Systematic Evasion and Abuse of Court Process The Appellant's conduct demonstrated a calculated strategy to evade the consequences of his actions. This Court’s records showed an avoidance of court appearances. Since the commencement of these contempt proceedings, the Appellant had systematically avoided attending court, depriving this Court of the opportunity to address his conduct directly. His absence appeared calculated to delay and frustrate the contempt proceedings while he continues filing vexatious applications elsewhere. There was apparent manipulation of court resources. By filing multiple frivolous applications across different courts while avoiding the consequences of his contempt, the Appellant was systematically abusing and manipulating court resources. His conduct clogs the court system with meritless applications, thereby prejudicing genuine litigants who require timely access to justice. His evasion demonstrates not merely disrespect for this particular order but contempt for the entire judicial process and the principle that all persons are subject to the rule of law. When viewed cumulatively, these aggravating factors revealed conduct that strikes at the very foundation of the judicial system. The Appellant's behaviour demonstrated a systematic campaign to undermine judicial authority, a calculated attempt to render court orders meaningless, a pattern of escalating defiance that threatens the rule of law itself, and a complete disregard for the rights of other court users and the efficient administration of justice Public interest demands that such conduct be met with firm sanctions that vindicate the authority of the courts and deter similar behaviour by others who might be tempted to follow the Defendant's example. Service and Procedural Compliance [7] The cause papers relating to this committal application were properly served on the Appellant via substituted service by leaving copies at his last known addresses on 27.3.2025 and by advertisement in the New Straits Times on 28.3.2025. This Court had since the service called this matter twice (on 4.3.2025 and 10.4.2025) prior to the hearing of Enclosure 53 on 29.4.2025. [8] The Appellant had acknowledged receipt of the court papers, as evidenced by his letter to the Court of Appeal dated 2.4.2025, in which he enclosed copies of the cause papers. The Appellant had failed to file any affidavit in response to the Respondent's affidavits, thereby admitting to all averments put forward by the Respondent. The Law on Contempt [9] The power to punish contempt is an inherent jurisdiction of the court. As stated by the Federal Court in Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v Lim Pang Cheong @ George Lim & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 458: "[20] In dealing with the applications to set aside the leave for committal proceedings, it is necessary for us to consider the law of contempt. A good starting point would be the definition of contempt of court itself. Oswald's Contempt of Court (3rd Ed), at p6 gives a general definition of contempt of court as follows: To speak generally, contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigants, or their witnesses during the litigation. [21] The jurisprudence for arming the court with the power to punish a contempt is best expounded by Brown J In re He Kingdon v SC Goho [1948] MLJ 17 as follows: But the root principle on which this inherent power to punish for contempt is founded, and the purpose for which it must be exercised, is not to vindicate the dignity of the individual judge or other judicial officer of a court or even of the court itself, but to prevent an undue interference with the administration of justice in the public interest. [22] Hence, the power to punish a contempt is not derived merely from statute nor truly from common law but instead flows from the very concept of a court of law (see Borrie & Lowe's The Law of Contempt (3rd Ed), at p 465; and Master Jacob (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23)." [10] The Federal Court went on to rule in the same case that a breach of a court order constitutes contempt: "[26] Contempt has been reclassified either as (1) a specific conduct of contempt for breach of a particular court order; or (2) a more general conduct for interfering with the due administration or the course of justice. This classification is better explained in the words of Sir Donaldson MR in Attorney-General v Newspaper Publishing Plc at p 362: Of greater assistance is the reclassification as (a) conduct which involves a breach, or assisting in the breach, of a court order; and (b) any other conduct which involves an interference with the due administration of justice, either in a particular case or, more generally, as a continuing process, the first category being a special form of the latter, such inference being a characteristic common to all contempts per Lord Diplock in Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440 at p 449." [11] The Appellant's conduct clearly falls within the first category - repeated specific breaches of the Vexatious Litigant Order. [12] It is well established that court orders must be obeyed until set aside or varied. In Ann Joo Steel Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor and another appeal [2020] 1 MLJ 689, the Federal Court held: "[59] It cannot be opened to any person to decide upon himself whether an order of a court which binds him is wrongly issued and does not require his obedience. Until such time it is set aside or varied the order of court is entitled to the obedience and respect from all parties. Any person who fails to obey an order of court runs the risk of being held in contempt with all its attendant consequences (see Wee Choo Keong v MBF Holdings Bhd & Anor and another appeal [1993] 2 MLJ 217)." [13] The standard of proof for contempt proceedings in Malaysia is beyond reasonable doubt, not the balance of probabilities. Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature given that they can result in imprisonment. [14] As to the evidential burden and standard of proof, the case of Ng Hee Thoong v Public Bank Berhad [1995] 1 CLJ 609 established that where a defendant fails to provide any form of response on oath to contempt allegations, this constitutes an admission to all averments put forward by the plaintiff. Proceedings in Absentia [15] The Appellant has been absent from these proceedings despite proper service. This Court had the discretion to proceed with committal proceedings in the absence of the contemnor, as established in Attorney General of Malaysia v Dato' See Teow Chuan & Ors [2018] 2 MLJ 311, where the Federal Court held: "[20] The issue before us is whether this court has the power to proceed with the trial of the contempt proceedings and to impose sentence against both the contemnors (Ah Eng and Doris) who, as affirmed in their affidavits and through their counsel in open court, had offered their unreserved, unconditional and unqualified apology and had waived their right to be present in court and were prepared to be sentenced in absentia. [21] We are reminded that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Thus, generally the court should avoid making a committal order without giving the contemnor a chance to be present in court to answer the charge against her and to raise any plea of mitigation before passing sentence on her. The House of Lords in Phonographic Performance Ltd v Inch [2002] All ER (D) 253 (May) expressed the view that in criminal cases, where the defendant is absent, and the court has the discretion to proceed with the trial, but it is a discretion to be exercised with great caution and with close regard to the overall fairness of the proceedings. The trial conducted in the absence of the contemnor must be fair as circumstances permit and lead to a just outcome (see also Regina v Jones (Anthony) [2003] 1 AC 1). [22] By analogy, the above position can and should apply for contempt proceedings, as in the present case before us. The court can exercise its discretion to proceed with the contempt proceedings against both the contemnors in the present case in their absence especially when their own counsel had informed the court about their request that their presence in court be dispensed with and that he has full instruction to proceed with the matter as requested." [16] The Federal Court further held that relevant considerations include: "[25] In Re Ellison (A Bankrupt); Hicken (as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Ellison) v Ellison [2016] EWHC 2791 (Ch), Warren J proceeded with the contempt proceedings against an alleged contemnor who was out of the country and was not present in court for the trial. In that case, the learned judge considered the following considerations, namely: