Chu Tuang Lin v 1. ) Mu Boon Hock (CB-22NCvC-8-05/2021)

MU BOON HOCK

CHU SOCK FEN (NO. K/P: 770609-02-5410) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah tuntutan Plaintif untuk penamatan perkongsian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. Plaintif juga memohon agar untuk Defendan-Defendan memindahmilik semua saham mereka dalam Chu & Mu Enterprise kepada Plaintif. 03/10/2023 15:00:52 CB-22NCvC-8-05/2021 Kand. 63 [2] Plaintif juga memohon gantirugi khas RM310,000.00 dan gantirugi am serta kos. [3] Defendan-Defendan memohon tuntutan balas gantirugi RM8,576.00 dan injunksi menghalang penjualan tanah tersebut oleh Plaintif, penamatan perkongsian dan Plaintif dikehendaki menanggung semua liabiliti, kos, denda, fi dan penalti yang melibatkan perkongsian tersebut. Keterangan [4] Chu & Mu Enterprise adalah perkongsian perniagaan di antara Chu Tuang Lin, Mu Boon Hock dan Chu Sock Fen. Plaintif dan Defendan Kedua adalah adik-beradik. Sementara Defendan Pertama adalah adik ipar kepada Plaintif. [5] Syarikat perkongsian telah membeli satu bidang tanah HSD 4113, PT 2606, Tempat Kuala Tela, Mukim Ulu Telom, Daerah Cameron Highlands, Negeri Pahang untuk tujuan menanam kebun sayur. [6] Tanah tersebut dibeli dengan harga RM1,068,000.00. Ia dibuat melalui pinjaman dari Maybank RM700,000.00. Baki harga diperolehi melalui cagaran hartanah Plaintif di Kedah untuk pinjaman sebanyak RM400,000.00. [7] Pada 2015, Defendan Pertama telah menyerahkan segala urusan kebun tersebut kepada pihak Plaintif. Ini dapat dilihat melalui perjanjian dalam tulisan Cina di halaman 442 dan 443 Ikatan Dokumen B yang terjemahannya terdapat di halaman 1 dan 2 Ikatan Dokumen E. [8] Dalam perjanjian tersebut yang telah ditandatangani oleh Defendan Kedua dan Plaintif yang menyatakan seperti berikut: [9] Alasan perjanjian tersebut yang menetapkan semua operasi syarikat kepada Plaintif adalah disebabkan terdapat kemerosotan hasil jualan sayuran daripada kebun tersebut semasa ianya dikendalikan oleh Defendan Pertama. Sementara itu Defendan Pertama pula menyatakan bahawa permohonan injunksi yang dinyatakan dalam Tuntutan Balas adalah disebabkan ada ura-ura untuk Plaintif menjual kebun tersebut kepada pihak ketiga. Analisa [10] Penelitian kepada pliding, keterangan saksi-saksi dan eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan adalah didapati isu-isu berikut perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah iaitu:

Adakah terdapat perkongsian di antara Plaintif, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua;

Adakah perkongsian tersebut sekiranya diputuskan wujud wajar ditamatkan; dan

Adakah Defendan-Defendan telah membuktikan tuntutan balas terhadap Plaintif. Isu (a) [11] Perkongsian adalah hubungan dua individu yang bertujuan untuk mendapatkan keuntungan di dalam satu kegiatan tertentu. Takrifan ini telah diberikan dengan menarik dalam kes Mollwo, March & Co v Court of Wards [1872] L.T. 4 P.C. 419 oleh Sir Montague Smith seperti berikut: “Where a man holds himself out as a Partner, or allows others to do it, the case is wholly different. He is then properly estopped from denying the character he has assumed, and upon the faith of which Creditors may be presumed to have acted. A man so acting may be rightly held liable as a Partner by estoppel. Again, wherever the agreement between parties creates a relation which is in substance a partnership, no mere words or declarations to the contrary will prevent, as regards third persons, the consequences flowing from the real contract. Numerous definitions by text-writers of what constitutes a partnership are collected at the end of the introduction to Mr. Lindley's excellent Treatise on this subject. Their Lordships do not think it necessary to refer particularly to any of them, or to attempt to give a general definition to meet all cases. It is sufficient for the present decision to say, that to constitute a partnership the parties must have agreed to carry on business and to share profits in some way in common.” [12] Ia juga dinyatakan dalam oleh Lord Coleridge C.J dalam kes The Queen v Robson [1885] 16 Q.B.D. 137 seperti berikut: “I cannot find any authority throwing any doubt on the accuracy of the passage in Lindley on Partnership, which makes the participation in profits essential to the English idea of partnership, and states that, although in former times the word "copartnership" was used in the sense of "co-ownership," the modern usuage as been to confine the meaning of the term to societies formed for gain. A number of definitions given by writers from all parts of the world are appended to the passage, and in all of them the idea involved appears to be that of joint operation for the sake of gain. The association in the present case is not a copartnership in any sense of the word into which the notion of co-operation for the purpose of gain enters. We must construe the word "copartnership" as used in the Act according to the meaning ordinarily attached to it by the decisions and text-books on the subject. This association does not come within that meaning. The only point reserved for us is whether this association is a copartnership within the Act. Inasmuch as we are of opinion that it is not, the conviction must be reversed.” [13] Takrifan perkongsian tersebut telah dikanunkan di bawah Akta Perkongsian 1961 di dalam teks asalnya di bawah seksyen 3 (1) seperti berikut: “Partnership is the relation which subsists between persons carrying on business in common with a view of profit.” [14] Perbincangan yang menarik telah dinyatakan berkenaan dengan apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan perkongsian oleh Dr. Samsar Kamar bin Hj. Ab. Latif dalam bukunya Partnership Law in Malaysia ILBS 1998 Reprint 2013 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “A partnership is defined in section 3(1) of the Partnership Act 1961 as “the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit. The definition provides three essential ingredients for a partnership, namely:

a business

carried on in common and

with a view of profit. The key word in the definition is the word ‘relation”. Partnership is a relationship, it is not an organisation in its own right with a separate legal personality. Although this statutory definition does not state from what the relation arises it has been clearly established that an agreement, whether express or implied is the course of the relation and it is therefore a relation resulting from a contract.” [15] Malahan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Dato' Mohamad Shahul Hameed v. Datin Mazita Osman [2023] 8 CLJ 526 telah sepintas lalu menyatakan bagaimana perjanjian perkongsian itu boleh wujud dengan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[38] Whilst it was common ground that there was no written agreement between the parties, we would agree with the appellant that in principle a partnership agreement can exist orally without the formality of an executed agreement premised on the negotiations, factual matrix, exchanges, and the intention of the relevant parties to enter into a legally binding contractual relationship.” [16] Pada masa yang sama mahkamah juga merujuk kepada seksyen 4 Akta Perkongsian 1961 bagi menentukan sama ada keterangan-keterangan perhubungan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan adalah mencukupi untuk dikatakan ia adalah perhubungan rakan kongsi. Seksyen 4 Akta Perkongsian 1961 menyatakan seperti berikut: “In determining whether a partnership does or does not exist, regard shall be had to the following rules-

joint tenancy, tenancy in common, joint property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself create a partnership as to anything so held or owned, whether the tenants or owners do or do not share any profits made by the use thereof;

the sharing of gross returns does not of itself create a partnership, whether the persons sharing such returns have or have not a joint or common right or interest in any property from which or from the use of which the returns are derived;

the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but the receipt of such a share, or of a payment contingent on or varying with the profits of a business, does not of itself make him a partner in the business; and in particular –

the receipt by a person of a debt or other liquidated amount, by instalments or otherwise, out of the accruing profits of a business does not of itself make him a partner in the business or liable as such;

(ii) a contract for the remuneration of a servant or agent of a person engaged in a business by a share of the profits of the business does not of itself make the servant or agent a partner in the business or liable as such;

(iii) a person being the widow or child of a deceased partner, and receiving by way of annuity a portion of the profits made in the business in which the deceased person was a partner, is not, by reason only of such receipt, a partner in the business or liable as such;

(iv) the advance of money by way of loan to a person engaged or about to engage in any business on a contract with that person that the lender shall receive a rate of interest varying with the profits, or shall receive a share of the profits, arising from carrying on the business, does not of itself make the lender a partner with the person or persons carrying on the business or liable as such: Provided that the contract is in writing and signed by or on behalf of all the parties thereto; and

a person receiving, by way of annuity or otherwise, a portion of the profits of a business in consideration of the sale by him of the goodwill of the business is not, by reason only of such receipt, a partner in the business or liable as such.” [17] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Chooi Siew Cheong v Lucky Height Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 513 telah memberikan perbincangan yang menarik berkenaan dengan seksyen 4 Akta Perkongsian 1961 dan terma prima facie dalam seksyen tersebut. Ia dinyatakan seperti berikut: “As to the finding of the learned trial judicial commissioner that the plaintiff was a partner (point (1) above), with respect, we agreed with counsel for the plaintiff and found ourselves unable to accept. The term 'partnership' is defined as the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit ( s 3(1) of the Act). In deciding whether or not a partnership exists, the court, apart from giving regard to the relevant rules in s 4 of the Act, must consider the intentions of the parties as appearing from the whole facts of the case and the contract they had made. … In the instant case under appeal, the plaintiff (through his father who was a party to the initial agreement) provided the land and the first defendant company was to provide capital, labour and services to develop and build on the land. With their combined resources they were to share the ultimate product in agreed proportions in that each was to take, to the exclusion of the other, certain sub-lots with or without buildings erected thereon respecting which there was to be complete freedom to deal with or dispose of as he or it wished. In other words, each intended a wholly separate business; there was no 'business in common', ie a single business by the parties nor, it follows, 'with a view of profit' from such business. In our view, therefore, no partnership resulted from the agreement.” [18] Dalam kes ini keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif semasa pemeriksaan utama berkenaan dengan kedudukan Syarikat Chu & Mu Enterprise yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa ia adalah satu perkongsian. Ini dapat dilihat melalui soalan dan jawapan seperti berikut: “PL Dan ini adalah suatu perkongsian 50 % setiap seorang, setuju? CHU Ya.” [19] Mahkamah juga mendapati dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan yang melibatkan Chu & Mu Enterprise jelas menunjukkan bahawa hubungan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan adalah rakan kongsi. Ini dapat dilihat melalui maklumat Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM), penyata-penyata akaun dan juga perjanjian pinjaman daripada institusi kewangan. [20] Dalam kes ini juga mahkamah mendapati bahawa tujuan Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan menubuhkan Chu & Mu Enterprise ialah untuk mengusahakan tanaman kebun sayur bagi memperolehi keuntungan. Ia sudah jelas dan nyata bahawa perhubungan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan adalah satu perkongsian. Isu (b) [21] Plaintif memohon supaya perjanjian perkongsian tersebut ditamatkan di atas beberapa faktor yang dapat dikesan melalui keterangan saksi-saksi dan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan. Ia disebabkan oleh kemerosotan hasil tanaman tomato di atas tanah tersebut. Plaintif terpaksa membelanjakan sejumlah wang RM30,000.00 untuk membeli benih-benih baharu disebabkan hasil yang diperolehi tidak lumayan. [22] Plaintif juga mendakwa bahawa Defendan Pertama telah melakukan tindakan tort dengan menghalang aliran air daripada bahagian atas tanah tersebut sehingga menyebabkan hasil penanaman adalah terjejas. Ini telah menyebabkan Plaintif terpaksa mencari sumber air baharu yang menyebabkan perbelanjaan dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif. [23] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa apabila satu perkongsian tersebut ingin dibubarkan, ia boleh dilakukan melalui permohonan di mahkamah sekiranya tiada tatacara pembubaran dinyatakan dalam perjanjian perkongsian atau apabila pihak-pihak tidak dapat bersetuju untuk pembubaran perkongsian tersebut. Ini telah dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 37 Akta Perkongsian 1961 yang memperihalkan keadaan yang boleh dipertimbangkan oleh mahkamah untuk membubarkan sesuatu perkongsian. Seksyen 37 Akta Perkongsian 1961 menyatakan seperti berikut: “37 Dissolution by the court On application by a partner, the court may decree a dissolution of the partnership in any of the following cases-

