Choi Yun Fatt v 1. Yap Choon Fatt (BA-24-242-03/2017)

Yap Choon Fatt (No. K/P: 620207-10-5449)

Hiew Wincy (No. K/P: 700427-05-5228) (No. K/P: 860114-14-5516) [Dipinda menurut Perintah Mahkamah (Lampiran 24) bertarikh 25.10.2017] … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1- Removal of caveats) A. INTRODUCTION [1] Enclosure 1 is the Plaintiff’s application for inter alia the following order:

bahawa kaveat persendirian dengan No. Perserahan 21289/2016 dan yang didaftarkan pada 22.04.2016, yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan Pertama yang dinamakan di atas tanah yang dipegang di bawah HSD 215589, PT 1819, Pekan Baru Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling dibatalkan serta-merta; 4

bahawa kaveat persendirian dengan No. Perserahan 21471/2016 dan yang didaftarkan pada 25.04.2016, yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan Ke-2 yang dinamakan di atas tanah yang dipegang dibawah HSD 215589, PT 1819, Pekan Baru Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling dibatalkan serta-merta;

bahawa gantirugi berbangkit atau diakibatkan oleh kemasukkan kaveat-kaveat tersebut ditaksir dan dibayar kepada Plaintif serta merta;

kos permohonan di sini dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif;

perintah atau relif selanjutnya yang Mahkamah Mulia ini fikirkan sesuai. [2] In support of the Plaintiff’s application, the Plaintiff has filed the following Affidavits:

Afidavit Sokongan affirmed on 10.02.2017 (“The Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif”); 5

Afidavit Jawapan (to reply the Afidavit Jawapan affirmed by the 1st Defendant) affirmed on 09.06.2017;

Afidavit Jawapan (to reply the Afidavit Jawapan affirmed by the 1st Defendant) affirmed on 09.06.2017;

Afidavit Tambahan affirmed on 22.11.2017;

Afidavit Jawapan (to reply Afidavit Tambahan dan Jawapan Defendan Pertama Kepada Afidavit Tambahan) affirmed on 19.12.2017;

Afidavit Jawapan (to reply Afidavit Tambahan dan Jawapan Defendan Kedua Kepada Afidavit Tambahan) affirmed on 19.12.2017. B. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] The background facts which have led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 are as follows:

3.1 Victor Hoo Kim Swee (NRIC No.: 751201-14-6071) and Wong Soon Lin (NRIC No: 520415-01-5044) are the 6 landowners (“the Landowners”) of a leasehold land held under HSD 215589, PT 1819, Pekan Baru Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling (“the Land”).

3.2 By a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 12.02.2016 (“the SPA”), the Plaintiff (Choi Yun Fatt) agreed to purchase the said Land from the Landowners free from all encumbrances subject to the terms and conditions therein contained.

3.3 To protect his interest on the land pending full execution of the SPA, the Plaintiff lodged a private caveat on the land on 18.2.2016.

3.4 The State Authority’s Consent was a condition precedent for the sale of the Land.

3.5 The consent of the State Authority was duly obtained on 29.3.2016 wherein by a letter dated 4.4.2016 the Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Petaling, Selangor had granted the Consent to Transfer the said Land (Kebenaran Pindahmilk Tanah) to the Plaintiff. 7

3.6

3.7 On 13.4.2016, Form 14A were executed by the Plaintiff and the Landowners.

3.8 Thereafter on 9.5.2016, the Plaintiff paid the stamp duty (Duty Ad Valorem) for the sum of RM11,700.00 to Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia.

3.9 Upon payment of the Duty Ad Valorem, the Plaintiff’s solicitors had then presented the duly signed Form 14A and the relevant documents to Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah, Negeri Selangor to execute the transfer and thereafter register the Plaintiff as the new proprietor of the Land.

3.10 However, by a letter dated 2.6.2016, the Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Selangor (the Land Office) had rejected the documents presented by the Plaintiff’s solicitor on the ground that there have been two private caveats lodged /entered on the said Land namely; No. Perserahan 21289/2016 and No. 8 Perserahan 21289/2016.

3.11 When the Plaintiff conducted a land search on the Land, the Plaintiff had discovered that the private caveat Perserahan 21289/2016 was lodged by the Yap Choon Fatt (the 1st Defendant), while private caveat No. Perserahan 21471/2016 was lodged by the Hiew Wincy (the 2nd Defendant).

3.12 Aggrieved by the existence of the two private caveats lodged by the Defendants, the Plaintiff vide this Enclosure 1 sought for removal of the two caveats.

3.13 The two private caveats No. Perserahan 21289/2016 and No. Perserahan 21471/2016 from time to time may be referred as “the said two caveats”. C. THE LAW AND PRINCIPLE RELATING TO REMOVAL OF CAVEAT [4] Before this Court proceeds to determine the merits of the 9 Plaintiff’s application, it is only apt for this Court to briefly set out the law and the legal principles relating to removal of a caveat. [5] It is trite principle of law that when dealing with an application for removal of a caveat, the questions to be determined by this Court are as follows: i. whether the caveator has a caveatable interest over the said property; ii. whether the contended caveatable interest so referred to discloses any serious issues/questions to be tried; iii. whether the balance of convenience is in favour of allowing the caveat to remain; iv. whether there are any special circumstances on the part of the Plaintiff that would warrant the status quo to be disturbed. 10 [6] This trite legal principle of law in relating to removal of caveat was laid down by the Privy Council in the celebrated case of Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 . The Privy Council has held inter alia that:- “This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee under section 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the evidence presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party”. [7] In the case of Kho Ah Soon v Duniaga Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 181, the Federal Court’s has re-stated the settled law. Peh Swee Chin, FCJ, delivering the judgment for the Federal Court at page 184 had said this: “It is settled that in a matter of removal of a caveat as between 11 a caveator and caveatee, as in the instant appeal, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that his evidence does raise a serious question to be tried as regards his claim to an interest in the land in question, and having done so he must show that, on a balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land, as laid down by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212, and by analogy indirectly to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 as indicated by Lord Diplock, the serious question for trial referred to above could mean a question not being vexatious or frivolous”. [8] The legal principle with regards to application to remove caveat was further encapsulated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng and Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 719. In Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd, the Court of Appeal has established the “three tier test”. This “three tier test” basically requires the Court to investigate three questions in considering whether a private caveat ought to be removed or ought to remain. The questions are as follows: 12

whether the Defendant has a caveatable interest;

(ii) whether the Defendant has raised serious issues to be tried; and

(iii) whether, on a balance of convenience, it would be better for the caveat to remain. D. THE DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS [9] In opposing the Plaintiff’s application, the Defendants had filed the following affidavits:

Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Pertama affirmed by Yap Choon

Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua affirmed by Hiew Wincy on 25.05.2017;

Afidavit Tambahan dan Jawapan Defendan Pertama kepada Afidavit Tambahan Plaintif affirmed by Yap Choon Fatt on 07.12.2017; 13

Afidavit Tambahan dan Jawapan Defendan Kedua kepada Afidavit Tambahan Plaintif affirmed by Hiew Wincy on 07.12.2017. [10] Through their affidavits, the Defendants had raised three grounds in opposing the Plaintiff’s application. The three grounds are namely: i. the Plaintiff is not an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of section 327 of the National Land Code 1965 (NLC) by the existence of the two caveats; ii. The 1st Defendant has a caveatable interest in the Land pursuant to an agreement dated 19.10.2015 with the Landowners on which the Landowners had agreed to sell the Land to the Defendant for a total consideration of RM350,000.00; and iii. The 2nd Defendant has a caveatable interest in the Land pursuant to an agreement dated 8.03.2016 with the Landowners who had agreed to sell the Land to the 2nd Defendant for a total consideration of RM480,000.00. The 14 2nd Defendant claimed that she had paid a sum of RM60,000.00 to the Landowners as deposit. GROUND 1: WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF IS AN “AGGRIEVED PERSON” WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 327 OF THE NLC [11] It must be noted here that there was no dispute that the Plaintiff had lodged his private caveat on the said Land earlier than the said two caveats lodged by the Defendants. The Plaintiff’s private caveat was entered and registered on 18.2.2016, while the said two caveats were subsequently registered on 22.4.2016 and 25.4.2016 by the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant respectively. [12] Now, in order for this Court to determine whether the Plaintiff is an “aggrieved person” within the confines of section 327 of the NLC, the Plaintiff must prove that he has a caveatable claim to title or registrable interest in the Land under s 323(1) of the NLC. [13] The Plaintiff in the present case had entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA - Exhibit “P-2”, Enclosure 2) of the said 15 Land with the Landowners on 12.2.2016 for a purchase price of RM350,000.00. The Plaintiff had paid the sum of RM35,000.00 as deposit. A further sum of RM165,000.00 was paid to the Landowners upon execution of the SPA. Following from the SPA, an application for consent to transfer was made to the State Authority. By a letter dated 4.4.2016, the Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Petaling Selangor had informed that the State Authority had consented to the transfer on 29.3.2016 (Exhibit “P-4”, Enclosure 2). The Plaintiff thereafter paid the stamp duty of RM11,700.00 (Exhibit “P-6”, Enclosure 2). The Landowners then executed the Memorandum of Transfer (Form 14A - Exhibit “P-5””, Enclosure 2) and the Land Tittle was in the possession of his solicitors for the purpose of registration of himself as the new Landowner. [14] The only obstacle obstructing the Plaintiff from being registered as the new registered proprietor of the Land was the said two caveats lodged by the Defendants. [15] In the present case the SPA which had been executed by the Plaintiff and the Landowners is still intact. Clearly here, the SPA is still valid and existing and there is no evidence to indicate the termination of the SPA. Here, the Plaintiff had fulfilled his 16 obligations as a purchaser under the SPA and the only hindrance to a full and final execution of the SPA is that the Form 14A presented to the land office was rejected and the Plaintiff cannot be registered as the new owner of the Land due the entry of the said two caveats. [16] Undoubtedly here, the SPA remains enforceable and the Plaintiff patently has a caveatable interest in the Land and as a matter of fact is entitled to the Land. The Plaintiff would have been the registered owner of the Land if the Form 14A was not rejected by the Land Office because of the subsequent lodgment of the said two caveats. [17] The Defendants in their attempt to challenge the SPA had alleged that the Plaintiff did not make the payment to the Landowners. [18] This Court opines that the allegation by the Defendants simply cannot sustain on the following grounds: i. it is not in dispute that the Plaintiff had lodged his private caveat prior to the Defendants lodging their caveats. At the time of lodging their caveats, the Defendants knew the existence of the Plaintiff’s caveat. The Plaintiff’s ground in 17 lodging his private caveat in the Land was clearly stated in his Form 19B dated 12.2.2016 as follows:

Alasan-alasan tuntutan kami atas tanah/kepentingan itu ialah:-

Saya telah membayar kepada VICTOR HOO KIM SWEE (No. K/P 751201-14-6071/A3278810) dan WONG SOON LIN (No. K/P 520415-01-5044/7998927) ('PENJUAL') sebanyak RM350,000-00 sebagai harga belian kepada Penjual untuk membeli sebuah rumah satu tingkat teres bawah pegangan pajakan Halanilik H.S.(D) 215589 PT 1819 pekan Baru Sungai Buloh Daerah Petaling Negeri Selangor.

Untuk menjaga kepentingan saya sebagai Pembeli dengan ini saya memohon supaya satu Kaveat Persendirian dimasukkan ke atas hartanah tersebut bagi mengikatnya. (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) ii. the Defendants are not the privy to the SPA entered between the Landowners and the Plaintiff. iii. there is no evidence from the Landowners that they did not received the payment or denying the payment of RM350,000.00 being made or the Sale and Purchase Agreement has been terminated. 18 [19] Based on the above mentioned reasons, this Court would have no hesitation to make a finding that the Plaintiff in the present case is an “aggrieved person” under section 327 of the NLC. (See: i. In Hew Sook Ying v Hiw Tin Hee [1992] 2 MLJ 189, ii. Yuny-Li Home Care Sdn Bhd v Fairview Development Sdn Bhd [2009] 9 MLJ 189 iii. Khatijah Abdullah & Ors v. Mohd Isa Biran [2017] 7 CLJ 513) WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS HAVE CAVEATABLE INTEREST ON THE LAND [20] The onus of proof to satisfy the three (3) stage test lies with the Defendants, who must adduce sufficient evidence to support their claims to a cavetable interest within section 323 of the National Land Code 1965. [21] Now the first stage requires this Court to ascertain the grounds put forth by the Defendants in their Form 19B. The law is trite that the caveator is bound by the grounds stated in the caveat form i.e. Form 19B filed under S.323 of the National Land Code 1965. The law is also trite that the grounds relied on by the caveator must be minutely scrutinized to see whether it amounts to a caveatable interest. 19 (See: Kumpulan Sua Betong Sdn. Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 263, Luggage Distributors, supra, Mok Yong Kong & Anor V. Mok Yong Chuan [2002] 2 MLJ 718) The 1st Defendant’s caveat [22] The grounds in which the 1st Defendant lodged the caveat is stipulated in the Form 19B dated 13.04.2016. The 1st Defendant in the Form 19B had stated this: “2. Alasan-alasan tuntutan saya atas *tanah/kepentingan itu adalah seperti yang dinyatakan dalam surat akuan yang dilampirkan di sini. Bahawa saya telah memasuki Perjanjian bertarikh 19-10-2015 dengan VICTOR HO KIM SWEE (NRIC No:751201-14-6071) WONG SOON LIN (NRIC No: 520415-01-5044) of No. 654, Jalan 1B/5, Bandar Baru Sungai Buloh, 47000 Sungai Buloh, Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Pemilik”) untuk memberi pinjaman peribadi sebanyak RM350,000-00. Dan bahawasanya Pemilik sebagai jaminan telah menandatangani Surat Perjanjian bertarikh 19-10-2015 untuk saya menguruskan hartanah ini iaitu dibawah hakmilik individu HS(D) 215589, PT No. 1819, Pekan Baru Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor memandangkan pemilik telah gagal untuk menjelaskan bayaran pinjaman peribadi tersebut, maka saya dengan ini memasukkan kaveat ini bagi melindungi kepentingan saya….” [23] Basically the grounds relied by the 1st Defendant for the entry of his 20 caveat can be summarized as follows:

The Landowners borrowed a sum of RM350,000.00 from the 1st Defendant;

The Landowners executed a Surat Perjanjian dated 19.10.2015 as security (jaminan);

As a result of the Landowners’ failure to repay the personal loan, the 1st Caveat was entered in order to protect the 1st Defendant’s interest. [24] Looking at the statements of the 1st Defendant in his Form 19B, this Court has no reason to disagree with the Plaintiff that in the Form 19B, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant’s claim against the Landowners was in respect of a personal loan given to the Landowner. The 1st Defendant’s claim is undoubtedly a claim in personam of an unsecured debt, which is totally foreign into the Land. [25] However, having stated in his Form 19B that a Surat Perjanjian dated 19.10.2015 was executed by the Landowners as security (jaminan) to guarantee payment of the borrowed sum of 21 RM350,000.00, the 1st Defendant in his Affidavit Jawapan (Enclosure 5) had stated otherwise. [26] In opposing the Plaintiff’s application, the 1st Defendant had averred that he had entered into Sale and Purchase Agreement with the Landowners for purchase of the Land. He had also produced a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 19.10.2015 purportedly entered by him and the Landowners (Exibit “YCF-1”, Enclosure 5). [27] The stance taken by the 1st Defendant was clearly in contradiction with his earlier stand that the surat perjanjian was a surat jaminan (guarantee) for a personal loan given to the Landowners. [28] Now, this Court of the view that if at all the purported Sale and Purchase Agreement was executed on 19.10.2015 is a genuine transaction of sale and purchase of the Land, the 1st Defendant would have expressly specified so in his Form 19B. However at the time of lodging his caveat, the 1st Defendant was more concerned with the repayment of the loan he had given to the Landowners. 22 [29] Be that as it may, the legal position in this respect is very well settled. A claim in personam can never give rise to caveatable interest on land. (See: Standard Chartered Bank v Yap Sing Yoke & Ors [1989] 2 CLJ (Rep) 500 "...It is of course axiomatic that a personal claim (i.e. in general law terms a mere, personal, in personam claim) enforceable against the registered proprietor and not the land, is not able to be caveated. Only claims to interests in land (i.e. in general law terms in rem claims) which relates to interests capable of registration, can be caveated) [30] It is also trite law that a mere monetary debt cannot give rise to a caveatable interest. (See: i. Kundang Lakes Country Club v Garden Masters (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 633, ii. Dusun Desaru Sdn Bhd & Anor v Wang Ah Yu & Ors (No.2) [2001] 5 CLJ 8; iii. Saffaruan Mohamad v Kamaludin Ibrahim & Satu Lagi [2008] 8 CLJ 531 iv. Soo Kam Cheong & Anor v Lim Ing Tiong [2016] 1 LNS 966 [31] Clearly, the grounds stated by the 1st Defendant in his Form 19B is incapable of giving rise to any caveatable interest. 23 The 2nd Defendant’s caveat [32] The grounds in which the 2nd Defendant lodged her caveat is stipulated in the Form 19B dated 13.04.2016. The 2nd Defendants had stated this: “2. Alasan-alasan tuntutan kami atas tanah itu ialah:- a. Bahawa saya telah menandatangani satu Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 08-03-2016 dengan VICTOR HO KIM SWEE (NO K/P: 751201-14-6071) dan WONG SOON LIN (NO K/P: 520415-01-5044) kedua-duanya adalah seorang warganegara Malaysia yang beralamat 654, Jalan 1B/5, Bandar Baru Sungai Buloh, 47000 Sungai Buloh, Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Penjual”) dimana saya telah membayar sebanyak RM60,000-00 kepada Pihak Penjual sebagai bayaran pendahuluan bagi tujuan pembelian Hartanah yang dikenali sebagai HS(D) 215589 PT No. 1819, Pekan Baru Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah”). b. Sementara menunggu penyempurnaan transaksi Jualbeli dan pindahmilik tersebut, saya ingin memasukkan satu kaveat persendirian ke atas Hartanah tersebut untuk menjaga kepentingan saya. [33] The grounds relied by the 2nd Defendant for the entry of her caveat 24 are basically as follows:

The Landowners and the 2nd Defendant entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 8.3.2016;

The 2nd Defendant had paid the sum of RM60,000.00 to the Landowners. [34] In her Form 19B, the 2nd Defendants claimed that she had entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement with the Landowners on 8.3.2016 sale of the Land. But, this Court finds it’s a bit strange that in the Form 19B there was no mention of the purchase price or the agreed price by the parties. If at all there was an agreement to buy and sell, the utmost or most relevant term would be the specific consideration of the sale. Similarly, in the Statutory Declaration (SD) sworn on 25.4 2016 by Aliza Hj Abd Samad (Aliza), the solicitor handling the matter for the 2nd Defendant in support of the Form 19B also has not mentioned anything about the purchase price or agreed price of the Land. [35] What was mentioned in the Form 19B and Aliza’s SD was merely; the 2nd Defendant had paid the Landowners the sum of RM60,000.00 as deposit. 25 [36] Another baffling statement in the 2nd Defendant’s Form 19B as well as Aliza’s SD, is that the 2nd Defendant admitted and confirmed that she had paid the sum of RM60,000.00 to the Landowners being the initial purchase price of the Land. How could there be an initial purchase price of the Land whereas and in fact there was no indication of the purchase price or the agreed price. [37] This Court must refer the statement made by the 2nd Defendant in her in paragraph 2(b) of the Form 19B. The 2nd Defendant had stated this: “b. Sementara menunggu penyempurnaan transaksi Jualbeli dan pindahmilik tersebut, saya ingin memasukkan satu kaveat persendirian ke atas Hartanah tersebut untuk menjaga kepentingan saya.” [38] Reading the above statement against the fact that at the time of lodging the caveat there was no purchase price or no consideration in respect of the Land, this Court opines the words menunggu penyempurnaan transaksi Jualbeli dan pindahmilik tersebut in actuality represents that at the time of lodging the caveat either there was actually no Sale and Purchase Agreement that has been 26 executed between the Landowners and the 2nd Defendant or the agreement has not yet been concluded or the payment of the RM60,000.00 was for some other arrangement known only to the 2nd Defendant and the Landowners. [39] However, the 2nd Defendant in her Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua (Enclosure 6), had produced a sale and purchase agreement dated 8.3.2016 purportedly entered between her and the Landowners (Exhibit “HW-2”). [40] Having perused Exhibit “HW-2”, this Court could not help making the following observations: i. suddenly in the agreement dated 8.3.2016, the purchase price of the Land was stated at RM480,000.00. ii. the exact time the agreement were signed by the parties is not known as at the signature column there was no date appearing to indicate date of signing the agreement. iii. the agreement was not stamped. 27 [41] Now, even if this Court were to assume the existence of such agreement, it is obvious that the agreement was an incomplete agreement. [42] Clearly, an incomplete agreement is an unenforceable agreement which cannot give rise to a caveatable interest. (See: Murugappa Chettiar Lakshmanan (Wasi Tunggal Harta Pesaka MRI Murugappa Chettiar, si mati) v Lee Teck Mook

2 CLJ 545) [43] In any event this Court is also bound and guided by the wisdom and precedent of the Federal Court in dealing with competing interests between alleged purchasers of land. Arifin Zakaria CJ (as he then was) in delivering the Federal Court’s decision in the case of Tan Ong Ban v Teoh Kim Heng [2016] 3 MLJ 23 had held the following: “The principle of beneficial ownership differentiates between the rights of a purchaser of a property who has fully settled the purchase price with one who has not. This principle clothed a purchaser who had settled the full 28 purchase price with a distinct privilege equivalent to a legal owner, although he or she had yet to be registered as the proprietor of the property”. [44] And the present case is exactly regarding the competing interest between purchasers of the same piece of property, with the Plaintiff having paid full purchase price while the Defendants both have not. Accordingly, in addition to the Defendants not proving their caveatable interests, it is also obvious that the Plaintiff’s equitable interest trumps over the Defendants’ alleged interest. The Plaintiff has paid the full purchase price, lodged his caveat first in time, obtained the necessary state consent, executed the necessary instrument of transfer, all well beyond and ahead of all the Defendants. It is only just that this Court finds that the Plaintiff would hold a greater equitable interest over the property. [45] Based on the above mentioned reasons, it is this Court’s judgment that the Defendants here do not have any caveatable interest in the Land. As such the two caveats ought to be removed. [46] In the present case, this Court had already determined that both the Defendants had totally failed the first question. By the 29 Defendants failing the first question, this Court would no longer require to investigate the other two questions. [47] For the aforementioned reasons, this Court grants order in terms of the Plaintiff’s Enclosure 1. This Court also orders that the Defendants do pay the sum of RM8000.00 to the Plaintiff as costs. ………………………………………….. (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judge High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated 18th January, 2018 For the Plaintiff - Messrs HK Ang & Partners Encik Joseph Yeoi Encik Kelvin Ngi Cik HY Fang For the Defendants - Tetuan Jeyaratnam & Chong Cik Wan Nabilah binti Wan Daud