This court further accepts the Federal Court's pronouncement in N Chanthiran Nagappan v Kao Che Jen [2023] 7 CLJ 677 that “the phrase 'subject to the control of the court' in s. 236(3) of the 1965 Act essentially means that a liquidator is answerable to the court in the performance of his duties” and that “no party can interfere with him save with the permission of the winding up court.” S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [32] The Applicant's attempt to distinguish this application as merely seeking “supervisory jurisdiction” is misconceived and this court rejects such submission. The relief sought in this application directly compels the Liquidator to deliver specific documents within prescribed timeframes of 14 days from the order of this court, to provide certified copies of documents, and to convene meetings for the formation of a committee of inspection. This constitutes clear interference with the Liquidator's exercise of statutory duties requiring prior judicial sanction. [33] The court finds that the inclusion of Prayer 1 seeking leave “if necessary” cannot cure this fundamental procedural defect. The authorities make clear that a separate application for leave must be made where the court can assess the merits, probable success, and whether the proposed action is vexatious or oppressive before any substantive relief is granted. The conditional nature of Prayer 1 demonstrates that the Applicant proceeded without first obtaining the necessary leave, seeking to cure the defect retrospectively. [34] In Sykt Yong Thai v Zung Zang Plantations Sdn Bhd, the High Court confirmed that “the contributory's failure to seek or obtain leave of the winding up court is fatal” to applications affecting liquidator conduct. The High Court in that case noted that the Court of Appeal in Woodsville Sdn Bhd v Tien Ik Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors (unreported) “expressly rejected the contention that a separate leave S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg application is not required before initiating proceedings against the liquidator,” holding that “whether the purported action against the liquidator is in another court or the winding up court is irrelevant.” This principle applies regardless of how the application is characterised or the jurisdiction under which it is brought. [35] The court cannot accept the Applicant's submission that section 248 Companies Act 1965 applications are exempt from the leave requirement. The statutory framework for creditor oversight must be balanced against the need to protect liquidators from vexatious litigation and ensure orderly liquidation proceedings. As held in N Chanthiran Nagappan v Kao Che Jen, “it would amount to an abuse of process if proceedings can be commenced against the liquidator before a different court notwithstanding the supervision exercised by the winding up court over the liquidator and the winding up process as a whole.” [36] The court finds that the Applicant's fundamental failure to obtain prior leave of the Winding Up Court before seeking to compel liquidator action constitutes a fatal procedural defect that cannot be cured by retrospective applications or creative characterisation of the relief sought. The proper procedure requires that leave must be sought from the Winding Up Court before any proceedings affecting a liquidator's conduct are commenced, and this requirement has not been satisfied in this case. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg Applicable Statutory Provisions and Transitional Issues [37] The Respondents argue that section 619(1) of the Companies Act 2016 now governs liquidator duties and that the documents sought fall outside the scope of both section 248 of the Companies Act 1965 and section 501 of the Companies Act 2016. The Liquidator submits that section 620 of the Companies Act 2016 clearly repeals the Companies Act 1965, and that section 619(4) specifically addresses pending proceedings, confirming that matters pending immediately before commencement under the Companies Act shall be deemed to have commenced and may continue under that Act. The Respondents contend that when bringing an action against a liquidator, this does not fall under “relevant provisions” but becomes an action under current law, since the old law is repealed to that extent. [38] The Applicant submits that section 619(6) Companies Act 2016 preserves the application of the Companies Act 1965 to ongoing liquidations and that the distinction between pre and post-winding up documents is artificial. The Applicant argues that section 619(6) clearly states that “A company which is in the course of winding up shall continue to be wound up under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 1965,” and therefore there is no flaw in the application as the Act specifically preserves the winding up process to continue under the Act under which the company was originally wound up. The Applicant maintains that the S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg provisions relied upon are applicable and effective in sustaining this application. [39] The court must carefully examine the transitional provisions under section 619 of the Companies Act 2016 to determine which statutory framework governs this application commenced in 2025. While section 619(6) of the Companies Act 2016 provides that companies in the course of winding up shall continue under the Companies Act 1965, this preservation is limited to “relevant provisions” of the earlier Act. The court must determine what constitutes “relevant provisions” in the context of new applications made under current law. [40] Section 619(4) of the Companies Act 2016 specifically addresses “proceedings, judicial or otherwise” commenced before the new Act, providing that such proceedings may continue under the old Act. However, this application was commenced on 9.1.2025, well after the Companies Act 2016 came into force on 31.1.2017, and therefore constitutes a new proceeding under current law. The transitional provisions in section 619(4) cannot assist the Applicant as this is not a proceeding that was pending before the commencement of the Companies Act 2016. [41] The critical distinction lies in understanding that whilst the liquidation process itself continues under the 1965 Act pursuant to section 619(6), new applications by third parties must comply with current statutory requirements. As S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg explained in Hap Seng Credit Sdn Bhd v Sri Muda Haulage Sdn Bhd [2017] MLRHU 13263 (High Court), the correct application of the law on savings and transitional arrangements should invoke the interpretation that proceedings continue under the Act under which they commenced, but new proceedings must comply with current statutory requirements. [42] Under the current statutory framework, section 509 of the Companies Act 2016 specifically governs applications for inspection of books and papers in the possession of liquidators. This provision requires leave of the Winding Up Court as a sine qua non before any applicant may mount proceedings to inspect books and papers maintained by the liquidator. Section 509 permits inspection only, not the delivery of certified copies as sought by the Applicant. The Applicant's reliance on section 248 of the Companies Act 1965 is misconceived as this provision has been superseded by section 509 of the Companies Act 2016 for new applications commenced after the latter Act came into force. [43] The documents sought by the Applicant - being post-winding up agreements executed by the Liquidator in the course of liquidation including the Settlement Agreement, Sale and Purchase Agreement, Power of Attorney Deed of Assignment - fall outside the traditional scope of “company books and papers” contemplated by section 248 of the Companies Act 1965. These documents represent the S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg Liquidator's exercise of statutory powers in the course of the liquidation rather than historical company records that existed at the time of winding up. The Applicant's attempt to characterise these post-winding up documents as falling within the ambit of traditional inspection rights is without merit. [44] The Applicant's selective application of provisions from both Acts - citing sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act 1965 whilst omitting equivalent provisions from the Companies Act 2016 because no such provisions exist for committee of inspection appointments in court-ordered liquidations - demonstrates the flawed approach to the transitional provisions. The legislative policy shift in the Companies Act 2016, which restricts committee of inspection formation to creditors' voluntary liquidations under sections 450 and 457 of the Companies Act 2016, reflects a deliberate decision that court-ordered liquidations have adequate oversight through judicial supervision. [45] The court finds that the Applicant's interpretation of section 619(6) as preserving all provisions of the Companies Act 1965 indefinitely for ongoing liquidations is overly broad and inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the transitional provisions. The reference to “relevant provisions” in section 619(6) must be construed purposively to refer to provisions directly related to the conduct of the liquidation process itself, not to new applications seeking to compel liquidator S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg action through judicial proceedings commenced years after the new Act came into force. [46] Having regard to the clear statutory framework under the Companies Act 2016, the Applicant's application fails to comply with the mandatory requirement for prior leave under section 509, seeks relief beyond the scope of inspection rights provided by current law, and relies upon superseded provisions that are no longer applicable to new proceedings. The court therefore finds that the Liquidator's submissions on the applicable statutory provisions and transitional issues are compelling and must be accepted, whilst the Applicant's contentions regarding the continued application of the Companies Act 1965 provisions to this new application are misconceived and must be rejected. Relevance and Necessity of Documents Sought [47] The Applicant submits that the documents sought are essential to identify correct parties for legal action and understand the allocation of responsibilities between the Liquidator and TPD. The Applicant contends that there has been persistent non-disclosure and blame-shifting between the Liquidator and TPD over the past seven years, with each party deflecting responsibility to the other whilst purchasers remain in uncertainty. The Applicant argues that the Settlement Agreement, Sale and Purchase Agreement, Power of Attorney, Deed of Assignment and related correspondence are essential to determine which party S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg bears responsibility for completing outstanding obligations relating to land amalgamation and formation of the Joint Management Board. The Applicant maintains that this application is necessary to launch an accurate and effective suit and that the documents will shed light on the agreements entered into by Atlas with various third parties and their obligations to each other to identify proper defendants. [48] The Respondents argue that the documents sought have no nexus to the Applicant's Guaranteed Rental Return claim of RM483,850.26 and that the application constitutes a fishing expedition for ulterior purposes. The Respondents submit that by casting such a wide net to compel disclosure of copies of post-winding up documents including all proofs of debt filed, the Applicant is clearly going beyond the scope of the law and seeking to interfere with the affairs of the Liquidator. The Respondents contend that the Applicant's Guaranteed Rental Return-based claim has no nexus to the request for post-winding up documents as set out in the application, and that in the Applicant's proof of debt dated 14.4.2004, the Applicant submitted under Guaranteed Rental Return for an unproven debt of RM483,850.26. [49] The court must carefully scrutinise the relevance of documents sought to ensure that inspection applications do not become general discovery proceedings. The fundamental principle governing creditor inspection rights is that such applications must be directed towards legitimate S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg verification or quantification of existing claims rather than speculative litigation development. In this case, the Applicant's proof of debt relates specifically to a Guaranteed Rental Return claim of RM483,850.26 dated 14.4.2004, yet the Applicant has manifestly failed to articulate how post-winding up agreements between Atlas and TPD relate to this specific claim. [50] The documents sought by the Applicant - comprising the Settlement Agreement, Sale and Purchase Agreement, Power of Attorney and Deed of Assignment - concern the transfer of assets and liabilities to TPD as part of the liquidation strategy implemented some six to seven years after the original winding up order. These agreements represent the Liquidator's legitimate exercise of statutory powers to resolve complex commercial issues arising from the liquidation and do not alter the fundamental nature of the Applicant's claim against Atlas or create new obligations that would affect the quantum or validity of the Guaranteed Rental Return claim. [51] The Applicant's argument that the documents are necessary to identify “proper parties” for future litigation reveals the inherently speculative nature of this application. The Applicant explicitly acknowledges in his affidavit that “this Application is necessary to launch an accurate and effective suit” and that “the documents sought will shed light on the agreements entered into by the Liquidator for Atlas with the various 3rd parties and their obligations to each S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg other to identify the proper Defendants.” This constitutes a clear admission that the Applicant seeks to use the inspection process to develop a case theory against third parties rather than to verify or quantify his existing claim against Atlas. Such an approach exceeds the legitimate scope of creditor inspection rights under the Companies Act. [52] The court notes that the case of SP Setia Berhad v Gasing Heights Sdn Bhd [2004] 6 MLRH 291 (High Court), upon which the Applicant relies, involved documents relating to “questionable transactions” where creditor interests specifically required protection. The High Court in that case stated that “the right of the Petitioner here in respect of those documents relating to certain questionable transaction would be entertained by the court if the Liquidator had not requested the directors to do so or having done so, the directors had failed to surrender them.” Crucially, no such questionable transactions have been identified in the present case. The Settlement Agreement and related documents represent a legitimate exercise of the Liquidator's powers to resolve complex commercial issues and transfer the project to a white knight developer capable of completing the development. [53] Furthermore, the Applicant's assertion of “blame-shifting” between the Liquidator and TPD does not establish any wrongdoing or breach of duty that would justify compelled disclosure. The Applicant's counsel acknowledged during S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg oral submissions that “every time we approach the White Knight (TPD), they assert that it is not their obligation and that this responsibility rests with the liquidator. Conversely, when we approach the liquidator, they deflect responsibility, claiming this role has been assumed by the White Knight.” However, commercial parties may legitimately disagree about respective obligations under complex commercial arrangements without this creating grounds for third-party document inspection. The existence of commercial disagreements or differing interpretations of contractual obligations does not constitute evidence of misconduct warranting judicial intervention. [54] The court must also consider the principle established in Andrew Christopher Chuah Choong Eng Chuan v Ooi Woon Chee & Anor [2007] 2 CLJ 405 (Court of Appeal) that courts will be slow to interfere with the affairs of liquidator, save for when there is element of fraud or where the liquidator had failed to act in a bona fide manner. In this case, the Applicant has presented no evidence of fraud, misconduct, or failure to act in good faith on the part of the Liquidator. The Liquidator has filed statutory returns with the Companies Commission of Malaysia (“SSM”) pursuant to section 281 of the Companies Act 1965 (now section 514 of the Companies Act 2016) and has provided such information as required by law. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [55] The Applicant's contention that the documents involve third party rights which the Liquidator is statutorily bound to protect does not establish relevance to his specific Guaranteed Rental Return claim. The fact that agreements may affect other creditors or stakeholders does not create an automatic right for individual creditors to inspect such documents for purposes unrelated to their own claims. The proper mechanism for addressing concerns about liquidator conduct affecting creditor interests generally would be through appropriate applications alleging misconduct with supporting evidence, not through fishing expeditions disguised as creditor inspection applications. [56] The court finds particularly compelling the Liquidator's submission that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate how the requested documents are relevant to his proof of debt for RM483,850.26 which is based on Guaranteed Rental Return provisions. The Applicant's proof of debt was filed on 14.4.2004, some six years before the Settlement Agreement was executed. The post-winding up arrangements between Atlas and TPD concern the future development and completion of the project but do not retrospectively affect the Applicant's pre-existing Guaranteed Rental Return entitlement which crystallised upon the original developer's failure. [57] The court concludes that this application constitutes a fishing expedition designed to obtain documents for speculative litigation purposes rather than legitimate creditor S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg oversight. The Applicant seeks to transform the statutory creditor inspection regime into a general discovery mechanism for contemplated litigation against third parties. Granting such relief would fundamentally undermine the proper boundaries of creditor inspection rights and establish a dangerous precedent allowing individual creditors to compel disclosure of sensitive commercial arrangements on purely speculative grounds. [58] The application for disclosure of documents relating to post-winding up agreements between Atlas and TPD is accordingly dismissed as the Applicant has failed to establish any relevant nexus between such documents and his existing Guaranteed Rental Return claim of RM483,850.26. Court's Supervisory Role and Liquidator Independence [59] The Applicant submits that after 21 years of liquidation, enhanced court oversight is warranted given the prolonged duration of these proceedings. The Applicant contends that liquidators owe a duty of transparency to creditors and cites the authority of Bina Puri Sdn Bhd v Jambulingam Sethuraman-Raki C/O Rimbun Corporate Advisory Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 MLRH 427 (High Court) which held that liquidators should always take into account creditors' views and “must always be transparent in whatever they do.” The Applicant argues that this transparency obligation justifies enhanced disclosure requirements and that the court should exercise S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg more stringent supervisory oversight in circumstances where a liquidation has persisted for over two decades. [60] The Respondents submit that courts should be slow to interfere with liquidator conduct absent evidence of fraud or bad faith, relying upon the established principle in Andrew Christopher Chuah Choong Eng Chuan. The Respondents contend that granting this application would establish a dangerous precedent for harassment of liquidators by individual creditors and that such interference would fundamentally undermine the effectiveness of court-appointed liquidators. The Respondents further submit that statutory returns have been filed with SSM as required by law, demonstrating compliance with all mandatory obligations. [61] The principle established in Andrew Christopher Chuah Choong Eng Chuan that courts will be slow to interfere with the affairs of liquidator, save for when there is element of fraud or where the liquidator had failed to act in a bona fide manner remains paramount in the supervisory framework governing liquidator conduct. This fundamental principle recognises the necessity of protecting liquidators from unwarranted interference whilst maintaining appropriate judicial oversight to prevent misconduct. [62] I accept the Respondents’ submission that the Applicant has failed to establish any evidence of fraud, misconduct, or bad faith that would justify enhanced court intervention. The S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg Applicant's assertion that prolonged duration alone warrants heightened oversight is misconceived. The evidence demonstrates that the 21-year duration of this liquidation reflects the complex commercial and legal issues inherent in resolving strata title and land amalgamation problems rather than liquidator negligence or misconduct. The Settlement Agreement with TPD represents a legitimate exercise of the Liquidator's statutory powers to address these complexities. [63] Whilst the Applicant cites Bina Puri for the proposition that liquidators should be transparent, I find this authority distinguishable from the present circumstances. The Bina Puri case concerned liquidator accountability to the court and creditors generally within the established statutory framework, not compelled disclosure to individual creditors pursuing speculative litigation strategies outside that framework. The transparency obligation referenced in Bina Puri operates within the confines of statutory reporting requirements and established supervisory mechanisms, not as a basis for unlimited disclosure demands by individual creditors. [64] The court must carefully distinguish between legitimate creditor oversight and impermissible interference with liquidator decision-making. The evidence establishes that the Liquidator has filed statutory returns with the Companies Commission of Malaysia and provided such information as required by sections 281 of the Companies Act 1965 (now S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg section 514 of the Companies Act 2016). The Applicant has not identified any specific failure to comply with statutory obligations that would justify enhanced disclosure requirements beyond those mandated by law. [65] I find compelling the Respondents’ submission that granting this application would establish a dangerous precedent allowing individual creditors to compel disclosure of sensitive commercial agreements on the basis of speculation about future litigation. Such an approach would fundamentally undermine liquidator effectiveness by subjecting every commercial decision to potential challenge by disgruntled creditors seeking to develop litigation strategies. This would deter qualified professionals from accepting liquidator appointments and impair the efficient administration of insolvent estates. [66] The authority of Kumpulan Sepakat Konsult v Cherish Springs Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 LNS 2804 (High Court), relied upon by the Respondents, confirms that section 509 of the Companies Act 2016 only provides for inspection of books and papers, not an entitlement to copies, and that there is no statutory duty on liquidators to submit statements of affairs or other documents to creditors beyond what is required by the court. This reinforces the limited nature of creditor inspection rights and the impropriety of the Applicant's broad demands. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [67] Furthermore, the principle established in Chi Liung Holdings by the Court of Appeal emphasises that courts, in exercising their supervision, will ensure that no wasteful litigation is brought against liquidators. The Court of Appeal held that applicants must obtain authority from the winding-up judge before proceeding against liquidators and must satisfy the court as to the probable success of their application whilst giving assurance that their action is not vexatious or merely oppressive. The Applicant's failure to satisfy these requirements further undermines the legitimacy of this application. [68] The evidence demonstrates that the Liquidator has acted within the scope of his statutory powers and in good faith throughout the liquidation process. The Settlement Agreement with TPD was entered into as part of a legitimate strategy to resolve complex issues surrounding the development project. The Applicant has presented no credible evidence of impropriety, breach of duty, or failure to act bona fide that would warrant enhanced court intervention beyond the existing supervisory framework. [69] Accordingly, I find that the Applicant's submissions regarding enhanced court oversight must be rejected. The existing supervisory framework, comprising statutory reporting requirements, court oversight of significant decisions, and established principles governing liquidator conduct, provides adequate protection for creditor interests without subjecting liquidators to unwarranted interference S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg from individual creditors pursuing collateral purposes. The court will not permit the transformation of liquidators into unwilling discovery agents for speculative litigation strategies that exceed the legitimate scope of creditor oversight rights. Committee of Inspection Issues [70] The Applicant submits that this application is legally compliant and necessary as the issues faced by the Applicant have not been resolved by four cycles of liquidators and still persist. The Applicant contends that there was a request by the Applicant's solicitor to the Liquidator on 15.10.2024 to convene a meeting to determine the wishes of the creditors on the formation of a committee of inspection, which the Applicant alleges “fell on deaf ears”. [71] The Applicant relies upon the Court of Appeal case of Lim Boon Chuan @ Lim Ban Huat v Wonderful Castle Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] 6 MLRA 372, where Nallini Pathmanathan JCA (as she then was) explained that a committee of inspection is only formed if the creditors or members request the same, and that such a committee is necessary where there are a large number of creditors and the numbers are too unwieldy to warrant attendance by all creditors on each occasion. The Applicant further cites the Federal Court decision in North Plaza Sdn Bhd v Equiticorp Holdings Ltd & Ors [2013] 3 MLRA 289, where the court S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg emphasised the importance of the appointment of a committee of inspection to ensure check and balance in respect of the liquidator's acts, quoting the case of Woodsville Sdn Bhd v Tien Ik Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors (unreported) dated 31.5.2000 per Abdul Aziz Mohamed J (as he then was) that “the committee of inspection, as the general body of creditors and contributories, are not advisers to the liquidator. They are people, as representing the creditors and contributories, who have claims on the company. They are the master. The liquidator is to serve their interests.” [72] The Respondents submit that the Companies Act 2016 only permits committee of inspection formation for creditors' voluntary winding up under sections 450 and 457, and there are no equivalent provisions for court-ordered winding up. The Respondents argue that section 620 of the Companies Act 2016 clearly repeals the Companies Act 1965, whilst section 619 provides for transitional provisions. Under section 619(6), a company in the course of winding up immediately before commencement shall continue to be wound up under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 1965, but when one wants to bring an action against a liquidator, this does not fall under “relevant provisions” but becomes an action under current law, since the old law is repealed to that extent. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [73] The Respondents contend that the 2004 Order clearly indicates that this court considered everyone's views at that time, including the creditors' meeting of 13.4.2004, where all creditors, including Plaza Pantai (now BTC) owners, appeared before the court and agreed to proceed without a committee of inspection. The Respondents argue that this matter involves one person approaching the court seeking documents, compared to everyone else who accepted the liquidation proceeding without a committee of inspection and are amenable to the current process. [74] The court must consider whether the statutory framework permits committee of inspection formation in court-ordered liquidations commenced under the Companies Act 1965. Whilst sections 241 and 242 of the 1965 Act provided for such committees, the Companies Act 2016 represents a deliberate legislative policy shift. The transitional provisions in section 619(6) of the Companies Act 2016 preserve the winding up process under the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 1965, but this does not extend to new applications against liquidators which must be brought under the current statutory regime. [75] Sections 450 and 457 of the Companies Act 2016 limit committee of inspection formation to creditors' voluntary liquidations. This restriction reflects legislative recognition that court-ordered liquidations have adequate oversight through judicial supervision, removing the need for additional creditor committees. The omission of equivalent S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg provisions to sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act 1965 in the context of court-ordered liquidations under the Companies Act 2016 represents a deliberate legislative choice that this court must respect. [76] Even if the court retained jurisdiction to order committee formation under the transitional provisions, the Applicant has fundamentally failed to demonstrate broad creditor support for such a committee. The evidence before this court establishes that this application represents the interests of one individual creditor rather than a collective creditor concern requiring enhanced oversight. As the Respondents’ counsel correctly submitted, the only party applying before this court is a single individual - not representing anyone else, not representing other stakeholders, but only Mr Chatar as one person acting solely for himself. [77] The original court order of 3.9.2004 that no committee of inspection be formed was made after comprehensive judicial consideration of the circumstances, including a creditors' meeting held on 13.4.2004 where all creditors, including BTC owners, appeared before the court. The evidence demonstrates that all creditors agreed at that time to proceed without a committee of inspection. The Applicant has not established that circumstances have materially changed in a manner that would justify revisiting this determination, particularly given the restrictive current statutory framework under the Companies Act 2016. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [78] The Applicant's reliance on the Court of Appeal decision in Lim Boon Chuan v Wonderful Castle Sdn Bhd is misplaced. In that case, Nallini Pathmanathan JCA emphasised that a committee of inspection is only formed if creditors or members request the same, and is generally necessary where there are a large number of creditors and the numbers are too unwieldy to warrant attendance by all creditors on each occasion. Crucially, Her Ladyship noted that “in the instant case there was no request, so there was no necessity to form a COI. It is not a mandatory requirement.” The present case is distinguishable as there remains no collective creditor request, only an individual application by one creditor. [79] Similarly, the Federal Court decision in North Plaza Sdn Bhd v Equiticorp Holdings Ltd & Ors must be read in its proper context. That case concerned enforcement of a consent order that specifically provided for the appointment of a committee of inspection. The Federal Court's observations about the importance of committees of inspection were made in the context of ensuring compliance with an existing court order, not as a general proposition requiring committee formation in all liquidations. [80] The court is particularly concerned that the Applicant's motivation for seeking a committee of inspection appears directly connected to his inability to obtain documents through the substantive relief sought in this application. This suggests an improper attempt to circumvent legal S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg requirements through alternative mechanisms. The Applicant has failed to establish any legitimate oversight concern that would justify the formation of a committee of inspection beyond his own individual desire to access liquidation documents. [81] The court notes that permitting individual creditors to compel the formation of committees of inspection based solely on personal dissatisfaction with liquidation progress would fundamentally undermine the efficiency of the liquidation process. As the Respondents correctly submit, if individual applications of this nature are permitted, there will be multiple actions and non-stop applications seeking similar relief, and liquidation will become burdened with various applications and responsibilities. The current application represents precisely the type of singular pursuit that the statutory framework seeks to prevent. [82] For these reasons, the court dismisses the Applicant's application for an order to convene a meeting to consider forming a committee of inspection. The current statutory framework under the Companies Act 2016 does not permit such formation in court-ordered liquidations, the original 2004 order was properly made with full creditor consideration, no material change in circumstances has been demonstrated, and the application represents individual rather than collective creditor interests inconsistent with the purpose and function of committees of inspection. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg Nature and Scope of Relief Sought [83] The Applicant submits that he seeks not merely inspection but delivery of certified copies of documents within specified timeframes, arguing this is necessary given the 21-year duration of the liquidation. The Applicant contends that common sense would dictate that 21 years is not an expeditious period to conclude any liquidation process whilst the rights of creditors and purchasers hang in the balance. The Applicant further submits that he requires these documents to launch an effective and accurate proposed suit and that the application was a spearhead in speeding up the liquidation process and bringing it to a final conclusion. [84] The Respondents submit that no statutory provision requires liquidators to deliver certified copies with specified deadlines, and such orders would impose undue administrative and financial burdens. The Respondents argue through counsel that if every creditor could demand certified copies with specified delivery deadlines, this would burden liquidators with unnecessary costs and administrative obligations. The Respondents further contend that Prayer 4 of the Summons which requests delivery of certified copies within 30 days has no provision under either the Companies Act 1965 or Companies Act 2016 requiring liquidators to deliver documents within such timeframes. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [85] After careful consideration of the parties' submissions and the applicable authorities, I find that the relief sought fundamentally exceeds the scope of traditional inspection rights under either section 248 of the Companies Act 1965 or section 509 of the Companies Act 2016. Both provisions contemplate inspection, not mandatory delivery of certified copies within prescribed timeframes. The distinction between inspection and delivery of certified copies is not merely technical but represents a fundamental difference in the nature and scope of creditor rights vis-à-vis liquidator obligations. [86] The High Court in Kumpulan Sepakat Konsult definitively held that “Section 509 of the Companies Act 2016 only provides that the Liquidator is to allow the Applicants to inspect the books and papers but they are not entitled to a copy of the same.” This authority is directly on point and establishes beyond doubt that the statutory framework does not permit the expanded relief sought by the Applicant. [87] I find that the Applicant's argument that exceptional circumstances justify expanded relief is misconceived. The statutory framework provides specific remedies, and courts cannot create additional obligations merely because applications involve lengthy liquidations or complex commercial issues. The fact that this liquidation has continued for 21 years, whilst lengthy, does not transform the nature of the statutory rights available to creditors or S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg permit the court to expand those rights beyond their statutory boundaries. [88] The court must be particularly mindful that granting the extensive relief sought would effectively transform the Liquidator into a discovery agent for the Applicant's speculative litigation plans, imposing costs and administrative burdens without statutory justification and potentially prejudicing other creditors who would ultimately bear these costs. The Liquidator's duties are to the creditors collectively, not to individual creditors pursuing private litigation strategies. [89] I note the Applicant's submission that the documents are necessary to launch an effective and accurate proposed suit. However, this acknowledgment reveals the true purpose of this application - to obtain documents for use in contemplated litigation against third parties rather than to verify or understand the Applicant's existing claim against Atlas If the Applicant genuinely requires specific documents for legitimate purposes, proper discovery procedures in any subsequent litigation would provide appropriate remedies without circumventing statutory limitations on creditor inspection rights. [90] The court must protect the integrity of the liquidation process by ensuring that statutory inspection rights are not misused as a substitute for proper discovery procedures. Allowing creditors to compel delivery of certified copies with S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg specified deadlines would establish a dangerous precedent that could be exploited by creditors seeking to harass liquidators or obtain documents for collateral purposes outside the scope of legitimate creditor oversight. [91] Accordingly, I find that the nature and scope of relief sought by the Applicant exceeds the statutory boundaries of creditor inspection rights and cannot be granted. The application seeks to transform limited inspection rights into a comprehensive discovery mechanism, which is neither contemplated by the legislation nor appropriate in the circumstances of this case. Discovery of Liquidator's Account (Form 75) [92] The Applicant submits that Enclosure 1 seeks discovery of the Liquidator's Account (Form 75) from the date of appointment of the Liquidator until the date of this court's order. The Applicant contends that the Account is relevant to his and the other purchaser's intended cause of action as creditors. In support of this application, the Applicant relies on Teo Cheng Hua v. Ker Min Choo & Ors [2015] 6 MLRA 87, where the Court of Appeal found that the original liquidator's statements constituted plainly material evidence before the court in pending litigation and that the liquidator's conduct was done with the intention of influencing the outcome of litigation, thereby constituting contempt of court. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [93] The Applicant further submits that since the liquidation of Respondent 1 has dragged on for 21 years, records of SSM may not capture all the Forms 75 filed, and therefore the Liquidator's Account are sought via this application. The Applicant averred that the documents sought are necessary to launch an effective and accurate proposed suit. [94] The Respondents submit that, the Applicant alleged that the liquidator's account is relevant to the Applicant's intended cause of action as creditors. However, the Respondents had confirmed that all relevant filings - including Form 75 - have been duly lodged with SSM pursuant to section 514(1) of the Companies Act 2016 (section 281(1) of the Companies Act 1965), and are publicly accessible. [95] The Respondents further submit that the Applicant had not shown any alleged failure by the Liquidator to comply with its statutory duty to file the necessary statutory documents including the liquidator's account. Clearly, there is no basis for the Applicant to compel the Liquidator to deliver the liquidator's account from the date of the Winding Up Order until the Order of this court, which is clearly arbitrary and excessive. [96] The Respondents distinguishes the case of Teo Cheng Hua v Ker Min Choo & Ors, submitting that the case does not lend any weight to the Applicant. In that case, the liquidator therein had produced in court a liquidator's account that is different than the one which has been filed with SSM, which S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg led to the Court of Appeal to state that “the original statements were plainly material evidence before the court in the pending litigation.” The Respondents submit that Teo Cheng Hua is in no way the authority to support the Applicant's contention that the Liquidator can be compelled to produce the liquidator's account from its inception, especially when the Applicant had not taken any steps to extract these liquidator's account inter alia from SSM. [97] I have carefully considered the submissions of both parties regarding the discovery of the Liquidator's Account (Form 75). The central issue is whether the Applicant has established sufficient grounds to compel the Liquidator to deliver the Form 75 accounts spanning the entire 21-year period of the liquidation. [98] The statutory framework governing liquidator's accounts is clear. Section 514(1) of the Companies Act 2016 (formerly section 281(1) of the Companies Act 1965) mandates that liquidators submit Form 75 accounts to SSM every six months. The Liquidator in this case has confirmed compliance with this statutory obligation, with all relevant filings including Form 75 having been duly lodged with SSM and being publicly accessible. [99] The Applicant's reliance on Teo Cheng Hua is misplaced and does not support the relief sought. I accept the Respondents' distinction of this case. In Teo Cheng Hua, the critical factor was that the liquidator had produced in S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg court a liquidator's account that differed from the one filed with SSM. This discrepancy led the Court of Appeal to find that the original statements were material evidence in the pending litigation and that the liquidator's conduct constituted contempt of court. The case concerned a specific instance of potential misconduct by a liquidator who presented conflicting accounts. [100] In the present case, there is no evidence or allegation that the Liquidator has filed different or conflicting Form 75 accounts. The Applicant has not demonstrated any failure by the Liquidator to comply with statutory filing obligations. The Applicant has not even attempted to extract the publicly available liquidator's accounts from SSM before seeking this court's intervention. [101] The Applicant's submission that SSM's records may not capture all Forms 75 filed due to the 21-year duration of the liquidation is speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Applicant bears the burden of establishing that there are missing or inadequate filings before compelling the Liquidator to produce additional documentation. [102] Furthermore, the relief sought by the Applicant is excessive and lacks statutory foundation. The Applicant seeks delivery of certified copies of all Form 75 accounts from the inception of the liquidation, which goes beyond what is contemplated by the statutory inspection provisions. As established in Kumpulan Sepakat Konsult, section 509 of S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg the Companies Act 2016 only provides that the Liquidator is to allow applicants to inspect books and papers but they are not entitled to copies of the same. [103] The court must also consider the principle established in Andrew Christopher Chuah Choong Eng Chuan that the court will be slow to interfere with the affairs of liquidators, save for when there is an element of fraud or where the liquidator has failed to act in a bona fide manner. No such circumstances have been established in this case. [104] I find that the Applicant's request for Liquidator's Accounts lacks the necessary statutory basis and factual foundation. The Liquidator has complied with statutory filing requirements, making the accounts publicly accessible through proper channels. The Applicant has not demonstrated any specific failure or misconduct that would justify compelling production of these documents beyond what is already publicly available. [105] Moreover, the request appears to be motivated by the Applicant's intention to identify parties for future litigation rather than legitimate oversight of the liquidation process. This constitutes an improper attempt to use statutory inspection provisions as a substitute for proper discovery procedures in contemplated litigation. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [106] Accordingly, I find that the Applicant's application for discovery of the Liquidator's Account (Form 75) must be dismissed. The Applicant has failed to establish sufficient grounds for the relief sought, and granting such relief would set an undesirable precedent for harassment of liquidators performing their statutory duties in compliance with the law. CONCLUSION [107] For the reasons comprehensively set out above, I find that the Applicant's application must be dismissed in its entirety. The Applicant has fundamentally failed to comply with the mandatory procedural requirement of obtaining prior leave from the Winding Up Court before mounting proceedings against the Liquidator, a defect that strikes at the heart of this application's legitimacy. The relief sought exceeds the scope of statutory inspection rights under both the Companies Act 1965 and Companies Act 2016, constituting an impermissible attempt to transform limited creditor oversight into a comprehensive discovery mechanism for speculative litigation purposes. The Applicant has failed to establish any relevant nexus between the post-winding up documents sought and his existing Guaranteed Rental Return claim, revealing this application as a fishing expedition designed to harass the Liquidator and obtain commercial information for collateral purposes. S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg [108] No evidence of fraud, misconduct, or breach of duty has been presented that would justify judicial interference with the Liquidator's legitimate exercise of statutory powers, and the current statutory framework does not permit committee of inspection formation in court-ordered liquidations. This application represents precisely the type of vexatious interference that the protective statutory framework seeks to prevent, and allowing such applications would establish a dangerous precedent undermining the effectiveness of court-appointed liquidators and the orderly administration of insolvent estates. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs of RM7,000.00 to paid by the Applicant to the Respondents subject to allocatur. 8 October 2025 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) S/N YWllzlJ/WEiMdwfaORoYxg Counsel: For the Applicant: Balbir Singh A/L Shingara Singh (Messrs Najiana Wan Balbir) For the Respondents: Joy Wilson Appukuttan (Kelvynn Foo Wai Tzen with him) (Messrs. KH Lim & Co)