what ancillary orders ought to be made in respect of the custody, care and control of, access to, and maintenance of the children, and as between the spouses. D. STATUTORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK [15] The governing instrument is Act 164. It is applied as amended by the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) (Amendment) Act 2017 (Act A1546), which came into force on 15 December 2018. The jurisdiction engaged by this petition is defined principally by two provisions. [16] Section 3(3) provides that the Act does not apply to a Muslim or to a person married under Islamic law. As amended, the subsection further provides that nothing in it is to be construed to prevent the court from having exclusive jurisdiction over the dissolution of a marriage and all matters incidental thereto, including the granting of a decree of divorce or other orders under Part VII and Part VIII on a petition under section 51, 52 or 53 on the petition of either party or both parties where one party has converted to Islam; and that such decree and orders are, notwithstanding any other written law to the contrary, valid against the party who has so converted. The effect of section 3(3) is thus to preserve, now in the express language of exclusivity, the authority of the civil court over a civil marriage where one spouse later embraces Islam. The conversion does not transfer the dissolution of the marriage, or any matter incidental to it, to any other forum. [17] Section 51, as amended, provides that where one party to a marriage has converted to Islam, either party may petition for divorce under that section or under section 53, or both parties may petition under section 52. The former requirement that a petition under section 51 not be presented before the expiry of three months from the date of the conversion has been removed; the section now contains no such proviso. Section 51(2) empowers the Court, upon dissolving the marriage or at any time, to make provision for the spouse and for the support, care and custody of the children of the marriage under Part VII and Part VIII, and to attach such conditions to the decree as it thinks fit. Section 51(3) provides that section 50 (the restriction on petitions within two years of marriage) shall not apply to any petition for divorce where one party has converted to Islam. In permitting either party to petition, the amendment closes a lacuna in the section as formerly enacted, under which only the non-converting spouse could petition and the converting spouse was left without standing to seek dissolution of the very marriage his conversion had placed in question. [18] Two features of the scheme should be noted. First, the ground for a decree under section 51 is the conversion itself. The Petitioner has proceeded under section 51, and not under section 53. It is not necessary, on a section 51 petition, to establish the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage by proof of one or more of the facts set out in section 54; those provisions govern a petition under section 53. Secondly, section 106(1) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 expressly provides that the requirement for prior reference of a matrimonial difficulty to a conciliatory body does not apply to petitions brought under sections 51 and 52. As the present petition is brought under section 51 following the Respondent's conversion to Islam, the Petitioner was exempt from the statutory requirement to obtain a conciliatory body's certificate before commencing these proceedings. The exemption order obtained under section 106(1)(iii) was therefore unnecessary, although it does not affect the validity of the present proceedings. [19] The Court's jurisdiction to grant a decree is further conditioned by section 48(1), which requires that the marriage have been registered or be deemed registered under the Act, or have been contracted under a law providing for or in contemplation of monogamy, and that the parties be domiciled in Malaysia when the petition is presented. By section 3(2), a citizen of Malaysia is, until the contrary is proved, deemed to be domiciled in Malaysia. [20] In matters concerning the children, section 88 governs. Custody may be placed with the father or the mother (section 88(1)). In deciding custody the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, and the Court is to have regard to the wishes of the parents and to the wishes of the child where the child is of an age to express an independent opinion (section 88(2)). The rebuttable presumption in favour of the mother applies only to a child below the age of seven (section 88(3)). Where there are two or more children, the welfare of each is to be considered independently (section 88(4)). The duty of a parent to maintain the children subsists except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides (section 92); the Court has power to order maintenance for a child and to attach conditions to a custody order (sections 93 and 89); and an order for the custody or maintenance of a child endures, in general, until the child attains the age of 18 years, save that, by section 95 as amended, where the child is pursuing further or higher education or training the order continues until the completion of that education or training, whichever is the later. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Jurisdiction [21] The first issue is whether the Court may dissolve the marriage at all, the Respondent now being a Muslim. The answer is supplied by the Act itself. Section 3(3) expressly contemplates the very situation before the Court: a petition under section 51 where one party has converted to Islam. Far from ousting the civil court's jurisdiction, the conversion of one spouse is the statutory occasion for its exercise. That this is so has long been settled at the highest level. In Tan Sung Mooi (f) v Too Miew Kim [1994] 3 MLJ 117 (SC) the Supreme Court held that the legal obligations of a spouse under a non-Muslim marriage cannot be extinguished or avoided by his conversion to Islam, and that the non-converting spouse must be able to obtain relief in the civil court, the Syariah Court having no jurisdiction over a non-Muslim. That principle was affirmed by the Federal Court in Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147 (FC), where it was held that a non-Muslim marriage does not dissolve automatically upon one party's conversion, and that, the parties having contracted a civil marriage, the civil court continues to have jurisdiction over the converted party in respect of the divorce and the custody of the children notwithstanding his conversion. The Federal Court returned to the question in Viran a/l Nagapan v Deepa a/p Subramaniam and other appeals [2016] 1 MLJ 585 (FC), holding that the civil courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to grant a decree dissolving a civil marriage under Act 164 and to make all ancillary orders, including those relating to the custody, care and access of the children of that marriage. The amendment of section 3(3) by Act A1546 has since placed the matter beyond argument, conferring on the civil court, in express terms, exclusive jurisdiction over the dissolution of the marriage and all matters incidental to it where one party has converted. The marriage here was a civil marriage registered under Act 164, and by section 8 it remained dissoluble only in accordance with that Act. The Respondent's subsequent embrace of Islam neither altered the character of that marriage nor removed its dissolution from this Court, and the decree, once granted, is by section 3(3) valid against him notwithstanding his conversion. The Court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction. [22] The requirements of section 48(1) are also met. The marriage was registered under Act 164, as the marriage certificate (Lampiran "A") establishes. Both parties are Malaysian citizens, and there is nothing to displace the statutory presumption under section 3(2) that they are domiciled in Malaysia; the petition affirms their domicile, and the Respondent has not appeared to contend otherwise. Domicile in Malaysia at the date of presentation is therefore established. Whether The Conditions For A Decree Under Section 51 Are Satisfied [23] The second issue is whether the conditions in section 51 are made out. In my judgment they are, for the following reasons. [24] First, one party to the marriage has converted to Islam. The conversion of the Respondent is evidenced by the extract of the register of addresses (Lampiran "B"), which records the approval of the change of his name and religion on 24 October 2024, and by his adoption of the name Muhammad Adam Sam bin Abdullah. The Petitioner has at all times remained non-Muslim. She is therefore a party entitled to petition under section 51. [25] Conversion is the jurisdictional gateway under section 51: the section is engaged only "where one party to a marriage has converted to Islam". It is therefore right to state how that fact may be proved. Conversion is the act of professing the religion of Islam, ordinarily evidenced by the certificate of conversion or the entry in the register of converts kept under the applicable State enactment. Where, as here, that primary record is not produced, a record of the National Registration Department evidencing an approved change of name and religion is admissible secondary evidence and, unrebutted on an undefended petition, is prima facie proof both of the fact of conversion and of a date not later than the date of the approval. Where the precise date is uncertain, the Court should fix it on the evidence and satisfy itself that the section is engaged on the latest date the evidence will bear, since any doubt as to the date must be resolved so as to ensure that the statutory condition is genuinely met. These propositions are stated for guidance and are not necessary to the present decision, the fact of conversion being plain on the documents. [26] Secondly, the petition is not met by any waiting period. Prior to the amendments effected by the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) (Amendment) Act 2017 (Act A1546), the proviso to section 51(1) required that no petition be presented before the expiration of three months from the date of the conversion. That proviso was repealed by Act A1546. The section, as it now stands, prescribes no minimum interval between the conversion and the presentation of a petition under section 51. Accordingly, no question of prematurity arises. It follows that the decision of the Federal Court in Subashini a/p Rajasingam v Saravanan a/l Thangathoray and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 147, insofar as it held the former proviso to constitute an imperative precondition to the presentation of a petition under section 51, must be understood in the context of the statutory language then in force. That aspect of the decision has been superseded by the subsequent legislative amendment. For completeness, it may be observed that even if the former proviso had remained in force, it would have been satisfied on the present facts. The Respondent's conversion is documented as having taken effect on 24 October 2024, whereas the present petition was presented only in February 2026, well beyond the former three-month minimum period. [27] Thirdly, the precise date of the parties' separation is immaterial to a petition under section 51. The verifying affidavit leaves the date of separation blank, while the petition pleads separation since 2024. Because the operative ground under section 51 is the conversion and not the living apart, the absence of a precise separation date does not impair the petition. For the same reason, the assertions in the petition as to the Respondent's want of affection and his alleged lack of cooperation matters of the kind relevant to a petition founded on breakdown under sections 53 and 54 need not be, and are not, made the subject of any finding. They are unnecessary to the relief sought and, being untested on an undefended petition, it would be wrong to treat them as established. [28] Fourthly, section 50 has no application. Section 51(3), as amended, provides that section 50 shall not apply to any petition for divorce where one party has converted to Islam; and in any event the marriage had subsisted for well over two years before the petition. [29] Fifthly, the requirement of prior reference to a conciliatory body under section 106(1) did not apply to this petition. By its own terms section 106(1) excepts petitions under sections 51 and 52. The exemption order of 21 January 2026 (Lampiran "C") was accordingly obtained ex abundanti cautela; it was not a precondition to the presentation of a section 51 petition. Its regularity is not in question, but the petition would not have failed for want of it. Whether The Marriage Ought To Be Dissolved [30] The conditions of section 51 being satisfied, there remains the Court's discretion. A decree under section 51 is not automatic; the section is framed in permissive terms. But where one spouse has embraced a faith under which the civil marriage cannot subsist as before, and the other spouse, who does not share that faith, seeks to bring the marriage to an end, the purpose of section 51 is directly engaged. On the documented facts a conversion in October 2024, parties living apart since 2024, and an unopposed petition by the non-converting spouse there is no circumstance suggesting that it would be wrong to dissolve the marriage. The Court is satisfied that the marriage should be dissolved. The Form Of The Decree [31] The petition prays that the marriage be dissolved forthwith. The form of the decree is, however, regulated by section 61. A decree under section 51 is a decree of divorce, and section 61(1) provides that every decree of divorce shall in the first instance be a decree nisi, not to be made absolute before the expiration of three months from its grant unless the Court fixes a shorter period. Section 61 is not disapplied to a section 51 petition: where the legislature intended a general provision in Part VI not to apply to such a petition, it said so expressly, as it did in section 51(3) in respect of section 50. The absence of any corresponding disapplication of section 61 is deliberate. The decree will therefore be pronounced as a decree nisi. No circumstance has been shown that would justify abridging the period the legislature has prescribed, and the Court declines to do so. Whether a decree under section 51 should, as a class, attract a shorter period under section 61(1) reconciliation not being in contemplation where the parties no longer share a religion is a question of more general importance that does not arise for decision on this petition, and it is left open. [32] By section 51(2) the Court may, on dissolving the marriage, make provision for the custody of the children; that provision falls to be made in accordance with section 88, the paramount consideration being the welfare of each child (section 88(2)). What welfare requires is not measured by material comfort alone; it is to be understood in its widest sense, embracing the moral as well as the physical wellbeing of the child. In Viran a/l Nagapan v Deepa a/p Subramaniam and other appeals [2016] 1 MLJ 585 (FC) the Federal Court affirmed that, in matters of custody arising from a civil marriage, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. On the material before the Court, the children have lived with and been cared for by the Petitioner; the statement as to the arrangements for the children records that they are in her care, that she is assisted by her parents, and that she is able to provide for their upbringing and education. The Respondent has taken no part in these proceedings, has advanced no competing proposal, and lives apart from the children in another State. The presumption in section 88(3) does not arise, both children being well above the age of seven. Considering the welfare of each child independently, as section 88(4) requires, and there being no factor pointing the other way, the welfare of each is served by placing her in the sole custody, care and control of the Petitioner, with whom both children have their settled home. As to access, the Petitioner proposes reasonable access to the Respondent subject to the children's wishes, without overnight access, and on prior notice. The children are of an age to form and express their own views, which under section 88(2)(b) are a proper and significant consideration. It should be said, however, that section 88(2)(b) requires the Court to have regard to those wishes; it does not make them determinative, nor does it permit the Court to delegate to the children the very question whether and when