when a partner is found lunatic or is shown, to the satisfaction of the court, to be of permanently of unsound mind, in either of which cases the application may be made as well on behalf of that partner by his committee, or next friend, or person having title to intervene as by any other partner;

when a partner, other than the partner suing, becomes in any other way permanently incapable of performing his part of the partnership contract;

when a partner, other than the partner suing, has been guilty of such conduct as, in the opinion of the court, regard being had to the nature of the business, is calculated to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business;

when a partner, other than the partner suing, wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable for the other partner or partners to carry on the business in partnership with him;

when the business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss; and

whenever in any case circumstances have arisen which, in the opinion of the court, render it just and equitable that the partnership be dissolved.” [24] Penelitian kepada bidang kuasa Mahkamah untuk membubarkan suatu perkongsian seperti yang diperuntukan di bawah seksyen 37 Akta Perkongsian 1961 tersebut menunjukkan bahawa pihak-pihak yang tidak boleh lagi meneruskan satu perongsian dengan rakan kongsinya boleh membuat permohonan di Mahkamah untuk dipertimbangkan pembubaran perkongsian tersebut. Oleh itu seksyen 37 Akta Perkongsian 1961 telah memperincikan keadaan-keadaan yang boleh dijadikan asas untuk pembubaran perkongsian oleh Mahkamah. [25] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pembubaran ini tidak berkaitan dengan seksyen 37 (a) dan (b) Akta Perkongsian 1961. Ini adalah disebabkan tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan keadaan seperti Defendan-Defendan telah hilang akal atau telah hilang keupayaan kekal bagi melaksanakan kontrak tersebut. [26] Oleh itu dalam kes ini asas yang boleh dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ialah seksyen 37 (c) Akta Perkongsian 1961. Penelitian kepada Penyata Tuntutan Plaintif dapat dilihat bahawa alasan untuk pembubaran tersebut dinyatakan di perenggan (28) hingga (39) iaitu tingkah laku Defendan-Defendan. Ia mencadangkan bahawa asas kepada tindakan Plaintif bagi membubarkan perkongsian tersebut adalah ekoran tingkah laku Defendan-Defendan yang memutuskan bekalan air dari kolam simpanan, pembelian benih tomato baharu oleh Plaintif ekoran daripada tindakan Defendan-Defendan tersebut dan mencari sumber air baharu, hasil tanaman yang musnah akibat pemberhentian sumber air, pembinaan kolam air yang baharu dan tempoh masa tanaman sehingga ia boleh dituai. Keseluruhan perbelanjaan yang terpaksa ditanggung oleh Plaintif adalah sebanyak RM310,000.00. [27] Dalam hal ini mahkamah perlu meneliti apakah kelakuan rakan kongsi yang mewajarkan perkongsian tersebut dibatalkan atau ditamatkan. Dalam hal ini adalah wajar mahkamah meneliti pandangan yang dinyatakan oleh Lord Lindley yang dinyatakan di dalam Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th Edition London Sweet & Maxwell, 1995 oleh R. C. I’ Anson Banks di halaman 724 seperti berikut: “Lord Lindley pointed out that: “ … the Court will never permit a partner, by misconducting himself and rendering it impossible for his partners to act in harmony with him, to obtain a dissolution on the ground of the impossibility so created by himself.” This is still, in theory, the position. However, if injunctive or other relief cannot, for whatever reason, be obtained, the other partners may in practice have no option other than to apply for a dissolution, even though this is precisely what the miscreant partner had intended, the court clearly cannot authorise that partner’s expulsion in the absence of an express power int the agreement.” [28] Penelitian kepada keterangan secara keseluruhan adalah penting dalam menentukan sama ada alasan tersebut adalah wujud atau sebaliknya. Hal ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di United Kingdom dalam kes Golstein v Bishop [2014] 2 WLR 1448 seperti berikut: “11 Nor should the outcome of this appeal be taken as deciding that breaches of the terms of a partnership agreement by partners in their conduct (or misconduct) of the affairs of the firm give rise in every case automatically to simple claims for damages in contract, as if the relationship of partners was purely contractual, and nothing else, like that between the buyer and seller of goods. Partners owe duties to each other, for example the duty of good faith, which are imposed by law by virtue of the nature of the relationship. In other respects, as Lord Millett noted, the relationship is governed by the 1890 Act. The terms of the partnership agreement no doubt set out important parts of the detailed terms of that relationship, just as do the articles of association of a company as between its shareholders. It may be that some forms of breach of partnership duty would better be treated as giving rise to claims for compensation in equity, or a liability to account, rather than simple claims for contractual damages. This touches on what the editors of the current edition of Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 19th ed, para 23- 208 describe as one of the most difficult and unresolved areas of partnership law. 12 Again, none of this has been the subject of any argument on this appeal. Rather, the concession made on Mr Bishop’s behalf to the judge, which I described at the beginning of this judgment, has been repeated and (in terms of causation, extended) in this court. 13 Again, my reservation about this question implies no doubt as to the good sense of Miss Eilledge’s concessions, even though they are criticised in Lindley & Banks, para 23-

