Chiang Chung Shing v Law Gek Ming (WA-A53-15-03/2025)

CHIANG CHUNG SHIN CANR IC No.: 881202-49-5201) of Block N Lot &, Taman Tyng Batu 6, Jalan Utara, 90000, Sandakan, Sabah (hereinafter referred to as "'CCS') of the one part; and

LAW GEK MING(NRIC No.: 920813-14-5998)of Blok A 3-0-1, Jalan Puncak Desa 2 Taman Puncak Desa, 52100 Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur (hereinafter referred to as "LGM") of the other part.

(A) The parties were in a on and off romantic relationship from the period of April 2023 until March 2024 (hereinafter referred to as "relationship")

(B) Dispute arose between the parties following the issuance of a letter of demand dated a May 2024 by CSS claiming for the reimbursement of expenses allegedly incurred on LGM and/or on behalf of LGM throughout the course of the relationship.

(C) In order to amicably and conclusively resolve all the disputes between the parties in relation to the above matter and all matters arising therefrom and/or relating to it (hereinafter referred to as "disputes"), the parties hereto have agreed to enter into this Agreement upon the terms set out below. IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS: AGREEMENT In consideration of the premises herein upon the mutual terms and covenants herein contained and without admission as to liabilities, the parties hereby agree to enter into this Agreement upon the terms and conditions hereinafter appearing in full and final settlement of the disputes.

2.1. LGM agrees to pay CCS a sum of RM70,000.00 to CCS's RHB Bank account No. 11001900442724 in the following manner:-

An initial payment of RM20,000.00 on/before 30 September 2024 and

(ii) The balance payment of RM50,000.00 shall be paid in 50 monthly instalments of RM1,000.00 each. The instalments will commence on 21 October 2024 and continue on the 21s! day of each subsequent month until 21 November 2028, or until the full amount is settled.

2.2. Upon the fulfilment of 2.1(i) and 2.1 (ii) above, the disputes shall be deemed fully settled and neither party shall have any further claim against each other. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG [14] Di dalam memutuskan permohonan ini, saya mendapat panduan dari kes Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. v. United Malayan Banking Corp. Bhd. [1993] 3 MLJ 36 at p. 44 yang menyatakan: “This court as well as the court below is not concerned at this stage with the respective merits of the claims. But what we have to consider is whether the counterclaim discloses some cause of action and, likewise, whether the defence to counterclaim raises a reasonable defence. It has been said that so long as the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some question fit to be decided by the judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out (see Moore v. Lawson [1915] 31 TLR 418 and Wenlock v. Moloney & Ors. [1965] 1 WLR 1238). See also Honan Plantations Sdn. Bhd. v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor [1998] 3 CLJ 253; [1998] 2 MLJ 498 CA; New Straits Times (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. v. Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn. Bhd. & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226 FC; Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association and others [1970] 1 All ER 1094 CA and the old English case of Attorney-General of the Duchy of Lancaster v. London and North Western Railway Company [1892] 3 Ch. 274 CA. When it is shown that there is a reasonable cause, however weak it is, the court should refuse the application”. [15] Ini bermaksud prosedur ringkas di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 hanya boleh diguna pakai dalam kes-kes di mana tuntutan atau pembelaan adalah jelas tidak boleh dipertahankan. [16] Untuk memudahkan rujukan diperturunkan Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1) (a), (b) dan

Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 iaitu seperti berikut: Striking out pleadings and indorsements (O 18 r 19)

The court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the indorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that:-

it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be;

it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; or

it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court; and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be. [17] Rujukan juga di buat kepada prinsip yang digariskan di dalam kes Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1, iaitu seperti berikut: “The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder (supra) is that the claim on the face of it must be “obviously unsustainable”. The stress is not only on the word “unsustainable” but also on the word 'obviously' ie, the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial.” [18] Bidang kuasa di bawah peruntukan untuk pembatalan pliding ini hanya patut digunakan secara jarang-jarang sahaja (sparingly) seperti diputuskan di dalam kes Solai Realty Sdn Bhd v. United Overseas Bank (MALAYSIA) Berhad [2013] 1 LNS 384. “Judges dealing with striking out application under Order 18 rule 19 of the RHC must always bear in mind that the power to strike a case under the Order without having to go for trial should be exercised sparingly and only in a plain and obvious case. The procedure is of a summary. The party affected should not be deprived of his right to have his case proceeded by a proper trial unless the claim is obviously unsustainable. The Federal Court in the case of C.C. Ng & Brothers Sdn Bhd v. Government of State of Pahang [1985] CLJ Rep 45; [1985] 1 MLJ 350, had said that “the inherently power to dismiss an action summarily without permitting the plaintiff to proceed to trial is a drastic power. It should be exercised with utmost caution". It is a power which ought to be very sparingly exercised and only in very exception cases (per Lord Herschell in Lawrence v. Norry – as cited C.C. Ng & Brothers).” DAPATAN [19] Berbekalkan dengan prinsip-prinsip yang dinyatakan di atas, saya mendapati bahawa tuntutan plaintif adalah sesuatu yang secara jelasnya tidak boleh dipertahankan. Tiada asas untuk plaintif membawa tindakan ini. [20] Setelah meneliti terma di dalam perjanjian penyelesaian ini, saya mendapati bahawa tuntutan yang dibawa oleh plaintif di dalam kes ini adalah termasuk dalam perkara yang telah dipersetujui di dalam perjanjian penyelesaian. [21] Isu kereta yang dipinjamkan telah disebut di dalam surat tuntutan dan dimasukkan ke dalam perjanjian penyelesaian ini. Apa-apa yang berlaku kepada kereta tersebut dalam tempoh pinjaman semestinya sudah diambil kira di dalam perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut. [22] Maka, plaintif terikat dengan perjanjian penyelesaian tersebut dan tidak boleh membuat tuntutan untuk kemalangan kereta yang telah dipinjamkan kepada defendan dan ganti rugi akibat kemalangan itu. [23] Oleh yang demikian, saya mendapati tuntutan plaintif adalah suatu tuntutan yang tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang sah. Maka, tuntutan plaintif dibatalkan dengan kos. Bertarikh pada hari ini 23.12.2025