Chevron Malaysia Limited v Razq Merdeka Service Station Sdn Bhd (MA-22NCC-3-04/2022)

This is the Plaintiff's application in Enclosure 137, brought pursuant to Order 26 rule 6 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012.

By Enclosure 137, the Plaintiff seeks an order requiring the Defendant to provide further and better answers to interrogatories already allowed by consent, the answers to which were filed in Enclosure 136. In the alternative, the Plaintiff seeks an order striking out the Defendant's Amended Defence and Counterclaim dated 25.5.2022.

The interrogatories concern the Defendant's alleged dealings, whether directly or through ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd, with Shell Malaysia Trading Sdn Bhd and Shell Timur Sdn Bhd in relation to the land and petrol station which form the subject matter of the present suit.

The central issue is not whether the Defendant's answers are true, but whether they are sufficient in law under Order 26 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012.

The dispositive issues are accordingly:

whether the Answers to Interrogatories in Enclosure 136 are insufficient within the meaning of Order 26 rule 6;

if so, the proper scope of any further answers to be ordered; and

whether the alternative prayer to strike out the Amended Defence and Counterclaim is justified. B. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [6] The Plaintiff, Chevron Malaysia Limited, is a body corporate engaged in, among other activities, the supply of petroleum products. The Defendant, RAZQ Merdeka Service Station Sdn Bhd, is a company which, at the material time, operated a Caltex-branded petrol station on land held under HSM 1342, PT 1365, Mukim Batu Berendam, Daerah Melaka Tengah, Negeri Melaka (now held under PM 1464, Lot 2821, Mukim Batu Berendam) ("the Land"). [7] By the Amended Writ of Summons and Amended Statement of Claim dated 15.4.2022 (Enclosures 120 and 121), the Plaintiff pleads that the Defendant has breached three agreements entered into on 16.12.2010, namely the Sale and Purchase Agreement, the Chevron Retail Fuel Supply Agreement, and the Equipment Sale Agreement (collectively, "the 2010 Agreements"). The pleaded breaches include the refusal to renew the fuel supply arrangement, the cessation of operation of the Land as a Caltex station, and the entry into business arrangements with Shell and other third parties through ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd without the Plaintiff's consent. [8] By the Amended Defence and Counterclaim dated 25.5.2022 (Enclosure 122), the Defendant denies the alleged breaches and pleads, among other matters, that any renewal of the Chevron Retail Fuel Supply Agreement required mutual consent and could not be effected unilaterally. The Defendant further pleads, by way of counterclaim, damages for being deprived of the use of the Land and alternatively, restitution of construction costs paid to BBA Jaya Sdn Bhd. The Plaintiff's Amended Reply and Defence to Counterclaim was filed on 7.6.2022 (Enclosure 123). [9] On 24.3.2025, this Court granted a discovery order which required among other things, production for inspection of the Retailer Partner Agreement between ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd and Shell Malaysia Trading Sdn Bhd / Shell Timur Sdn Bhd dated 17.12.2021, the Tenancy Agreement with Texas Chicken (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd dated 14.3.2022 and the Letter of Acceptance issued by QL Maxincome Sdn Bhd for the operation of a FamilyMart outlet. [10] Following limited disclosure pursuant to the discovery order, the Defendant's stated position - confirmed both in correspondence between the parties' solicitors and on affidavit - was that all communications and dealings between the Defendant or ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd and Shell were oral and informal, and that no further written documents existed. [11] On 2.7.2025, the Plaintiff filed Enclosure 124, a Notice of Application for leave to serve interrogatories under Order 26 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012, supported by the Affidavit-in-Support of Tang Wern Ping affirmed on 2.7.2025 (Enclosure 125). After the exchange of affidavits, the parties recorded a Consent Order on 9.12.2025 (Enclosure 135), whereby the Defendant agreed to answer the interrogatories appended to Enclosure 124. [12] On 15.12.2025, the Defendant filed its Answers to Interrogatories jointly affirmed by Rokiah binti Abdul Majid and Ahmad Za'im bin Zulkefli (Enclosure 136). [13] On 9.2.2026, the Plaintiff filed the present application in Enclosure 137, supported by the Affidavit-in-Support of Bobby Marshal Sebastian affirmed on 9.2.2026 (Enclosure 138). The Defendant's Affidavit-in-Reply was affirmed by Rokiah binti Abdul Majid on 5.3.2026 (Enclosure 140), and the Plaintiff's Affidavit-in-Reply was affirmed by Bobby Marshal Sebastian on 19.3.2026 (Enclosure 141). C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [14] The issues for determination are as follows:

whether the Answers to Interrogatories in Enclosure 136 are insufficient within the meaning of Order 26 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012;

if so, the proper scope of any further answers to be ordered;

whether the alternative prayer to strike out the Defendant's Amended Defence and Counterclaim should be granted; and

the appropriate orders as to compliance and costs. D. STATUTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK [15] Order 26 rule 1(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 permits the service of interrogatories where they relate to a matter in question between the parties and are necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. [16] Order 26 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012 provides that, where a party answers interrogatories insufficiently, the Court may order that party to make a further answer either by affidavit or on oral examination as the Court may direct. [17] Order 26 rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 empowers the Court, where a party fails to comply with an order made under rule 1 or rule 6, to make such order as the Court thinks just, including an order that the action be dismissed or that the defence be struck out and judgment entered accordingly. [18] The striking out of pleadings is otherwise governed by Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 and the inherent jurisdiction preserved by Order 92 rule 4. The pleading must be shown to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. [19] In Sheikh Abdullah bin Sheikh Mohamed v Kang Kock Seng [1975] 1 MLJ 89,90, the Federal Court held that interrogatories must be designed to obtain admissions of fact which reduce the issues, shorten trial and thereby save costs. [20] In Pertubohan Berita Nasional Malaysia v Stephen Kalong Ningkan [1980] 2 MLJ 19, the Federal Court affirmed that the grant of interrogatories lies within the discretion of the Court, the discretion being guided by whether they are necessary for the fair disposal of the cause or matter or for saving costs. [21] In Philip Hoalim v Amalgamated Theatres Limited [1936] 1 MLJ 10, the Court drew the important distinction between an answer which is genuinely insufficient and an answer which is merely not the answer the interrogating party desired or expected. Order 26 rule 6 is directed only to the former. [22] In Hall v Sevalco Ltd [1996] Lexis Citation 2288, Sir Thomas Bingham MR observed that necessity is a stringent test, and that interrogatories should not be discharged as routine interlocutory ammunition. That observation, while made in respect of the equivalent English rule, is consistent with the Malaysian position under Order 26. [23] In Shum Kai Cheong v See Too Woon Yee [1998] 4 MLJ 155, the High Court reiterated that interrogatories are not to be employed oppressively, and that the Court must consider the procedural stage of the proceedings and the nature of the information sought. [24] In Swisslog Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Chang Jun Qiang & Ors [2020] MLJU 1597 (High Court), further answers were ordered where the unanswered interrogatories were directed at pleaded issues and were not in the nature of fishing interrogatories. [25] In M Wealth Corridor Sdn Bhd v BJ Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] 9 MLJ 721 (High Court), interrogatories were refused at the leave stage because they were broad and speculative, and were directed towards searching for material to ground allegations not yet properly anchored in admitted facts. [26] From these authorities, the following propositions may be distilled for the purposes of Order 26 rule 6:

the test is one of sufficiency, not truth or completeness in any absolute sense;

the Court will not compel an answer in the form preferred by the interrogating party;

the Court will, however, require the responding party to address the substance of the question, including such particulars as are reasonably available within its present knowledge, information and belief;

where the answer directly responds to the question posed, the Court will not find it insufficient merely because the answer is not the one the interrogating party expected or desired, or because the answer is deemed commercially implausible (see Philip Hoalim); the Court must assess whether the answer addresses the substance of the question (see Swisslog Malaysia); and

where particulars are genuinely unavailable, the responding party must say so expressly and explain why. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Issue 1: Whether the Answers to Interrogatories are insufficient [27] The ten interrogatories are conveniently grouped by subject matter. Interrogatories 1 to 7 concern the existence, timing, manner and substance of communications and dealings between the Defendant or ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd, on the one hand, and Shell, on the other. Interrogatories 8 and 9 concern the commercial rationale for engaging with Shell and for using ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd as the contracting party. Interrogatory 10 concerns the persons within the Defendant who authorised the engagement and the process of decision-making. Interrogatories 1 and 4: timing and meeting particulars [28] Interrogatory 1 sought the date on which the Defendant or ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd first initiated or received any communication from Shell. Interrogatory 4 sought identification of the meetings that took place, including their dates, locations, attendees, subject matter and outcomes. [29] In Enclosure 136, the Defendant identified that the first contact was made by an individual named Najib of Savills "in or around 2020, prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic"; that there were approximately three casual physical meetings; that the meetings ceased upon the enforcement of the Movement Control Order; and that the principal attendees were Najib and Ahmad Za'im bin Zulkefli. [30] These answers are not wholly non-responsive. They identify the approximate year, the broad timing, the alleged intermediary, the approximate number of meetings, the principal attendees and the cessation event. However, given the admission that the meetings ceased upon the enforcement of the Movement Control Order, which took effect in March 2020, the timing of the communications and meetings is reasonably ascertainable to a closer approximation than "in or around 2020". The Defendant has not, on oath in Enclosure 136, given the closest approximation reasonably available within its present knowledge, information and belief. [31] Once the Defendant accepts that there were approximately three physical meetings, a bare statement that there is "no accurate record" does not, without more, sufficiently answer Interrogatory 4. The Defendant is required to state the most specific particulars reasonably available concerning each of the three admitted meetings. Where any such particulars are genuinely unavailable, the Defendant must say so expressly and explain why. [32] The answers to Interrogatories 1 and 4 are accordingly insufficient in the limited respects identified above. Interrogatories 2,3,5 and 6: written records and the manner of communication [33] Interrogatory 2 asked whether any written proposal, invitation, inquiry or approach was made by either side. Interrogatory 3 asked, if no written communication existed, the manner in which the communications took place. Interrogatory 5 asked whether minutes, summaries, notes or recordings were prepared. Interrogatory 6 asked whether any presentation, proposal or briefing document was exchanged. [34] In Enclosure 136, the Defendant answered that there were no written proposals or approaches; that the communications were verbal and informal, initiated by a telephone call from Najib to Ahmad Za'im, with subsequent communications taking place at informal physical meetings; that no minutes, summaries or recordings were prepared; and that no presentation, proposal or briefing document was exchanged. [35] The principle in Philip Hoalim v Amalgamated Theatres Limited applies directly to these answers. The answers are responsive in substance. The Plaintiff's complaint is that, as a matter of business common sense, written records ought to exist and the Defendant's denial is implausible. That objection goes to the truth of the answers, not to their sufficiency. Whether the Defendant's account is credible is a question for trial, where the Defendant's witnesses may be cross-examined and where any inferences arising from the absence of contemporaneous records may be properly tested. [36] Order 26 rule 6 does not provide a mechanism by which the Court may compel a deponent to give the answer the interrogating party prefers. The answers to Interrogatories 2, 3, 5 and 6 are therefore sufficient, and no further answer is required in respect of them. Interrogatory 7: corporate documents handed over to Najib [37] Interrogatory 7 sought identification and description of any emails, letters, text messages, WhatsApp messages, internal memoranda or other documents exchanged between the Defendant or ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd, on the one hand, and Shell, on the other, relating to the discussions, negotiations, drafts, revisions, approvals or final execution of the Retailer Partner Agreement. [38] In Enclosure 136, the Defendant answered that, after the Movement Control Order was lifted in 2021, Najib requested the Defendant's "corporate documents" and that those documents were handed over without written correspondence during one of the informal meetings. [39] The answer is responsive to the substance of Interrogatory 7. The Defendant has stated that no emails, letters, text messages, WhatsApp messages, internal memoranda or like documents were exchanged, and that the only material which passed between the parties was the Defendant's corporate documents, handed over physically during one of the informal meetings. The Plaintiff's complaint is, in substance, that the Defendant did not specify which corporate documents were handed over. That complaint does not go to the sufficiency of the answer as framed by the interrogatory; it goes to a further particular which the Plaintiff would now wish to extract. To require the Defendant to identify the specific documents would, in effect, be to amend Interrogatory 7 after the event and to compel the answer which the interrogating party desires. That is not the function of Order 26 rule 6: see Philip Hoalim. [40] The answer to Interrogatory 7 is therefore sufficient within the meaning of Order 26 rule 6, and no further answer is required in respect of it. Interrogatory 8: commercial rationale for engaging with Shell [41] Interrogatory 8 sought an explanation of the commercial purpose and rationale for engaging with Shell in light of the Defendant's then existing contractual relationship with the Plaintiff. [42] In Enclosure 136, the Defendant answered that it never initiated any relationship with Shell; that Ahmad Za'im responded to Najib's overtures out of good faith; and that it is common practice in the industry for intermediaries such as Najib to make such approaches. [43] That answer responds to the question, albeit by denying its underlying premise. The Plaintiff's complaint is that the answer is implausible because the Defendant nonetheless attended meetings and handed over corporate documents. That complaint is again directed to the truth or commercial plausibility of the answer, not to its sufficiency. The answer to Interrogatory 8 is therefore sufficient within the meaning of Order 26 rule 6. Interrogatory 9: use of ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd as the contracting party [44] Interrogatory 9 sought an explanation as to why ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd, rather than the Defendant, was the contracting party with Shell in respect of the Retailer Partner Agreement concerning the Land. [45] In Enclosure 136, the Defendant answered that this was a business and commercial decision; that ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd had been incorporated for distinct lines of business including real-estate activities and the trade in fireworks and firecrackers; and that one director of the Defendant, Encik Ruslan bin Majid, was not involved in the new venture. [46] The answer substantively addresses the interrogatory. The Plaintiff may dispute the answer's adequacy or commercial plausibility at trial. As Order 26 rule 6 does not operate to compel an answer favourable to the interrogating party, no further answer is required in respect of Interrogatory 9. Interrogatory 10: persons who authorised the engagement and the decision-making process [47] Interrogatory 10 has two limbs. First, it sought identification of the persons within the Defendant or ZR Fortune Sdn Bhd who approved or authorised the decision to enter into a business arrangement with Shell. Second, it required elaboration of the process of decision making. [48] In Enclosure 136, the Defendant identified Rokiah binti Abdul Majid and Ahmad Za'im bin Zulkefli as the persons concerned. The answer is responsive to the first limb but omits the second limb entirely. The Defendant has not stated whether there was any meeting, internal discussion, oral approval, written instruction, board resolution or other step. The interrogatory expressly sought elaboration of the process of decision-making, and Order 26 rule 6 requires the Defendant to address it. If there was no formal step of any kind, the Defendant must say so expressly. [49] The answer to Interrogatory 10 is accordingly insufficient in respect of the second limb. The Defendant's authorities on necessity and the relevance of those principles [50] In opposition to Enclosure 137, the Defendant placed substantial reliance on M Wealth Corridor Sdn Bhd v BJ Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] 9 MLJ 721 (High Court) and a body of related authorities, including Industrial Property Management Sdn Bhd v Forebase Property Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 10 CLJ 763 (High Court), Doa Huat Holdings Sdn Bhd v MBL Plantation Sdn Bhd [2024] CLJU 229 (High Court), and MI Technovation Berhad & Anor v Chin Yong Keong & Ors [2023] CLJU 2814 (High Court). Each of those authorities concerned interrogatories at the leave stage, where the questions sought to develop allegations not yet anchored in admitted facts. [51] The Defendant's reliance on M Wealth Corridor is not misplaced, as the Plaintiff's application for interrogatories at Enclosure 124 was granted by consent. The legal principles governing the necessity of interrogatories, as articulated in M Wealth Corridor, remain relevant in assessing whether the answers given are sufficient. However, the dispositive issue here is not necessity but sufficiency under O.26 r. 6. The test at the leave stage is whether the interrogatories are "necessary" for a fair disposal or to save costs (O.26 r.1(3)). The present application, however, concerns the distinct and less stringent test of "sufficiency" of the answers already given under O.26 r.6. The test under r.6 is whether the answer addresses the substance of the question, not whether the Court would have granted leave for the interrogatory in the first place. Issue 2: Scope of any further answers to be ordered [52] The proper order under Order 26 rule 6 must be proportionate and confined strictly to the actual insufficiency identified. It is not an occasion to broaden the original interrogatories or to circumvent the ordinary discipline of trial. [53] Having regard to the analysis above, the further answers required are limited to the following matters:

in respect of Interrogatory 1, the Defendant shall state, on the basis of its present knowledge, information and belief, the most specific approximation it can give of the date or month of first communication with Najib of Savills, including (if such be the case) that the communication occurred in or about January or February 2020 prior to the enforcement of the Movement Control Order. Where any closer approximation is unavailable, the Defendant shall say so and explain why;

in respect of Interrogatory 4, the Defendant shall state, on the basis of its present knowledge, information and belief, the most specific particulars reasonably available concerning the three admitted physical meetings between Najib and Ahmad Za'im bin Zulkefli, including their approximate dates or sequence, their location, the persons present, and the subject matter and outcome of each. Where any such particulars are genuinely unavailable, the Defendant shall say so and explain why; and

in respect of Interrogatory 10, the Defendant shall state, on the basis of its present knowledge, information and belief, the process by which Rokiah binti Abdul Majid and Ahmad Za'im bin Zulkefli approved or authorised the engagement with Shell, including any meeting, internal discussion, oral approval, written instruction, board resolution or other step. Where no such step took place, the Defendant shall say so expressly. [54] No further answer is required for Interrogatories 2,3,5,6,7,8 and 9, the existing answers being sufficient within the meaning of Order 26 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012. Issue 3: Whether the Amended Defence and Counterclaim should be struck out [55] The Plaintiff's alternative prayer is for the striking out of the Defendant's Amended Defence and Counterclaim. The asserted basis is that the Answers to Interrogatories in Enclosure 136 amount to merely performative compliance with the Consent Order, and accordingly to no compliance at all. [56] The power to strike out a defence for non-compliance with an interrogatories order under Order 26 rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 is discretionary. The discretion must be exercised with proper regard to the gravity and persistence of the non-compliance and the consequences to the responding party. Striking out is the most drastic procedural sanction available short of judgment, and is to be reserved for cases of contumelious or repeated default. The principle is mirrored in the requirement under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 that the impugned pleading must be shown to be scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. [57] In the present matter, the Defendant filed substantive Answers to Interrogatories within the time stipulated in the Consent Order. The answers identified the alleged intermediary, the approximate number of meetings, the principal attendees, and the request for corporate documents. While the answers are insufficient in the three respects identified at paragraph [53] above, those insufficiencies are properly remediable by an order under Order 26 rule 6 itself. The case is far removed from the kind of contumelious default contemplated by Order 26 rule 7 or by Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012. [58] The alternative prayer to strike out the Amended Defence and Counterclaim is accordingly refused. F. CONCLUSION [59] Enclosure 137 succeeds in part. The proper relief on the facts is a focused and proportionate order for further and better answers under Order 26 rule 6 of the Rules of Court 2012, confined to the three matters of insufficiency identified. The drastic alternative of striking out the Amended Defence and Counterclaim is not warranted, and is refused. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [60] In the premises, the orders of the Court are as follows:

Enclosure 137 is allowed in part.

The Defendant shall, within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, file and serve an affidavit providing further and better answers to Interrogatories 1, 4 and 10 in the terms set out at paragraph [53] above.

The Plaintiff's prayer to strike out the Defendant's Amended Defence and Counterclaim is dismissed.

Costs of Enclosure 137 shall be costs in the cause. TAKE NOTICE THAT if the Defendant neglects to obey paragraph (2) of this Order by the time specified, the Defendant may be held in contempt of Court and liable to such consequences, including any order under Order 26 rule 7 of the Rules of Court 2012, as the Court may direct on application by the Plaintiff. (MELAKA) Lawyer For Plaintiff : Cik Lim Shu Yi Tetuan Skrine Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 50-8-1, Tkt. 8, Wisma UOA Damansara, 50, Jalan Dungun, Damansara Heights, 50490 Kuala Lumpur. Lawyer For Defendent : Cik Lim Tse Hwei (Desmond Ho & Associates) bersama Cik Jacelyn Heng Yi Zo Tetuan Richard Wee Chambers Peguambela dan Peguamcara Lavel 38, Menara Multi-Purpose, Capital Square, No. 8 Jln. Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur. No. 2, Jalan Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur.