Chong Jia Ming v Abdul Khalik Bin Yusof (JA-12B-33-07/2022)

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ABDUL KHALIK BIN YUSOF KIM HUO CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS SDN BHD … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA SAMAN SIVIL NO. JA-A53KJ-830-11/2020 ANTARA CHONG JIA MING …PLAINTIF

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ABDUL KHALIK BIN YUSOF KIM HUO CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS SDN BHD …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Mukadimah [1] Bagi tujuan rayuan ini, pihak-pihak akan dirujuk sebagaimana status mereka semasa prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen sebelum ini. [2] Ini adalah rayuan Plaintif terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (“HMS”) pada 6.7.2022 mengenai kuantum gantirugi yang diberikan selepas perbicaraan taksiran gantirugi. [3] Sebagai latar belakang, kes ini melibatkan tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan bagi mendapatkan gantirugi ekoran kemalangan yang berlaku pada 8.7.2019 di Jalan Persiaran Perdana, Iskandar Puteri, Johor Bahru melibatkan motorsikal yang ditunggang oleh Plaintif dengan lori milik Defendan Kedua yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama. [4] Selepas perbicaraan penuh dijalankan, HMS memutuskan bahawa Defendan-defendan adalah bertanggungan sepenuhnya terhadap kemalangan tersebut dan mengawardkan gantirugi am dan khas kepada Plaintif. Bagaimanapun, Plaintif tidak berpuas hati terhadap jumlah gantirugi berkenaan dan merayu kepada Mahkamah ini. Prinsip Mahkamah dalam memutuskan rayuan terhadap gantirugi [5] Adalah prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan secara umumnya tidak akan campur tangan terhadap keputusan mahkamah bicara dalam membuat keputusan. Abdul Hamid Omar KHN dalam kes Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani [1985] CLJ Rep 323; [1985] 2 MLJ 22 telah menggariskan prinsip utama bagi mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan dalam menguruskan rayuan terhadap jumlah gantirugi di mana beliau menyatakan – "Now, in appeal on quantum of damages, it is essential in order to come to a conclusion, to bear in mind certain principles which are well established. The appeal court is slow, indeed, disinclined to interfere with the judge's finding merely because the appeal court thinks that if the case had been before it in the first instance a lesser sum would have been awarded. Asmi CJ (Malaya) (as he then was) giving the judgment of the Federal Court in Topaiwah v. Salleh [1968] 1 LNS 161; [1968] 1 MLJ 284 said that: In order to justify reversing the trial judge on the question of the amount damages it will generally be necessary that this court should be convinced either that the judge acted on some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it entirely an erroneous estimate of the damages to which the Perayu is entitled (see Flint v. Lovell [1935] 1 KB 354). The principle that should guide this court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore it is for the appeal court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purpose of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the court is satisfied or convinced that the judge had acted upon wrong principle of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed it is the duty to reverse the finding of the trial judge.". [6] Dalam kes Mokhtaruddin Abdullah & Anor v Norizan Rosdi & Ors [1998] 1 LNS 248 Abdul Wahab Patail H (pada masa itu) memutuskan – “A long line of binding authority has established that an appellate Court would be slow to interfere with the award. In Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani [1985] CLJ Rep 323; [1985] 1 CLJ 429; [1985] 2 MLJ 22 SC, applying Greenfield v. London and North Eastern Railway Company [1945] KB 89, which held that the principle is not whether the appellate Court might have given rather more or rather less, but only if the trial judge had omitted some relevant consideration or admitted some irrelevant consideration or if the amount is so excessive or insufficient as to be plainly unreasonable.”. [7] Dalam kes Rasidin Bin Partorjo v. Frederick Kiai [1976] 1 LNS 123 Wan Suleiman HMP menyatakan – “The principle upon which an appellate court will interfere with an award of damages made by a judge sitting alone has been stated by Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd (2) at pp 616-617 as follows: Where the award is that of the judge alone, the appeal is by way of rehearing on damages as on all other issues, but as there is generally so much room for individual choice so that the assessment of damages is more like an exercise of discretion than an ordinary act of decision, the appellate court is particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount of damages. It is difficult to lay down any precise rule which will cover all cases, but a good general guide is given by Greer LJ in Flint v. Lovell. In effect the court, before it interferes with an award of damages, should be satisfied that the judge has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has misapprehended the facts, or has for these or other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. It is not enough that there is a balance of opinion or preference. The scale must go down heavily against the figure attacked if the appellate court to interfere, whether on the ground of excess or insufficiency. Thus the appellant here has to convince us that the learned trial judge has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has misapprehended the facts, or has for other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered.”. [8] Dalam kes Amar Singh v. Chin Kiew [1960] 1 LNS 5; [1960] 26 MLJ 77, Thompson CJ (pada masa itu) memutuskan – ".....The fixation of damages is so largely a matter of opinion or of impression that differences of calculation or assessment are to be expected. It is an exercise of judicial discretion. Merely disagree with the figure arrived at by the trial judge is no ground for interference unless it is wholly erroneous estimate.................." [9] Sehubungan itu, persoalan yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ini sebagai mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan adalah sama ada Plaintif berjaya membuktikan HMS telah bertindak atas prinsip undang-undang yang salah atau gagal mengambil kira perkara yang relevan atau jelas tidak munasabah. [10] Dalam rayuannya, Plaintif tidak berpuas hati dengan kuantum gantirugi am dan khas bagi perkara yang berikut:

left knee posterior cruciate ligament laxity (PCL);

left knee anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) and lateral collateral ligament (LCL) tear; dan

higher risk of developing osteoarthritis of the left knee joint;

ligament reconstruction;

knee brace; dan

kehilangan keupayaan pendapatan (loss of earning capacity). Analisis Mahkamah [11] Bagi jumlah gantirugi yang melibatkan PCL, ACL dan LCL, Plaintif berhujah bahawa gantirugi berasingan perlu diberikan bagi setiap jenis kecederaan pada ligamen lutut kiri. Oleh itu Plaintif berhujah, bagi PCL, award yang sepatutnya adalah sebanyak RM30,000.00 dan RM60,000.00 bagi ACL and LCL. Manakala bagi koyakan pada ligamen berkenaan, Plaintif berhujah bahawa jumlah award adalah sepatutnya RM30,000.00 dan RM30,000.00 lagi bagi higher risk of developing osteoarthritis of the left knee joint. Oleh itu, jumlah keseluruhan yang dituntut oleh Plaintif adalah RM150,000.00. [12] Bagaimanapun, HMS telah mencantumkan ketiga-tiga kecederaan berkenaan serta higher risk of developing osteoarthritis of the left knee joint di bawah satu kecederaan iaitu melibatkan ligamen lutut kiri. Ekoran itu, HMS telah memberikan award global sebanyak RM30,000.00 bagi kesemua kecederaan ini berdasarkan kepada revised compendium of personal injury awards yang menyatakan bahawa award bagi kecederaan yang melibatkan ligamen lutut adalah antara RM18,000.00 hingga RM30,000.00. [13] Dalam hal memberikan award global, perkara utama yang perlu diberi perhatian ialah sama ada kecederaan-kecederaan yang dialami melibatkan satu bahagian atau fungsi anggota badan sebagaimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Mahamad Mahamad Said & Anor v. Perianayagam & Anor [1971] CLJU 71; [1971] 1 LNS 71; [1972] 1 MLJ 67, di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menggariskan panduan yang berikut: With respect we do not think that the learned Judge should have taken compensation for each of the two injuries suffered by the plaintiff separately and then just have added them up at the end. The items are not separate heads of compensation. They are only aid at arriving at a fair and reasonable compensation. See Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters Ltd. [1968] 1 All ER 726, 733. There is an element of overlapping when two or more injuries are suffered simultaneously. [14] Begitu juga dalam kes kes Seah Yit Chen v. Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd & Ors [1990] CLJU 56; [1990] 1 LNS 56; [1990] 3 MLJ 144, mahkamah menyatakan – In my opinion, which approach is to be followed in each case must necessarily depend on the facts of the case, bearing in mind the need to avoid overlapping. When the injuries sustained are related to the same part or function of the body, there should only be one award of damages, without any risk of overlapping: where the injuries sustained are to different parts of the body and affect different functions, as in the instant case where the plaintiff has sustained injuries to the knee and to the spine, it would be appropriate to make a separate award for each head of damage. In such cases, however, care would still have to be taken to avoid a further 'sub-itemizing' of a head of damage or injury. [15] Pendekatan begini diteruskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Tan Cheong Poh & Anor v. Teow Ah Keow [1996] 3 CLJ 665, di mana hakim VC George HMR ketika menyampaikan keputusan mahkamah menyatakan – We also note that all the disabilities suffered by the plaintiff stem from that one injury, the damage to the brain. Particularly for that reason we do not agree with Encik Harpal Singh Grewal's submission that the learned Judge erred in not having made a separate assessment each for physical disabilities and for intellectual disabilities and thereafter allow for overlap. In our judgment, particularly where the disabilities stem from the one injury as is the case here, all the disabilities being neurological in nature, the extent of overlap will be such that there would be a merger as it were. We note with respectful approval the learned Judge in Pattan a/l Sembadayan v. Periasamy s/o Vellan [1988] 1 CLJ 826 in effect declining an invitation by the plaintiff's Counsel to assess different disabilities suffered by the plaintiff separately where they all stemmed from the same brain injury. [16] Berbalik kepada rayuan di hadapan saya ini, adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa ketiga-tiga PCL, ACL dan LCL ini melibatkan satu tempat yang sama iaitu di lutut kiri Plaintif atau lebih tepat ia melibatkan ligament lutut kiri Plaintif. Selain itu, akibat kecil di lutut tersebut, isu higher risk of developing osteoarthritis of the left knee joint dikatakan oleh Plaintif akan timbul. Berdasarkan kepada prinsip di atas, saya mendapati keputusan HMS yang memberikan award global bagi ketiga-tiga PCL, ACL dan LCL serta higher risk of developing osteoarthritis of the left knee joint adalah tepat dan tidak bercanggah dengan undang-undang. [17] Mengenai award sebanyak RM30,000.00 yang diberikan oleh HMS, saya mendapati jumlah tersebut adalah munasabah berdasarkan kepada revised compendium of personal injury awards bagi kecederaan yang melibatkan ligament lutut. [18] Mengenai rayuan Plaintif berkaitan dengan ligament reconstruction, Plaintif menuntut jumlah sebanyak RM300,000.00 disebabkan kos bagi setiap pembedahan ACL, PCL dan LCL adalah RM100,000.00. Namun HMS membenarkan kuantum sebanyak RM50,000.00 atas alasan kos pembedahan bagi ligamen adalah antara RM50,000.00 hingga RM100,000.00 dan tiada alasan kukuh diberikan oleh saksi pakar Plaintif mengapa setiap pembedahan ligamen berkenaan perlu dibuat secara berasingan. [19] Dalam hal ini, saya mendapati kos pembedahan yang melibatkan ligamen di hospital swasta adalah antara RM50,000.00 hingga RM100,000.00. Bagaimanapun HMS telah memberikan gantirugi sebanyak RM50,000.00 atas alasan Plaintif layak diberikan 1/3 daripada kos pembedahan tersebut disebabkan ia dijalankan di hospital swasta. [20] Mengenai keputusan HMS memberikan 1/3 daripada kos pembedahan tersebut disebabkan ia dijalankan di hospital swasta, adalah menjadi amalan bahawa bagi melayakkan Plaintif mendapatkan kos pembedahan penuh beliau mestilah membuktikan bahawa rawatan yang diperlukan tidak boleh didapatkan di hospital kerajaan sebagaimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Chai Yee Chong v. Lew Thai [2004] 2 CLJ 321; [2004] 3 AMR 341 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan – If the court is not satisfied that a plaintiff is justified to seek treatment at a private hospital, then depending on the facts and figures of the case, the court should either dismiss the claim or award an amount not exceeding one third of the expenses. The one third principle is not fixed by any written law. It is a matter of practice. If one third is excessive an amount of less than one third may be awarded. [21] Bagitu juga dalam kes Kuala Terengganu Specialist Hospital Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Ahmad Thaqif Amzar Ahmad Huzairi v. & Ors [2022] 10 CLJ 209 [2022] 1 LNS 2213 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan – [73] Item 9.18 concerns the cost of treatment at a private hospital. It is now settled law that in personal claims cases where treatment that is readily available at a public hospital, albeit with the usual delays being encountered, is sought at a private medical facility, the court in normal cases would only grant 1/3 of the private hospital cost as appropriate compensation. [22] Dalam kes Muhammad Yassein Zuliskandar (A Child Suing Through His Father and Next Friend; Zuliskandar Md Pechor) v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2019] 4 CLJ 289; [2018] MLJU 2185 Harminder Singh Dhaliwal HMR (pada masa itu) menyatakan – [12] In other words, the test of reasonableness applies in two ways. First, the plaintiff must justify why he chooses treatment at a private hospital over a public hospital. Secondly, the plaintiff must show that the cost of treatment at a private hospital was reasonable. In determining whether it is, or was, reasonable or justifiable in resorting to treatment at a private hospital, there can be no fixed or inflexible rules simply because of the myriad of reasons or circumstances why treatment is sought or intended to be sought at a private hospital. [23] Oleh itu, saya berpandangan jumlah RM50,000.00 yang diberikan oleh HMS iaitu 1/3 daripada kos pembedahan di hospital swasta adalah berpatutan disebabkan tiada alasan kukuh yang diberikan oleh Plaintif bagi menunjukkan bahawa pembedahan ini tidak boleh dilakukan di hospital kerajaan, sebaliknya hanya di hospital swasta sahaja. [24] Bagi rayuan Plaintif untuk kos left custom adjustable OA defiance knee brace, Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM141,900.00 berdasarkan cadangan oleh pakar orthotics (SP5) yang telah memeriksa Plaintif selama 45 minit. Bagaimanapun, tuntutan ini ditolak oleh HMS atas alasan semasa Plaintif kembali bekerja selepas kemalangan sehingga hari perbicaraan, beliau tidak memakai alat ini. Ini menunjukkan tiada keperluan kepada Plaintif untuk menggunakan alat berkenaan. Selain itu, pakar perubatan Plaintif (SP4) sendiri ketika memberi keterangan di mahkamah mengakui bahawa “left custom adjustable OA defiance knee brace is better option”. Ini disebabkan, menurut beliau, dengan pembedahan terhadap lutut Plaintif serta rawatan fisio akan menjadikan Plaintif pulih seperti sedia kala. Tambahan pula, jumlah RM141,900.00 tersebut adalah untuk seumur hidup. Oleh yang demikian, saya bersetuju dengan dapatan HMS untuk menolak tuntutan Plaintif bagi pembelian left custom adjustable OA defiance knee brace berkenaan. [25] Mengenai kehilangan keupayaan pendapatan (loss of earning capacity), Plaintif menuntut gantirugi sejumlah RM126,089.28 atas alasan sebelum kemalangan Plaintif bekerja sebagai penjaga stor di OFT Pancing Sdn Bhd dengan gaji RM1,313.43 sebulan dan disebabkan kemalangan, Plaintif tidak boleh lagi bekerja seperti sebelum ini ekoran kesakitan pada lutut kiri beliau. [26] Bagaimanapun tuntutan Plaintif ini ditolak oleh HMS atas alasan tiada bukti yang menunjukkan Plaintif berisiko dibuang kerja ekoran kecederaannya. Sebaliknya, selepas kemalangan Plaintif masih bekerja di tempat dan gaji yang sama. [27] Dalam hal menuntut gantirugi bagi kehilangan keupayaan pendapatan, Plaintif mestilah membuktikan kepada mahkamah bahawa disebabkan kemalangan yang dialami beliau berisiko diberhentikan kerja dan risiko ini mestilah sebenar dan bukannya bersifat spekulatif sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v. Aidi Abdullah [1984] 2 CLJ 163; [1984] 1 CLJ 294 (Rep), di mana Syed Agil Barakbah HMP ketika menyampaikan keputusan mahkamah menyatakan – There is also a difference between loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity although both items are under general damages. Future loss of earnings or loss of prospective earnings are awarded for real assessable loss ie, loss that is capable of assessment at the date of the trial. It must be proved by evidence and not by mere speculation. In the absence of such evidence if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, he will be awarded a sum as part of the general damages for his disability suffered as a result of the injuries sustained, instead of compensation for loss of future earnings. It arises where there is a residual risk that the plaintiff might be thrown out of work altogether at some future date. The risk must be real and not speculative or fanciful. Any loss of money is relevant, whether the money is properly described as "earnings" or not, provided that the money is more than a "mere possible contingency. " Thus loss of possible contract as opposed to loss of probable contract is not recoverable. (See Kemp and Kemp on the Quantum of Damages, vol. 1, 4th edn. on pp. 122 and 123)." [See also Hj Ariffin Hj Ismail v. Mohamaad Noor Mohammad [2001] 2 CLJ 609] [28] Prinsip yang sama digunakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sumarni v. Yow Bing Kwong & Anor [2008] 3 CLJ 489 di mana James Foong HMR (kemudian HMP) menyebut – it is explicit that before an award of this nature can be entertained, there must be evidence to show that the plaintiff will face a real or substantial risk in her earning capacity being affected in the future due to the disability she sustained from the motor accident. The medical report did say that the plaintiff will suffer a permanent limp of her left leg which may prevent her from standing and walking for long periods. This would certainly be a handicap but is not a complete impairment to prevent her from performing other tasks. But since her starting job level was only that of a domestic help, the prospect of her getting another job that would pay her the same as what she was earning before the motor accident is low. In my view, her physical shortcoming will expose her to receiving less in the future than what she obtained before the accident. Mr. S. Sivanesan has submitted a sum of RM60,000 for this head of damages. I think this is far too excessive. It would be fairer if a sum of RM20,000 is awarded to the plaintiff's loss of earning capacity." [29] Berdasarkan kepada nota keterangan, saya mendapati semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen, Plaintif masih bekerja dengan syarikat yang sama dengan gaji yang setara seperti sebelum kemalangan walaupun diberikan tugasan yang lebih ringan. Sungguhpun Plaintif menyatakan beliau takut akan diberhentikan kerja ekoran kecederaan yang dialami, namun tiada keterangan daripada majikannya SP2 and SP3 yang menyatakan kemungkinan besar Plaintif akan diberhentikan kerja, dikurangkan gajinya atau prospek bertugas akan terjejas. Oleh yang demikian adalah jelas kepada saya bahawa risiko akan diberhentikan kerja yang dihujahkan oleh Plaintif merupakan spekulatif semata-mata. Sehubungan itu, penolakan gantirugi bagi kehilangan keupayaan pendapatan oleh HMS adalah berasas. Kesimpulan [30] Sebagaimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Goh Bak Ming v Yeoh Eng Kong & Other Appeals [2019] 3 MLRA 56 dan Lee Ing Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin [2003] 1 MLRA 95 yang menyatakan bahawa adalah prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan tidak akan mengganggu keputusan mahkamah bicara melainkan mahkamah bicara itu jelas salah dalam membuat keputusan. [31] Berdasarkan kepada pemerhatian di atas, saya mendapati Plaintif gagal membuktikan bahawa HMS telah bertindak atas prinsip undang-undang yang salah atau gagal mengambil kira perkara yang relevan atau jelas tidak munasabah bagi membolehkan saya menggunakan kuasa untuk mengganggu atau campur tangan terhadap keputusan yang diberikan oleh HMS. Oleh itu saya menolak rayuan Plaintif tanpa kos dan keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen dikekalkan. Tarikh: 15.5.2024 - t.t - (SHAMSULBAHRI BIN HAJI IBRAHIM) Hakim, Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya, Johor Bahru Peguam: Bagi pihak Perayu - Saralathevi a/p Murthy; Tetuan Teo & Associates Bagi pihak Responden – Nik Mohd Hasrul bin Nik Hamdan; Tetuan T.J. Goh & Co Kes yang dirujuk:  Amar Singh v. Chin Kiew [1960] 1 LNS 5; [1960] 26 MLJ 77  Chai Yee Chong v. Lew Thai [2004] 2 CLJ 321; [2004] 3 AMR 341  Goh Bak Ming v Yeoh Eng Kong & Other Appeals [2019] 3 MLRA 56  Kuala Terengganu Specialist Hospital Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Ahmad Thaqif Amzar Ahmad Huzairi v. & Ors [2022] 10 CLJ 209 [2022] 1 LNS 2213  Lee Ing Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin [2003] 1 MLRA 95  Mahamad Mahamad Said & Anor v. Perianayagam & Anor [1971] CLJU 71; [1971] 1 LNS 71; [1972] 1 MLJ 67  Mokhtaruddin Abdullah & Anor v Norizan Rosdi & Ors [1998] 1 LNS 248  Muhammad Yassein Zuliskandar (A Child Suing Through His Father and Next Friend; Zuliskandar Md Pechor) v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2019] 4 CLJ 289; [2018] MLJU 2185  Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v. Aidi Abdullah [1984] 2 CLJ 163; [1984] 1 CLJ 294 (Rep)  Rasidin Bin Partorjo v. Frederick Kiai [1976] 1 LNS 123  Seah Yit Chen v. Singapore Bus Service (1978) Ltd & Ors [1990] CLJU 56; [1990] 1 LNS 56; [1990] 3 MLJ 144  Sumarni v. Yow Bing Kwong & Anor [2008] 3 CLJ 489  Tan Cheong Poh & Anor v. Teow Ah Keow [1996] 3 CLJ 665  Tan Kuan Yau v. Suhindrimani [1985] CLJ Rep 323; [1985] 2 MLJ 22