Chui Sau Kueen v Ching Koon Kah @ Chin Kon Kah (BA-24NCvC-2467-10/2025)

This judgment concerns an Intervener application in Enclosure 11, that raises a dispute over the custodian of an elderly man’s estate under the Mental Health Act 2001. The Intervener, Charlotte Louise Grandesso @ Charlotte Louise Chin Boon Ming, the Defendant’s only biological child, seeks to displace or share the authority vested in the Plaintiff, Chui Sau Kueen, who was appointed sole committee by order of this Court dated 19 November 2025. Charlotte intends to set aside that order and to be installed either as co-committee with the Plaintiff or in the alternative, as sole committee in substitution.

The Defendant, Ching Koon Kah, a 79-year-old man afflicted by repeated strokes, advanced vascular dementia and Parkinson’s disease, has been rendered completely incapable of managing his own life or assets. With his profound mental incapacity conceded by all parties, the dispute shifts from medical diagnosis to legal administration. The sole, fundamental issue before this Court is the proper constitution of the committee to be entrusted with his welfare and the preservation of his estate.

The Defendant, Ching Koon Kah @ Chin Kon Kah, is 79 years of age and between June 2023 and August 2024 he suffered a series of strokes which, together with a diagnosis of progressive vascular dementia and Parkinson's disease, have left him severely cognitively impaired and wholly incapable of managing his affairs. The medical evidence of his incapacity is unchallenged and no party to this action disputes that the Defendant requires the Court's protective jurisdiction.

While the full extent of the Defendant’s wealth has not been fully disclosed in these proceedings, the evidence points to a substantial estate comprising significant liquidated assets and valuable properties. Although the precise scope of this fortune remains uncertain, it’s management, control and arrangement is the central issue in this dispute.

The Plaintiff, is the Defendant’s second wife and their marriage was solemnised on 19 May 2010. Since the onset of the Defendant’s medical decline in mid-2023, she has resided with him at the matrimonial home and assumed the role of primary caregiver. The evidence shows that she has organised a team of caregivers and has been consistently present to attend to his daily needs. I find and accept, that the Plaintiff has provided practical and constant care to the Defendant presently.

However, evidence also discloses that the relationship between the Plaintiff and Charlotte has been strained, marked at times by hostility and animosity. The Defendant’s first wife, passed away when Charlotte was 18 years old and the Defendant’s subsequent relationship and marriage to the Plaintiff has been a continuing source of family tension. Charlotte’s relationship with the Defendant

Charlotte is the Defendant's only biological child, born and raised in the United Kingdom, where the Defendant himself studied as a young man, met Charlotte's mother and built his early family life. Even after the Defendant returned to Malaysia when Charlotte was approximately 14 years of age, he made regular visits to the United Kingdom to maintain his relationship with Charlotte and her mother.

Following her mother's passing when Charlotte was 18, Charlotte remained in the United Kingdom where she built her life and career. The Defendant continued to visit her and to maintain a close paternal bond. When the Defendant's health began to deteriorate in 2023, Charlotte sought information about his condition and welfare from both the Plaintiff and from Jasmindar Kaur A/P Sarban Singh, a long-standing family friend and the Defendant's former business associate of 25 years.

Charlotte obtained a copy of the Defendant's Last Will and Testament dated 29 January 2024, at which point she became aware that she is named as its sole beneficiary, with the Plaintiff and Jasmin named as co-executors. Subsequently, Charlotte filed an Intervener application in enclosure 11, approximately eleven weeks after the MHA Order was sealed by this court. MHA Order of 19 November 2025

Plaintiff commenced proceedings by Originating Summons seeking a declaration that the Defendant was mentally incapacitated and her appointment as sole committee of his person and estate. The application was supported by her Affidavit in and on 19 November 2025 and this Court granted the MHA Order (Enclosure 10). By that order, the Court declared the Defendant mentally disordered and incapable of managing his personal estate and appointed the Plaintiff as sole committee under Section 58 of the Mental Health Act 2001. Consequently, the order, conferred upon her, the full authority to manage and administer all assets of the Defendant, including powers to sell, lease, mortgage, transfer or otherwise dispose of property, operate bank accounts, sign cheques or effect transfers and execute all necessary documents.

It is significant to note that at no stage during the Originating Summons proceedings did the Plaintiff disclose the existence of Charlotte. As a matter of fact, Charlotte falls squarely within the definition of “relative” under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001 and that omission is material to the Court’s consideration of the Plaintiff’s conduct and the validity of the earlier order granted by this court. Events Following the MHA Order

The evidence discloses a sustained course of obstruction by the Plaintiff. On 24 November 2025, Charlotte and Jasmin sought transparency over the Defendant’s financial affairs, but were refused access, resulting in confrontation and a police report. On 8 December 2025, they returned with Balbeer Singh and police officers, yet another altercation followed. In January 2026, the Defendant was hospitalised with pneumonia for two weeks, but Charlotte was only informed after his discharge on 29 January 2026, the Plaintiff contending that no court order required notification. Further, the Plaintiff consistently withheld bank statements, medical records, and financial information despite concerns of estate dissipation. Collectively, these events reveal a pattern of obstruction, concealment, and disregard for both the Defendant’s welfare and Charlotte’s legitimate interest in his affairs. The Financial Concerns

The evidence, particularly the recorded admissions deposed in Enclosure 45, establishes that approximately RM7,000,000 was transferred from the Defendant’s Alliance Bank account into a unit trust registered in the Plaintiff’s name, with her two biological sons as nominees, thereby locking the funds for 15 years and depriving the Defendant’s estate of access during his lifetime.

In my opinion this demonstrates a financial misconduct and a deliberate abuse of the Defendant’s vulnerability. They highlight a critical conflict of interest and a lack of fiduciary integrity, rendering the Plaintiff unfit to continue as sole committee of the Defendant’s person and estate.

I find the Plaintiff’s explanation that the disputed transactions were voluntary gifts of the Defendant’s wishes, to be legally and factually unsustainable. Her own case throughout these proceedings has been that the Defendant suffers from severe progressive vascular dementia and is incapable of managing his affairs. In such circumstances, reliance on his supposed wishes is wholly inconsistent. The evidence establishes that the Plaintiff exploited the Defendant’s incapacity for personal financial gain, thereby disqualifying her from continuing as sole committee of his person and estate. Issues for Determination

(i) Material Non-Disclosure and Validity of the MHA Order Whether the Plaintiff’s omission of Charlotte, in the meaning of statutory “relative” under Section 2 of the MHA 2001, was a material non-disclosure and if such an omission, challenges the validity of the Sealed Order dated 19 November 2025 appointing the Plaintiff as sole committee.

2001.

(v) Inclusion of Jasmin in Committee Arrangement Whether Jasmindar Kaur A/P Sarban Singh, having no statutory standing under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001 can be recognised in any formal capacity within the committee structure. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The jurisdiction of this Court in the present proceedings is derived from Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001, specifically Sections 51 to 75, which confer authority over the management of the person and estate of individuals adjudged mentally disordered. In addition, the Court’s inherent jurisdiction, preserved by Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012, empowers the Court to act ex debito justitiae to safeguard vulnerable persons and to ensure the integrity of its own processes

I accept that the overriding standard in all proceedings under Part X of the MHA 2001 is the welfare and best interests of the incapacitated person. However, the welfare standard does not operate in a vacuum it must be assessed against the full factual background, including the conduct and character of the person entrusted with the committee's powers and the reliability of that person to discharge those powers faithfully and transparently.

In Tan Sri Dato (Dr) Razali Ismail v Gary Lim Ting Howe [2014] 3 MLJ 874, the Court of Appeal confirmed that anyone with information concerning the mental state of an incapacitated person may seek a remedy in court to challenge the status of the committee and that the Court is empowered to vary or set aside an earlier committee order in appropriate circumstances. Further, in Tan Guek Tian & Anor v Tan Kim Kiat @ Chua Kim Kiat (Part 2) [2007] 6 MLJ 260, the High Court held that because a Mental Health Order obtained ex-parte is provisional in nature, the justice of the case may require variation, alteration, substitution and/or amendment of that order.

The court's committee jurisdiction must be exercised to give effect to the best interests of the incapacitated person. A committee who has admitted in her own recorded words to exploiting an incapacitated person's mental vulnerability to secure personal financial gain for her own family is not a person in whose hands the welfare of that incapacitated person can safely rest, whatever the practical caregiving arrangements she may have in place. ISSUE I - MATERIAL NON-DISCLOSURE AND THE ORDER MUST

In the Mental Health Act applications, the person at the centre of the case cannot defend himself or participate in proceedings because of his incapacity. He is, in effect, voiceless. For that reason, anyone applying to be appointed as committee is treated like an ex parte applicant and must meet a higher duty of honesty. This requires the applicant to disclose all important facts, even those that weaken their case, including the existence of relatives, any competing claims and any matter the Court would reasonably need to know to protect the incapacitated person. The fact that the summons is technically served does not reduce this duty, because in substance the Court is still acting on one-sided evidence. Was the non-disclosure deliberate and material

I conclude that the Plaintiff’s failure to disclose Charlotte’s existence was deliberate and materially significant. The Plaintiff’s explanation that Charlotte’s UK residence and lack of caregiving role rendered her unimportant. In my opinion, such materiality of facts, is for the Court to determine, not for the applicant to suppress. By concealing Charlotte’s existence, the Plaintiff deprived the Court of the opportunity to scrutinise her suitability as sole committee, to consider Charlotte’s legitimate interest and to impose safeguards or a co-committee arrangement. The concealment enabled the Plaintiff to secure sweeping fiduciary powers over the Defendant’s estate without oversight. This deliberate non-disclosure constitutes a serious breach of the duty and frank disclosure which fatally taints the validity of the MHA Order. Such an order obtained in those circumstances must therefore be set aside.

I adopt the principle articulated in Tan Guek Tian & Anor v Tan Kim Kiat @ Chua Kim Kiat (Part 2) [2007] 6 MLJ 260, that a Mental Health Order obtained in the practical absence of countervailing voices is provisional in nature and injustice persists so long as such an order remains unvaried where justice requires alteration. This principle applies squarely to the present case. Because the MHA Order dated 19 November 2025 was procured through material non-disclosure, it cannot stand. While the declaration of incapacity rests on unchallenged medical grounds and remains undisturbed, the appointment of the Plaintiff as sole committee is fatally tainted. Accordingly, the order of appointment is set aside, and the Court must now determine an alternative composition for the committee to properly safeguard the Defendant’s welfare and estate. ISSUE II - THE FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE PLAINTIFF'S

Even if the MHA Order were not to be set aside on the non-disclosure ground, I would find that the evidence of the Plaintiff's financial misconduct and acute conflict of interest constitutes an independent and freestanding ground for the removal or variation of the committee order under the MHA 2001. The RM 7,000,000 Unit Trust

The primary financial dispute in these proceedings’ centers on the transfer of approximately RM7,000,000 from the Defendant’s Alliance Bank account into a unit trust investment. This investment was placed exclusively in the Plaintiff's name, with her two biological sons designated as nominees. The affidavit evidence, particularly within Enclosure 45, reveals a fundamental contradiction in the Plaintiff's case, while she admits to the transaction, she also claims it reflected the Defendant's wishes, a position entirely irreconcilable with her own pleadings that the Defendant is suffering from severe dementia and lacked mental capacity.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s own recorded voice messages severely undermine her position, confirming that the Defendant was "coaxed" and confused, that the trust was created because he could no longer validly alter his Will and that her intent was to "take more." Ultimately, this arrangement yielded no benefit to the Defendant but instead, it severely prejudiced his interests by locking up RM7,000,000 of his liquid assets for 15 years, completely depriving both him and his estate of access to these funds.

The Plaintiff sought to dismiss the allegations as hearsay from her estranged sister, Cindy. The allegations are corroborated by the Plaintiff’s own recorded admissions, authenticated through sworn affidavit evidence in Enclosure 45. Her characterization of hearsay cannot survive the emergence of her own voice making the incriminating statements.

Equally she cannot be held accountable for transactions predating her formal appointment as committee on 19 November

The Defendant was already cognitively impaired and the Plaintiff, as his primary carer and de facto controller of his affairs, owed a duty not to exploit his incapacity. The law does not permit evasion of responsibility for exploiting a vulnerable individual merely because formal committee status had not yet been conferred.

The Plaintiff’s conduct is further compromised by her deliberate suppression of the very documentary evidence that would expose the scale of her financial misconduct. Leveraging her exclusive statutory control over the Defendant’s banking records under the MHA Order, she has systematically blocked all requests for the Alliance Bank statements.

Despite withholding these vital records herself, the Plaintiff asserted in her written submissions that the Applicant had "failed to produce a single bank statement" to support the allegations. This hypocritical submission is deceitful as the Plaintiff cannot fault the Applicant for the absence of documents she actively suppressed. Such conduct is directly contrary to the strict standards of honesty, transparency, and good faith required of a court-appointed fiduciary, demonstrating that the Plaintiff cannot be trusted to discharge her duties with integrity.

Having found that the MHA Order must be set aside and that the Plaintiff's conduct disqualifies her from serving as sole committee without independent oversight, I turn to the question of whether Charlotte should be appointed as co-committee. Standing and Legal Entitlement

Charlotte, as the Defendant’s only biological daughter, falls squarely within the definition of “relative” under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001. Her statutory standing to apply is expressly recognised. Moreover, by order of this Court dated 10 March 2026, she has been granted leave to intervene in these proceedings. Her locus standi is therefore firmly established and beyond challenge. The UK Residency Issue

The Plaintiff contends that Charlotte’s permanent residency in the United Kingdom renders her unsuitable to serve as committee, since the committee of the person must be physically present to discharge welfare duties in real time. I have considered this submission carefully. While it is correct that a committee must be capable of performing her duties effectively, I reject the contention that UK residency is a bar to appointment as co-committee in the circumstances of this case for the following reasons: - a) Firstly, Charlotte’s role as co-committee would be primarily check upon the Plaintiff’s exercise of powers over the estate. The critical functions, ensuring financial transparency, reviewing bank statements, approving major transactions and preventing dissipation, do not require daily physical presence in Malaysia. They require access to information, joint authority over significant financial decisions and recourse to this Court if her authority is disregarded. b) Secondly, Charlotte is the Defendant’s sole biological child, possessing a lifelong relationship that predates the Plaintiff's involvement by decades. Excluding the one person with the deepest filial connection and the most direct interest in preserving the estate does not serve the Defendant's welfare. To safeguard the incapacitated Defendant's physical and financial well-being, his only daughter must not be shut out from oversight. c) Thirdly, I note the High Court’s decision in Liew Ju Min v Choo Wee Poh & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 186, where a person ordinarily domiciled overseas was appointed as co-committee upon demonstrating commitment to be present in Malaysia when required. Charlotte has made a credible commitment to attend in Malaysia for significant medical and financial decisions. Characterisation of Application

The Plaintiff seeks to portray Charlotte’s application as a premature inheritance grab by an estranged daughter, motivated solely by her discovery that she is the sole beneficiary under the Defendant’s Will. I reject that characterisation as unfair and unsupported by the evidence.

The record confirms that Charlotte has maintained a genuine, lifelong relationship with her father despite living in the United Kingdom, a bond underscored by his regular visits to see her and his decision to name her as his sole beneficiary and co-executor in his 29 January 2024 Will. Although her active involvement in these legal proceedings began after discovering the Will in June 2025, her intervention is driven by genuine filial concern rather than financial opportunism.

Upon learning that her father had been declared incapacitated without her knowledge, that the Plaintiff had secured exclusive control over his affairs, that she was being denied access to him, and that millions of ringgit had been moved from his accounts, in my opinion, Charlotte acted as any concerned daughter would when realizing her father was being systematically isolated and financially exploited.

In my opinion, Jasmindar Kaur has no statutory standing under Section 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001, being neither a relative of the Defendant nor entitled to relief under Part X. Her position is further compromised by a direct financial conflict, as she is named co-executor of the Defendant’s Will, thereby aligning her interests with Charlotte’s success. The statutory framework provides no basis for delegating committee functions to her and any such recognition would create an accountability beyond the Court’s supervision. To provide her with formal authority would replicate the very defect this Court is correcting, namely unchecked power vested in a conflicted party. In my view, the co-committee arrangement with Charlotte alone is sufficient to safeguard the Defendant’s welfare and estate without introducing Jasmin into the governance structure. THE WEAPONISATION OF THE MHA ORDER TO ISOLATE THE DEFENDANT Weaponisation of the MHA Order

The Mental Health Act 2001 imposes upon a committee the statutory duty to safeguard the personal care and welfare of the incapacitated person. That duty necessarily encompasses the preservation of family bonds and relationships, insofar as they are consistent with the person’s wellbeing. A committee who systematically severs those bonds and excludes the incapacitated person’s closest biological relative is not discharging thier duty, but weaponising the committee order for personal needs.

