In this section “decision” includes any act, omission, refusal, direction or order. [12] Apa yang jelas rayuan di bawah seksyen 418 KTN ini hendaklah dibuat dalam tempoh tiga bulan dari perintah dikeluarkan atau disampaikan kepada orang yang terkilan. Memandangkan lelongan awam tersebut telah dijalankan pada 14.5.2015 adalah ekoran perintah jualan bertarikh 12.3.2015, tempoh masa untuk Plaintif memfailkan rayuan di bawah seksyen 418 KTN ini telahpun lama luput. 12 [13] Di dalam hal ini, Plaintif telah tidak berjaya di dalam percubaannya yang pertama pada Saman Pemula 24-564-05/2015 dan tempoh tiga bulan merayu telah lama luput tempohnya. Kini Plaintif cuba menyalahgunakan proses mahkamah dengan cuba mendapatkan relif berbentuk deklarasi pula di mana remedi undang-undang ini adalah tidak terbuka kepadanya. [14] Undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila di bawah satu undang-undang statut telah memperuntukan remedi yang sedia ada dan terbuka bagi orang-orang yang terkilan atas perintah yang dikeluarkan menurut statut tersebut, maka satu remedi deklarasi tidaklah terbuka kepada orang-orang itu. [15] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas dengan merujuk kepada kes-kes berikut: i. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd v Cecil Abraham (Executor of the Estate of Loo Cheng Ghee) [1998] 4 MLJ 651: “It is beyond dispute that the remedy of declaration is discretionary in nature. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 reads as follows: 13 Any person entitled to any legal character, to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to the character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, the plaintiff need not in that suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration or title, omits to do so. Explanation — A trustee of property is a 'person interested to deny' a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.' (Emphasis added.) Although s 41 is not a complete code upon the subject of declaratory decrees (Attorney General of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan Chik & Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 620) and the power to make a declaration is almost unlimited (Hanson v Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922] 2 Ch 490 at p 507 per Lord Sterndale MR), yet, the remedy of declaration may be refused upon settled principles. Thus, generally speaking, the court will not grant a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41).” ii. Hakim K.C Vohrah (YA pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Lokmanal Hakim Ramli & Ors v. Hj. Ismail Ishak & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 795, di dalam memutuskan di dalam perkara-pekara 14 pesaka kecil yang di bawah bidang kuasa Pentadbir Pesaka dan terdapatnya peruntukan rayuan di bawah seksyen 29(1) Akta Pembahagian Pesaka Kecil 1955 telah menyatakan berikut di muka surat 798 dan 798: “In this case the matters complained of relate to a small estate which under the Act are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector; the plaintiffs should under s.29(1) of the Act have appealed against both orders of the Collector made on 22 February 1987, the order made under s.13 relating to the distribution of the property and the other order made under s. 14 relating to the colleteral dispute. I am not unmindful of the Supreme Court case of Development and Commercial Bank Bhd. v. Land Administrator, Wilayah Persekutuan [1991] 2 MLJ 181 on the availability of the remedy available to him to redress a grievance he has against a decision or order of an authority constituted under a statute. The Plaintiffs in this case are indeed applying, inter alia, for a declaration that the defendants had renounced their beneficial share in the property of deceased Ishak and for a consequential order to set aside the Collector’s order of distribution. However, all the plaintiffs being aggrieved parties within the meaning of 2. 29(1) of the Act they had a right of appeal and they should have appeal and they should have appealed under s. 29(1) and the remedy of declaration is not open to them.” 15 iii. Di dalam Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41, Mahkamah Persekutuan di muka surat 44 telah memutuskan antara lain seperti yang berikut: “It is well settled law that the court will not make a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, volume 22, page 749, paragraph 1611). To quote but a few authorities in support of that proposition, Lord Herschell said in Barraclough v Brown: "It was argued for the appellant that, even if not entitled to recover the expenses by action in the High Court, he was, at all events, entitled to come to that court for a declaration that on the true interpretation of the statute he had a right to recover them. It might be enough to say that no such case was made by the appellant's claim. But, apart from this, I think it would be very mischievous to hold that when a party is compelled by statute to resort to an inferior court he can come first to the High Court to have his right to recover – the very matter relegated to the inferior court – determined. Such a proposition was not supported by authority, and is, I think, unsound in principle." In Pasmore v The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council Earl of Halsbury L.C. said: "… The principle that where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form of remedy than that given by the statute, is one which is very familiar and which runs through the law." 16 In the more recent case of Wilkinson v Barking Corporation Asquith L.J. said: "… It is undoubtedly good law that where a statute creates a right and, in plain language, gives a specific remedy or appoints a specific tribunal for its enforcement, a party seeking to enforce the right must resort to that remedy or that tribunal, and not to others." iv. Hakim Hepworth di dalam kes Chop Chuah Seong Joo v. Teh Chooi Nai & Ors. (1963) 29 M.L.J. 96, di muka surat 100 telah menyatakan: “In the present case the plaintiffs were not without a remedy. They were specifically given a right of appeal on a point of law by section 11 of the 1956 Ordinance. They have suffered no injustice because they have only themselves to blame for not pursuing the appeal. In my opinion section 11 of the 1956 Ordinance provides for an aggrieved party an entirely adequate alternative remedy and accordingly this is not a case in which a claim to a declaration should be entertained.” [16] Di dalam kes ini, Plaintif juga telah memohon perintah deklarasi bahawa beliau adalah tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut sedangkan pada lelongan awam yang dijalankan pada 14..5.2015, hartanah tersebut telah berjaya dibida oleh seorang bernama Lee ZiXin yang telah membayar penuh harga belian dan melalui No. 17 Perserahan 10614/2015 bertarikh 16.12.2015, Lee ZiXin kini adalah tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Hak dan kepentingan Lee ZiXin sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar dan pembeli suci hati hartanah perlulah dipelihara dan Plaintif tidak boleh sewenang-wenangnya memohon deklarasi seperti yang dipohonnya di dalam Kandungan 1. Permohonan Plaintif ini adalah jelas suatu penyalahgunaan proses undang-undang yang tidak boleh dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini, [17] Atas alasan-alasan di atas sahaja, permohonan Plaintif ini semestinya gagal dan saman pemula Plaintif di dalam Kandungan 1 hendaklah ditolak. Justeru itu, Kandungan 1 Plaintif dengan ini ditolak kos sebanyak RM5000.00. .................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 22 haribulan November 2016 18 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Munir & Co. Encik Munir Abdullah Peguamcara Defendan - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Puan Nurhamimah Binti Amrah