(j) Menurut OKT juga beliau tidak membuka beg P19 dan beg coklat untuk melihat isi kandungannya, ini kerana, pada sangkaannya beg hitam itu juga sampel-sampel sebab ia masih baru.” [8] In a nutshell, the appellant’s defence was that she knew nothing about the drug as she thought the bag she was carrying only contained clothing samples to be delivered to an African man on her arrival in Malaysia. This appeal therefore turned on findings of fact made by the learned trial judge, in particular his finding that the appellant knew about the drug. [9] In his grounds of judgment, the learned trial judge had given careful consideration to the appellant’s explanation and came to a finding that the appellant’s defence was an afterthought and rejected it. In his view, the appellant’s explanation was “highly improbable”. We had no reason to interfere with this finding of fact. On the material before him, and having had the advantage of seeing and hearing the appellant giving evidence, he was perfectly entitled to come to that conclusion. 6 [10] The learned trial judge’s evaluation and assessment of the appellant’s defence can be found at paragraph 39 to paragraph 42 of his grounds of judgment. In our view, he had properly and sufficiently addressed his mind to all relevant issues of fact and law before him. [11] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial judge ought to have found that the appellant was merely in passive possession of the drug as she was an innocent carrier. It was argued that the appellant’s defence was not an afterthought and her cautioned statement (D48) ought to have been considered by the learned trial judge together with the fact that the “real trafficker” did make a call to the appellant by phone on her arrival at the LCCT Sepang. [12] The defence of an innocent carrier is a valid defence, and whether it will succeed or not would depend very much on the facts of each case: see Munuswamy Sunder Raj v PP [2015] 6 MLRA 443; [2015] 6 AMR 405 per Suriyadi Halim Omar FCJ. [13] Knowledge is an essential ingredient of the offence of trafficking. In this case it was presumed against the appellant by operation of section 37(d) of the DDA. The burden was therefore on her to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that she had no knowledge of the drug. [14] It was submitted by learned counsel that the appellant’s conduct of not attempting to flee the scene or struggle with the police proves that she did not have mens rea possession of the drug. Furthermore, she gave full cooperation to SP5 when she was called back for SP5 to examine her bags as she was heading out of the airport. According to learned counsel, 7 her conduct had rebutted the statutory presumption of knowledge under section 37(d) of the DDA. [15] It was submitted that the doctrine of wilful blindness is not applicable in this case as the appellant did not have an “appropriate level of suspicion that led her to a refusal to investigate further”. Two reasons were proffered by learned counsel for saying this: (1) the appellant had explained to the Court that she had done deliveries of clothing samples like this for Pledgy before and had never got into any trouble with the authorities and therefore had no reason to be suspicious this time around; and (2) P19 still had its brand tagging and was new. [16] Learned counsel argued that it was reasonable for the appellant not to suspect anything since her duty was only to carry the new clothing samples to be delivered to someone in Malaysia. In addition to that, the drug was concealed in P19, which could not be easily seen even if she had checked P19. It was submitted that if these facts had been appreciated by the learned trial judge, he would have found that the appellant was telling the truth when she said that she had no knowledge of the drug. [17] With due respect, contrary to what counsel contended, there was sufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence by the learned trial judge. It is incorrect to say that he had not properly appreciated the facts. From his grounds of judgment, it is clear that he had given valid and sufficient reasons for coming to the conclusion that the appellant had knowledge of the drug. It could not therefore be said that he was wrong in finding that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge under section 8 37(d) of the DDA. This finding is not plainly wrong to warrant appellate interference. [18] Two figures featured prominently in the appellant’s defence. They were “Pledgy” and “Xue Bi”. According to learned counsel, these two characters were the real traffickers and not the appellant. The learned trial judge however found them to be fictitious characters and a recent invention by the appellant. He found that the appellant failed to give sufficient particulars of these two characters for the authorities to investigate, citing Rengarajan Thangavelu v PP [2015] 1 CLJ 993. We found nothing wrong with this finding. The evidence shows that the Investigating Officer had called the telephone numbers which were found in the appellant’s handset but each time he called the numbers, there was no response. [19] In rejecting the appellant’s defence of no knowledge, the learned trial judge had also considered the fact that the appellant did not appear to have booked her lodging in Malaysia and a return ticket to China. She also had no idea to whom the clothing samples were to be handed in Malaysia except to say that it was to an African male. No address of the African male was given to her. [20] The next issue that called for our consideration was whether the appellant was only guilty of the lesser offence of possession under section 39A(2) of the DDA as opposed to the offence of trafficking under section 39B. It was submitted that the interest of justice would be served by reducing the charge from one under section 39B to one under section 39A(2) of the DDA. 9 [21] We had given due consideration to the point raised and found no basis to accede to learned counsel’s argument. Having failed to discharge her legal burden of proving that she had no knowledge of the drug (which means she knew about the drug), the question was whether the drug was for the purpose of trafficking. [22] In the absence of evidence that the drug was for the appellant’s own consumption or for any purpose other than trafficking, the drug could only be for the purpose of trafficking having regard to its quantity and the manner it was cleverly hidden in the bag that the appellant was carrying. And by the appellant’s own admission, the drug was to be handed over to a male African after her arrival in Malaysia. [23] In any event, it was not the appellant’s defence that the drug was not for the purpose of trafficking. Her defence was that she was an innocent carrier and had no knowledge of the drug. The learned trial judge was therefore not wrong in finding that the appellant failed to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case and that the case had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. [24] It was for all the reasons aforesaid that we found the conviction to be safe and affirmed the verdict of guilt arrived at by the learned trial judge. Signed ABDUL RAHMAN SEBLI Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated: 2 November 2018. 10 For the Appellant: Afifuddin Ahmad Hafifi (Assigned Counsel) of Messrs Salehuddin Saidin & Associates. For the Respondent: Mohd Hamzah bin Ismail, DPP of the Attorney General’s Chambers.