole proprietorship providing property management services. He asserts that he is a qualified and registered property manager, that he has good standing and reputation in the property management industry, and that his work depends materially on professional reputation, trust and integrity.

The Defendants are unit owners in Bunga Raya Apartment. The 1st Defendant was the presiding chairman during the 9th AGM. The other Defendants were committee members of the management corporation. Undisputedly, they were committee members of Perbadanan Pengurusan Apartment Bunga Raya during the material period.

On or about 16.7.2022, KS Property Management entered into a Property Management Agreement with the management corporation of Bunga Raya Apartment. The Plaintiff’s case is that, under that arrangement, he was the responsible person and registered property manager acting for KS Property Management. His duties included secretariat functions for the AGM and taking minutes of meetings.

It is also not in dispute that before the 9th AGM there had been management committee meetings at which the notice and agenda for the 9th AGM were discussed and approved. The Plaintiff relies on the committee minutes of 8.4.2023 and 6.5.2023 to show that he, as property manager, took the committee through the draft notice and agenda and later updated the committee on the AGM preparations.

During cross-examination of DW1 (Chin Moly, the 2nd Defendant), counsel for the Plaintiff put these committee minutes to DW1 to show that the Plaintiff had been involved in preparing and facilitating the AGM and that the agenda had been approved by the then management committee.

The 9th AGM was held on 20.5.2023. The Plaintiff attended. The parties differ on the precise scope of his role during the AGM. The Plaintiff’s case is that he attended as the appointed property manager and facilitator, and that his role was to assist in the conduct of the AGM and ensure compliance with the applicable legal framework.

The Defendants accept that the Plaintiff attended in his capacity as property manager and that he provided guidance and advice when necessary, but they resist the suggestion that he had any authority to control or override the chairman’s conduct of the meeting.

The Plaintiff’s core factual case is that, during the AGM, the 1st Defendant as presiding chairman attempted to introduce matters outside the agenda. The Plaintiff says he objected because, in his professional view, no fresh item could lawfully be introduced into the AGM if it was not properly noticed.

The Plaintiff says that whatever he said during the AGM must be understood in that context, namely, that he was giving professional guidance on legal compliance and on the limits of the AGM agenda. The Plaintiff’s written submission places strong emphasis on this context and on the audio transcript. He says the Defendants later turned this professional advice into a defamatory accusation that he threatened, disrupted, interfered, and behaved unprofessionally.

After the AGM, the Plaintiff’s firm prepared a draft set of minutes. The Plaintiff’s case is that this was the proper draft prepared by the appointed minute taker. He says that on 1.6.2023 he submitted the draft AGM minutes and summary of resolutions to the Defendants in the WhatsApp group for approval. He says that on 4.6.2023 he reminded the Defendants about the need to finalise the minutes and reminded the 1st Defendant to share the revised minutes back to the group for checking by the minute taker before signature. He says he received no response.

The Plaintiff then discovered on or about 9.6.2023 that the Defendants had amended and published a materially different set of minutes without notifying him. The Plaintiff’s case is that the final document bore little resemblance to the original draft, that it misleadingly still referred to the draft as having been prepared by “Angeline Ng for KS Property Management”, and that it contained defamatory statements against him.

During his cross-examination, Plaintiff maintained that the published minutes deviated substantially from the original draft, that they were more than 80% different, and that they were effectively a new set of minutes not prepared by him.

The Defendants do not deny that the minutes were amended. Their position is that the original draft was inadequate or inaccurate, and that the amended minutes reflected what actually transpired during the AGM.

In cross-examination of the Plaintiff, counsel for the Defendants repeatedly put to him that the amended minutes were the minutes approved by the Defendants and reflected events during the AGM and that the minutes were accurate, genuine, and complete.

The impugned statements are pleaded expressly in the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiff identifies four impugned statements in the minutes. The pleaded text is lengthy and I set out the material parts here because, in a defamation action, the exact words matter. The full impugned statement will be reproduced later in this judgment.

The first impugned statement is at paragraph 4.8 of the minutes. It states, among other things, that the Plaintiff “threatened to leave the floor”, that the presiding chair and attendees had their “first shock” at such threat and unfair treatment, and that there were “two conflicting presiding chairmen” at the AGM.

The second impugned statement is at paragraphs 5.3 and 5.4. It states that the Plaintiff and the outgoing management committee “seemed un-prepared” to present matters arising and that “those responsible failed to report”, with the result that the chairman had to run through the 8th AGM minutes himself.

The third impugned statement is at paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6. It states, among other things, that the Plaintiff “again threatened to walk out of the meeting”, that the presiding chair and attendees had their “second shock” at such threat and “unprofessional interference”, and that there were indeed “two conflicting presiding chairmen”, one being the Plaintiff and the other the elected chair.

The fourth impugned statement is at paragraph 11.3.1. It states, among other things, that the Plaintiff emphasised that if anyone disagreed with his approach he would walk out of the AGM as the “third threat”, and that the chair and attendees had their “third shock” at such “unprofessional behavior and poor communication technique”.

The Plaintiff pleads that these statements mean, among other things, that he acted unprofessionally and unfairly, threatened to leave the AGM without proper reason, acted unreasonably and unprofessionally in insisting the agenda be followed, was unprepared, had poor communication skills, was incompetent, irresponsible, unethical, dishonest, untrustworthy, and had breached the ethics, rules and law governing the profession of property management.

As for publication, the Plaintiff pleads and the Defendants do not really dispute that the impugned minutes were placed on the apartment notice board and sent to the Commissioner of Buildings. It was also submitted that the notice board was accessible not only to proprietors and residents but also to visitors, contractors and workers.

A letter of demand dated 20.6.2023 was then issued on behalf of the Plaintiff requiring, among other things, removal of the minutes, withdrawal of the allegations, apology and damages. The Plaintiff pleads that the Defendants did not comply, and that publication continued.

There is also evidence concerning the subsequent 10th AGM. During the cross-examination of DW1, counsel for the Plaintiff put to DW1 the minutes of the 10th AGM and the statement recorded there that the 9th AGM minutes were not adopted. Counsel pointed to the record that the presiding chairman had informed the attendees that there were numerous discrepancies and that the vote to adopt the 9th AGM minutes failed. Defence counsel ultimately accepted that the 9th AGM minutes were not adopted at the 10th AGM. However, when re- examined, DW1 said she did not know why the minutes were not adopted. Parties’ submissions

The Plaintiff’s written submission addresses the elements of defamation, the defamatory meaning of the impugned statements, the pleaded defences, malice, the liability of the committee members, and the reliefs sought.

On defamatory meaning, the Plaintiff submits that each impugned statement separately and cumulatively attacks his professional competence and integrity as a property manager. He relies on authorities such as Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315, Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 CLJ 720, Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Halim bin Mohammad v Syed Ahmad bin Tun (Dr) Syed Nasir & Anor [2013] 8 MLJ 348, and Perunding Alam Bina Sdn Bhd v Errol Oh & Ors [1999] 6 MLJ 101. He also relies on Saraswathy Shirke Deo (Practising under the name and style of Sara Deo & Co) v Amutha d/o Ayawoo & Ors [2025] MLJU 2351 as authority that allegations of “unprofessional” conduct in official minutes are capable of being defamatory of a professional person.

On publication, the Plaintiff submits that publication is plainly established because the minutes were displayed on the apartment notice board and sent to the Commissioner of Buildings. He says the audience was wide, extending to at least 184 units and their occupiers, as well as visitors and workers. The Plaintiff also submits that, being a libel case, proof of actual special damage is not required. He relies in reply on authorities including Datuk May Phng @ Cho Mai Sum v Tan Pei Pei [2018] 11 MLJ 741 and Yeo Ing King v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 631 for the proposition that libel is actionable per se and that the law presumes damage once defamatory publication is proved.

On justification, the Plaintiff submits that the Defendants have misunderstood the legal burden. He says the issue is not whether there was some disagreement at the AGM, but whether the sting of the libel, namely that he behaved unprofessionally, threatened to walk out, interfered with the chairman, and was unprepared or incompetent, is substantially true. He says the audio recording and transcript do not support the words used in the minutes. He submits that the Defendants’ timestamp-based reliance on the audio is selective and decontextualised. He further says that the alleged “shock” was only the Defendants’ own subjective reaction, not an objective fact proved by the recording. He also points to admissions in the Notes of Proceedings which, according to him, undermine the specific imputations.

On fair comment, the Plaintiff submits that the defence is misconceived because the statements in the minutes are not comments or opinions but alleged statements of fact presented in an official record. He says the Defendants’ own case shows that they intended the words to be read as factual descriptions of what happened at the AGM. In reply, the Plaintiff relies on an appellate discussion in Abu Hassan bin Hasbullah v Zukeri bin Ibrahim [2017] MLJU 1676, particularly the observations there that a defence of fair comment requires the words to be comment and not statements of fact, and that compliance with the pleading requirements of Order 78 is necessary. He also relies on Lee Kuan Yew v JB Jeyaretnam [1979] 1 MLJ 281 for the proposition that a libellous statement of fact is not comment.

On qualified privilege, the Plaintiff accepts in principle that there may be an occasion of privilege because AGM minutes are generally to be communicated to proprietors and authorities. But he says the privilege is confined to fair and accurate minutes. He says it was exceeded here because the minutes contained pejorative and false statements not necessary for a fair record of proceedings. He relies in reply on Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 as to the duty-interest basis of privilege, but also on more recent authorities and submissions that privilege is defeated where the publication exceeds the proper occasion or is actuated by malice. He places particular emphasis on the facts that the minutes were altered from the neutral draft prepared by the minute taker, that strong language was inserted, that the minutes remained on the notice board after the letter of demand, and that the 10th AGM did not adopt them.

On malice, the Plaintiff’s written submission is detailed. He cites Anne Lim Keng See v The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 492 for the general meaning of malice, and Chan Yoke Sim v Choong Teck Fook & Ors [2014] 2 MLJ 117 for the principle that indifference to truth or falsity may suffice. He says that, in the present case, malice is shown by unilateral alteration of the draft minutes, insertion and emphasis of strong language, failure to verify against the recording, continued publication after the letter of demand, and use of committee position to attack the Plaintiff personally. He also says he has complied with Order 78 rule 3(3) for particulars of malice.

The Defendants’ written submission is also structured. It begins by restating the Plaintiff’s case and the documents before the court, then turns to the burden of proof, justification, qualified privilege, and the other defences.

The Defendants first submit that the Plaintiff has failed to prove reputational damage because he did not call any proprietor, resident or independent witness to say his reputation had been lowered. They rely on JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1987] 1 MLJ 176 in support of a submission that actual or special damage has not been shown. They also say that the Plaintiff failed to prove tangible consequential loss such as loss of contracts or business opportunities.

On justification, the Defendants rely heavily on section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 and on Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 577 and Masyitah bt Md Hassan v Sakinah bt Sulong [2021] 7 MLJ 144. Their submission is that it is enough if the material sting of the libel is substantially justified. They say the audio recording corroborates the minutes and identifies three separate occasions where the Plaintiff threatened to leave the meeting. They also submit that Plaintiff admitted in cross-examination that the committee approved and signed the minutes. On this basis they say the minutes are true, accurate and complete.

On qualified privilege, the Defendants say they were under a statutory duty under the Strata Management Act to prepare, post and furnish the AGM minutes. They say they, as committee members, had a duty and the proprietors had a corresponding interest. They also say the minutes dealt with matters of legitimate concern to the residents. Their submission is that, in the absence of malice, privilege should apply.

The Defendants also argue, in substance, that not every unfavourable statement is defamatory and that the words must be read in context as minutes of a heated AGM. Their real position, however, as presented in the trial and submission, is that the words are true. The Defendants’ case is therefore centred primarily on justification, with privilege raised in the alternative. The Basic Law on Defamation

The basic elements of defamation are not in dispute. To succeed, the Plaintiff must prove that the words bear a defamatory imputation, that they refer to the Plaintiff, and that they were published to a third party. The parties themselves cite Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315 and the Plaintiff also relies on Kian Lup Construction v Hongkong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 MLJ 283 for those basic elements.

The test whether words are defamatory is objective. The court asks what meaning the words would convey to ordinary reasonable recipients in the circumstances of publication. The court is concerned with the natural and ordinary meaning of the words read as a whole and in context. The Plaintiff relies on Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 CLJ 720 and Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Halim bin Mohammad v Syed Ahmad bin Tun (Dr) Syed Nasir & Anor [2013] 8 MLJ 348. Those principles are uncontroversial and I adopt them.

In a professional setting, words alleging unprofessionalism, lack of integrity, incompetence, improper conduct, dishonesty or unethical conduct are plainly capable of being defamatory. That is shown by authorities cited by the Plaintiff such as Perunding Alam Bina Sdn Bhd v Errol Oh & Ors [1999] 6 MLJ 101 and Saraswathy Shirke Deo v Amutha d/o Ayawoo & Ors [2025]

The same principles may also be seen in cases concerning meeting minutes and internal strata communications (see Saraswathy Shirke Deo v Amutha Ayawoo & Ors [2025] MLRHU 1623, Mah Yoke Keong v Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort [2025] MLRHU 1664 and Keith Richard Judd v Suppayah a/l Krishnan & Ors [2016] 9

In the present case, the expressions 'threatened', 'shock', 'unprofessional interference' and 'unprofessional behaviour' are not neutral descriptions of events. Read in context, they are evaluative characterisations of the Plaintiff's conduct and are capable of conveying that the Plaintiff acted improperly in the discharge of his professional duties.

On publication, the rule is also clear. Communication to at least one person other than the Plaintiff is sufficient. In libel, damage is presumed. The Plaintiff does not need to prove special damage as a precondition to liability. The Defendants’ reliance on JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1987] 1 MLJ 176 is misplaced in the context of this case. The Plaintiff’s reply correctly points out that the present case is one of libel, not slander, and that libel is actionable per se.

On justification, section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 and the Federal Court authorities cited by the Defendants (Dato' Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail and Masyitah bt Md Hassan) recognise that a defence of justification need not prove every single detail literally true, provided the words not proved true do not materially injure the Plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the truth of the remainder.

But the law remains that the Defendant must justify the sting of the libel. Therefore, where the negative characterisation itself, such as describing a legal explanation as a “threat” or conduct as “unprofessional”, forms the sting, the defence fails unless that characterisation itself is shown to be substantially true.

This is a factor relevant to the defence of fair comment and I return to it later.

On qualified privilege, the governing test remains the reciprocal duty-interest test, as confirmed in Dato Dr Low Bin Tick v Datuk Chong Tho Chin [2017] 5 MLRA 361. The privilege is limited by the scope of publication and the purpose of the communication, and may be defeated where the communication goes beyond what the recipients have a legitimate interest to receive, or where malice is established. Further, the more recent authorities concerning strata minutes, such as Mah Yoke Keong v Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort [2025] MLRHU 1664 and Saraswathy Shirke Deo v Amutha Ayawoo & Ors [2025] MLRHU 1623, show that a statutory duty to publish minutes is not a shield for defamatory content inserted into minutes.

Finally, on malice, where the publisher is indifferent to the truth or falsity of the allegations, or uses the occasion for an improper purpose, malice may be inferred. Privilege is defeated by express malice, which may be inferred from bypassing verification, one-sided investigation, deliberate alteration of drafts, and refusal to retract after a demand. Issues and analysis

The parties have identified and addressed the issues to be tried in their respective submissions. Having considered those issues, I find that the dispute may be determined by considering whether the impugned statements are defamatory, whether the Defendants have successfully established the pleaded defences of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege, whether malice has been established, and the reliefs, if any, to which the Plaintiff is entitled. Whether the impugned statements are defamatory

I begin with meaning. In my judgment, the words complained of are plainly capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. I say this for several reasons.

First, the words are not neutral descriptive entries such as that the Plaintiff disagreed with the chairman or stated a legal position. Instead, they frame the Plaintiff as someone who “threatened” to leave, repeatedly, who caused “shock” to the chairman and attendees, who engaged in “unprofessional interference”, who exhibited “unprofessional behavior and poor communication technique”, and who was effectively acting as a rival presiding chairman. These are evaluative descriptions of personal and professional misconduct.

For ease of reference, I reproduce the impugned statement as set out in paragraph 15 of the Statement of Claim: “15.1 - “The property Manager, who is our employed MA disagreed and insisted that for these typical items to be inserted, any of the 31 qualified proprietors / proxies should had to present a motion at least 7 days before 20 May for their inclusion. He threatened to leave the floor for the residents to manage the meeting themselves, should the presiding chair not follow the MA's set agenda as he was a qualified and registered Property Manager, he would then leave or walk off from this AGM. The presiding Chair and the attendees had their first shock of such threat and such unfair treatment from our employed MA because this MA's practice differed from all previous MA(s) and differed from the other eight (8) past annual general meetings. Note 1: The elected presiding chairperson sensed that in this AGM, that he had the preliminary first impression and could sense that there were, two conflicting "presiding chairmen" at this AGM.”

15.2 - “The MA and the MC (2022-2023) seemed un-prepared to present the above, as it took a few minutes for the search of Minutes of the 8th meeting that was finally cast onto the screen. The Chair requested the MC (2022-2023) or the MA to highlight which items they wished to report on their status to the AGM attendees. As those responsible failed to report, the Presiding Chair then ran through the 8th AGM minutes quickly on those items deemed important.”

15.3 - “Approximately at this juncture, feeling uneasy and that it was seemed / perceived to be so, that is, it was a waste of time for giving opportunity for the floor in seeking clarification and or taking an interest in going through "Matters Arising" session, the MA (Mr KS Chan) again threatened to walk out of the meeting should the President Chair continued to exercise his experience on essential role of chairman in engaging with the attendees for their active participation. As he was merely exercised his privilege of chairperson in conducting its business in the manner, he deemed appropriate, and as per his understanding of the mandate and the wishes of the attendees who were very familiar with past 8 AGMs standard meeting format. The Presiding Chair and the attendees had their second shock of such threat and such unprofessional interference during the otherwise smooth and quick session that finished off within 5 Minutes or so, that finally concluded "matters arising from 8th AGM Minutes". Note 2: The chairperson confirmed his suspicious/ preliminary impression that in this AGM, that there were indeed, two conflicting "presiding chairmen" , one being the MA and another the elected Chair at this AGM”.

15.4 - “In response to CHIN MOLY (BR/F/2D) who drew attention to the above, at this juncture, the MA (Mr KS Chan) drew attention that as long as he is the qualified and registered / licensed Property Manager at PPA-BR, he wouldn't permit a person with even one (1) sen outstanding to qualify as AGM attendee instead of advising that future MC to do all things reasonably necessary in trying to improve their communication with residents to those with one (1) arrears. He again emphasised that if any one disagreed on his approach he would walk out of the AGM as the third threat. Note 5: The Presiding Chair and the attendees, so to speak, had their third shock of another last threat on such unprofessional behavior and poor communication technique other than threat.”

Second, the context matters. The Plaintiff is not merely an attendee. He is a property manager whose professional work depends on reputation, reliability, competence and legal compliance. A statement that he acted unprofessionally, improperly interfered, was unprepared, and threatened to abandon the meeting strikes directly at his professional standing.

Third, I accept the Plaintiff’s submission that the words must be read as a whole. When read together, the four impugned statements convey a cumulative impression that the Plaintiff was unreasonable, obstructive, unprofessional, incompetent and unfit in his professional role. That cumulative sting is substantially the same as the pleaded meanings in paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim : “19. Dalam makna semula jadi dan biasa dan/atau secara innuendo, Kenyataan-Kenyataan Fitnah tersebut bermaksud dan/atau boleh difahami bermaksud, antara lainnya, bahawa:-

19.1. Plaintif telah mengendalikan AGM tersebut dengan cara yang tidak profesional dan tidak adil;

19.2. Plaintif telah mengancam untuk meninggalkan AGM tersebut tanpa sebab yang wajar dan adil;

19.3. Plaintif telah bertindak secara tidak munasabah dan tidak profesional dengan menegaskan bahawa agenda AGM harus dikekalkan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam notis;

19.4. Plaintif tidak bersedia untuk AGM sebagai pengurus harta, dan Plaintif gagal menjalankan tugas mereka apabila dipanggil untuk melaporkan dalam AGM tersebut;

19.5. Plaintif sebagai pengurus harta mempunyai kemahiran komunikasi yang lemah;

19.6. Plaintif tidak kompeten, tidak cekap, tidak wajar, tidak bertanggungjawab, tidak beretika, tidak jujur, tidak boleh dipercayai, tidak bertanggungjawab dan buruk sebagai pengurus harta;

19.7. Plaintif telah melanggar etika, peraturan dan undang-undang yang mengawal profesion Penilai, Pentaksir, Ejen Hartanah dan Pengurus Harta; dan

19.8. Plaintif harus diejek secara terbuka kerana telah melakukan salah laku yang serius dan/atau tindakan salah terhadap pemilik-pemilik di Bunga Raya Apartment.”

I therefore find that the words complained of are defamatory of the Plaintiff. Reference and publication

There is no serious dispute that the impugned statements refer to the Plaintiff. The minutes expressly name him as “Mr KS Chan”, “KS”, or “the MA” in a context that is plainly referable to the Plaintiff. The Statement of Claim particulars on reference are clear, and the trial proceeded on that basis.

Publication is equally clear. The impugned minutes were placed on the apartment notice board and furnished to the Commissioner of Buildings. On the Plaintiff’s pleaded case and submission, the notice board was accessible not only to proprietors but also to families, visitors, contractors and workers. The Defendants themselves never disputed that the minutes were put up and furnished. Publication is therefore established.

I reject the Defendants’ submission that the Plaintiff had to prove actual damage to reputation through resident witnesses or lost contracts before liability could arise. This is libel. The law presumes damage once defamatory publication is shown. The issue of actual impact goes more to quantum. Whether justification is established

This is the central defence advanced by the Defendants. The Defendants’ case is that the minutes are a true, accurate, complete and genuine record of what transpired and that the recording corroborates the contents of the minutes.

I am unable to accept that submission.

The first difficulty lies in the distinction between an event and its characterisation. The Defendants may be right that the Plaintiff expressed himself strongly during the AGM and that he said words to the effect that he could not continue if the chairman proceeded contrary to law. But the sting of the minutes is not limited to the bare event of disagreement. The sting lies in the transformation of that disagreement into repeated “threats”, “shock”, “unprofessional interference”, “unprofessional behavior”, “poor communication technique”, and the suggestion that the Plaintiff set up a parallel chairmanship.

In law, that sting must be justified. It is not enough to prove that the Plaintiff objected or spoke firmly. It must also be shown that the description chosen by the Defendants was substantially true. On the evidence before me, it is not.

I place weight on the cross-examination of DW1. When asked where in the recordings the presiding chairman expressed “shock”, DW1 could not identify the precise portion. Instead, she reverted to a general assertion that they were shocked because the Plaintiff wanted to leave if they did not follow what he said. That is not objective proof that the minutes accurately recorded any shock actually expressed at the meeting.

I also place weight on the fact that DW1 accepted that she did not fully understand the contents of the minutes at the time of cross-examination, even though those very statements were central to the defence. That weakens the Defendants’ position that the wording chosen in the minutes was carefully grounded in what transpired.

In relation to the allegation that the Plaintiff’s conduct differed from all previous property managers or all previous AGMs, DW1 had no documentary basis beyond her own assertion. When pressed as to whether she had proof that the Plaintiff’s practice differed from the past eight years of AGMs, she disagreed but pointed to no supporting documentation.

The Plaintiff also relies on admissions said to have been extracted from DW2 (Chin Miew Lim, the 1st Defendant). In reply, the Plaintiff points to Notes of Proceeding (3) at page 49 as showing that the 1st Defendant conceded he never asked the Plaintiff to present the 8th AGM minutes. The Plaintiff then submits that this undermines the allegation that the Plaintiff was “unprepared” or “failed to report”. That submission is significant because, if the Plaintiff was not in fact asked to present, then the minutes’ categorical description of him as unprepared and failing to report becomes very difficult to sustain.

The Plaintiff also submits, again by reference to the Notes of Proceedings, that DW2 could not locate in the transcript the specific words attributed to the Plaintiff in the 4th impugned statement and effectively accepted uncertainty as to whether the precise allegation appeared in the recording. If correct, that is a serious weakness in the Defendants’ claim of accuracy.

I also consider the subsequent non-adoption of the minutes at the 10th AGM. I do not treat the later vote as conclusive proof that the minutes were false. The Defendants are right that non-adoption at a later AGM does not by itself prove falsity. But it is still a relevant contextual fact. It shows that the minutes were controversial, that their accuracy was questioned, and that the proprietors themselves did not unanimously accept them as an accurate record. This is relevant when I evaluate the Defendants’ claim that the minutes were simply a neutral and accurate account.

In the end, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Defendants have justified the sting of the libel. At most, the Defendants have shown that the Plaintiff objected strongly to deviations from the agenda and that he indicated he could not continue if the meeting proceeded unlawfully. That does not establish that he threatened, acted unprofessionally, interfered improperly, or caused shock in the sense recorded. The defence of justification therefore fails. Whether fair comment is established

I turn to fair comment. Although the defence was pleaded, I do not find it available on the facts of this case.

The first reason is the nature of the words themselves. These words appear in official meeting minutes. They are written as assertions of what happened. They are not framed as opinion, comment, inference or evaluation attributed to the Defendants. The structure of the minutes presents them as factual accounts of the Plaintiff’s conduct.

The second reason is that the Defendants themselves treated the impugned statements as factual accounts. Their evidence and submissions were directed towards proving that the minutes were true, accurate and complete. In those circumstances, the statements stand or fall on whether the Defendants have established their truth. For the reasons already stated, I am not satisfied that they have done so.

In the circumstances, I find that the impugned statements are not properly characterised as fair comment. The defence therefore fails. Whether qualified privilege applies

I accept that an occasion of qualified privilege may arise in relation to AGM minutes. The management committee has a duty to communicate meeting proceedings to proprietors and to furnish the minutes to the Commissioner of Buildings. The recipients have a corresponding interest in receiving an accurate record of the AGM. In that limited sense, the Defendants are correct.

But that does not end the matter. Qualified privilege protects a proper communication made for that duty and within its bounds. It is not a licence to insert evaluative and defamatory material under cover of an official minute.

I am of the view that the Defendants exceeded the scope of any such privilege here. I say so for several reasons.

First, the language used was not necessary to discharge the duty to record proceedings. A fair minute could have recorded that the Plaintiff objected, stated the legal position, or said he could not continue if the meeting went outside the agenda. What the Defendants did instead was to add repeated descriptions of threat, shock, unfair treatment, unprofessional interference, and poor communication technique. Those are evaluative statements, not neutral minutes.

Second, the publication was wider than what the reciprocal duty and interest required. The Plaintiff’s pleaded case, which I accept on the evidence before me, is that the notice board was accessible not only to proprietors and residents but also to visitors, contractors and workers. In Keith Richard Judd v Suppayah a/l Krishnan [2016] 9 MLJ 380 and Mah Yoke Keong v Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort [2025] MLRHU 1664, wider publication to persons without a corresponding interest was treated as a factor capable of defeating qualified privilege. This is consistent with the principle stated in Dato Dr Low Bin Tick v Datuk Chong Tho Chin [2017] 5 MLRA 361 that the protection of qualified privilege is confined to communications made within the reciprocal duty-interest relationship.

Third, the more recent authorities concerning strata management minutes, particularly Mah Yoke Keong v Perbadanan Pengurusan Genting Permai Park & Resort and Saraswathy Shirke Deo v Amutha Ayawoo & Ors, support the proposition that a statutory duty to publish minutes does not, without more, protect defamatory content contained in those minutes. Those cases support the Plaintiff’s submission that qualified privilege is confined to a fair and proper communication made for the purpose of discharging the relevant duty. It does not extend to defamatory characterisations which go beyond what is reasonably necessary for that purpose.

I therefore find that the Defendants cannot rely on qualified privilege on the facts of this case. Whether malice is established

Given my conclusion that privilege is unavailable because the Defendants stepped outside the proper occasion, strict necessity might not require a finding on malice. However, the parties have addressed it in detail, and for completeness I make findings on it.

The Plaintiff’s pleaded and submitted case on malice is that the Defendants deliberately altered the draft minutes prepared by the minute taker, inserted strong and pejorative language, maintained publication after receiving the letter of demand, and used the minutes as a vehicle to attack him personally. The Plaintiff says this conduct shows an intention to injure his reputation or, at the very least, indifference to truth or falsity.

I find several facts relevant.

First, the Defendants did not merely correct or tidy the original draft. On the evidence of the Plaintiff, which was not meaningfully displaced, the final minutes materially deviated from the original draft and, in his words, were more than 80% different. The Defendants do not deny substantial amendment. The whole tenor of their defence is that they replaced the original draft with their own version.

Second, the language inserted was not moderate. It was emphatic and repetitive. It did not use one neutral reference to disagreement. It used escalating references to first shock, second shock, third shock, first threat, second threat, third threat, unprofessional interference, and unprofessional behavior and poor communication technique. This repeated escalation is difficult to reconcile with a purely dispassionate attempt to keep minutes.

Third, the Defendants had access to the audio recording which they themselves say they cross-checked. If that is so, then one would expect the final wording to be carefully tied to what the recording demonstrated. Yet, as already discussed, the evidence does not satisfy me that the core evaluative sting was objectively supported by the recording. Publishing strong evaluative statements while asserting cross-checking, but without being able to identify adequate support for them, points toward indifference to truth.

Fourth, the minutes remained in circulation after the Plaintiff’s letter of demand. I do not say that refusal to capitulate to a demand letter, by itself, establishes malice. But in this case it forms part of the overall conduct. The Defendants did not tone down, review, or retract. They maintained the impugned minutes in place despite the seriousness of the allegations and despite having had the opportunity to revisit the content.

Fifth, the subsequent non-adoption of the minutes at the 10th AGM does not itself prove malice. But it further weakens any claim that the Defendants were simply and honestly preserving an uncontested official record.

Applying the principles in Anne Lim Keng See and Chan Yoke Sim, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has established at least reckless indifference to the truth of the more serious evaluative allegations. That is sufficient to constitute malice in law. Whether the Defendants can escape liability by saying they acted only as committee members

The Defendants also take the position that they acted as committee members of the management corporation and that this should shield them from personal liability.

I reject that submission on the facts before me.

It is true that a management corporation acts through individuals and that some publications may properly be treated as corporate acts. But where specific individuals actively alter a draft, approve pejorative wording, and publish defamatory material that goes beyond the proper business of recording proceedings, personal liability can arise. The Plaintiff’s reliance on Saraswathy Shirke Deo for this proposition is, in my view, apt in broad principle. The minutes here did not remain within the bounds of a neutral institutional document. They became a vehicle for evaluative and damaging allegations against the Plaintiff. On the evidence before me, the Defendants cannot simply hide behind their offices. Reliefs

Having found the Defendants liable in defamation, I now turn to the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff.

In light of my findings, I grant the relief for removal and withdrawal of the impugned minutes. The Defendants are to remove and withdraw the impugned minutes from the notice board at Bunga Raya Apartment and from any circulation to the Commissioner of Buildings within 7 days from the date of the order.

I also grant injunctive relief restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their servants or agents, from further publishing or disseminating the impugned statements or statements to similar effect concerning the Plaintiff.

As to the prayer for an apology, counsel for the Plaintiff informed the Court that the Plaintiff withdraws this prayer. No order is therefore made in respect of the prayer for an apology.

On damages, the Plaintiff has proposed a figure in submissions and cited authorities in support. However, the Defendants have not addressed quantum in any focused manner. In the circumstances, and given the need for comparison with relevant authorities and a proper evidential basis, I direct that damages be assessed.

The Plaintiff shall file a Notice of Assessment within 30 days, supported by affidavit. The Defendants may reply within 14 days thereafter. The Plaintiff may file a further reply within 14 days after service of the Defendants’ reply. The factual findings made at trial may be relied upon in the assessment proceedings.

I award costs of RM30,000 to the Plaintiff, subject to allocator. Conclusion

This case is not about whether the Plaintiff and the chairman disagreed at the AGM. They did. It is about whether the Defendants were entitled to publish official minutes describing the Plaintiff as having made threats, caused “shock” to attendees, engaged in unprofessional interference, displayed unprofessional behaviour and poor communication technique, and acted in a manner inconsistent with his professional role.

On the evidence before me, they were not entitled to do so. The words are defamatory. Reference and publication are established. The Defendants have failed to justify the sting of the libel. The defence of fair comment is not available and the Defendants are also unable to rely on the defence of qualified privilege.

For these reasons, the Plaintiff's claim is allowed with the consequential orders set out above. Dated this: 3 June 2026 ~signed~ (NOOR HAYATI BINTI HAJI MAT) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR Representative: For the Plaintiff : Tan Yan Hong Messrs Tan & Hong For the Defendants : Datuk R. S. Sodhi together with Chan Ding Chong Messrs Gurmit Sodhi Chambers