Cheing Jin Hui v 1. ) Cheing Jin Huang (WA-22NCvC-707-12/2025)

CHEING JIN HUANG (No. K/P: 880405-43-5255)

CHEING JIN LIN (No. K/P: 780103-10-5746)

CHEING YEE PAM (No. K/P: 840630-10-5424)

TAN LAY KUAN @ TAN LAY WAH (No. K/P: 470327-10-5258) ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 16 - Application for an Injunction by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant, $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendant and $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendant under Order 29 of the Rules of Court 2012) INTRODUCTION [1] Initially Enclosure 16 was an ex-parte application by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ and $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants (collectively to be referred as "the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ -3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants") dated 5 February 2026 for an ad interim injunction and a prohibitory injunction. The inter-partes application was then heard on 13 April 2026 to which I dismissed with costs subject to a fee allocator. Below are my grounds. BACKGROUND FACTS [2] The Plaintiff is the older sister of the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant (Enclosure 17: $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant's Affidavit in Support, paragraph 1). The Plaintiff and the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ - 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants are the children of their deceased father, Cheing Boon Ngoun ("the Deceased"). The Deceased passed on 29 August 2025 without leaving a Will. The $ 4^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendant is the legal wife of the Deceased. [3] Enclosure 16 arises from an action filed by the Plaintiff dated 11 December 2025 (Enclosure 24, Plaintiff's Affidavit Reply) to be appointed as an Administrator for the estate of the Deceased. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ -3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants opposed the Plaintiff's suit. On 12 January 2026, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants filed the Defence and Counterclaim seeking instead for the letters of administration to be granted to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants jointly for the purpose of administering the Deceased's estate. [4] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ -3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants stated that the Deceased was diagnosed with Parkinson and Dementia by one Dr. Wong Kim Ming (Enclosure 17, paragraph 23). The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ -3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants stated that since 5 April 2023, the Deceased was placed in a nursing home at Genesis Life Centre Klang, No. 3 Jalan Istana, Pusat Perniagaan Amvertor, 41000 Klang, Selangor. [5] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants stated that there is an ongoing application before the High Court in Originating Summons (Suit No. 4450) to determine whether the $ 4^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendant is mentally disordered and incapable of managing her affairs under the Mental Health Act 2001. The High Court in suit 4450 has allowed the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant who is the Plaintiff in this instant case, for an inquiry to be undertaken on the $ 4^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendant (the Deceased's legal wife, as $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant in suit 4450). [6] On 7 August 2024, the solicitors for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants wrote to the Plaintiff requesting for the details of the transfer of shares and that the Plaintiff be refrained from performing any further transfer of shares from the Deceased to the Plaintiff. [7] The Plaintiff replied vide its letters dated 18 September 2024 and 26 September 2024 sought clarification as to which shares the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants were referring to. [8] On 15 October 2024, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants instructed their solicitor to respond requesting the following documents in relation to the seven (7) companies: i. All relevant Directors' resolutions approving the said transfer if shares; ii. All relevant Share Transfer Agreements/Instruments signed between the Plaintiff and the Deceased; iii. All Stamp Duty receipt paid for each share transfer; iv. All relevant Share Transfer Form(s); v. All relevant Share Certificates evidencing the Plaintiff's ownership of shares belonging to the Deceased; and vi. Any other relevant documents. [9] By letter dated 30 October 2024, the Plaintiff through her solicitors replied among others that the Plaintiff as director of the five (5) companies have a fiduciary duty and responsibility to act in the best interest of the five companies. For the other two (2) companies, the Plaintiff had referred the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants request to the board of directors and they refused the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants request (Enclosure 17, paragraph 33). [10] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants' letter dated 27 November 2024 to the Plaintiff requesting her confirmation and explanation on her actions in transferring ownership of the seven (7) companies from the Deceased to the Plaintiff. The seven (7) companies are listed in Enclosure 17, paragraph 32. [11] The 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant entered private caveats on the lands held in the seven (7) companies (Enclosure 17, paragraph 46). On 1 December 2025 the Plaintiff then issued five (5) notices of demand to the $ ^{st} $ Defendant to remove the private caveats to which the $ ^{st} $ Defendant removed the private caveats on the two (2) land, Ladang Mewah Sdn Bhd and Alam Pentas Sdn Bhd. The Plaintiff continued to commence an action for the removal of the remaining caveats in originating summons suit no.2836. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT [12] Before deciding whether or not to grant a prohibitory injunction, I looked at the nature of Enclosure 16 application. The Nature of Enclosure 16 Application [13] On 11 February 2026 this Court heard the ex-parte application Enclosure 16 by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants (together with the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant's Affidavit in Support and Certificate of Urgency (Enclosure 18)) and ordered that the ex-parte application be converted into an inter-partes hearing and fixed within fourteen (14) days to hear the inter-partes application: Order 29 rule (2BA) of the Rules of Court 2012. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants learned counsel also submitted orally the amendments to Enclosure 16 of clerical error on the undertaking to damages which should be referring to the 1st- $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants instead of to the Plaintiff. [14] An ad interim injunction was granted until the hearing of the interpartes application. The ad interim injunction lapsed after 21 days (on 4 March 2026) and both parties have yet to exhaust their affidavits. As affirmed by the Plaintiff, on 16 February 2026, that is the night before the Chinese New Year 2026, the ex-parte injunction order dated 11 February 2026 was served on the Plaintiff's counsel whom passed it to the Plaintiff only on 19 February 2026 (Plaintiff's Affidavit in Reply, paragraphs 19 & 20, Enclosure 24). [15] As both parties have yet to file in their affidavits, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants requested for an extension of the ad interim injunction order on 2 March 2026 which was to be the inter-partes hearing of Enclosure 16. This Court disagreed for an extension as there is no extension of an ad interim injunction: RIH Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Tanjung Tuan Hotel Sdn Bhd (2002) 3 CLJ 83 CA. I allowed a fresh ad interim injunction until the inter-partes hearing of Enclosure 16 for both parties to exhaust their affidavits, fixed on 13 April 2026 based on the principle enunciated in the Federal Court case of Petrodar Operating Co Ltd v Nam Fatt Corp Bhd (in liquidation) & Anor (2014) 6 MLJ 189 FC and also exercising my discretion under Order 92 rule 4 of the ROC 2012. [16] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants' application was made under Order 29 rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 and under sections 50, 51 and 52 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. Briefly, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants prayed for an ad interim injunction and prohibitory injunction to restrain the Plaintiff from dealing with, disposing of, or transferring shares, properties, and bank account funds related to five (5) companies and also for the appointment of an administrator. [17] Based on section 52 of the Specific Relief Act 1950, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants sought not only to restrain the Plaintiff from disposing of the assets held by the five (5) companies, but also to restrain the Plaintiff from obstructing "and/or interfere with the rights of the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ and $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants as beneficiaries to the Deceased's estate" (paragraph 52, $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants' written submission). [18] The learned counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants submitted that the injunction is necessary to prevent multiplicity of judicial proceedings and until the recovery and/or restitution action by the Administrator so as to prevent further breaches by the Plaintiff. [19] The counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants further submitted that they have an undisputed claim to be the beneficiaries of the Deceased who being intestate, section 6 of the Distribution Act 1958 would apply to grant the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants an interest in the estate and the appointment of an Administrator is a claim for the recovery of the assets. [20] The Plaintiff's learned counsel submitted that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants affirmed in their affidavit that the injunction is intended to preserve assets pending a "future recovery/restitution action" to be filed by a yet-to-be-appointed Administrator. It was argued that the application is incompetent because it is not anchored to any existing cause of action and an injunction application does not allow to benefit a future cause of action. [21] The counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the application by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ - $ $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants is a Mareva injunction or a Mareva-type injunction for the reason that it is an order that seeks to restrain the Plaintiff from dealing with the shares, properties and bank accounts held by five (5) companies. It was argued that for a Mareva injunction, a higher test is required whereby the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ $ - $ $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants must have a good arguable case and there is a real risk of dissipation of the assets by the Plaintiff. [22] I now turned to Enclosure 16. For clarity, the prayers under Enclosure 16 are laid out as follows: "a) Bahawa satu injunksi larangan ad interim diperintahkan untuk menghalang Plaintiff sama ada oleh diri sendiri, ejen-ejen, pekhidmat-pekhidmat, wakil-wakil, proksi-proksi, semua orang yang bertindak secara konsert atau mengambil bahagian dengan Plaintif atau sebaliknya, daripada melupuskan, menjual, memindahkan, menyerahkan, mencagar dan/atau melalui apa-apa jua cara berurusan dengan asset-aset berikut semnetara menunggu pelupusan penuh dan muktamad Notis Permohonan ini: i. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, Wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Astra Bestari Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 201001002707 (887287-A)]; ii. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, Wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Ladang lenang Sdn Bhd [No/ Syarikat: 201001010807 (895467-D)]; iii. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, Wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Ladang Maha Warisan Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 201001009249 (893879-A)]; iv. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, Wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun bank-Bank Syarikat Agenda Jernih Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 200601028605 (748361-M)]; dan v. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Seraya Harapan Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 201001025752 (909666-X)]. b) Bahawa satu injunksi larangan diperintahkan untuk menghalang Plaintiff sama ada oleh diri sendiri, ejen-ejen, pekhidmat-pekhidmat, wakil-wakil, proksi-proksi, semua orang yang bertindak secara konsert atau mengambil bahagian dengan Plaintiff atau sebaliknya, daripada melupuskan, menjual, memindahkan, menyerahkan, mencagar dan/atau melalui apa-apa jua cara berurusan dengan asset-aset berikut sementara pelupusan muktamad Prosiding Probet Bertikaian menerusi Tindakan Writ No. WA-22NCvC-707-12/2025 ("Guaman 707") dan sementara menunggu seorang Pentadbir harta Pusaka Cheing Boon Ngoun @ Chean Puan In (No. K/P: 470212-08-5111) ("Si Mati") dilantik oleh Mahkamah ini dan sementara menunggu pelupusan penuh dan muktamad Tindakan Pemulihan ("Recovery/Restitution Action") oleh Pentadbir Harta Pusaka Si Mati tersebut itu terhadap Plaintiff:- i. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Astra Bestrai Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 201001002707 (887287-A)]; ii. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, Wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Ladang Lenang Sdn Bhd [No/ Syarikat: 201001010807 (895467-D)]; iii. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, Wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Ladang Maha Warisan Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 201001009249 (893879-A)]; iv. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, Wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun bank-Bank Syarikat Agenda Jernih Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 200601028605 (748361-M)]; dan v. Saham-Saham, Hartanah-Hartanah, wang-Wang dalam Akaun-Akaun Bank-Bank Syarikat Seraya Harapan Sdn Bhd [No. Syarikat: 201001025752 (909666-X)]. c) Kos; dan d) Apa-apa-perintah dan relif lanjutan yang difikir patut dan adil oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia Ini." [23] No where in Enclosure 16 specifically state the words "for a Mareva Injunction". The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants anchored its injunction application under Order 29 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 and sections 50, 51 and 52 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. As such I am inclined to treat Enclosure 16 as an application for an ad interim injunction and a prohibitory injunction. [24] I now turned to Order 29 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. "Application for injunction (O29 r 1)

-(1) An application for the grant of an injunction may be made by any party to a cause or matter before or after the trial of the cause or matter, whether or not a claim for the injunction was included in that party's originating process, counterclaim or third party notice, as the case may be." (emphasis added) [25] Based on the reading of Order 29 rule 1 of the ROC 2012, it is essential for the applicant seeking an injunction to show that he has a cause of action. [26] This is supported by a plethora of case laws. The applicant must have a pre-existing cause of action against the other party, which means it cannot stand on its own: Nishimatsu Construction Co Ltd v Kecom Sdn Bhd (2009) 2 MLJ 404 CA. [27] An application for an injunction is not a separate cause of action: IMPSA (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad & Ors (2011) 1 LNS 729 HC. [28] Therefore, the application for an injunction based on the grounds to restrain the Plaintiff from dissipation and to protect the beneficiaries which would also include the Plaintiff (see paragraph 67 of Enclosure 17), are flawed as there is no cause of action by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants. [29] I viewed that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants application that the injunction is required until the appointment of an Administrator and until the recovery/restitution action to be filed by the Administrator that has yet to be appointed, is not a valid cause of action. [30] Furthermore, nowhere under Order 29 of ROC 2012 allows an injunction or an interlocutory injunction to be granted for future cause of action. Only those stipulated under Order 29 rule 1 (3)(a) and (b) of the ROC 2012 for such application before the issue of originating process is allowed, and if they are unfulfilled, the court can have the injunction discharged. [31] On the basis of no cause of action alone, the application Enclosure 16 can be dismissed. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants is unable to even show prima facie they have a valid cause of action for this Court to consider the four-tier tests in the case of American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (1975) 1 All ER 504. Whether there is a serious question to be tried? [32] I am mindful that a cause of action is the prerequisite for this application. To find on prima facie that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants have a cause of action as propounded by the Supreme Court in the case of RCA Sdn Bhd v Pekerja-Pekerja RCA Sdn Bhd & Ors (1991) 1 MLJ 309 SC I also turned to the affidavit evidence if the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants could disclose serious question to be tried. [33] Briefly, I find that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant's claim on the Plaintiff's actions in transferring the shares which occurred during the Deceased's lifetime are merely allegations. Based on the rebuttal by the Plaintiff's affidavit, the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ - $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants' claim of risk of dissipation rests entirely on unproven allegations of fraud simply by relying on their suspicion that the transfer of the Deceased's shares to the Plaintiff occurred whilst the Deceased was still alive but suffering from Parkinson and Dementia (Plaintiff's Affidavit in Reply, Enclosure 24, paragraphs 12- 18). [34] I am inclined to agree with the Plaintiff's counsel's submission that allegations of fraud cannot be used to infer a risk of dissipation at the interlocutory stage when its validity should be ventilated between the parties on the evidence adduced at the trial: Caltex Oil Malaysia Ltd v Tee Than Song (1969) 2 MLJ 184 OCJ. [35] As affirmed by the Plaintiff, the majority of the targeted assets by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants are properties and bank account funds belonging to the five (5) separate companies which are not owned by the Plaintiff and do not belong to the Deceased's estate (Enclosure 42, paragraphs 19). The Plaintiff affirmed that those assets ownership of the five (5) companies were never disputed and those assets never belong to the Deceased. [36] I disagree with the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants' counsel argument that all the assets of the five (5) companies are owned by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants as beneficiaries. Companies' properties belong to the companies and not even to their shareholders: Tan King Yong @ Tan Keng Hong v Tan Hwa Ling (2022) 2 MLJ 805 CA. In other words, the assets of the five (5) companies do not belong to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants and the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants do not have any proprietary claim on those assets (Enclosure 42, paragraphs 20-21). [37] In relation to the Deceased's estate which has yet to be administered, I am bound by the principle decided by the Court of Appeal case of Faustina Anne Sta Maria v Mary Patricia De Cruz (2024) 1 MLJ 741 CA that the beneficiaries under an intestacy have a right to require distribution to be effected and to the future proceeds of sale of the properties in the estate but they do not have the rights, or the title or interest in the specific properties themselves. CONCLUSION [38] In light of the above reasons, there is no cause of action by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}- $ $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants and therefore it would not be proper to make the order sought by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}- $ $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendants against the Plaintiff. Enclosure 16 is hereby dismissed with costs subject to a fee allocator. The ad interim injunction that was in place up to the hearing of this application is discharged. Dated 13th April 2026 (ZALITA BINTI ZAIDAN) (JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER) (HIGH COURT CIVIL NCVC3) (HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR) (IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA) Plaintiff's Counsel : Joshua Ho Fung Lym Nurul Hanani binti Azamuddin Messrs Raj, Ong & Yudistra $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ Defendant's : Leonard Raj a/l Kanaga Raj, Oon Thian Seng Counsel Choong Shu Wan & Messrs Anad & Noraini Cases Referred: RIH Services (M) Sdn Bhd v Tanjung Tuan Hotel Sdn Bhd (2002) 3 CLJ 83 CA Petrodar Operating Co Ltd v Nam Fatt Corp Bhd (in liquidation) & Anor (2014) 6 MLJ 189 FC Nishimatsu Construction Co Ltd v Kecom Sdn Bhd (2009) 2 MLJ 404 CA IMPSA (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad & Ors (2011) 1 LNS 729 HC American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (1975) 1 All ER 504 RCA Sdn Bhd v Pekerja-Pekerja RCA Sdn Bhd & Ors (1991) 1 MLJ 309 SC Caltex Oil Malaysia Ltd v Tee Than Song (1969) 2 MLJ 184 OCJ Tan King Yong @ Tan Keng Hong v Tan Hwa Ling (2022) 2 MLJ 805 CA Faustina Anne Sta Maria v Mary Patricia De Cruz (2024) 1 MLJ 741 CA Act/Law Referred: Order 29 rule 1 (3)(a) and (b) and 2 (2BA), Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 Sections 50, 51 and 52 of the Specific Relief Act 1950