Furthermore, based on the evidence before this court, a deliberate pattern of exclusion by the Plaintiff is observed: a) Charlotte’s visits were refused or subjected to onerous preconditions, while Jasmin, a family friend of three decades was reduced to “pleading” and “begging” for access. b) The Plaintiff’s son Andrew, who has no biological connection to the Defendant and is excluded from his Will, was granted de facto control over access to the Defendant’s home and prevented Charlotte from physically touching her father. c) The Plaintiff concealed a two-week hospitalisation for pneumonia from the Defendant’s only biological daughter, justifying her conduct on the basis that “there was no court order requiring notification”. This reasoning betrays a view of the committee appointment as conferring absolute ownership rather than fiduciary responsibility. d) The Plaintiff ceased providing medical records and updates to Charlotte and Jasmin and unilaterally terminated consultations with the Defendant’s neurologist, after only a few sessions, without family consultation.

This pattern of conduct is wholly inconsistent with the welfare duties imposed by the Act. It demonstrates that the Plaintiff has used the MHA Order as an instrument of exclusion and control, serving her own financial and personal interests at the expense of the Defendant’s welfare, dignity and family relationships.

The committee jurisdiction of this Court under Part X of the Mental Health Act 2001 exists for one purpose alone, the protection and welfare of the incapacitated person. That purpose is fundamentally betrayed when the committee appointed to discharge that protective function uses her position to enrich herself and her family, to suppress information concerning the estate and to exclude from the incapacitated person’s life his closest biological relative.

Having secured the MHA Order through material non-disclosure, in my view, the Plaintiff systematically abused her position. She diverted approximately RM7,000,000 of the Defendant’s assets to benefit her own sons, actively concealed this diversion from both the Court and the Defendant’s daughter and isolated the Defendant from his only child. To cover her tracks, she has suppressed the very financial records that would expose the full extent of this asset dissipation.

To fulfill its protective function, this Court requires an independent, authorized, and court-recognized presence capable of monitoring the Defendant’s welfare and the administration of his estate. Such a presence is necessary to check the Plaintiff’s exercise of her powers and to ensure the Court is kept fully informed of significant developments. By appointing Charlotte as co-committee, the Court establishes that essential safeguard.

For all the reasons set out above, I allow Enclosure 11 with the following orders: a) Prayers 2, 3(a)–(f), and 5(c)(i)–(iv) are allowed. However, the inclusion of Jaswinder, Balbir and Satlin is expressly excluded, as their participation is not warranted under the present circumstances. b) Prayer 6(a)(i)–(vi) are allowed, subject to the condition that Charlotte shall be informed at the earliest opportunity and in any event within twenty-four (24) hours. This ensures timely communication and avoids prejudice. c) As for Prayer 6(b), the word “weekly” is to be removed and replaced with “when and if required,” reflecting the Court’s view that flexibility is necessary. d) Prayer 6(b)(i) and 6(b)(v) are disallowed, as their substance is subsumed under Prayer 6(c), which is separately allowed. e) Prayer 6(b)(ii), 6(b)(iii), and 6(b)(iv) are allowed, being consistent with the overall scheme of relief. f) Prayer 6(c) is allowed, as it provides sufficient safeguards and is not inconsistent with the other reliefs granted. g) Paragraphs 8 and 9 are disallowed, as they fall outside the scope of permissible relief and are not justified on the facts. h) Costs of Enclosure 11 shall be paid by the Plaintiff to the Applicant. Date: 13 July 2026 SGD SHOBA DORAI RAJAH JUDICAL COMMISSIONER SHAH ALAM HIGH COURT Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Vincent Lim [MESSRS SL LIM & LUI (KUALA LUMPUR)] Solicitor for the Intervener: Francis Pereira with Kailash Sharma [MESSRS FRANCIS PEREIRA & SHAN (KUALA LUMPUR)]