access is to take place. The welfare judgment remains the Court's. An order which makes access exist only if and when the children desire it both places upon them a burden of decision that the Act commits to the Court and risks the gradual attenuation of the parental relationship. The preferable course is to fix a workable framework of access, informed by but not surrendered to the children's wishes — sufficiently flexible not to compel an unwilling older child, yet sufficiently defined to keep the relationship open. Access is the right of the child as much as of the parent, and an order ought not to foreclose the relationship between the children and their father. The arrangement proposed, so understood, strikes an acceptable balance. The Court will order reasonable access to the Respondent, to be exercised having regard to the wishes of the children and upon reasonable prior notice to the Petitioner, without overnight access. Liberty to apply is reserved, so that the terms of access may be revisited should the children's circumstances or wishes change. Maintenance Of The Children [34] The Petitioner seeks no order for maintenance against the Respondent; she undertakes to bear the children's expenses until each attains 18 years or completes tertiary education, whichever is the later. The Court may give effect to that undertaking, but two matters require care. [35] First, the statutory duty of a parent to maintain his children under section 92 is not extinguished merely because the other parent is willing and able to bear the cost. Section 92 preserves that duty except where an agreement or order of court otherwise provides. Nor does the Respondent's conversion diminish it: as the Supreme Court held in Tan Sung Mooi (f) v Too Miew Kim [1994] 3 MLJ 117 (SC), the obligations arising under a non-Muslim marriage are not extinguished by a party's conversion to Islam. Section 51(2) is to be read in light of its protective purpose. In conferring on the Court the power to provide for the children of the marriage notwithstanding the conversion, the provision is directed to ensuring that the children of a civil marriage are not deprived of the support and security to which they are entitled by reason only of a parent's change of faith. The Court therefore records the Petitioner's undertaking and makes no order for maintenance against the Respondent at this time, but does not thereby discharge the Respondent of his underlying obligation to his children. The children's right to seek maintenance from the Respondent in future, should circumstances require, is expressly preserved, and the liberty to apply already reserved extends to that matter. That duty is not necessarily spent at the age of 18: by section 95 as amended it may continue while a child is pursuing further or higher education or training. Secondly, the duration of any order touching the children is governed by section 95. As amended by Act A1546, section 95 fixes the ordinary terminus at the age of 18, but provides that where a child is pursuing further or higher education or training the order continues until the completion of that education or training, whichever is the later. The Petitioner's proposal to provide for the children until each attains 18 or completes her tertiary education, whichever is the later, therefore accords with the duration the statute now permits, and not merely with a voluntary undertaking. The Court's order for custody, care and control will run until each child attains the age of 18 years; the provision for the children's maintenance and education may, consistently with section 95, extend until the completion of further or higher education or training, whichever is the later. The amendment effected by Act A1546 resolves a question that had previously been attended by uncertainty, namely whether the obligation to maintain a child might extend beyond the age of majority to support the child during further or higher education; the section now establishes that it may, and that the duration of such provision is no longer necessarily confined to the child's minority. [37] The Petitioner makes no claim for maintenance for herself under section 77, and makes no claim to a division of matrimonial assets under section 76. These are matters within her own disposition. There being no claim, no question arises for determination and no order is made. The Court records the position so that the record is complete. F. CONCLUSION [38] The Court has jurisdiction, under sections 3(3) and 51 read with section 48 of Act 164 as amended, to dissolve this civil marriage notwithstanding the Respondent's conversion to Islam; section 3(3) now confers that jurisdiction in terms of exclusivity. The conditions for a decree under section 51 are established: the Respondent has converted, the section is engaged on the petition of the Petitioner as the non-converting party, no waiting period now applies, section 50 is inapplicable, and reference to a conciliatory body was not required. In the exercise of its discretion the Court is satisfied that the marriage should be dissolved, the decree taking effect in the first instance as a decree nisi. The welfare of each child is served by sole custody, care and control to the Petitioner, with reasonable access to the Respondent on the terms set out, while the Respondent's statutory duty to maintain the children is preserved notwithstanding the Petitioner's undertaking to bear their expenses. No order for spousal maintenance or for the division of matrimonial property is sought or made. G. ORDERS OF THE COURT [39] It is accordingly ordered that: