Chong Mei Ling v 1. ) Chong Sin Wei (JA-24NCvC-1317-11/2023)

1.

KETUA PENGARAH INSOLVENSI [Sebagai pegawai penerima bagi harta Chong Sin Wei, Si Bankrap] ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN

Melalui Saman Pemula (Lampiran 1) yang difailkan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua memohon relif-relif berikut:-

Satu deklarasi bahawa D1, CHONG SIN WEI (NO.KIP: 840406- 08-6273), ialah pemegang amanah yang memegang ½ bahagian yang tidak dapat dibahagikan ke atas satu unit rumah teres biasa dua tingkat yang dipegang di bawah Geran 158748 Lot 69366, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (dahulunya dikenali sebagai HS(D) 357326 PTD 101040, Mukim Tebrau, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor) yang beralamat di 34, Jalan Setia 9/10, Taman Setia Indah, 81100 Johor Bahru ("Hartanah tersebut") atas amanah bagi pihak P dan D1 dalam bahagian yang berikut: Pihak Bahagian dalam Hartanah tersebut CHONG MEI LING (Plaintif) (NO. K/P: 790609-08-6166) 3/10 Bahagian CHONG SIN WEI (Defendan Pertama) (NO. KIP: 840406-08-6273) 2/10 Bahagian

Satu deklarasi bahawa 3/10 Bahagian dalam Hartanah tersebut yang dipegang oleh D1 sebagai pemegang amanah bagi pihak P, bukan merupakan sebahagian estet kebankrapan D1;

Satu deklarasi bahawa P, CHONG MEI LING (NO. KP: 790609-08-6199) ialah pemilik benefisial bagi lapan per sepuluh (8/10) bahagian yang tidak dapat dibahagikan dalam Hartanah tersebut;

Satu perintah bahawa Hartanah tersebut dijual pada harga pasaran tertakluk kepada pembayaran balik jumlah pinjaman dengan United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd dan gadaian melalui No. Perserahan 35528/2007 bertarikh 08.06.2007;

Satu perintah bahawa selepas penjualan Hartanah, 80% daripada hasil jualan bersih Hartanah tersebut (setelah menolak wang penebusan (redemption sum) dan segala kos dan perbelanjaan yang diperlukan untuk menyempurnakan jualan Hartanah tersebut) hendaklah dibayar kepada P manakala baki 20% daripada hasil jualan bersih Hartanah tersebut hendaklah dibayar ke dalam

Satu perintah bahawa D2 atau pegawai penerima bagi harta D1 hendaklah melaksanakan dan menandatangani semua suratcara, dokumen dan instrument pindahmilik yang sah dan boleh didaftarkan bagi menyempurnakan jualan ½ Bahagian dalam Hartanah tersebut yang didaftarkan dalam nama D1 dalam tempoh masa 14 hari dari tarikh penerimaan suratcara,dokumen dan/atau instrument pindahmilik daripada P dan/atau peguamcara P dan/atau peguamcara pembeli atau dalam tempoh masa lanjut yang dipersetujui oleh P dan D2 secara bertulis;

Sekiranya D2 atau pegawai penerima bagi harta D1 enggan, gagal dan/atau abai untuk mematuhi Perenggan (f) di atas, Penolong Kanan Pendaftar atau Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah ini diberi kuasa untuk melaksanakan dan menandatangani semua suratcara,dokumen dan/atau instumen pindah milik bagi pihak D1 dan D2 untuk memberi kesan kepada perintah ini;

P diberi kebebasan untuk membuat permohonan bagi mendapatkan arahan dan/atau perintah lanjut untuk memberi kesan kepada perintah ini;

Kos tindakan ini; dan

Lain-lain perintah dan/atau relif selanjutnya yang Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini fikir patut dan sesuai untuk diberi.

Mahkamah ini, setelah meneliti kertas-kertas kausa dan afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan oleh kedua-dua pihak dan setelah meneliti hujah-hujah peguam-peguam yang bijaksana telah memutuskan untuk menolak tuntutan P seperti mana dalam Saman Pemula dengan kos.

P telah memfailkan rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini.

Maka, berikut merupakan alasan-alasan penghakiman Mahkamah ini. Fakta kes

Pada 21.07.2016, atas permohonan Public Bank Berhad, Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bharu telah mengeluarkan perintah ke atas D1.

Berikutan perintah kebankrapan tersebut, D2 (Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi) telah dijadikan sebagai pentadbir harta D1 selaras dengan peruntukan Seksyen 8 (1)(b) Akta Insolvensi 1967 yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- 1) On the making of a bankruptcy order-

except as provided by this Act, no creditor to whom the bankrupt is indebted in respect of any debt provable in bankruptcy shall have any remedy against the property or person of the bankrupt in respect of the debt, or shall proceed with or commence any action or other legal proceeding in respect of such debt unless with the leave of the court and on such terms as the court may impose; and

all the property of the bankrupt shall become divisible among his creditors and shall vest in the Director General of Insolvency and the Director General of Insolvency shall be the receiver, manager, administrator and trustee of all properties of the bankrupt.

Kuasa-kuasa pentadbiran Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi terhadap harta mana-mana sibankrap adalah luas dan ini termasuklah kuasa untuk menjual harta sibankrap sebagaimana diperuntukkan di dalam s.60 Akta Insolvensi 1967 seperti berikut:- Subject to this Act, the Director General of Insolvency may-

sell all or any part of the property of the bankrupt, including the good-will of his business, if any, and the book-debts due or growing due to him, by public auction or private contract, with power to transfer the whole thereof to any person or company or to sell the same in parcels;

give receipts for any money received by him, which receipts shall effectually discharge the person paying the money from all responsibility in respect of the application thereof;

prove, rank, claim, and draw a dividend in respect of any debt due to the bankrupt;

exercise any powers, the capacity to exercise which is vested in the Director General of Insolvency under this Act, and execute any powers of attorney, deeds and other instruments for the purpose of carrying into effect this Act;

deal with any property to which the bankrupt is beneficially entitled sui juris, or other owner of an estate of inheritance less than an estate in perpetuity, in the same manner as the bankrupt might have dealt with it; and any such dealing with any property to which the bankrupt is before his discharge so entitled shall, although the bankrupt is dead at the time of that dealing, be as valid and have the same operation as though the bankrupt were then alive.

P memfailkan tindakan ini pada tahun 2023 terhadap D1 dan D2 bagi menuntut relief-relief yang dinyatakan di dalam Lampiran

Memandangkan D1 adalah seorang bankrap maka segala urusan tindakan ini adalah dikendalikan oleh D2 bagi pihak D1. Adalah penegasan D2 bahawa meskipun D2 telah membawa kepada perhatian D1 mengenai tindakan P di Lampiran 1, D1 tidak memberikan apa-apa maklum balas kepada D2.

Carian yang dibuat ke atas hartanah tersebut bertarikh 06.03.2024 serta perjanjian pinjaman dan perjanjian jual beli yang diekshibitkan oleh P dalam Afidavit Sokongan menunjukkan yang hartanah tersebut dimiliki D1 dan P secara sama rata iaitu ½ bahagian setiap seorang.

Pada masa yang sama, juga ditunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut telah digadaikan kepada United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd e juga salah satu pemiutang yang telah terhadap D1 di pejabat D2.

Setelah meneliti kertas kausa, afidavit dan hujah-hujah P, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa P mengambil posisi kononnya wujud satu amanah berbangkit (resulting trust) atau amanah konstruktif (constructive trust) di antara P dan D1 ke atas 3/10 daripada ½ bahagian hartanah milik D1 berikutan P mendakwa telah membuat 80% daripada bayaran pinjaman perumahan kepada pemegang gadaian hartanah tersebut. Analisis dan keputusan Kedudukan undang-undang berkenaan RT

Pertama sekali, prinsip undang-undang berkenaan RT boleh dirujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Inggeris Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 di mana House of Lords di muka 708 telah menyatakan seperti berikut:- Under existing law a resulting trust arises in two sets of circumstances: (A) where A makes a voluntary payment to B or pays (wholly or in part) for the purchase of property which is vested either in B alone or in the joint names of A and B, there is a presumption that A did not intend to make a gift to B: the money or property is held on trust for A (if he is the sole provider of the money) or in the case of a joint purchase by A and B in shares proportionate to their contributions. It is important to stress that this is only a presumption, which presumption is easily rebutted either by the counter - presumption of advancement or by direct evidence of A's intention to make an outright transfer: see Underhill and Hayton pp. 317ff, Vandervell v. IRC [1967] 1 All ER 1 at 8, [1967] 2 AC 291 at 312ff and Re Vandervell's Trusts (No 2), White v. Vandervell Trustees Ltd [1974] 1 All ER 47 at 63ff, [1974] Ch 269 at 288ff. (B) Where A transfers property to B on express trusts, but the trusts declared do not exhaust the whole beneficial interest: ibid and Barclays Bank Ltd v. Quistclose Investments Ltd[1968] 3 All ER 651, [1970] AC 567. Both types of resulting trust are traditionally regarded as examples of trusts giving effect to the common intention of the parties. A resulting trust is not imposed by law against the intentions of the trustee (as is a constructive trust) but gives effect to his presumed intention. Megarry J in Re Vandervell's Trusts (No 2) suggests that a resulting trust of type (B) does not depend on intention but operates automatically. I am not convinced that this is right. If the settlor has expressly, or by necessary implication, abandoned any beneficial interest in the trust property, there is in my view no resulting trust: the undisposed - of equitable interest vests in the Crown as bona vacantia: see Re West Sussex Constabulary's Widows, Children and Benevolent (1930) Fund Trusts [1970] 1 All ER 544, [1971] Ch 1.

Melalui prinsip di atas, apa yang jelas ialah RT hanya boleh dikatakan sebagai wujud hanya dalam keadaan-keadaan berikut:-

P berjaya buktikan bahawa pihaknya ada membuat bayaran sama ada penuh atau sebahagian untuk hartanah tersebut;

P secara terang atau secara implikasi menunjukkan bahawa P tidak berniat bahawa bayaran yang dibuatnya itu bukan sebagai hadiah kepada D1; dan

P secara terang atau secara implikasi menunjukkan bahawa beliau tidak melepaskan kepentingannya dalam hartanah tersebut.

Apa yang paling penting di sini adalah bahawa, Mahkamah perlu meneliti secara objektif tentang niat pihak-pihak terlebih dahulu. Perkara ini juga telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Takako Sakao v Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2010] 1 CLJ 381 dalam nada berikut:- [19] In our judgment, the primary function of the court in a case where a resulting trust is asserted or a gift is alleged arising from a disposition of property is clear. It is to determine whether the initial donor intended to make a gift of the property be it movable or immovable, or whether he or she intended it to be held by the donee in trust for some other person or persons, including the donor or the disponee or both. A court when called upon to decide whether a resulting trust or a gift was intended in given circumstances should not begin by resorting to presumptions. It must meticulously examine the facts to objectively ascertain the true intention of the parties. If the intention of the parties when objectively determined was that the particular property was to be held on a resulting trust then that is the conclusion the court should declare. However, if the intention was that the disponee of the property was to have it as a gift, there can then be no question of a resulting trust being implied. It is only when there is absent any indication of what was intended by the parties that the court should resort to presumptions. Were it otherwise, the court may be arriving at an incorrect conclusion based on a presumption when the evidence points in quite the opposite direction.

Justeru, beban pembuktian adalah terletak ke atas P untuk membuktikan kewujudan RT dalam hal ini. Tanpa beliau membuktikan perkara ini, beban pembuktian tidak beralih kepada pihak D2. Rujuk Ranchhodbhai v Babuhai AIR 1982 Guj 308 (Mahkamah Tinggi):- It is also well to bear in mind that there is an essential distinction between "burden of proof" and "onus of proof"; burden of proof lies upon the person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but the onus of proof shifts. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence (see Raghavamma v. Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136). Burden of proof has two distinct meanings, namely, (i) the burden of proof as a matter of law and pleadings, and (ii) the burden of proof as a matter of adducing evidence. Section 101 of the Evidence Act deals with the former and s. 102 of the Evidence Act with the latter. The first remains constant but the second shifts. In a claim application, therefore, the burden of proof, in the first sense, certainly lies on the claimant. If he examines himself and his witness, if any, and if the evidence, tested in the light of the principles set out above, is found to be acceptable, the onus shifts on the tortfeasor to prove those circumstances, if any, which dislodge the assertions of the claimants. If the tortfeasor fails to prove before the court any fact or circumstance which tends to affect the evidence led by the claimant, the claimant would be entitled to ask the court to hold that he has established the case and, on that basis, to make a just award it would thus appear, that though the legal burden, - the burden as a matter of law and pleadings - remains constant on the claimant, the burden as a matter of adducing evidence changes often times as the trial of the claim petition progresses.

Rujuk juga kes Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan (As Executor To SL Alameloo Achi (Deceased)) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 5 CLJ 418 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- [57] The rule is that "the onus of proof of any particular fact lies on the party who alleges it, not on him who denies it; et incumbit probation qui decit, non qui negat, Actori incibit probation... The plaintiff is bound in the first instance, to show a prima facie case, and if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Hence the maxim potior est condition defendantis. A plaintiff cannot obviously advantage himself by the weakness of the defence. A plaintiff's case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. When, however, the defendant, or either litigant party, instead of denying what is alleged against him, relies on some new matter which, if true, is an answer to it, the burden of proof changes sides; and he, in his turn, is bound to show a prima faciecase at least and, if he leaves it imperfect, the court will not assist him. Reus excipendo fit actor " (Woodroffe and Amir Ali, supra, vol. 3 at pp. 3190-3191).

Anggapan berkenaan kewujudan RT hanya berbangkit sekiranya niat pihak-pihak tidak dapat ditentukan dengan jelas secara objektifnya berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan. Rujuk Gek Kiau v Goh Koon Suan [2007] 6 CLJ 626 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- [7] With respect, we are unable to agree with the approach adopted by the learned judge. In our judgment the correct approach in cases such as the present is for a court first to determine the true intention of the purchaser. The question whether the purchaser in a particular case had a donative intention is to be determined objectively through a meticulous examination of the facts and evidence of the surrounding circumstances. If after such an examination the court concludes that there was a donative intention on the part of the purchaser that is the end of the matter and there is no room for the operation of the presumption of resulting trust or advancement as the case may be. It is only where there are no or insufficient facts or evidence from which a fair inference of intention may be drawn that a court should turn to presumptions as a last resort to resolve the dispute.

Dalam erti kata lain, anggapan kewujudan RT hanya boleh dibangkitkan jika tiada keterangan berkenaan niat sebenar pihak-pihak. Rujuk Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777 (House of Lords) muka 814:- .. in the absence of evidence to the contrary if the property be conveyed into the name of a stranger he will hold it as trustee for the person putting up the purchase money Kedudukan Undang-Undang tentang CT

Manakala CT pula beroperasi atas dasar undang-undang tanpa mengambil kira niat pihak-pihak. Rujukan juga dibuat kepada kes Takako Sakao di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut:- "[20] A constructive trust is imposed by law irrespective of the intention of the parties. And it is imposed only in certain circumstances. Two examples readily available (apart from the facts of this case and those illustrations provided by Millet LJ in Paragon Finance plc v. DB Thakerar & Co) are (i) where there is a specifically enforceable contract for the sale of property (moveable of immovable), the vendor holds the property on a constructive trust for the purchaser: see, Wong Siew Choong Sdn Bhd v. Anvest Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 CLJ 409; and (ii) where a gift made as a donation mortis causa fails, the intended beneficiary of the gift holds it in trust for the donor. As may be seen, the vendor in the first illustration and the purportedly dying donor or the beneficiary in the second did not create any trust. Nor did they intend to do so. What equity does in those circumstances is to fasten upon the conscience of the holder of the property a trust in favour of another in respect of the whole or a part thereof. [21] As earlier observed, we are of the view that the appellant at all material times was entitled to a half share in the trust property as a beneficiary under a constructuve trust She was entitled to claim it from the first respondent and to trace her half share in the property into the hands of anyone who acquired it. But equity will not assist the victim of a breach of trust to trace trust property where it will be inequitable to do so, for example because the property to be traced has gone into the hands of a bona fide acquirer for value or because it has gone into the general funds of a charity (see Re Diplock's Estate [1948] 2 All ER 429)."

Tujuan CT adalah untuk mewujudkan hubungan yang atas dasar amanah di antara pihak-pihak untuk mengelakkan apa-apa ketidakadilan berlaku. Kedudukan ini adalah sebagaimana yang diputuskan di dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan di m.s. 45- 46 menyatakan seperti berikut:- "[111] It is trite law that the intention to create a trust is applicable in situation of express trusts and not in constructive trusts. Constructive Trusts are trusts that may be implied in the absence of any declaration / intention of a trust, where the trustee has induced another to act to their detriment they would acquire a beneficial interest in the land / property. A characteristic feature of this trust does not owe its existence to the parties' intention, but by operation of law. In Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen [2010] 1 CLJ 381; [2009] 6 MLJ 751, it was held that: A constructive trust is imposed by law irrespective of the intention of the parties. And it is imposed only in certain circumstances, e.g. where there is dishonest, unconscionable or fraudulent conduct in the acquisition of property. What equity does in those circumstances is to fasten upon the conscience of the holder of the property a trust in favour of another in respect of the whole or part thereof. [112] Constructive Trust is viewed as a device under which equity will intervene so as to create a trust relationship between the parties in order to make a person accountable for the trust to prevent any unfairness or injustice. Equity will impose obligation on the defendant to hold the property for the benefit of another." Samada wujudnya RT atau CT dalam kes ini

Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan sedia ada, Mahkamah tidak dapat menerima kewujudan RT seperti yang didakwa oleh P dalam kes ini atas sebab bahawa jika pun benar sebagaimana P mendakwa yang beliau membayar 80% sebagai sumbangan kepada pemegang gadaian, ini tidak semestinya bermaksud yang 3/10 daripada ½ bahagian hartanah tersebut dipegang D1 atas dasar amanah kepada P dalam hal ini.

Ini kerana, Mahkamah memerhatikan tidak ada keterangan kukuh dikemukakan oleh P bahawa sumbangan 80% yang kononnya dibuat oleh beliau berpadanan dengan harga beliau hartanah tersebut dan/ atau pinjaman yang diambil daripada pemegang gadaian dalam hal ini.

Selain itu, tiada keterangan dikemukakan oleh P yang kepentingan benefisial beliau dan D1 berpadanan dengan sumbangan masing-masing samada ke atas pembelian hartanah tersebut dan/ atau pinjaman yang diambil daripada pemegang gadaian.

Selanjutnya, carian hartanah tersebut bertarikh 06.03.2024 dengan jelas menunjukkan D1 dan P masing-masingnya memiliki ½ bahagian ke atas hartanah tersebut.

Mahkamah juga tidak boleh menggunapakai anggapan RT kerana apabila dilihat keterangan secara objektifnya, terdapat kebarangkalian yang D1 mempunyai mengambil kira beliau dan P adik beradik. Perkara ini dikuatkan dengan fakta dalam Afidavit Sokongan P sendiri khasnya di perenggan 32 yang mana P dan D1 tinggal bersama di atas hartanah tersebut dari tahun 2007 sehingga P berpindah keluar pada tahun 2015. D1 pula masih tinggal di atas hartanah tersebut.

Maka, Mahkamah tidak boleh mengenepikan kemungkinan yang pembayaran yang dikatakan dibuat oleh P adalah satu hadiah ataupun derma untuk faedah D1 dan bukannya RT seperti didakwa oleh P.

P juga selanjutnya mendakwa dengan bersandarkan kepada beberapa ekshibit dalam Afidavit Sokongan iaitu Ekshibit P5 (Pernyata Sumbangan), Ekshibit P6 (Pernyata Akaun Bank United Overseas Bank-UOB), Ekshibit P7 (Pernyatan Akaun Bank Malayan Banking Berhad-Mayban) bahawa ianya menunjukkan sumbangan beliau dan seterusnya wujud RT dalam hal keadaan kes ini.

28.

Seterusnya, Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada Perjanjian Pinjaman yang dimasuki oleh P dan D1 bertarikh 24.04.2007 (Ekshibit P3, Afidavit Sokongan) di mana jelas liabiliti kedua-dua pihak adalah secara bersesama dan berasingan. Lihat Klausa 23 P3:- comprises of two or more persons or parties the terms and conditions stipulated herein and the Facility Letter shall be binding on such persons or parties jointly and severally.

tly Alliance Bank Malaysia Bhd v Mukhriz Mahathir & Anor [2006] 2 CLJ 723 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi di m.s. 735-736 memutuskan seperti berikut:- "[31] Back to the present action before this court, the plaintiff's claim against both the 1st and 2nd defendant is based on the letters of guarantee they signed as guarantors to the overdraft facilities granted by the Plaintiff to Strategy Powerhouse Sdn. Bhd. (where both of them were directors of the company at the material times). Both the letters of guarantee carry 'joint and several' liability on both the guarantors. This was clearly stated in the letters of guarantee. Both the defendants being educated, knew about it. That was the intention of the parties to the contract. The liability is to pay for liquidated claim on demand in the event Strategy Powerhouse Sdn Bhd. failed to repay the facility. [32] The words "jointly and severally" is defined as "persons who are jointly and severally bound render themselves liable not only to a joint action against them, but also to a separate actions against them individually." (see: A Dictionary of Law L.B. Curzon [33] When the letters of guarantee provide for 'joint and several' liability what they meant is that the plaintiff has a cause of action against both the defendants as guarantors not only to a joint action against them but also to separate action against them individually. In such situation, the plaintiff can proceed with one action against both of them at the same time or 2 separate actions against both of them individually. The effect is that, either way, the cause of action against any one of them is not discharged if judgment is entered against the other one. The fact that the said judgment in default dated 25 January 2005 against the 2nd defendant as well as the prayer in the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim do not state or insert the words "jointly and severally" does not in any way change the position. The plaintiff's right on the cause of action against both of the defendants either jointly or individually (ie, severally) still survives. The plaintiff can always proceed against the 1st defendant even though a final judgment in default had been entered against the 2nddefendant."

Signifikasi Klausa 23 di atas ialah P dan D1 bertanggungan secara bersesama dan berasingan terhadap pembayaran keseluruhan pinjaman yang diambil ke atas hartanah tersebut. Dalam perkara ini tidak ada keterangan pula dikemukakan oleh P mengenai pembahagian pembayaran ansuran pinjaman dengan D1 dalam Perjanjian Pinjaman iaitu P3.

Walaupun P mendakwa adanya perjanjian lisan dengan D1 mengenai pembahagian bayaran ansuran pinjaman, Mahkamah ini tidak dapat menerima keterangan tersebut begitu sahaja kerana D2 sendiri telah mengatakan secara khusus bahawa D1 telah tidak memberikan apa-apa penyataan atau respon kepada D2 walau pun telah diserahkan dengan Lampiran 1. Rujuk Willis v Willis [1704] 26 ER 443:- ... trusts of this nature are when the legal interest is in another, but the purchase money has been paid by a third person; this is a resulting trust for him who paid the moneys, but then he must clearly prove the payment.

Malahan, sikap berdiam diri yang telah dibuat oleh D1 kepada D2 juga mewujudkan kesangsian terhadap kebenaran dakwaan P kerana P dan D1 adalah adik beradik dan D1 kini adalah seorang bankrap yang mana perlu menjelaskan hutang kepada pemiutangnya. Dalam hal ini, jika Mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai kesangsian langsung terhadap perhubungan adik beradik di antara P dan D1 dan perintah kebankrapan terhadap D1, adalah dikhuatiri keadaan ini akan membuka ruang kepada penyalahgunaan RT atau CT oleh mana-mana pihak sebagai alat untuk mengganggu-gugat tugas-tugas statutori D2 atau memprejudiskan kedudukan pemiutang kepada mana-mana sibankrap.

Akhir sekali, berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan afidavit sedia ada, Mahkamah ini mendapati P gagal untuk membuktikan kewujudan apa-apa kelakuan yang atau tidak adil di pihak D1 yang boleh memberikan justifikasi wujudnya CT di antara P dan D1 dalam sebahagian milikan D1 kepada hartanah tersebut. Dapatan Mahkamah yang sebegini adalah berpandukan kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Datuk M Kayveas v See Hong Chen & Sons Sdn Bhd & Ors [2014] 4 MLJ 64 yang memutuskan di m.s muka 80 seperti berikut:- "[37] Due to the fine line drawn between an express trust and a constructive trust, perhaps a comparison of these two classes of trusts may help give a clearer picture. An obvious difference is that an express trust comes into existence the moment the trust is expressed while for a constructive trust the unconscionable behaviour of the trustee ignites it into existence."

Berdasarkan ulasan-ulasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa segala keterangan yang dibawa oleh P, apabila dinilai secara objektifnya, telah gagal untuk membuktikan wujudnya Resulting Trust atau Constructing trust di antara P dan D1 dalam pemegangan ½ bahagian D1 kepada hartanah yang menjadi subjek pertikaian dalam perkara ini.

Berikutan dengan dapatan mutakhir ini, D2 bebas untuk menjalankan kuasa-kuasanya menurut Akta Insolvensi 1967 terhadap ½ bahagian hartanah tersebut yang didaftarkan di atas nama D1, kini sibankrap.

Maka dengan itu Lampiran 1 adalah ditolak dengan kos tertakluk fi alokator. Bertarikh 7hb November 2025 (NOOR HISHAM BIN ISMAIL) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Johor Bahru Peguam Plaintif: Tetuan Rohamat & Ling No. 61A, Jalan Molek 2/4 Taman Molek, 81100, Johor Bahru Johor Darul Takzim Peguam Defendan Pertama dan Kedua: Peguam Persekutuan Ketua Pengarah Insolvensi Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia Cawangan Johor Bahru Tingkat 12, Menara Tabung Haji Jalan Ayer Molek, 80720, Johor Bahru