Chin Seh Sang v Chin Sia Seong (BA-24NCvC-376-02/2026)

1.

TAN SUEY YING … DEFENDANTS

This is the Plaintiff’s application by way of Originating Summons for the termination of co-proprietorship in respect of a piece of land known as Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 6267, Lot No. 727, Pekan Pengkalan Kundang, Kg. Baru Kundang, District of Gombak, State of Selangor, bearing the postal address No. 192, Kg. Baru Kundang, Rawang, 48020 Selangor (“the Property”). 30/07/2026 15:00:23

The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are registered co-proprietors of the Property. Each holds an undivided one-half share. The 2nd Defendant is not a registered co-proprietor but had entered a private caveat over the 1st Defendant’s undivided share.

The Plaintiff seeks, among others, an order terminating the co-proprietorship, an order that the 1st Defendant’s one-half share be sold to the Plaintiff at market value, and alternatively, that the Property be sold by public auction with the proceeds divided equally between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The Plaintiff also seeks consequential orders relating to the execution of transfer documents, the cancellation of the 2nd Defendant’s private caveat and directions to the relevant land authorities to give effect to the order.

The Defendants oppose the application. They contend that the Property is a family home, that the 1st Defendant has been residing there, that the Plaintiff has long ceased to treat the Property as his home, and that the dispute involves contested facts which should not be disposed of by Originating Summons.

Having considered the Originating Summons, the affidavits filed by the parties, the written submissions, reply submissions, authorities cited, and the oral submissions, I allowed the Plaintiff’s application in part. I ordered that the co-proprietorship between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant be terminated. However, I was not persuaded that the fair and practical order should be that the 1st Defendant’s share be sold to the Plaintiff as the first mechanism. Having regard to the particular facts of this case, including the nature of the Property as a family home and the fact that the 1st Defendant resides there, I ordered instead that the Plaintiff’s undivided one-half share be sold to the 1st Defendant at market value, with public auction as the fallback mechanism should the 1st Defendant fail to complete the purchase.

The essential facts are not seriously disputed. The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are siblings and registered co-proprietors of the Property in equal undivided shares. The Property was previously associated with the parties’ family. The Defendants say that the Property originated from or was transferred by the parties’ late father and that the Property has been treated as the family home.

It is also common ground that there is a house structure on the Property. The Plaintiff’s position is that there are separate portions or separate living areas, with the Plaintiff and his family occupying one portion and the 1st Defendant and his family occupying another. The Defendants dispute the legal and practical significance of this alleged division. They contend that the Property is a single family home, bearing one address, with shared features and common use by family members.

The Plaintiff’s case is that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. The Plaintiff alleges acts of oppression, threats, intimidation, obstruction and disturbance by the Defendants. These allegations include, among others, alleged interference with access, disputes over parking, CCTV, placement of items and alleged obstruction of survey works. The Plaintiff contends that these matters demonstrate that continued co-proprietorship is no longer practical, safe or beneficial.

The Defendants deny these allegations. They say that the Plaintiff and his family were not forced to leave the Property, that the Plaintiff had in fact moved out earlier and resided elsewhere, and that the allegations of intimidation and obstruction are either exaggerated, disputed or incapable of being resolved without cross-examination.

The Defendants further submit that the Plaintiff’s true intention is to force the 1st Defendant and his family out of the family home by compelling the 1st Defendant to sell his share to the Plaintiff. The Defendants say this would be unfair, particularly because the 1st Defendant continues to reside at the Property whereas the Plaintiff has alternative accommodation.

During the course of arguments, it became clear that whatever the parties’ competing narratives, the relationship between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant has broken down. The parties can no longer deal with the Property harmoniously as co-proprietors. There is no longer mutual trust or cooperation. The central question for this Court is therefore whether the co-proprietorship should be terminated and, if so, what order would be just.

The Plaintiff submits that he and the 1st Defendant are registered co-proprietors in equal undivided shares and that section 145 of the National Land Code 1965 empowers this Court to terminate the co-proprietorship. The Plaintiff argues that he is not required to remain indefinitely bound to the 1st Defendant in circumstances where the relationship has broken down.

The Plaintiff relies on the fact that he is the registered owner of a one-half undivided share. He submits that his proprietary right is not illusory. If the co-proprietorship has become unworkable, the Court has jurisdiction to make a practical order to bring it to an end.

The Plaintiff further submits that the Property cannot realistically continue to be enjoyed jointly. Although the parties may have occupied different parts in practice, the legal title remains undivided. The Plaintiff says that there has been continuing hostility and that the Property can no longer be peacefully or usefully shared.

The Plaintiff also relies on the 2nd Defendant’s private caveat. The Plaintiff’s position is that the caveat operates as an obstacle to any meaningful dealing with the Property and should be removed so that any order of the Court may be effectively implemented.

In law, the Plaintiff relies on section 145 of the National Land Code 1965, section 25 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and Order 31 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012. The Plaintiff further relies on the principles in Ong Chin Hai & Anor v Ong Hoo See & Ors[2022] 5 MLJ 690 and Yong Hin Seong & Anor v Yong Teik Seong [2003] 6 MLJ 38, where the Court may order sale or other appropriate relief to resolve an impasse between co-proprietors.

The Plaintiff’s primary relief is that the 1st Defendant’s share be sold to him at market value. The Plaintiff submits that such an order is expressly contemplated by section 145 because the Court may direct that one co-proprietor’s undivided share be transferred to another co-proprietor on terms specified by the Court.

Alternatively, the Plaintiff submits that if a buy-out is not ordered, the Property should be sold by public auction and the net proceeds divided equally between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant according to their registered shares.

The Defendants oppose the Originating Summons. They submit that the Plaintiff’s application should not be allowed in the terms sought.

First, the Defendants submit that the Property is a family home. They say that the Property was intended to be retained for the family and used as a place where family members could reside and gather. The Defendants say that the Plaintiff’s attempt to compel the 1st Defendant to sell his share is inconsistent with the history and character of the Property.

Secondly, the Defendants submit that the 1st Defendant is the party who continues to reside at the Property. They say that the Plaintiff and his family have moved out and have alternative accommodation. The Defendants therefore argue that if a buy-out is to be ordered, fairness requires that the 1st Defendant be given the first opportunity to purchase the Plaintiff’s share, rather than the Plaintiff being allowed to purchase the 1st Defendant’s share and thereby remove the 1st Defendant from the home.

Thirdly, the Defendants submit that the Plaintiff’s allegations of intimidation, obstruction, nuisance and misconduct are seriously disputed. They say that these allegations cannot fairly be determined on affidavit evidence alone and that cross-examination would be required if those matters are to be finally determined.

The Defendants rely on Order 5 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 and submit that Originating Summons is appropriate where the principal question is one of law or construction of documents and where there is unlikely to be any substantial dispute of fact. They argue that the present case is factually contested and therefore ought to proceed by writ.

The Defendants also say that the alleged separate address or separate portion is disputed. They submit that the Property bears one address and is not divided in law. They dispute the Plaintiff’s allegation that there exists a separate registered house or separate legal portion.

The Defendants further deny that they had caused the Plaintiff and his family to leave the Property. They contend that the Plaintiff had left much earlier and that the Plaintiff’s own conduct shows that the Property no longer carries the same residential or sentimental value to him.

The Defendants also address the Plaintiff’s reliance on the 2nd Defendant’s private caveat. They submit that the caveat should not be used as the basis for forcing the sale of the family home. They argue that the caveat issue is separate and should not determine the broader question of whether the Property should be sold.

In essence, the Defendants ask the Court either to dismiss the Originating Summons or, alternatively, if the Court is minded to terminate the co-proprietorship, to craft an order which allows the 1st Defendant to buy out the Plaintiff’s share at market value.

The issues for determination are as follows: a. Whether the Originating Summons is procedurally proper notwithstanding the factual disputes raised by the Defendants; b. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to terminate the co-proprietorship under section 145 of the National Land Code 1965; c. Whether the co-proprietorship between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant has become unworkable; d. What is the just and practical mode of terminating the co-proprietorship; e. Whether the Court should order the 1st Defendant’s share to be sold to the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff’s share to be sold to the 1st Defendant; f. Whether the 2nd Defendant’s private caveat should be removed insofar as necessary to give effect to the Court’s order; and g. What consequential orders should be made.

Section 145 of the National Land Code 1965 provides the statutory mechanism by which the Court may facilitate the termination of co-proprietorship. The section recognises that land may be vested in co-proprietors and that disputes may arise rendering continued co-ownership impractical.

The jurisdiction under section 145 is broad. It permits the Court to make such order as may be just for the purpose of terminating co-proprietorship. The Court is not confined to ordering a partition. It may order the transfer of an undivided share from one co-proprietor to another on terms specified by the Court, or it may order that the land be sold.

Section 25 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and paragraph 3 of the Schedule thereto also confer on the High Court powers relating to the partition and sale of land. Order 31 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 further empowers the Court to order sale in proceedings relating to immovable property where such sale is necessary or expedient.

In Ong Chin Hai & Anor v Ong Hoo See & Ors [2022] 5 MLJ 690, the Court of Appeal recognised that section 145 may be invoked by a co-proprietor who seeks to terminate co-proprietorship. The Court is not required to insist that a party must first pursue partition if the circumstances show that termination by sale or transfer is the appropriate remedy.

The decision in Ong Chin Hai is important because it confirms that section 145 is a practical statutory remedy. It exists to resolve the difficulty created by deadlock between co-proprietors. It is not limited only to cases where physical partition has been attempted and failed.

In Yong Hin Seong & Anor v Yong Teik Seong [2003] 6 MLJ 38, the Court recognised that sale may be ordered to resolve an impasse among co-proprietors. The Court’s power is directed at achieving a just and workable outcome where continued co-ownership is no longer viable.

The common thread in the authorities is that the Court must exercise its discretion judicially. The Court must consider the registered interests of the parties, the use and nature of the land, the feasibility of continued co-ownership, the prejudice to each party, and the practical justice of the order to be made.

The law does not compel co-proprietors to remain indefinitely locked in a relationship of co-ownership where that relationship has broken down. Equally, the Court must not use section 145 oppressively. The remedy must not permit one co-proprietor to unfairly take advantage of another. The order must preserve the value of each party’s registered interest. Analysis and Findings A. Whether the matter may proceed by Originating Summons

I first deal with the Defendants’ procedural objection. The Defendants contend that there are substantial disputes of fact and that the matter should have been commenced by writ.

It is correct that Originating Summons is generally appropriate where the principal issue is one of law, construction of instruments, or where there is unlikely to be any substantial dispute of fact. It is also correct that where material factual disputes require oral evidence and cross-examination, a writ action may be more appropriate.

However, the mere existence of some factual dispute does not automatically render Originating Summons inappropriate. The Court must examine whether the disputed facts are central and necessary to the determination of the relief sought.

In the present case, there are many factual disputes between the parties. These include disputes concerning the alleged separate address, the extent of occupation, alleged obstruction, alleged intimidation, the alleged survey incident, alleged criminal conduct, the history of the parties’ residence and the value of sentimental attachment to the Property.

However, the central issue before this Court is not whether each allegation of misconduct is proven as if the Court were trying a tort claim, criminal allegation or claim for damages. The central issue is whether the co-proprietorship has become unworkable and whether it is just and necessary to make an order under section 145 of the National Land Code 1965.

On that central issue, the evidence is sufficiently clear. The Plaintiff wants the co-proprietorship terminated. The Defendants strongly oppose the Plaintiff’s proposed mode of termination. The parties no longer cooperate. There is deep hostility and mistrust. The affidavits themselves show that the relationship between the parties has broken down.

The Court need not make definitive findings on every allegation of intimidation or misconduct in order to determine whether the co-proprietorship has become impractical. The existence of such allegations and denials is itself evidence of the state of the relationship between the parties.

I am therefore satisfied that the matter may properly proceed by way of Originating Summons. Not every factual dispute requires the matter to be converted into a writ action. The disputed matters raised by the Defendants do not prevent the Court from determining the statutory issue under section 145. B. Whether the Court has jurisdiction under section 145

I am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction under section 145 of the National Land Code 1965. The Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are registered co-proprietors. Each holds an undivided one-half share. This is precisely the type of situation contemplated by section 145.

The jurisdiction is not restricted to ordering physical partition. The section permits the Court to order the transfer of one co-proprietor’s undivided share to another or to order sale of the land. The Court’s discretion is wide enough to craft a practical order suitable to the circumstances.

The Defendants’ submission that the Plaintiff has no right to force the 1st Defendant to sell his share is correct only to this extent: the Plaintiff cannot unilaterally compel the 1st Defendant to sell at a price or on terms chosen by the Plaintiff. However, the Court may, under section 145, order a transfer or sale if such order is just.

The Court’s power is therefore not excluded merely because the 1st Defendant does not wish to sell. The purpose of section 145 is to enable the Court to resolve deadlock among co-proprietors. C. Whether the co-proprietorship has become unworkable

I find that the co-proprietorship has become unworkable. The affidavits disclose a serious breakdown in the relationship between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The parties are no longer able to manage, occupy or deal with the Property harmoniously.

The Plaintiff no longer wishes to remain a co-proprietor. The 1st Defendant does not accept the Plaintiff’s proposed purchase of his share. The 2nd Defendant has entered a private caveat. The parties have exchanged serious accusations. There have been disputes concerning occupation, access, use of common areas, survey and alleged interference.

Even if I were to accept that some allegations are disputed and cannot be conclusively determined on affidavit, the broader conclusion remains unavoidable: the parties are in deadlock. Continued co-proprietorship is no longer practical.

It is neither just nor sensible to compel the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant to remain registered co-proprietors indefinitely. Such an outcome would merely preserve conflict and uncertainty.

Accordingly, I find that the co-proprietorship should be terminated. D. The appropriate mode of termination

The more difficult issue is the appropriate mode of termination.

The Plaintiff asks that the 1st Defendant’s share be sold to him at market value. The Defendants oppose this and argue that the Property is a family home and that the 1st Defendant resides there.

Section 145 permits the Court to order that the undivided share of one co-proprietor be transferred to another co-proprietor. Therefore, in principle, the Plaintiff’s primary prayer is legally possible. However, the question is not merely what is legally possible. The question is what is just.

In exercising the Court’s discretion, I take into account several material considerations.

First, the Property is said to be a family home. Although this does not prevent the Court from terminating the co-proprietorship, it is a relevant factor in determining the appropriate mechanism.

Secondly, the 1st Defendant resides at the Property. The Plaintiff, on the evidence, is no longer residing there on the same basis. In practical terms, an order allowing the Plaintiff to buy the 1st Defendant’s share would likely result in the 1st Defendant and his family having to vacate the family home.

Thirdly, the Plaintiff’s proprietary interest can be fully protected by requiring the 1st Defendant to purchase the Plaintiff’s one-half share at market value. The Plaintiff receives the monetary value of his registered share. The 1st Defendant, who resides at the Property, is given the opportunity to retain the home by paying the Plaintiff fair value.

Fourthly, there is no evidence that the Plaintiff would be prejudiced if he receives the market value of his share. The Plaintiff’s essential right is to terminate the co-proprietorship and realise the value of his interest. That can be achieved by a sale of his share to the 1st Defendant.

Fifthly, a public auction should not be the first option if a less disruptive and fair buy-out can achieve the same legal result. A public auction may involve delay, costs and uncertainty. It may also unnecessarily expose the family home to third-party purchase when a buy-out between the co-proprietors is possible.

I therefore find that the fair and practical order is to allow the 1st Defendant the first opportunity to purchase the Plaintiff’s undivided one-half share at market value.

This order does not dismiss the Plaintiff’s complaint that the co-proprietorship has broken down. On the contrary, it gives effect to it. The co-proprietorship is terminated. The Plaintiff is no longer locked into co-ownership. The difference is that the Court directs the mode of termination in a manner that balances the interests of both parties.

The Plaintiff asked to buy out the 1st Defendant. The Court, exercising its statutory discretion, instead orders that the 1st Defendant buy out the Plaintiff. This is not inconsistent with section 145. The section empowers the Court to make such order as is just, including transfer of an undivided share to another co-proprietor on terms specified by the Court. E. Market valuation

Any buy-out must be at market value. It would be unjust to require the Plaintiff to sell his share at an undervalue. Equally, it would be unjust to allow the Plaintiff to demand an inflated value unsupported by evidence.

The proper solution is an independent registered valuation. The market value shall be determined by an independent registered valuer jointly appointed by the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant within 14 days from the date of the order.

The valuation shall determine the market value of the Property. The purchase price for the Plaintiff’s undivided one-half share shall be one-half of the market value, subject to any lawful deductions or adjustments agreed by the parties or directed by the Court.

The valuation cost shall be borne equally by the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. This is fair because valuation is necessary for both parties and benefits both parties by ensuring that the buy-out is conducted objectively.

The 1st Defendant shall complete the purchase within 90 days from the date of the valuation report. A definite timeline is necessary to avoid delay and to ensure that the Plaintiff is not left in uncertainty. F. Public auction as fallback

The Court must also provide for the possibility that the 1st Defendant fails to complete the purchase. The order cannot leave the parties in continuing deadlock.

Accordingly, if the 1st Defendant fails to complete the purchase of the Plaintiff’s one-half share within the stipulated period, the Property shall be sold by public auction. The net proceeds of sale shall then be divided equally between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant after deduction of all lawful expenses.

This fallback mechanism is consistent with the authorities and the statutory scheme. Where co-proprietors are unable to remain in co-ownership and a buy-out fails, sale of the Property is a practical and lawful method of ending the co-proprietorship.

A public auction is therefore not rejected. It is simply postponed as a secondary mechanism. The Court considers that a buy-out by the 1st Defendant should be attempted first because it better reflects the justice of the case. G. The private caveat

The Plaintiff also seeks cancellation of the 2nd Defendant’s private caveat.

The 2nd Defendant is not a registered co-proprietor. Her caveat cannot be allowed to defeat or frustrate the implementation of an order made by this Court under section 145.

That said, the Court’s order should be proportionate. The 2nd Defendant is directed to remove the private caveat within 14 days insofar as necessary to give effect to this order.

If the caveat obstructs the valuation, transfer, completion or public auction process, it must be removed. If the 2nd Defendant asserts any separate personal claim, such claim may be pursued separately in accordance with law. It cannot be used as a means to prevent the termination of the co-proprietorship ordered by this Court. H. Fairness of the order

I am satisfied that the order made is fair to both sides.

The Plaintiff obtains the principal relief that truly matters: termination of the co-proprietorship and realisation of the value of his one-half share.

The 1st Defendant is not unfairly removed from the family home without first being given an opportunity to purchase the Plaintiff’s share at market value.

The 2nd Defendant’s caveat is not allowed to frustrate the order.

If the 1st Defendant fails to complete the purchase, the Plaintiff is protected because the Property will then be sold by public auction and the proceeds divided equally.

The order balances legal rights with practical realities. It recognises the Plaintiff’s registered proprietary interest while also recognising that the 1st Defendant resides at the Property and that the Property has the character of a family home.

The order is also consistent with section 145 of the National Land Code 1965, section 25 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Order 31 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 and the principles in Ong Chin Hai & Anor v Ong Hoo See & Ors[2022] 5 MLJ 690 and Yong Hin Seong & Anor v Yong Teik Seong [2003] 6 MLJ 38

For the reasons above, I find that the co-proprietorship between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant has become unworkable and should be terminated.

I also find that while the Plaintiff is entitled to termination of the co-proprietorship, the fair and practical first mechanism is for the 1st Defendant to purchase the Plaintiff’s undivided one-half share at market value.

The Plaintiff’s application is therefore allowed in part, with modifications to the mode of relief.

Accordingly, the Court orders as follows: a) The co-proprietorship between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant in respect of the Property known as Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 6267, Lot No. 727, Pekan Pengkalan Kundang, Kg. Baru Kundang, District of Gombak, State of Selangor, bearing the postal address No. 192, Kg. Baru Kundang, Rawang, 48020 Selangor, is terminated. b) The Plaintiff’s undivided one-half share in the Property shall be sold to the 1st Defendant at market value. c) The market value shall be determined by an independent registered valuer to be jointly appointed by the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant within 14 days from the date of this order. d) The valuation cost shall be borne equally by the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. e) The 1st Defendant shall complete the purchase of the Plaintiff’s one-half share within 90 days from the date of the valuation report. f) The 2nd Defendant shall remove the private caveat within 14 days, insofar as necessary to give effect to this order. g) In the event the 1st Defendant fails to complete the purchase within the stipulated period, the Property shall be sold by public auction and the net proceeds shall be divided equally between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant after deduction of all lawful expenses. h) The relevant land authorities, including the Director of Lands and Mines Selangor and/or the Land Administrator of Gombak, shall give effect to this order in accordance with law. i) Liberty to apply is granted for consequential directions relating to valuation, removal of caveat, transfer, execution of documents, completion, public auction and implementation of this order.

Costs of RM5,000.00 are awarded to the Plaintiff.