If one partner, in breach of his duty to his fellow partner, seeks to squeeze him out or otherwise to conduct himself in a manner which makes it intolerable or impracticable for the other partner to continue to carry on the business with him in partnership, and this causes the innocent partner to dissolve or agree to the dissolution of the firm earlier than would otherwise have occurred, then it is plainly necessary for the law to recognise some means whereby the innocent partner can be compensated for consequential loss. It may in the end be little more than a matter of terminology whether that compensation is described as damages for breach of the partnership agreement (as the parties and, at their invitation, the judge has described it) or, as some would find more appropriate, compensation during a dissolution account for breach of partnership duty. I shall continue to adopt, for convenience but not necessarily by way of agreement, the terminology thus far adopted by the parties and continued during argument in this court. It may be that, since the present claim is ultimately about the loss for a specific period of the benefit of Mr Bishop’s personal guarantee of Mr Golstein’s partnership income, applicable even in the absence of sufficient partnership profits, this is a case peculiarly apt for a contractual rather than partnership duty analysis but, again, it makes no difference to the outcome.” [29] Dalam kes ini menunjukkan bahawa salah laku yang dikatakan dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan ialah Defendan Pertama dikatakan telah menutup air seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam soalan 22, 23 dan 24 penyataan saksi seperti berikut: S22 : Apakah yang berlaku pada bulan Mac 2016? J22 : Pada sekitar 13.03.2016, Defendan Pertama telah memutuskan dan/atau menamatkan belakan air ke ladang perkebunan tersebut dengan menghentikan bekalan air dari kolam simpanan air atas hartanah abang Defendan Pertama yang mengalir ke ladang perkebunan tersebut. S23 : Bagaimana kamu tahu bahawa Defendan Pertama yang bertanggungjawab dalam pemotongan bekalan air tersebut? J23 : Sejak saya bermula perniagaan ini bersama Defendan Pertama, perkara luar biasa seperti ini tidak pernah berlaku. Perkara luar biasa ini berlaku Perjanjian Kedua ditandatangani di mana Defendan Pertama telah berhenti melibatkan diri dalam perniagaan. Tambahan pula, Defendan Pertama mempunyai akses ke kolam simpanan air tersebut yang diletak dalam kawasan ladang kebung abang Defendan Pertama, iaitu bersebelahan dengan ladang kebun saya. S24 : Mengapa kamu tidak pergi berjumpa dengan tuan punya tanah di mana kolam air tersebut dibina? J24 : Saya memang ada berjumpa dengan tuanpunya tanah tersebut, iaitu abang kepada Defendan Pertama. beliau beritahu saya supaya jangan menghebahkan perkara ini walaupun sumber air telah diusik oleh Defendan Pertama kerana kami adalah keluarga. [30] Ekoran daripada tindakan tersebut Plaintif terpaksa mencari sumber air yang lain. Semasa pemeriksaan balas SP1 menafikan bahawa dakwaannya di dalam soalan 22 tentang bekalan air itu adalah tidak benar. Plaintif juga tidak setuju dengan cadangan yang menyatakan bahawa Defendan Pertama tidak ada alasan untuk menutup belakan air tersebut. Semasa dikemukakan soalan kepada Plaintif sama ada ada bukti yang menunjukkan bahawa Defendan Pertama yang menutup air jawapan Plaintif ialah disebabkan paip itu masih tidak dicabut lagi maka ia masih ada di sana lagi. [31] Seterusnya berkenaan dengan isu air ini juga telah dinyatakan secara jelas oleh Plaintif seperti berikut: Di sebelah kebun, tanah yang En Chu dan En Mu beli, ada sebuah sungai. Soalan saya, ada sungai ke tak ada? Setuju. Jadi, kamu boleh ambil air dari sungai dan menggunakan. Tak boleh guna sebab saya tak tahu air sungai itu bersih atau tidak. Saya guna air bawah tanah untuk pastikan dia bersih. Yang Arif, boleh saya rujuk pelan tanah – Ya. Tersebut, En Chu, boleh rujuk Bundle B? Bangkok, yes. Muka surat 142, Yang Arif. 142. Sila lihat muka surat 142. Sebelah tanah PT 2606 ada sebuah sungai ya, yang mengikut pelan ini sungai itu selebar 25 kaki. Dan sungai ini mengalir dari bukit ya, dari atas. Jadi, saya cadangkan kepada kamu, jika benar kebun itu tidak ada air ya, tiba-tiba pada 13/03/2016, sebagai langkah emergency ya, kamu boleh gunakan air dari sungai tersebut. setuju atau tidak? Tak setuju. [32] Berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan serta dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan Mahkamah mendapati tiada keterangan yang dapat menunjukkan bahawa Defendan Pertama terlibat dalam tindakan menutup sumber air bagi kebun tersebut. Apa yang ada adalah anggapan Plaintif bahawa tiada orang lain yang boleh membuat tindakan menutup air tersebut melainkan Defendan Pertama. Dalam hal ini pihak Plaintif berkewajipan untuk membuktikan bahawa Defendan Pertama terlibat dalam tindakan tersebut yang boleh dikategorikan sebagai tindakan yang tidak boleh diterima oleh Plaintif bagi meneruskan perkongsian tersebut. Ini gagal dilakukan oleh pihak Plaintif. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat pembubaran perkongsian oleh Mahkamah di bawah seksyen 37 (c) Akta Perkongsian 1961 tidak dapat dibuktikan oleh pihak Plaintif. [33] Seterusnya Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan alasan di bawah seksyen 37 (d) Akta Perkongsian 1961. Ia berdasarkan kepada dakwaan Plaintif bahawa berlaku kemerosotan di dalam hasil pengeluaran kebun tersebut terutamanya semasa ianya diuruskan oleh pihak Defendan Pertama. Adakah kemerosotan tersebut disebabkan oleh pihak Defendan Pertama? Bagi menjawab persoalan tersebut Mahkamah perlu meneliti keterangan-keterangan berkenaan kemerosotan tersebut. [34] Defendan Pertama mengendalikan operasi di kebun tersebut lebih kurang enam bulan mulai Januari 2015 hingga Jun 2015. Hasil jualan bagi tahun 2015 telah mengalami kemerosotan seperti yang dapat dilihat di halaman 264 Ikatan Dokumen B. Pada muka surat tersebut dapat dilihat penurunan penjualan di antara bulan Januari hingga Disember. Walau bagaimanapun pemerhatian kepada penyataan jualan tersebut mendapati bahawa terdapat peningkatan pada bulan Oktober dan November 2015 walaupun terdapat penurunan pada bulan Mac, April dan Mei. Apa yang jelas daripada penelitian tersebut ialah terdapat turun naik hasil penjualan daripada kebun tersebut semasa pengendalian kebun tersebut oleh Defendan Pertama. Oleh yang demikian adalah tidak tepat untuk menyatakan bahawa kemerosotan tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh tindakan Defendan Pertama semata-mata. Ini adalah disebabkan terdapat turun naik hasil jualan dalam tempoh enam bulan tersebut. Ini ditambah pula dengan keterangan yang menyatakan bahawa dalam tempoh Januari hingga Jun, hasil tanaman di kebun tersebut masih belum matang dan ia menjejaskan hasil pengeluaran kebun tersebut. Seterusnya pada bulan Jun hingga Disember terdapat peningkatan yang konsisten disebabkan hasil sayuran tersebut telah matang. [35] Selain daripada itu Mahkamah juga mendapati terdapat keterangan selepas daripada prestasi kebun tersebut yang tidak memuaskan semasa tempoh Defendan Pertama mengendalikan operasi kebun tersebut, Defendan Pertama dan Plaintif telah menandatangani perjanjian kedua di muka surat 2 Ikatan Dokumen E yang melepaskan Defendan Pertama daripada menjalankan operasi kebun tersebut yang diambil alih oleh Plaintif. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah menunjukkan bahawa kemerosotan hasil kebun tersebut adalah sesuatu yang tidak boleh dijadikan alasan untuk dikatakan Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan tidak boleh meneruskan perkongsian tersebut. Perjanjian kedua tersebut adalah satu cara untuk menyelamatkan kebun tersebut serta memastikan kesinambungan perkongsian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. Oleh itu Mahkamah tidak dapat mempertimbangkan untuk pembubaran perkongsian di bawah seksyen 37 (d) Akta Perkongsian 1961. [36] Seterusnya Mahkamah juga perlu mempertimbangkan dakwaan Plaintif bahawa Defendan Pertama enggan memberikan kerjasama bagi memastikan tanah yang terlibat boleh dijual kepada pihak ketiga. Ia juga berkaitan dengan pembayaran kembali kepada bank bagi menyelesaikan pinjaman yang telah dibuat oleh Plaintif dan Defendan bagi membeli tanah tersebut. Keengganan Defendan Pertama untuk bersetuju dengan penjualan tanah tersebut telah menyebabkan Plaintif telah kehilangan peluang untuk menjual tanah tersebut pada harga yang telah dipesetujui oleh pihak ketiga dalam usaha untuk melunaskan segala pembiayaan yang diberikan oleh bank bagi membeli tanah tersebut sebelum ini. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan tidak menunjukkan bahawa terdapat apa-apa tunggakan bank yang belum dilunaskan oleh syarikat perkongsian Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. Dalam hal ini juga Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan keterangan Plaintif yang menyatakan bahawa bayaran tersebut dibuat oleh pihak Plaintif. Keterangan juga menunjukkan bahawa terdapat beberapa percubaan perjumpaan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan untuk membincangkan isu penjualan tanah tersebut namun tiada tindak balas positif daripada Defendan-Defendan. [37] Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan keterangan bahawa pembayaran kepada pihak bank adalah dibuat atas nama Chu & Mu Enterprise. Ini dapat dilihat di muka surat 30 – 31 seperti berikut: Sebelum itu, saya nak dapat sikit pengesahan di muka surat 22 pliding, ikatan penyata tuntutan. Sejak daripada 01/07/2015 hingga 31/03/2021, yang bayar loan ini adakah Encik seorang ataupun juga dibayar bersama oleh Defendan? E dan F. Soalan Mahkamah ialah, adakah daripada 01/07/2015 hingga 31/03/2021, hanya beliau seorang yang bayar loan apa ini, Agro dan Maybank, Defendan bayar ke tidak bersama-sama? Dibayar menggunakan duit Chu & Mu Enterprise. Bukan dia, Plaintif? Bukan duit bersama. [38] Selain daripada itu Defendan Pertama juga dikatakan telah gagal menandatangani dokumen-dokumen yang berkaitan dengan urusan bank sehingga menyebabkan Plaintif terpaksa melunaskan bayaran kepada pihak bank. Walau bagaimanapun Plaintif mengesahkan bahawa tiada sebarang tunggakan kepada pihak bank. [39] Mahkamah juga telah meneliti dokumen-dokumen gadaian dan pinjaman daripada bank yang mana telah dinyatakan nama Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama yang menunjukkan bahawa kedua-dua pihak mempunyai kepentingan dalam hartanah tersebut dan bertanggungjawab kepada institusi kewangan yang berkaitan. Dalam erti kata lain sebarang urusan berkaitan tanah tersebut haruslah melibatkan Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama. Malahan dalam dokumen Lembaha Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN) juga tertera nama syarikat perkongsian tersebut adalah Chu & Mu Enterprise. Ini semua memberi satu gambaran bahawa Plaintif tidak dapat menjalankan apa-apa aktiviti berkaitan dengan hartanah tersebut atau syarikat itu tanpa penglibatan rakan kongsi iaitu Plaintif dan Defendan Kedua dalam kes ini. Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa keterangan yang ada setakat ini tidak dapat menyokong pembubaran perkongsian ini di bawah seksyen 37 (e) Akta Perkongsian 1961. [40] Mahkamah ini juga perlu mempertimbangkan sama ada terdapat alasan untuk perkongsian ini ditamatkan di bawah seksyen 37 (f) Akta Perkongsian 1961 yang menyatakan bahawa ia boleh ditamatkan sekiranya pada pendapat Mahkamah adalah adil dan berekuiti bahawa perkongsian tersebut perlu ditamatkan. [41] Apa yang menarik dalam kes ini ialah frasa adil dan berekuiti telah diberikan penjelasan yang menarik semasa perbincangan berkenaan dengan peruntukan yang sama di bawah Partnership Act 1980 di United Kingdom di dalam Lindley & Bank on Partnership 18th Edition London, Sweet & Maxwell 2002 di halaman 710 hingga 711 seperti berikut: “ It is inevitable that, in the exercise of its discretion, the court will take into account all relevant factors, including the terms of the partnership agreement and the availability of any alternative remedy thereunder. It could also, in theory, take into the account the partners’ conduct before the formation of the partnership, if this has a bearing on the dissolution issue, e.g as explaining a loss of trust and confidence. It is apprehended that, as was the position prior to the Act, an order is likely to be made if, for whatever reason, the objects for which the partnership was formed can no longer be attained, either at all or in the manner originally contemplated by the partners, and a dissolution cannot be obtained on one of the other grounds. A complete breakdown in the relationship between the partners will, in general, justify a dissolution, as will circumstances in which the applicant partner(s) have lost trust and confidence in the other partners.” [42] Frasa ini telah dijelaskan dalam konteks undang-undang perkongsian dalam kes Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] A.C. 360 di mana Lord Wilberforce menyatakan seperti berikut: “The "just and equitable" provision does not, as the respondents suggest, entitle one party to disregard the obligation he assumes by entering a company, nor the court to dispense him from it. It does, as equity always does, enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of a personal character arising between one individual and another, which may make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in a particular way. It would be impossible, and wholly undesirable, to define the circumstances in which these considerations may arise. Certainly the fact that a company is a small one, or a private company, is not enough. There are very many of these where the association is a purely commercial one, of which it can safely be said that the basis of association is adequately and exhaustively laid down in the articles. The superimposition of equitable considerations requires something more, which typically may include one, or probably more, of the following elements: (i) an association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual confidence - this element will often be found where a pre-existing partnership has been converted into a limited company; (ii) an agreement, or understanding, that all, or some (for there may be "sleeping" members), of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the business; (iii) restriction upon the transfer of the members' interest in the company - so that if confidence is lost, or one member is removed from management, he cannot take out his stake and go elsewhere. It is these, and analogous, factors which may bring into play the just and equitable clause, and they do so directly, through the force of the words themselves. To refer, as so many of the cases do, to "quasi-partnerships" or "in substance partnerships" may be convenient but may also be confusing. It may be convenient because it is the law of partnership which has developed the conceptions of probity, good faith and mutual confidence, and the remedies where these are absent, which become relevant once such factors as I have mentioned are found to exist: the words "just and equitable" sum these up in the law of partnership itself. And in many, but not necessarily all, cases there has been a pre-existing partnership the obligations of which it is reasonable to suppose continue to underlie the new company structure. But the expressions may be confusing if they obscure, or deny, the fact that the parties (possibly former partners) are now co-members in a company, who have accepted, in law, new obligations. A company, however small, however domestic, is a company not a partnership or even a quasi-partnership and it is through the just and equitable clause that obligations, common to partnership relations, may come in.” [43] Persoalan dalam kes ini ialah adakah tindak-tanduk Defendan Pertama seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Plaintif telah dibuktikan dengan sewajarnya. Mahkamah mendapati selain daripada keterangan Plaintif berkenaan dengan sekatan belakan air oleh Defendan Pertama tiada keterangan bebas yang dapat menunjukkan bahawa Defendan Pertama telah terlibat dalam tindakan menutup paip air tersebut. Apa yang lebih jelas ialah apabila tiada alasan yang boleh diberikan untuk Defendan Pertama mengambil tindakan tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan sekiranya berlaku sebarang kerugian atau kemerosotan pendapatan daripada kebun tersebut ia juga akan menjejaskan Defendan Pertama yang merupakan rakan kongsi kepada syarikat tersebut yang mengusahakan kebun tersebut. [44] Seterusnya Defendan-Defendan juga dikatakan enggan untuk memberi maklumbalas terhadap surat niat untuk membeli tanah tersebut atau tanah tersebut dijual kepada pihak ketiga. Ekoran daripada tingkah laku Defendan-Defendan tersebut pihak Plaintif terpaksa melunaskan pinjaman daripada institusi kewangan dan mengalami kerugian daripada kemungkinan tanah itu akan dijual kepada pihak ketiga dengan harga RM3.5 juta. [45] Mahkamah ini berpendapat melainkan terdapat keterangan bebas yang dapat mengesahkan tingkah laku Defendan Pertama untuk menutup air tersebut adalah sukar untuk Mahkamah ini menyatakan bahawa ia adalah suatu tingkah laku yang boleh dijadikan alasan untuk pembubaran perkongsian Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan atas alasan adil dan berekuiti di bawah seksyen 37 (f) Akta Perkongsian 1961. [46] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah merujuk kepada keputusan Majlis Privy dalam kes Ng Eng Hiam v Ng Kee Wei & Ors [1965] 1 MLJ 238 bagi melihat bagaimana suatu keadaan yang boleh dikatakan adil dan berekuiti untuk sesuatu perkongsian itu ditamatkan oleh Mahkamah. Dalam kes tersebut ia melibatkan penggulungan syarikat. Apa yang jelas ialah alasan ianya suatu yang adil dan berekuiti adalah timbul sekiranya terdapat kebuntuan (deadlock) dan hilangnya kepercayaan sesama rakan kongsi dalam suatu syarikat sehingga menyebabkan ia tiada pilihan lain melainkan perlu ditamatkan perkongsian atau digulungkan syarikat tersebut. “Their Lordships do not propose to review these authorities in detail. The question whether such a deadlock exists as makes it just and equitable to wind the company up is a question predominantly of fact in each case. The principle is clear that if the court is satisfied that complete deadlock exists in the management of a company the jurisdiction will be exercised. See Buckley on Companies 13th Edition page 456. It may be that the jurisdiction will be more readily exercised where (as is alleged to be the case here) although the business is carried on by means of a private limited company, the case is one not unlike a partnership. In the present case the courts below have held that such a dead lock as would make it just and equitable to wind the company up does not exist. Ong J. said: "I could not, and still cannot believe, that businessman of the calibre and standing of the petitioner (i.e. the appellant) and Ng Chin Sin cannot, if they have to, be large-hearted enough to treat a mutual misunderstanding as if there had never been one." Hill J.A. said: "I do not consider that a stage of such continued quarrelling and animosity has yet been reached between the petitioner and the second respondent" (i.e. such precludes all reasonable hope of reconciliation and friendly co-operation) "and there seems to be reasonable hope of reconciliation and co-operation if ordinary good sense is employed": and Barakbah J.A. concluded: "this is a family concern and I feel it would not be impossible for them to resolve their differences and carry on with the spirit of cooperation that had existed from 1952 to 1957". Their Lordships cannot override these views, even if they felt disposed to do so, which they do not. In addition the fact is that between the year 1957 when the trouble began, up to at least the year 1962 when the matter came before the Court of Appeal, the business had been carried on smoothly and successfully. Further, although in this particular case this consideration is not crucial, Ong J. and Thomson C.J. clearly took the view that the blame for the difficulties which have arisen rested largely with the appellant himself, and both courts considered that in all the circumstances it would be unfair to the shareholders to wind the company up. In the exercise of their discretion both courts therefore declined to make the order.” [47] Bagi memahami kes ini wajar diteliti keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ng Eng Hiam v Ng Kee Wei & Ors [1963] 1 MLJ 73 seperti berikut: “The events which the petitioner claimed then to be leading to a deadlock would appear to have been certainly due in part to a lack of congeniality, but I can find no justification for a lack of trust. Congeniality is probably essential between partners who, say, are solicitous, but as between directors of a rubber estate it seems no more than desirable. However, the petitioner's dissatisfaction arose, in addition to the two main causes stated above, from matters which, when regarded singly, appear to me to be inconsequential and which when considered in toto appear to have been reasonably explained by the first respondent. In the main the petitioner's further grounds were that meetings had not been held, that he had not been furnished with accounts and estimates, that the respective families have not been on speaking terms since early 1958, that sales of rubber had been effected by the manager without his knowledge and that the books of the company had been moved from No. 19 Ampang Road, which is the registered office of the company, to No. 21 Ampang Road where he could not inspect them because of the ill-feeling and the fact that the front door of No. 21 was kept closed. It appears that Nos. 19 and 21 are adjoining premises and comprise the residence of Ng Chin Siu and his family. It is not unusual for front doors to be kept closed in Kuala Lumpur and the petitioner does not claim that he was ever refused admission. To these grounds the first respondent has replied that meetings were held by way of circular, that the petitioner was in fact furnished with all accounts and estimates, that some members of the two families are on speaking terms, that as manager it is his duty to conduct the affairs of the company and though it is not denied that the books are kept in No. 21 it is claimed that they have always been available to the petitioner for inspection and that no discourtesy has ever been offered him.” [48] Hakim Hill JA membuat kesimpulan seperti berikut: “I have come to the conclusion therefore that this is not an instance where a winding up order would be just and equitable and that Ong J. properly exercised his discretion in refusing to make such an order.” [49] Ketika di Mahkamah Tingi dalam kes tersebut melalui kes Semantan Estate (1952) LTD, RE [1962] 1 MLJ 285 Hakim Ong telah membuat dapatan berkenaan dengan permohonan untuk pembubaran atas dasar adil dan berekuiti setelah meneliti affidavit Pemohon seperti berikut: “After careful consideration of the affidavits on both sides, I find that all the subsequent complaints by the petitioner flowed from nothing more substantial than pique which he felt over the events of 1957. There were no grounds which could justify what was tantamount to an ultimatum, vide the last paragraph in the letter of April 12, 1958, exhibited to the petitioner's affidavit of December 5, 1961 and marked “NEH-1”. The reply by the Secretaries, “NEH-2”, clarifies the position as seen by a neutral party. Certainly, there were no grounds for “absence of trust”. Absence of congeniality could have been, and still can be, overcome. The petitioner had been more unreasonable than cooperative, and any deadlock so-called was one created entirely by himself. I could not, and still cannot believe, that businessmen of the calibre and standing of the petitioner and Ng Chin Siu cannot, if they have to, be large-hearted enough to treat a mutual misunderstanding as if there had never been one.” [50] Hakim Ong juga turut menambah berkenaan dengan istilah ekuiti dan adil itu dalam konteks perkongsian seperti berikut: “Even regarding this private company as a partnership, I had in mind as particularly appropriate what was said in Lindley on Partnership (11th Ed.) at p. 692: “It must be borne in mind that the Court will never permit a partner by … rendering it impossible for his partners to act in harmony with him, to obtain a dissolution on the ground of the impossibility so created by himself.” [51] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat pertikaian di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan ini bukanlah menemui jalan buntu (deadlock). Ia juga tidak menunjukkan telah hilang kepercayaan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. Sebaliknya Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan mempunyai hubungan kekeluargaan sehingga menyebabkan mereka bersetuju untuk menubuhkan suatu perkongsian. Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa tanah yang berkaitan dibeli hasil daripada sumbangan kedua-dua pihak rakan kongsi tersebut. Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan pernah mengusahakan tanah tersebut yang menghasilkan pulangan kepada syarikat perkongsian tersebut. Apa yang berlaku ialah terdapat kemerosotan hasil jualan dan salah faham di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan yang pada hemat Mahkamah boleh diselesaikan tanpa perlu untuk perkongsian tersebut ditamatkan oleh Mahkamah ini. [52] Seterusnya berkenaan dengan kerugian yang dialami oleh pihak Plaintif disebabkan kemerosotan hasil tanaman. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia adalah merupakan perkara kebiasaan yang perlu ditanggung risiko oleh Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan sebagai rakan kongsi. Ia bersesuaian dengan konsep prinsip undang-undang perkongsian bahawa rakan kongsi akan sama-sama menanggung susah dan senang dalam mengharungi perniagaan perkongsian tersebut. Ia tidak boleh dijadikan alasan untuk menyatakan tindakan Defendan-Defendan yang menyebabkan kerugian tersebut. Isu (c) [53] Dalam kes ini Defendan-Defendan melalui penyata tuntutannya menuntut seperti yang telah dinyatakan di perenggan 3 di atas. Asas kepada permohonan pembubaran perkongsian telah diteliti dan Mahkamah berpendapat tidak dapat ditunjukkan oleh Defendan-Defendan ianya boleh dilakukan di bawah seksyen 37 (c), (d), (e) dan

Akta Perkongsian 1961. [54] Mahkamah juga berpendapat sebagai rakan kongsi kepada perkongsian ini Defendan-Defendan tidak wajar secara mudah meletakkan segala liabiliti dan tanggungjawab statutori berkenaan syarikat perkongsian ini kepada Plaintif. Sebaliknya Defendan-Defendan adalah bertanggungan bersama-sama semasa susah dan senang dalam menjalankan perniagaan syarikat perkongsian tersebut melainkan dapat dibuktikan bahawa Defendan-Defendan boleh dan dibenarkan untuk melupuskan tanggungjawab tersebut di sisi undang-undang. Dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat Defendan-Defendan tidak dapat menunjukkannya. Oleh itu tuntutan balas Defendan-Defendan adalah ditolak. Perintah Akhir [55] Setelah meneliti keterangan saksi-saksi, eksibit-eksibit dan hujahan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif ditolak dengan kos RM10,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokator. Tuntutan balas Defendan-Defendan ditolak dengan kos RM10,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokator. Bertarikh: 03 hb. Oktober 2023 (ROSLAN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Plaintif Christopher Yeo dan Oon Wei Chi Tetuan Marie & Oon Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan Bagi Pihak Defendan-Defendan Prakash dan Lim Yee Chuan Yeeu Ren Tetuan The Chambers of Lim Yeeu Ren Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan