in the alternative, that Chiptar purchases the minority shareholding in THC Rice with a discount on the basis of it being a minority block. [168] The above reliefs were sought on the basis of what was ideal to Chiptar as at the date of the filing of the Originating Summons. However, much has happened since then. In particular, Chiptar is now in liquidation. The grant of the reliefs as prayed for may not be bringing to an end or remedying the matters complained of especially if Chiptar were to be granted an order merely for the original shareholding to be restored. [169] I agree with learned counsel for Chiptar that the appropriate reliefs that are granted are assessed as at the date of hearing of the Originating Summons herein. Any reliefs that are to be given is to be considered in the context of the reality and practicalities of the overall situation, past, present and future. Some guidance can be gained from the following cases: Re Hailey Group Ltd [1993] BCLC 459, p. 473e: There might be circumstances in which, despite the appointment of an administrative receiver (or administrator or liquidator) before the hearing of the petition, the court would feel it necessary to impose on respondents an obligation to purchase the petitioner's shares. Such an order would, in my view, be appropriate where the unfairly prejudicial conduct had prevented the petitioner from selling his shares at a proper price prior to the onset of insolvency. That, however, is not the present case. There is no evidence that the petitioner had any intention to sell his shares: on the contrary the order he sought until after the appointment of the administrative receiver was for the purchase of shares held by the respondents. Another exception might be the case where the substantive relief originally asked for, at a time when the company concerned was solvent, was for a purchase of the petitioner's shares by respondents. In that case it might reasonably be said that the petitioner should remain entitled to the relief he was entitled to at the outset, despite supervening insolvency. That again is not the case here: a purchase order was not sought until the eleventh hour. Grace v Biagioli [2005] EWCA Civ 1222, para 73: [73] Once unfair prejudice is established, the court is given a wide discretion as to the relief which should be granted. at all the relevant circumstances in deciding what kind of order it is fair to make. It is not limited merely to reversing or putting right the immediate conduct which has justified the making of the order. In Re Bird Precision Bellows [1986] Ch 658, [1985] 3 All ER 523 Oliver LJ described the appropriate unfair prejudice which the petitioner has suffered at the hands of The prospective nature of the jurisdiction is reflected in the fact that the court must assess the appropriateness of any particular remedy as at the date of the hearing and not at the date of presentation of the petition; and may even take into account conduct which has occurred between those two dates. The court is entitled to look at the reality and practicalities of the overall situation, past, present and future. [170] In the present case, given the relationship between the Ter Family there is a need to be a clean break between Chiptar and TTT, CFH and CNM in respect of THC Rice. Authorities emphasizing on a clean break is found in the following cases: - Re Elgindata Ltd (No. 1) [1991] BCLC 959 @ 1005 f i: The petitioners' case has for the most part failed. Ought I none the less to order Mr Purslow, or Mr and Mrs Purslow, to purchase Mr and Mrs Rowland's shares? I have, after a great deal of hesitation, come to the conclusion that I should. The decisive factor to my mind is Mr Purslow's propensity for using the company's assets for his personal benefit and the benefit of his family and friends. I accept Mr Nurse's submission that, having regard to the evidence about that, it would be unfair to Mr and Mrs Rowland for the court to leave them 'locked in' as minority shareholders in the company. Mr Chivers, pointing to the great width of the court's discretion under s 461, and to the undesirability of using a sledge hammer to crack a nut, suggested that I might give directions or accept undertakings as to the future conduct of the company's affairs, to safeguard Mr and Mrs Rowland's interests in that respect. He did not, however, specify what form those directions or undertakings might take and I can think of none that would be effective without being, from Mr and Mrs Rowland's point of view, inordinately costly and time consuming to police. I think, to use an expression that is more familiar in the Family Division, that this is a case for a 'clean break.' Cheyne v Alfred Cheyne Engineering Ltd [2021] CSOH 17, para 61: behalf of Balmoral that the default remedy is for the majority to In my opinion, a buyout of the minority by the majority is an appropriate remedy in many but not all circumstances ( EILL V PHILLIPS; RE BRENFIELD SQUASH RACQUETS CLUB LTD; RE A COMPANY (NO 836 OF 1995)). In a situation where persons expect to remain as both a shareholder and a director, but the relationship between them has broken down and one is being excluded from being a director, the court will often order a clean break whereby the majority shareholder buys out the minority. The advantage of such a solution is that the excluded person is not trapped in a situation where he has no access to the money which Buy Out Order [171] Towards a clean break, and given that the Liquidator of Chiptar has a duty to liquidate all of its assets, it is best that Chiptar is no longer a shareholder of THC Rice or connected to THC Rice any further. [172] I must state that it is rare for a Court to make an order for a minority This is because in almost all cases, the majority will be able to rely on its majority control to remedy the oppressive action perpetrated by the minority. [173] However, this is an exceptional case. Although Chiptar holds 80.93% shares in THC Rice, TTT in fact has effective control of Chiptar through his personal 40% shareholding in Chiptar. The remaining shareholders of Chiptar, namely, LYH, TWH and TCH have an aggregate of 36% shareholding only. The balance 24% s in estate and there is an on-going dispute over the rightful administrator to his estate. This means that TTT will be able to thwart any attempts by Chiptar to change the composition of the board of directors of THC Rice. [174] Furthermore, the alternative relief requiring Chiptar to buy over the minority shares in the present case when Chiptar is in liquidation will effectively lead to either the winding up of THC Rice since the liquidator would be looking at realising all assets of Chiptar or it will protract the liquidation process, if the liquidator were to sell the shares of THC Rice to a third party post the acquisition of the minority shares. In fact, rather than a sale to a third party, the preference ought to be for the present minority shareholder of THC Rice to pur [175] Accordingly, an order against TTT, CFH and CNM to purchase Authorities for the grant of purchase order at fair value can be found in the following cases: Re Bird Precision Bellows [1986] Ch 658, p. 669 D H :- For my part I find myself quite unable to accept this submission. It seems to me that the whole framework of the section, and of such of the authorities as we have seen, which seem to me to support this, is to confer on the court a very wide discretion to do what is considered fair and equitable in all the circumstances of the case, in order to put right and cure for the future the unfair prejudice which the petitioner has suffered at the hands of the other shareholders of the company; and I find myself quite unable to accept that that discretion in some way stops short when it comes to the terms of the order for purchase in the manner in which the price is to be assessed. It has been pointed out, and I mention it again, that section 75(4) is merely a collection of possible methods of giving effect to section 75(3), and it is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of subsection (3), which gives the court a very wide discretion as to the granting of relief in general terms in respect of the matters of which complaint has been made. We have been referred to the speech of Lord Cross of Chelsea in In re Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1973] A.C. 360, 385, where he said in a very short passage, to which Mr. Stubbs drew attention: What the minority shareholder in cases of this sort really wants is not to have the company wound up - which may prove an unsatisfactory remedy - but to be paid a proper price for his shareholding. It is on the question of a "proper" price that the parties here divide. So, Mr. Sparrow's second submission, which I have dealt with first, I find myself quite unable to accept. In my judgment, the "proper" price is the price which the court in its discretion determines to be proper having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Re London School of Electronics Ltd [1986] Ch 211 p. 224 A B If there were to be such a thing as a general rule, I myself would think that the date of the order or the actual valuation would be more appropriate than the date of the presentation of the petition or the unfair prejudice. Prima facie an interest in a going concern ought to be valued at the date on which it is ordered to be purchased. But whatever the general rule might be it seems very probable that the overriding requirement that the valuation should be fair on the facts of the particular case would, by Premium for majority shares [176] Learned counsel for Chiptar urged this Court to include a premium in assessing the account that Chiptar held a majority block in THC Rice at 80.93% citing in support the following authorities: CVC Demarco v Almeida [2002] BCC 684: arises: whether a discount should be applied to reflect the fact that the holding is a minority one. An outsider would normally be unwilling to pay a significant price for a minority holding in a private company, and a fair price as between a willing seller and a willing purchaser might be expected to reflect this fact. It would seem to be unreasonable for the seller to demand a higher price from an unwilling purchaser than he could obtain from a willing one. Small private companies commonly have articles which restrict the transfer of shares by requiring a shareholder who is desirous of disposing of his shares to offer them first to the other shareholders at a price fixed by the rs. It is the common practice of auditors in such circumstances to value the shares as between a willing seller and a willing buyer and to apply a substantial discount to reflect the fact that the shares represent a minority holding. Khong Kok Yun & 6 Ors v Ong Soon Kwee & 3 Ors (Court of Appeal, Malaysia, unreported), p 42, para [2]: purchase the shares of the 3rd and 4th Respondents at a discount of 25% of the price determined by the valuer in the valuation report. I am making the order in such a way because I take into consideration that the evidence in this case shows that the conduct of the majority had been unfair prejudicial to the interest [177] The aforesaid cases concern the principle that a discount is imposed shares represent only a minority holding. However, the more recent trend has been that the Courts in making an order for the majority to buy out the minority in an oppression action, no discount shall be deducted from the fair value on the ground that the sale of the a consequence of the oppressive act(s) of the majority. The sale is not one between a truly willing seller and a willing buyer. [178] Although as a matter of logic, it seems fair that just as no discount is usually ordered when a majority shareholder is ordered to buy out , similarly so as not to benefit the oppressor, a premium on the purchase price ought to be paid in the converse case i.e. where the minority shareholder is ordered to buy . [179] However, I am not inclined to include any premium in the valuation [180] This is because the remedy of a buy out by the minority from the majority in this case is an option expressly preferred by Chiptar given the present status of the company which is in liquidation. Further, as alluded to above, the alternative order requiring Chiptar effectively result in the winding up of THC Rice. Also, based on the facts of this case, to impose a premium on the valuation price on the minority may unnecessarily place too heavy a financial burden on the minority to Method of Valuation [181] Given that THC Rice is still operating at a profit, I accept the submission by learned counsel for Chiptar that the mode of means that THC Rice is valued on the assumption of its earnings in the years to come. [182] Authorities in support of a valuation method on a going concern basis is found in the following cases: Buckingham v Frances [1986] 2 All ER 738, p 739 f: