Chung Soh Eng v Chung Yang Huang (WA-24NCvC-5928-12/2025)

CHUNG YANG HUANG (NRIC No. 610515-10-6284)

CHUNG YIAW HONG (NRIC No. 710908-10-5205)

CHUNG GIT ENG (NRIC No. 570209-10-5204) ... DEFENDANTS

This is my decision on the Plaintiff's Amended Originating Summons dated 11.03.2026 (Encl. 29), filed pursuant to Schedule 10 of the Financial Services Act 2013 ("FSA 2013"), Insurance Act 1996, and Order 80 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC").

The Plaintiff sues in her capacity as a beneficiary of the estate of the late Chung Bon Eng ("the Deceased"), seeking declarations that the proceeds of twelve (12) insurance policies form part of the Deceased's estate and are held on trust by the Defendants.

The Defendants previously filed striking-out applications (Encl. 12 and 16). Those applications have since been dismissed with costs, and the matter now proceeds on the merits of the Amended Originating Summons.

The Court has considered the affidavits filed herein the parties' written submissions and the authorities cited.

The Deceased passed away on 4.4.2023, intestate, leaving behind six siblings, including the Plaintiff and the three Defendants.

On 13 June 2023, a Grant of Letters of Administration ("LA") was issued to the Plaintiff and the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant as co-administrators.

Between October 2023 and March 2024, the Plaintiff discovered that several insurance policies had been paid out to the Defendants, including: O Hong Leong Assurance Policy TL201210434552 ("HLA 4552") paid to D3 Manulife Policy 00011772 - paid to D3 O. AlA Compassionate Allowance Policy G98000881H - paid to D1 O Nine (9) AIA Life Policies - paid to D1, D2, D3 and Chung Yow Fooi

The Plaintiff sought clarification from the insurers. The documentary responses from Hong Leong Assurance (14.05.2024) and AIA Bhd (08.10.2025) confirmed unequivocally that: o No assignment—whether absolute or conditional—was ever submitted for any of the policies. o The nominees were merely named beneficiaries, not assignees.

One nominee, Chung Yow Fooi, voluntarily returned all monies he received to the estate.

The remaining Defendants refused to do so, asserting that the Deceased intended them to benefit personally. The Plaintiff and D1 subsequently fell into dispute over the administration of the estate, resulting in Revocation Suits (Suit 694). The LA was deposited with the Court pursuant to a citation.

Despite the administrative deadlock, the Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled, as a beneficiary, to seek declaratory relief under Order 80 ROC 2012 to protect estate assets. Issues For Determination The following issues arise:

Whether the Plaintiff has locus standi as a beneficiary to bring this action;

(ii) Whether the insurance proceeds form part of the Deceased's estate under Schedule 10 FSA 2013 and Insurance Act 1996;

(iii) Whether the Defendants hold the proceeds on trust for the estate;

(iv) Whether the Court should grant the reliefs sought under Order 80 ROC 2012. Locus Standi Of The Plaintiff

The Defendants argue that only a personal representative may sue to recover estate assets, and that the Plaintiff cannot do so while the LA is suspended pending the Revocation Suits.

The Plaintiff relies on Order 80 ROC 2012, which expressly permits any person with a beneficial interest to seek the Court's determination of questions arising in the administration of an estate.

The statutory scheme under Order 80 of the Rules of Court 2012 together with the principles articulated by the Federal Court in Al Rashidy bin Kassim & Ors v Rosman bin Roslan [2007] 4 MLJ 297, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff falls within the class of persons legally entitled to invoke the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over questions arising in the administration of an estate.

The Federal Court has made clear that beneficiaries are not invariably barred from commencing proceedings; where the factual circumstances demonstrate that estate assets are at risk, or where the personal representatives are unable or unwilling to act, the Court may recognise a beneficiary's standing to seek declaratory or preservatory relief.

In our instant case, the Letters of Administration have been deposited with the Court, the co-administrators are in open conflict, and the Defendants being nominees have already received and utilised the insurance proceeds.

These features collectively reveal a real and immediate risk of loss to the estate unless the Court intervenes. The Plaintiff does not seek to administer the estate or to supplant the personal representatives; she seeks only a determination of the legal status of the insurance monies and their preservation pending proper administration.

Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiff satisfies both the statutory standing under Order 80 and the "special circumstances" threshold under Al Rashidy and therefore possesses the requisite locus standi to maintain this action for the limited but essential purpose of protecting and preserving the assets of the estate.

Having examined the statutory scheme governing nominations under life insurance policies, I am satisfied that the legal position is both clear and decisive. Paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 10 to the Financial Services Act 2013 ("FSA 2013") creates a trust only in favour of a nominee who is the spouse, child, or, in the absence of both, a parent of the policy owner.

The Deceased in this case passed away without spouse, parent or child. All nominees under the twelve policies were siblings. They therefore fall outside the statutory class of persons capable of taking beneficially under Paragraph 5(1).

The legal consequence is prescribed expressly by Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 10 FSA 2013. In such circumstances, the nominee does not take as beneficiary but receives the policy moneys as an executor, and any payment made to the nominee "shall form part of the estate of the deceased policy owner". This is a mandatory statutory direction; it leaves no room for subjective intention, familial expectations, or informal assurances said to have been given by insurance agents. The statute governs, and the statute is unequivocal.

The same legal structure existed under sections 166 and 167 of the Insurance Act 1996 ("IA 1996"), which applied to the older policies. Those provisions are in pari materia with the FSA 2013. The jurisprudence interpreting the IA 1996 therefore remains directly relevant and continues to guide the Court.

The documentary evidence before the Court reinforces this statutory outcome. The letters from Hong Leong Assurance Berhad and AIA Bhd confirm that no assignment, whether absolute or conditional, was ever executed in favour of any of the Defendants.

Assignment is the only mechanism by which a nominee outside the statutory class may take beneficially. In the absence of assignment, the nominee's role is purely administrative: to receive the monies and to hold them for the estate.

The High Court authorities—Re Tan Hui Guan, deceased (Phang Siew Fa v Aw Kim Siok) [2006] 3 MLJ 663, Lee Heng Moy (f) v John Hancock Life Insurance (M) Bhd & Anor [2010] 1 MLJ 624, and Kiranjit Kaur a/p Dr Jagjit Singh (menyaman dalam keupayaan sebagai pentadbir bersama harta pusaka Suresh a/l Thanabalasingam, si mati) v Thamabalasingam @ Thanabalasingam (disaman dalam keupayaan sebagai pentadbir bersama harta pusaka Suresh a/l Thanabalasingam, si mati) [2022] MLJU 829—consistently affirm this interpretation.

These cases reiterate that where the nominee is not a spouse, child or parent, and where no assignment is proven, the policy moneys are held on trust for the estate. The nominee acquires no beneficial entitlement.

Applying these principles to the present facts, I find that all twelve policies whether issued by Hong Leong Assurance, AIA Bhd, or Manulife Insurance Berhad—fall squarely within Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 10 FSA 2013 and section 167 IA 1996.

The nominees, being siblings, cannot take beneficially. The insurers' confirmations eliminate any possibility of assignment. The statutory consequence is therefore unavoidable: the entirety of the policy proceeds forms part of the Deceased's estate.

I therefore hold that all twelve policies constitute estate assets and must be restored to the estate for proper administration.

In light of the statutory scheme under both the Financial Services Act 2013 and the Insurance Act 1996, I am compelled to conclude that the legal effect of the nominations in this case is unequivocal.

Where a nominee does not fall within the narrow class of spouse, child, or parent, the law imposes a trust by operation of statute. The nominee receives the policy moneys not beneficially, but as a trustee for the estate.

This trust arises automatically upon the death of the policy owner; it does not depend on the nominee's knowledge, intention or conduct. The Defendants, having received the proceeds, therefore stand in the position of trustees, with the corresponding fiduciary obligations to account, preserve, and return the monies to the estate.

The Defendants' contention that the Deceased "intended" them to benefit from the policies cannot displace the clear statutory language. Whatever the Deceased may have believed, hoped, or informally expressed, the law is explicit: intention cannot override legislation.

It bears emphasis that the Court's task is not to reconstruct the Deceased's personal wishes, but to apply the law governing insurance nominations. The statutory provisions are mandatory, not permissive. They leave no room for judicial discretion to validate informal intentions or to elevate familial expectations into legal entitlements. To accept the Defendants' argument would be to permit private intention to supplant statutory command, a proposition wholly inconsistent with the rule of law.

The conduct of one of the nominees, Chung Yow Fooi, who voluntarily returned the monies he received, is not determinative but is nonetheless telling. It demonstrates that at least one nominee understood the legal position and acted consistently with the statutory trust. His conduct underscores the correctness of the Plaintiff's position and highlights the inconsistency in the stance taken by the remaining Defendants.

While the Court does not decide matters on the basis of comparative conduct, the voluntary return of funds by one nominee reinforces the conclusion that the monies were never intended to be held beneficially.

For these reasons, I hold that the Defendants, upon receipt of the policy proceeds, did so as trustees for the estate, and continue to hold those monies subject to the duties imposed on trustees.

They are therefore obliged to return the proceeds to the estate and to account fully for their receipt and utilisation. Their continued retention of the monies is inconsistent with their statutory role and constitutes a breach of trust. The Plaintiff is entitled to the declaratory and consequential reliefs sought.

Order 80 of the Rules of Court 2012 confers upon the Court a broad and flexible supervisory jurisdiction over matters arising in the administration of estates. It empowers the Court not merely to answer abstract questions of law, but to intervene substantively where necessary to ensure that an estate is properly constituted, preserved, and ultimately administered in accordance with law.

The rule expressly authorises the Court to determine questions arising in the administration of an estate, to order the payment of monies into Court, to compel the furnishing and verification of accounts, and to direct any act which the Court considers necessary for the due administration of the estate.

These powers are deliberately wide, reflecting the long-standing equitable jurisdiction of the Court to protect trust property and to prevent injustice where the ordinary machinery of administration is impaired or unavailable.

In the present case, the estate is in a state of administrative paralysis. The Letters of Administration have been deposited with the Court pursuant to the citation procedure, and the co-administrators are embroiled in active and adversarial litigation in the Revocation Suits.

As a result, there is no functioning personal representative capable of taking steps to secure or recover estate assets. This paralysis is not temporary or incidental; it is structural, and it is likely to persist until the Revocation Suits and any appeals are resolved.

In the meantime, the insurance proceeds have already been received by the Defendants, who assert personal entitlement to them. Without judicial intervention, there is a real and tangible risk that the monies will be dissipated, utilised, or rendered unrecoverable, thereby causing irreparable loss to the estate.

It is precisely in such circumstances that Order 80 is intended to operate: to fill the vacuum created by the absence of an effective administrator and to ensure that estate assets are not lost while the question of representation is being contested.

The reliefs sought by the Plaintiff are, in my view, appropriate,proportionate, and firmly grounded in the statutory trust imposed by the Financial Services Act 2013 and the Insurance Act 1996. The Plaintiff does not seek to undertake a full administration of the estate, nor does she seek to displace the eventual administrator. She seeks only declaratory relief as to the legal status of the insurance monies, orders for their restoration to the estate, and ancillary orders for accounts and tracing.

These are classic preservatory remedies, designed to safeguard assets pending proper administration. They do not prejudice the Defendants' rights in the Revocation Suits, nor do they pre-empt the Court's eventual determination of who should administer the estate. Rather, they ensure that, when an administrator is ultimately appointed, there remains an estate of proper composition to administer.

In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Court should exercise its powers under Order 80. To decline intervention would be to permit the continued retention and potential dissipation of monies which, as a matter of law, belong to the estate.

It would also undermine the statutory trust imposed by Parliament and frustrate the equitable duty of the Court to protect trust property. The reliefs sought are necessary to prevent injustice, to preserve the integrity of the estate, and to ensure that the eventual administrator whoever that may be receives the estate in a form consistent with law. I therefore hold that the Court should, and does, grant the reliefs sought under Order 80.

This dispute does not spring from commercial rivalry or contractual missteps, but from a family once held together by shared blood and memory, now strained by grief, mistrust, and differing recollections of what the Deceased may have wished.

The Court is mindful that the Deceased was remembered as a gentle anchor in the family an elder sibling whose presence steadied the others. Yet the law governing insurance nominations is not a sail that shifts with the winds of sentiment; it is the keel of the vessel, fixed and steady, guiding the course regardless of emotional tides.

In resolving this conflict, the Court's task is not to weigh the hearts of siblings or to choose between competing narratives, but to ensure that the estate is administered according to law-fairly, transparently, and with the quiet dignity that the Deceased herself would have deserved.

For the reasons above, the Plaintiff's Amended Originating Summons (Encl. 29) is allowed. Accordingly, the Court orders:

Declarations that all proceeds from HLA 4552, the nine AIA Life Policies, the AIA Compassionate Allowance Policy, and the Manulife Policy form part of the Deceased's estate and are held on trust by the respective Defendants;

(ii) Orders that the Defendants pay the said proceeds to the estate within 14 days upon expiry of the 30 days ( filing of the affidavit);

(iii) Orders for accounts and disclosure by way of affidavit within 30 days from the date of the order, to include all relevant amounts, dates, and supporting documents.

(iv) No Order as to interest;

Costs in the cause. Liberty to apply. Date: 13.7.2026 NIXON ANAK KENNEDY KUMBONG Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur PARTIES For the Plaintiff: Solicitor: Nathalie Annette Kee Xuan Li Messrs Messrs. Thomas Philip 5-1, Jalan 22A/70A, Wisma CKL, Desa Sri Hartamas, 50480 Kuala Lumpur. For the First Defendant: Solicitor: Vince Chung & Melissa Chua Messrs Melissa Chua & Partners Unit C06, Level 17, Boutique Office 1 (B01-C) Menara 2, No. 3, Jalan Bangsar KL Eco City 59200 Kuala Lumpur For the Second & Third Defendant: Solicitor: Terrence Lee Messrs Terrence Lee & Co Suite 30-02/03, 30th Floor Menara Keck Seng 203 Jalan Bukit Bintang Bukit Bintang 55100 Kuala Lumpur