Chin Kim Hoon v See Chett Yen (BA-33-257-04/2019)

This was an application in enclosure 53 by the Petitioner wife for an 2 order to vary the consent order made on 10.3.2021. 3 4

The variation sought by the petitioner is as follows :

reduced access to the respondent;

(ii) increase in maintenance for the 2 children of the marriage 7 namely Olivia See Zhiyiu and Janelle See Ruiyu;

(iii) Respondent to bear the fees and expenses for the education 9 and courses for Olivia and Janelle;

(iv) Respondent to take out medical cards for Olivia and Janelle;

Additional maintenance for the petitioner. 12 13

Under the consent order dated 10.3.2021, guardianship of the 2 14 children then aged 12 and 8 years was granted jointly to the petitioner and 15 the respondent while the petitioner retained sole custody care and control 16 of the children. 17 18

For ease of reference the amendments allowed by this court to 19 terms in the consent Order dated 10.3.2021, insofar as they are relevant 20 to Encl 53 are attached to this judgment in Enclosure A. 21 22

In summary the petitioner is seeking less access rights to the 23 respondent but more financial assistance to be imposed upon him for the 24 monthly maintenance of both the petitioner and the children as well as 25 more educational and medical expenses for the children. 26 27

Apart from opposing the petitioner’s notice of application the 28 respondent has filed a cross-claim to the petitioner’s application as 29 follows: 30

reduction of child maintenance per child from RM4000 to 1 RM3000 2

the maintenance payment of RM2000 to the petitioner to 3 cease forthwith. 4 5

On 1.8.2023 after hearing arguments by counsel for both parties, I 6 allowed Encl 53 in part. I allowed for inter alia reduced access visits for 7 the respondent to one day in the weekend per month as well as for parts 8 of the school holidays. I also allowed an increase of the monthly 9 maintenance for both the children and the respondent is to bear all the 10 costs of education, health, medical insurance. 11 12

I simultaneously dismissed the respondent’s application for variation 13 finding that he had failed to prove his cross-claim on a balance of 14 probabilities. 15 16

The respondent is aggrieved with that decision and has filed an 17 appeal to the Court of Appeal. 18 19

These are the reasons for my decision. 20 21 Background Facts 22

The petitioner and the respondent were lawfully married on 23 13.12.2008. There are two children (Olivia and Janelle) of the marriage 24 who are under 18 years old. Olivia is 14 years old and Janelle is 11. 25 26

On 10.4.2019 the petitioner commenced divorce proceedings 27 against the respondent and the co-respondent. The Decree Nisi was 28 granted and made absolute on 10.3.2021. The respondent and co- 29 respondent have since married and they have a child. 30 1

The petitioner has alleged that there are material changes which 2 have occurred after the date of the order which has necessitated in the 3 petitioner filing the instant application. 4 5

For the purpose of the hearing of Encl 53 the petitioner and the 6 respondent have filed and used the following affidavits:- 7

Affidavit in Support affirmed by the petitioner on 23.2.2023;

(ii) Affidavit in Reply by the respondent affirmed on 5.4.2023;

(iii) Affidavit in Response by the petitioner affirmed on 19.4.2023. 10 11 Petitioner Wife’s Submissions 12

It is the petitioner’s contention that there have been material 13 changes in the circumstances after the granting of the consent order and 14 this has necessitated a variation of the consent order. 15 16

The reasons advanced by the petitioner are, inter alia as follows:- 17

The respondent has been uncooperative with the petitioner 18 with regard to Janelle’s problem whilst attending at a Chinese 19 medium school which led to the petitioner having to take steps 20 to transfer Janelle to Sri Dasmesh International School;

(ii) The respondent has not taken an interest on the progress of 22 the studies of both the children and was uncooperative to 23 assist when Janelle was hospitalized;

(iii) The respondent has failed to comply with the allocated access 25 as set out in the order, rendering the children and the 26 petitioner’s schedule in total disarray and as such access for 27 the respondent to the children ought to be reduced to only 28 Sundays from 10 am to 8 pm to avoid future difficulties; 29

(iv) Access during school holidays to be reduced as the 1 respondent would rather spend the holidays with his new 2 family and abandoning Olivia and Janelle for the said holidays 3 causing Olivia and Janelle to experience mental and 4 emotional stress;

Additional maintenance for the two children as their needs 6 have increased;

(vi) Additional payment for the schooling needs for the two 8 children as their needs have increased;

(vii) Medical cards for the two children as the petitioner has to 10 settle the medical expenses first and thereafter seek 11 reimbursement from the respondent;

(viii) Increase in maintenance for the petitioner, as the petitioner 13 has to look after Olivia and Janelle full time and do the 14 household chores as well, resulting in the petitioner’s income 15 being reduced drastically;

(ix) Olivia is uncomfortable to stay with the respondent and his 17 new wife;

Olivia was experiencing depression beginning in 2020 when 19 she stayed with the respondent in 2019. The respondent 20 ignored the petitioner’s request for Olivia to be taken to consult 21 a psychiatrist causing Olivia to :- 22 - slash her wrist in the respondent’s house on 2.5.2022; 23 - slash her wrist a second time on 11.5.2022; 24 - sometime in May 2022 the petitioner discovered a suicide 25 note directed to the respondent in Olivia’s handphone. 26 27

The suicide note is reproduced in part below : 28 29 “to papa (justin see) 30 … 31 you should tell ayi to keep herself in check. She isn’t my mother and will 1 never be. no matter what, I will never consider her as an aunt at most. 2 … 3 it’s alright. I guess u never considered me as ur daughter but a 4 responsibility, u did not even want to think of me as a responsibility. 5 … 6 you left me, mummy & janelle. It was YOU who left us. u betrayed us 7 papa, it was you who molded me into this person today. 8 … 9 she is a third person, a home wrecker, for me to even consider her as 10 an aunt it’s hard. tell her to know boundaries and stop involving in our 11 family matter. 12 …. 13 it’s ok, Im gone now. You have a better life now, without me as a burden. 14 I just want u to know that I love you. goodbye.” 15 16

Although the respondent was made aware of the suicide note, it was 17 the petitioner who immediately brought Olivia to seek the assistance of a 18 psychiatrist. It was averred that if Olivia is required to be with the 19 respondent in the respondent’s house with the respondent’s wife in 20 accordance with access stated in the consent order dated 10.3.2021 then 21 the depression experience by Olivia will not be alleviated easily. 22 23

The complaints about the respondent’s fatherly duties were also not 24 spared. The petitioner felt burdened as the respondent only placed 25 importance to his own needs and his requirements compared to the two 26 children’s welfare and wellbeing and acted inconsiderately towards the 27 petitioner. Among the incidences cited by the petitioner is as follows :- 28 - refusal to assist Olivia to buy school essentials; 29 - refusal to attend to Janelle’s problems at the Chinese medium 30 school she attended and brushing aside the petitioner’s 31 suggestion that Janelle be transferred to an English medium 1 school to solve the problem; 2 - rejecting petitioner’s request for an additional sum of a few 3 hundred ringgit for Janelle’s schooling needs; 4 - refusal to accompany Janelle at night when Janelle was 5 hospitalized in July 2021 so that the petitioner could take care 6 of Olivia at home during the night. The petitioner had to leave 7 Olivia alone at home in order to take care of Janelle at the 8 hospital. The respondent did not offer to take Olivia back to 9 his home to look after Olivia for that night. The next day the 10 respondent did not assist to buy and deliver lunch to Olivia 11 even though the distance between the respondent’s house 12 and petitioner’s house was only 5 kilometers and the driving 13 time was only 3 minutes; 14 - the respondent was unwilling to make minor sacrifices and 15 placed more importance for his weekend activities as 16 compared to the activities of Janelle and would not ensure that 17 Janelle attended tuition and/or online tuition classes at the 18 appropriate times; 19 - unwilling to pay for Janelle’s transfer from the Chinese 20 medium school to Sri Damesh International School when the 21 additional costs were not unreasonable; 22 - inconsiderate and did not inform Olivia of his intention to 23 propose to his present wife resulting in Olivia being upset and 24 caught by surprise; 25 - left Olivia home alone when she contracted covid-19 in 26 February 2022 and went out partying with his wife and Janelle 27 until 3 am; 28 - played badminton with his friends and attended a party the 29 next day without taking Olivia for a covid-19 test; 30 - lackadaisical with regard to his access to Olivia and Janelle as 1 stated in the Order which adversely affected the children’s 2 activities and rendered the petitioner’s plan in disarray; 3 - has not shown interest in the children’s schooling activities 4 and extra curricular activities. The petitioner would take the 5 initiative to update the respondent of the same via Whatsapp; 6 - failed to attend Janelle’s school and sports activities; 7 - does not monitor and supervise the children’s activities during 8 his designated access days; 9 - would not bring Olivia and Janelle along for holidays with him 10 and his other family; 11 - allows the children to be online for long hours instead of 12 spending time with them; 13 - often broke his promise to fetch them for access and then not 14 turning up; 15 - failed to fulfil his access obligations for the year end school 16 holidays without offering replacement dates. 17 18

The petitioner averred that the respondent placed more importance 19 on his needs and his new wife’s needs as compared to Olivia and Janelle. 20 He gave excuses that he is in financial difficulties but yet he : 21 - bought a pet dog costing RM3000. Its maintenance per month 22 is in the region of RM1000; 23 - purchases expensive items and branded handbags for his 24 new wife; 25 - purchased a condominium in KLCC, Kuala Lumpur; 26 - purchased a Toyota Alphard worth RM300,000; 27 - goes on expensive holidays abroad; 28 - can afford to employ a Filipino maid. 29

The present arrangement for maintenance for the children is 1 insufficient and the petitioner has set out the expenses for Olivia and 2 Janelle as seen in Paragraph 26 and Exhibit CKH-3 of the petitioner’s 3 affidavit. 4 5

The petitioner is requesting for medical cards for the two children as 6 the costs for medical treatment is costly and the petitioner feels it 7 cumbersome and inconvenient to look for the respondent in times when 8 Olivia and Janelle’s health in in jeopardy. 9 10 Respondent Husband’s Submissions 11

In reply the respondent has refuted the petitioner’s claims. 12 13

The respondent has submitted that he has been struggling to pay 14 for the maintenance of the two children and the petitioner and had tried 15 very hard to meet month ends. The respondent argued that he has 16 remarried and has a child with his new wife. He now has the added 17 responsibility of his new family and his parents to support, he is finding it 18 very difficult to abide with the financial payments imposed upon him by 19 the terms of the Consent Order dated 10.3.2021. 20 21

The respondent has cross claimed for a reduction in child 22 maintenance on the ground that he supposedly cannot afford. 23 24

The respondent has urged this court to take into consideration that 25 the petitioner is at the age where she can still work and it is only fair for 26 the petitioner to also bear a portion of the expenses in the upbringing of 27 the children. The petitioner should not place all the burden on the 28 respondent to pay for everything in regard to the children. 29 30 Decision of the Court 1

This application is premised on the provisions of sections 96 and 97 2 of the LRA 1976 which provide as follows :- 3 4

“Power for court to vary orders for custody or maintenance 5 The court may at any time and from time to time vary, or may rescind, 6 any order for the custody or maintenance of a child on the application of 7 any interested person, where it is satisfied that the order was based on 8 any misrepresentation or mistake of fact or where there has been any 9 material change in the circumstances. 10 11

Power for court to vary agreement for custody or maintenance 12 The court may at any time and from time to time vary the terms of 13 any agreement relating to the custody or maintenance of a child, 14 whether made before or after the appointed date, notwithstanding any 15 provision to the contrary in any such agreement, where it is satisfied that 16 it is reasonable and for the welfare of the child so to do.” 17 18

Undisputedly gathered from the averments in the affidavits and 19 submissions filed by counsel for the petitioner and respondent 20 respectively, both rely solely on the ‘material change in the circumstances’ 21 as their main reason to amend or vary the original consent order. 22 23

As a general rule a consent order even in a divorce matter should 24 rarely be disturbed. This court agrees with the learned counsel on both 25 sides that the Court has the discretionary power provided under s 97 LRA 26 1976 to modify the consent order for custody and maintenance of the 27 children if the circumstances have changed materially (see YCC v SLY 28 [2007] 7 CLJ 207). 29 30

The term ‘material change in circumstances’ has been explained in 31 a great number of cases and I shall need only to refer to the oft-quoted 32 case of Sivajothi K. Suppiah v Kunathasan Chelliah [2006] 5 CLJ 318 1 where it was stated by Azahar Mohamed JC (as he then was), in the 2 following passage : 3 4 “[10]. The meaning of the section is plain and very clear. It is apparent 5 that under s.96, in so far as it relates to the case at hand, there must be 6 a material change in the circumstance in order for the occur to vary or 7 rescind any order for maintenance. The section says any ‘material 8 change’ and not simply ‘change’. There is no ambiguity whatsoever. It 9 means a change in an essential part. In considering whether there has 10 been any ‘material change’ within the meaning of this section regard 11 must be had to all the relevant circumstances, including, in the context 12 of the present case, the judgment of Faiza Tamby Chik J. On a proper 13 construction, the requirement in this section does not impose a legal 14 obligation on the defendant to prove on the balance of probability that 15 there had been a material change in the circumstances as at 24 August 16

There is no requirement at all for the plaintiff to disprove anything.” 17 (emphasis added) 18 19

Undoubtedly the burden to prove whether there has been a material 20 change in circumstances is on the party who is moving the court to vary 21 or amend the original consent order relating to the variation that is prayed 22 for in the Notice of Application. 23 24

From the evidence presented by both the petitioner and the 25 respondent, I find both parties cannot see eye to eye with regard to the 26 upbringing and welfare of their two children. They blame each other for 27 most if not all matters relating to the two children. I understand it is most 28 common that in nearly all custody cases the parents will fight over their 29 rights and responsibilities to the children in their care. That should not be 30 the case but the harsh realities show otherwise. What is of paramount 31 importance is in deciding what is in the best interests and welfare of the 32 children. The court will not be drawn into the quarrels of the parties as to 1 which parent is to be rewarded and which parent is to be punished. The 2 court’s primary concern is only for the welfare of the children. 3 4

In the present situation, based on the facts and the circumstances 5 of the case, it is the finding of this court that the children have been 6 adversely affected by the previous arrangements and as such finds that 7 the petitioner has discharged her burden to prove the material change in 8 circumstances that called for a variation of the original order. 9 10

From the evidence presented by both the petitioner and respondent, 11 it is noted that they are, on many parts particularly the alleged negative 12 behavior of the parties conflicting. However, there is one part that was not 13 disputed by the parties and that is to do with the mental health of the 14 children. The court is concerned that the respondent instead of 15 empathizing with the problems faced in raising the children especially in 16 the already difficult adolescent years the two children are going through 17 and will go through in the next few years has out rightly accused the 18 petitioner of being the source of the mental health problems faced by the 19 children. To compound matters the respondent has accused the petitioner 20 of doctoring Olivia’s suicide note. I am of the view that the respondent 21 allegations are untenable and of no merit. The respondent did not raise 22 this issue at the material time. The issue of editing the suicide note has 23 only now arisen after the application was filed. 24 25

In any event the mental and emotional wellbeing of Olivia and the 26 incidences of Olivia’s attempted suicide are material issues which in my 27 view is a factor that materially changed the circumstances and it 28 warranted a variation of the previous terms of the consent order. The 29 incidents of self harm and cutting her wrist are a cry for help from the child 30 and it is within reason for the petitioner to acknowledge that and not take 1 it lightly, and to take steps to address the issue so that it does not happen 2 again. The petitioner is the daily sole caregiver of both the children. In light 3 of that she clearly has the welfare of the children as her paramount 4 consideration. It is only fair and equitable that her application to vary the 5 terms of the consent order on this issue should be favorably considered 6 and allowed. 7 8

Hence having considered the evidence and in the exercise of my 9 discretion I make the finding that those are material changes in the 10 circumstances which are sufficient enough to invite the court’s discretion 11 to address and to correct the situation so as to ensure that the children’s 12 welfare and best interests is well looked after. I find that the respondent 13 has not adduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his assertions that the 14 problems and difficulties faced by the children are the fault of the 15 petitioner. 16 17

The variation sought does not totally remove reasonable access 18 from the respondent. Nor does it totally alienate the respondent from his 19 children. There are enough days of access and overnight access stated 20 in the variation sought for the respondent to maintain his relationship and 21 close bond with the children. The terms of the access is not so onerous 22 on the respondent and with those changes, it is foreseen that the 23 respondent will have ample time for Olivia and Janelle as well as for his 24 new family. He will also be free for his badminton and other recreational 25 activities for the weekend. In my view the variation of the access in this 26 application is not uncommon. It is almost standard in most custody and 27 access cases. In my opinion while the variation is implemented only for 28 the welfare and the best interests of both the children I have in no way 29 disregarded the respondent’s right to have an ongoing and meaningful 30 relationship with the children. I believe the children need their father in 1 their lives. 2 3

Therefore the court orders that Paragraph 4(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) 4 of the Consent Order dated 10.3.2021 be varied in the terms stated in the 5 proposed order. 6 7 Variation of Maintenance 8

It is the duty of the respondent to maintain his children whether they 9 are in his custody or not. In the case of Ng Say Chuan (H) v Lim Szu 10 Ling (W) and Another application [2010] 4 MLJ 796, the court explained 11 that duty as follows : 12 13 “…under s 92 of the Act, it is the duty of a parent to maintain his children, 14 whether they are in his or her custody or the custody of any other person 15 by providing them with such accommodation, clothing, food and 16 education as may be reasonable having regard to his or her means or 17 station in life or by paying the cost thereof. The husband has the primary 18 responsibility, whereas the wife has a secondary responsibility, to 19 maintain the children…” 20 21

The power of the court to vary any subsisting agreement for 22 maintenance is allowed as long as the party applying can show a material 23 change in the circumstances in order for the court to vary the agreement 24 for maintenance. In considering whether there has been any material 25 change within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 all the relevant 26 circumstances must be taken into account. 27 28

The question now to be determined is whether there indeed has 29 been any material change in the circumstances which have adversely 30 affected the children. The respondent in applying for a reduction of the 31 maintenance payment has merely contended that his monthly liability to 1 be in the region of RM49,140.00. The question that the respondent has 2 not answered is what is his monthly income. Apart from claiming that his 3 monthly liabilities are in the region of RM49,140.00 he has not divulged 4 what his monthly income is nor has he particularized the details of his 5 monthly expenditure. He has made no genuine attempts to disclose his 6 monthly income and his true financial position in his affidavit in reply. In 7 the circumstances his assertions about his struggles to pay the monthly 8 maintenance is unconvincing and ambiguous. He has not shown he is in 9 dire financial straits. 10 11

The petitioner on the other hand has alleged that the respondent’s 12 income is in the region of RM250,000 to RM300,000. The respondent has 13 not rebutted that statement. In a trial by affidavits where one party has 14 made a positive assertion upon a material issue, the failure of the 15 opponent to contradict is usually treated as an admission by him of the 16 fact so asserted (Ng Hee Thong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [2000] 2 17 MLJ 29). Since the respondent has not disputed the petitioner’s specific 18 allegation it is therefore deemed to be admitted and true. 19 20

The respondent has also not disputed the petitioner’s allegation that 21 he is financially sound as he could afford to purchase branded items for 22 his present wife, a new car, condominium in KLCC and even purchase a 23 pedigree dog. He brings his family for holidays and can afford to employ 24 a Filipino maid. The petitioner has alluded to the fact that the respondent 25 flaunts his wealth and his new family yet claims that he is unable to meet 26 his obligations to the petitioner and his 2 children. I am of the opinion that 27 the respondent is not a man of straw. His assertions about his monthly 28 expenditure is ambiguous and unconvincing. Just because he has a high 29 monthly expenditure does not mean that he is in dire financial straits and 30 not able to meet his obligation to pay maintenance for his two children. It 1 bears repeating that as regards to the respondent’s financial status, he 2 has not made any real attempt to disclose to this court all relevant 3 information pertaining to it. When applying for a variation order, the party 4 making the application must prove his case on the balance of probabilities. 5 It was decided in the case of Tan Sin Wah v Yeow Siow Lin [2015] 7 6 CLJ 207, HC, that when applying for a variation order, the applicant must 7 include a comprehensive and definitive disclosure of the financial position 8 of the affected parties in the form of documentary evidence. The 9 respondent did not produce his full monthly income statement, income tax 10 return, expenses and particulars of properties he may have in his 11 possession. The respondent has not make full and frank disclosure of all 12 his income and properties for the consideration of the court. Thus there is 13 no credible evidence to show that there is a material change in the 14 circumstances to justify a reduction of the amount of monthly maintenance 15 payable to the petitioner and the children. The reduction if allowed would 16 adversely affect the quality of the petitioner and the children’s lives and 17 deprive them of what they have come to be used to. 18 19

With regard to the respondent’s argument that he has remarried and 20 now has a new family to support, this court is of the opinion that his 21 remarriage does not constitute a material change in circumstance. The 22 reason offered by the respondent does not to my mind justify any 23 suggestion that the maintenance for the children should be reduced. 24 25

On the other hand, I find the petitioner’s reasons for requesting an 26 increase of the amount of maintenance for the children to be reasonable 27 and convincing. I am satisfied that the petitioner has produced enough 28 evidence to show that there is a material change in the children’s’ financial 29 circumstances to warrant a variation of the quantum of maintenance. 30

The petitioner has substantiated her claim for an increase in the 1 maintenance of the children while the respondent has not justified with 2 any reasons why his cross claim for reducing the sum should be 3 considered. I accept the petitioner’s explanation that the schooling needs 4 for Olivia and Janelle have changed and that the present maintenance is 5 insufficient to tide over their needs. I take into consideration of the fact 6 that the children are growing up and required new needs. Their other living 7 expenses such food, clothing, transportation are other factors to be taken 8 into consideration. The note on their expenses from June 2022 to 9 November as exhibited in the petitioner’s affidavit Exhibit CKH-3 supports 10 the petitioner’s averments. The note shows the necessary payments for 11 the children’s needs. 12 13

In this regard I relied for support on the case of Sivajothy (supra) 14 where the learned judge took cognizance of the children going through 15 the stages of growing up and noting that their needs had changed : 16 17 “(18) I would respectfully agree with the views expressed by the learned 18 judge. In the same way, in the instance case, the children are at the 19 stage of growing up. I would say that they certainly need new clothes 20 and other accessories. I must add that besides this, it is the duty and 21 responsibility of the defendant, as the natural father, to provide the 22 children better education, medical care, tuition and extra curricular 23 activities for their overall development, welfare and advancement, which 24 would warrant me to vary the high court maintenance, which was 25 affirmed and upheld by the Court of Appeal on 11 January 2005.” 26 27

In regard to the change of schools for Janelle, I am of the opinion 28 that the petitioner had valid reasons and did not have much of a choice 29 other than to move Janelle to the Sri Damesh International school. In light 30 of the educational difficulties faced by Janelle, I leaned in favour of the 31 petitioner’s decision as the move would benefit Janelle in her studies. 32

The petitioner currently has no income except for the maintenance 1 she receives from the respondent. She has stated and I agree that she 2 cannot be expected to contribute to the education and medical expenses 3 of the children as she is the main caregiver for them and has her hands 4 full looking after the children’s health, safety and wellbeing. The petitioner 5 is the constant person in the children’s life, the one person who did not 6 abandon them. I have no doubt that she is a hands-on mother who 7 provides emotional support and a conducive and comfortable living 8 environment for the children. She has the advantageous position to be 9 able to focus extra attention and provide care, physical comfort and 10 mental support to the children, paying particular attention to Olivia given 11 the fact that her mental health is unstable. I was of the view that at this 12 point of their young life the two children needed their mother more than 13 their father for support as she is their primary caregiver. They will receive 14 undivided love, care and attention with their mother which will inevitably 15 make them feel happier and safe. 16 17

Having said that it is important for me to state at this juncture that I 18 do not subscribe to the view that the respondent is incapable of providing 19 the support required for the 2 daughters. It cannot be gainsaid that a 20 father’s role is invaluable in a child’s life and it would be wrong to deny 21 access to him. It is just that it is undeniable that he is unable to provide 22 what the petitioner can to the children. They continue to be dependent on 23 the petitioner for their physical, emotional and mental development and 24 therefore it is in their best interest and welfare to reduce their access times 25 with the respondent. 26 27

For all the reasons stated aforesaid, I am satisfied and I make the 28 finding in the particular facts and circumstances of this case that there has 29 been a material change which has taken place since the time the consent 30 order dated 10.3.2021 was entered into and it is no longer fair to continue 1 with the terms of that order any more. The variation sought after is solely 2 for the benefit of the two children. 3 4 Conclusion 5

In conclusion and to sum it up, I find that the petitioner has 6 satisfactorily discharged her burden to show that there has been a 7 material change in circumstances as envisaged in sections 96 and 97 of 8 the LRA to justify a variation of the consent order dated 10.3.2022 with 9 regard to the provisions of access and increased maintenance for the 10 children. The respondent is also required to bear all medical and 11 educational expenses of the children until completion of their first 12 university degree. I did not see any compelling evidence from the 13 respondent to hold otherwise. 14 15

Consequently, I allowed the petitioner’s claim in part and dismissed 16 the respondent’s cross claim as a whole with no order as to costs. 17 18 Dated 27 October 2023. 19 20 21 22 (JULIE LACK) 23 Judge 24 High Court of Malaya 25 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan 26 27 28 29 30 Counsel 1 For the Petitioner : 2 Kasthuri Krishnan 3 (MESSRS. KASTHURI BASIR SHAH & PARTNERS) 4 5 For the Respondant : 6 Jazzmine Khoo 7 (MESSRS. JAZZMINE KHOO & ASSOCIATES) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29