Lampiran
Lampiran 15 kemudian difailkan oleh PYD pada 07.02.2025 dan Mahkamah ini pada 12.02.2025 telah memberikan satu perintah ad-interim menangguhkan sementara tarikh lelongan awam sementara Lampiran 15 dilupuskan. Posisi PYD 14. Berdasarkan kertas-kertas dan afidavit-afidavit yang berkaitan dengan Lampiran 15, alasan-alasan PYD untuk mencelah adalah seperti berikut. 15. Pertama sekali, PYD mendakwa pihaknya mempunyai kepentingan benefisial terhadap hakmilik hartanah tersebut yang mereka dakwa telah dipindahkan secara frod daripada PYD kepada D. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA 16. Pindahan secara fraud tersebut merupakan kausa tindakan PYD terhadap D dalam kes 84 yang difailkan oleh PYD di Mahkamah Tinggi Muar bagi tujuan mendapatkan kembali hakmilik hartanah tersebut daripada terhadap D. 17. Walaupun kes 84 tersebut kemudiannya telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Muar, namun keputusan Mahkamah Tunggi Muar tersebut kini sedang dirayu oleh PYD di Mahkamah Rayuan. 18. Berikutan rayuan PYD yang masih berlangsung di Mahkamah Rayuan inilah PYD menyatakan bahawa pihaknya mempunyai kepentingan untuk mencelah dalam Saman Pemula dan Prosiding Pelaksanaan tersebut dan PYD selanjutnya memohon supaya kedua-dua Saman Pemula dan Prosiding Pelaksanaan tersebut digantung sehingga rayuan PYD dalam kes 84 selesai dilupuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. 19. Akhir sekali, PYD mendakwa sekiranya hartanah tersebut dijual tetapi PYD berjaya dalam rayuan mereka di Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes 84, maka rayuan mereka tersebut akan menjadi sia-sia sahaja dan mereka akan mengalami kerugian yang tidak dapat dipampas. Posisi P 20. Sementara itu, P membantah Lampiran 15. Alasan-alasan P pula dapat disimpulkan seperti berikut. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA 21. Pertama sekali, P mendakwa bahwa Lampiran 15 bukan sahaja satu salah guna proses Mahkamah tetapi mempunyai kesan melengahkan prosiding perlaksanaan sehingga menjejaskan hak P sebagai pemegang gadaian. 22. Kedua, tiada sekatan undang-undang ke atas hartanah tersebut yang menghalang pendaftaran gadaian tersebut didaftarkan sebelum ini yang memihak kepada P sebagai penerima gadaian. 23. Selanjutnya, hak P selaku pemegang gadaian berdaftar tidak boleh disangkal di sisi KTN serta P mempunyai hak statutori untuk memulakan Saman Pemula tersebut yang merupakan tindakan halang tebus ke atas hartanah tersebut yang telah digadaikan kepada P. 24. Selain itu, P turut mendakwa kepentingannya sebagai penerima gadaian hartanah tersebut adalah ‘indefeasible’ kerana pihaknya telah mengambil langkah munasabah dan berhati-hati dalam proses memberikan pinjaman tersebut dan mendaftarkan gadaian tersebut. 25. Akhir sekali, P tertakluk kepada had masa untuk memulakan tindakan halang tebus dan melaksanakan perintah jualan terhadap Defendan. Keputusan S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA 26. Pertama sekali, Mahkamah dalam kes ini telah menjadi Functus Officio apabila perintah jualan telah diberikan pada 24.09.2024 yang lalu. 27. Adalah juga fakta yang tidak dinafikan bahawa perintah jualan tersebut bukan sahaja telah direkodkan tetapi telah disempurnakan dengan lengkap (“perfected”). 28. Dalam erti kata lain, prosiding Saman Pemula tersebut telah selesai. 29. Oleh yang demikian, tidak ada apa-apa lagi prosiding yang wujud bagi membolehkan PYD mencelah pada peringkat ini. Lebih-lebih lagi Lampiran 15 ini hanya difailkan lebih kurang lima (5) bulan selepas tarikh perintah jual diumumkan iaitu pada 24.09.2024. 30. S\elanjutnya, Aturan 42 Kaedah 13 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (“KKM 2012”) juga tidak menyokong kedudukan PYD kerana PYD bukanlah pihak-pihak asal dalam Saman Pemula tersebut. Apa-apa permohonan mencelah adalah sepatutnya dibuat di bawah Aturan 15 Kaedah 6 KKM 2012 ketika prosiding Saman Pemula tersebut masih lagi berlangsung di hadapan Mahkamah ini. 31. Dalam erti kata lain, Lampiran 15 sepatutnya difailkan oleh PYD sebelum perintah jualan diberikan oleh Mahkamah ini pada 24.09.2024 yang lalu. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA 32. Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai keperluan permohonan pencelah difailkan sebelum daripada sesuatu perintah diumum dan dimuktamadkan dalam sesuatu kausa adalah jelas sebagai mana keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Staghorn Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2008] 2 CLJ 121 memutuskan bahawa:- “[43] Considering all these authorities, my conclusion is that an application to intervene under O. 15 r. 6(2) of the RHC 1980 must be before judgment. To set aside an order or judgment, there must be a provision in the Rules that can be relied on for the purpose. This is provided for in O. 42 r. 13 of the RHC 1980: 13. Setting aside or varying judgments and orders (O. 42 r. 13 ) Where in these Rules provisions are made for the setting aside or varying of any order or judgment, a party intending to set aside or to vary such order or judgment must make his application to the Court and serve it on the party who has obtained the order or judgment within thirty days after the receipt of the order or judgment by him. [44] Examples of such provisions are O. 13 r. 8, O. 14 r. 11, O. 70 r. 18(6) and 20(9) and O. 81 r. 7 of the RHC 1980. In other cases, setting aside may only be done by a fresh action - see Hock Hua Bank Bhd. v. Sahari bin Murid [1980] 1 LNS 92. [45] Let us now look at cases involving challenges to an order for sale by a person not already a party to the proceedings leading to the order for sale being made who intervenes in order to set aside the order for sale. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA [46] Before going any further, it must be remembered that where a non-party tries to intervene in the proceedings, he must necessarily do so under O. 15 r. 6 of the RHC 1980. There is no other provision under the National Land Code ("NLC") or any other law or rule for him to rely on. So, like interveners in other civil proceedings, he too must comply with the provisions of O. 15 r. 6 of the RHC 1980. …….. 57] What conclusions can be drawn from the provisions of O. 15 r. 6 of the RHC 1980 and the cases discussed above? I think, they are as follows: [58] First, an application to set aside an order for sale by an existing party to the proceeding may be made before the final order is perfected, otherwise the judge is functus officio. [59 ] Secondly, an application for leave to intervene in order to set aside an order for sale by a party not already a party to the proceedings must be made under O. 15 r. of the RHC 1980. The application may be made "at any stage of the proceedings" meaning before judgment, otherwise the proceedings have concluded and there is no longer a proceeding in existence for the party to intervene in. The judge has also become functus officio. Even then, the application must be made promptly. Order 15 r. 6 of the RHC 1980 applies to all civil proceedings whether commenced by a writ, motion or summons etc. [60] Thirdly, an application for leave to intervene is supported by an affidavit. In other words, in such an S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA application, the judge merely decides on affidavit evidence, whether or not leave should be granted. At that stage, the judge should not make a definite finding of facts which, as envisaged by O. 15 r. 6 of the RHC 1980, will and can only be made after all evidence has been adduced in the trial which will follow subsequently. [61] Fourthly, any party, whether a party in the original proceeding or not, who wants to challenge the order for sale, or for that matter, any judgment, other than a default judgment or where it is specifically provided for in the rules, may only do so by filing a fresh action. [62] Fifthly, while the principles laid down in Pegang Mining as to exercise of discretion are applicable, all the requirements of O. 15 r. 6(2) must be satisfied.” 33. Selanjutnya, jika pun Mahkamah ini masih boleh mendengar Lampiran 15 dan tidak functus officio, persoalan yang timbul adalah samada PYD patut dibenarkan untuk mencelah seperti mana dipohon dalam Lampiran 15. 34. Aturan 15 Kaedah 6 (2) KKM 2012 memperuntukkan sepeti berikut:- (2) Subject to this rule, at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter, the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application- (a) order any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party; S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA (b) order any of the following persons to be added as a party, namely- (i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon; or (ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which, in the opinion of the Court, would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter. 35. Dalam kes Pegang Mining Company Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52, Majlis Privi memutuskan seperti berikut:- The cases illustrate the great variety of circumstances in which it may be sought to join an additional party to an existing action. In their Lordships' view one of the principal objects of the rule is to enable the Court to prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment by proceeding to adjudicate upon the matter in dispute in the action without his being given an opportunity of being heard. To achieve this object calls for a flexibility of approach which makes it undesirable in the present case, in which the facts are unique, to attempt to lay down any general proposition which could be applicable to all cases. It has been sometimes said as in Moser v. Marsden [1892] 1 Ch 487 and Re LG Farbenindustrie AG [1944] Ch 41 that a party S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA may be added if his legal interests will be affected by the judgment in the action but not if his commercial interests only would be affected. While their Lordships agree that the mere fact that a person is likely to be better off financially if a case is decided one way rather than another is not a sufficient ground to entitle him to be added as a party, they do not find the dichotomy between "legal" and "commercial" interests helpful. A better way of expressing the test is: will his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action? 36. Maka, berdasarkan fakta dan latarbelakang kes Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa PYD tidak mempunyai kepentingan terus (direct interest) terhadap hartanah tersebut memandangkan instrumen gadaian yang sempurna didaftarkan atas kepentingan P tidak pernah dicabar sebelum ini oleh PYD. 37. PYD hanyalah pemilik terdahulu hartanah tersebut serta tiada kepentingan dan/atau hak ke atas hartanah tersebut pada masa yang matan iaitu ketika perjanjian pinjaman tersebut dimasuki antara LKG dan P serta semasa gadaian tersebut didaftarkan atas nama P oleh D. Maka, hak dan/ ataupun liabiliti PYD tidak sepatutnya lagi berbangkit dalam hal ini. Rujukan mengenai perkaitan langsung atau tidak langsung ini juga boleh dibuat dalam kes Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad v Dr Jamaluddin Dato’ Mohd Jarjis [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 19, di mana Mahkamah Agung (ketika itu) telah memutuskan seperti berikut:- S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA “One of the class of cases covered by the said rule, which allows intervention by persons not parties, is where the proprietary or pecuniary rights of the intervener are directly affected by the proceedings or where the intervener may be rendered liable to satisfy any judgment either directly or indirectly. The ambit of this class has been materially widened by the decision of the U.K. Court of Appeal in Gurtner v. Circuit [1968] 1 All ER 328, the effect of which is to include any case in which the intervener is directly affected not only in his legal rights but in his pocket.” 38. Dalam hal ini, fakta-fakta semasa menunjukkan sejak 16.11.2011, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik dan didaftarkan atas nama D. Perkara ini turut diakui PYD sendiri dalam perenggan 10 dan 11 Afidavit Jawapan PYD. 39. Oleh yang demikian, sebagai pemilik terdahulu, PYD gagal mematuhi syarat di bawah Aturan 15 Kaedah 6 (2) KKM 2012 yang kehadiran PYD diperlukan dalam Saman Pemula tersebut. Apa-apa relif yang dipohon oleh P baik dalam Saman Pemula tersebut ataupun dalam Prosiding Pelaksanaan tersebut jelas tidak ada kaitan dengan apa-apa kepentingan PYD. Rujuk Tajul Ariffin B. Mustafa v Heng Cheng Hong [1993] 3 CLJ 117 di mana Mahkamah Agung (keika itu) memutuskan seperti berikut:- "The power to add a co-defendant is entirely discretionary and it shall be exercised when there may exist a question or issue arising out of or related to or connected with any relief or remedy S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA claimed in the cause or matter which in the opinion of the court it would be just and convenient to determine as between the person sought to be joined and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter" 40. Selanjutnya, Mahkamah tidak nampak kaitan jelas antara PYD dan prosiding saman pemula tersebut. Tidak timbul apa-apa persoalan fakta atau undang-undang melibatkan PYD yang hanyalah merupakan orang asing (stranger) yang tiada kaitan dengan urusan pinjaman dan gadaian tersebut. 41. Oleh yang demikian juga, Mahkamah ini berpendapatkan bahawa tidak wujud keperluan untuk PYD dijadikan pihak dalam Saman Pemula tersebut ataupun Prosiding Pelaksanaan tersebut kerana tiada apa-apa isu ataupun persoalan yang akan dapat diselesaikan dengan kehadiran PYD dalam kedua-dua prosiding tersebut. Dalam kes Hee Awa v Syed Muhammad Sazaly & Anor [1988] 1 MLJ 300 Mahkamah Agung juga telahh memutuskan bahawa:- "It has been sometimes said as in Moses v. Marsden... that a party may be added if his legal interests will be affected by the judgment in the action, but not if his commercial interests only would be affected. While their Lordships agree that the mere fact that a person is likely to be better off financially if a case is decided one way rather than another is not a sufficient ground to entitle him to be added as a party, they do not find the dichotomy between 'legal' and 'commercial' interests helpful. A better way of expressing the test is: will his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA respect of the subject matter of the action be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action?" 42. Ketiga, tidak ada juga apa-apa sekatan yang wujud dalam hakmilik hartanah tersebut bagi menghalang pendaftaran gadaian tersebut dan hartanah tersebut bebas daripada apa-apa halangan (“encumbrances”). 43. Lagipun, berdasarkan rekod pendaftaran hakmilik hartanah tersebut, D adalah pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut pada masa pinjaman diberikan P kepada LKG. Selepas gadaian tersebut didaftarkan pada 17.09.2020, P telah direkodkan sebagai pemegang gadaian berdaftar maka dengan itu mempunyai kepentingan yang tidak boleh disangkal dalam hartanah tersebut. Bahawa pendaftaran adalah segala-galanya dalam sistem torren yang berkuatkuasa di negara ini sepatutnya tidak lagi menjadi perkara pertikaian di sini. Untuk itu, rujukan adalah dibuat kepada s.89 KTN yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- “Every register document of title duly registered under this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be conclusive evidence— (a) that title to the land described therein is vested in the person or body for the time being named therein as proprietor; and (b) of the conditions, restrictions in interest and other provisions subject to which the land is for the time being held by that person or body, so far as the same are required by any S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA provision of this Act to be specified or referred to in that document.” 44. Selain itu, pemilikan atau kepentingan yang sempurna didaftarkan mewujudkan hak tak boleh sangkal (indefeasiblity of title) sebagai mana yang termaktub di dalam s.340 KTN yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- (1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible. (2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible— (a) in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or (b) where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or (c) where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law. (3) Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2)— (a) it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA (b) any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser. (4) Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent— (a) the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or (b) the determination of any title or interest by operation of law. 45. Berhubung kedua-dua peruntukan di atas, rujukan boleh dibuat kepada kes Malayan Banking Bhd v Mohd Affandi Ahmad & Anor [2024] 10 CLJ 501 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut:- “[28] The relevant statutory provisions which are relevant to the issue at hand are ss. 89 and 340 of the NLC. Given that it is undisputed that D2 is the registered owner of the two lots, the aforesaid sections play a vital role. Section 89 of the NLC provides for the conclusiveness of the register document of title which we reproduced herein for clarity: 89. Conclusiveness of register documents of title. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA Every register document of title duly registered under this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be conclusive evidence - (a) that title to the land described therein is vested in the person or body for the time being named therein as proprietor; and (b) of the conditions, restrictions in interest and other provisions subject to which the land is for the time being held by that person or body, so far as the same are required by any provision of this Act to be specified to referred to in that document. [29] The proviso to s. 340(3) confers the indefeasibility of title or interest on bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. The section reads as follows: S. 340 (1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible. (2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible (a) in any case of fraud... to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or (b) where registration was obtained by forgery,...; or (c)... S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA (3) Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) - (a) it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and (b) any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser. (4)... (emphasis added) [30] Hence, pursuant to s. 340(1), the proprietor whose name has been registered in the register document of title will obtain an indefeasible title to or interest in the land. However, such title or interest so acquired is liable to be set aside under s. 340(2) where it has been obtained by, inter alia, fraud or forgery. In the case of fraud, s. 340(2)(a) provides for the title or interest obtained to be defeasible where the proprietor or his agent is a party or privy to the fraud. In the case of forgery, s. 340(2)(b) provides for the title or interest so acquired by the proprietor or transferee immediately to the forgery to be defeasible and liable to be set aside. This is so, irrespective of whether the said proprietor or transferee acted in good faith in acquiring the title or interest. This is because there is no similar requirement, as in the case of fraud, that he must also be a party or privy to the forgery. In these circumstances, where the title or interest is subsequently transferred, s. 340(3)(a) provides that the subsequent proprietor or transferee will similarly obtain S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA a defeasible title or interest. Also, under s. 340(3)(b), any interest subsequently granted out of a title which is defeasible under s. 340(2)(a) and (b) will attract the same consequence. However, where the subsequent proprietor or transferee acts in good faith and gives valuable consideration for the title or interest in question, s. 340(3) proviso confers protection on such a subsequent proprietor or transferee such that his title or interest will be indefeasible. This is what we call the concept of deferred indefeasibility. Our present appeal is concerned with the proviso of s. 340(3) of the NLC.” 46. Selanjutnya, walaupun terdapat kaveat-kaveat dimasukkan ke atas hartanah tersebut sebelum gadaian tersebut didaftarkan, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa ianya tidak membantu justifikasi PYD untuk mencelah dalam prosiding Saman Pemula dan Prosiding Pelaksanaan tersebut kerana bukti-bukti dokumentari jelas tunjukkan bahawa Kaveat PC2013 telahpun ditarik balik pada 17.04.2014 selepas dimasukkan pada 15.01.2013, sementara Kaveat PC 2014 yang dimasukkan pada 17.04.2014 telah luput pada 16.04.2020 walaupun tidak ditarik balik. 47. Mengenai kaveat PC 2013 yang telah ditarik balik, Mahkamah ini merujuk kesannya sebagai mana diperuntukkan dalam s.325 KTN seperti berikut:- “(1) A private caveat may be withdrawn at any time by a notice in Form 19G, duly attested in accordance with section 211 notwithstanding that section 211 dealt with dealings in alienated S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA land, accompanied by the prescribed fee and presented to the Registrar by the person or body at whose instance it was entered, or by the personal representatives of any such person. (2) On receiving any notice of withdrawal under this section, the Registrar shall— (a) cancel the entry of the caveat on the register document of title, noting thereon the reason for the cancellation and the date thereof; and (b) give notice of the withdrawal to the person or body in whom the land or an undivided share in the land or interest formerly bound by the caveat is for the time being vested. (3) Every cancellation under paragraph (2)(a) shall be signed and sealed.” 48. Berkenaan Kaveat PC2014 yang telahpun luput, rujukan boleh dibuat kepada s.328 KTN yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut:- “(1) A private caveat shall, if not sooner withdrawn under section 325 or lapsing pursuant to subsection 326(1B) or removed by the Registrar pursuant to an order of the Court under section 327, lapse at the expiry of six years from the time from which it took effect, and the entry thereof may be cancelled accordingly by the Registrar, either of his own motion or on an application in that behalf by any interested person or body. (2) Every cancellation under subsection (1) shall be signed and sealed.” S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA 49. Maka, memandangkan kedua-dua kaveat tersebut tidak berkuatkuasa pada masa gadaian tersebut didaftarkan, ianya tidak mempunyai apa-apa kesan di sisi undang-undang. P juga tidak mempunyai apa-apa kewajiban untuk menyiasat kaveat-kaveat tersebut sebelum memberikan pinjaman kepada LKG ataupun sebelum mendaftarkan gadaian tersebut. Memadai untuk P hanya merujuk kepada suratan hakmilik hartanah tersebut dalam rekod pendaftaran sebagai bukti konklusif berkenaan hak milik D sebagai pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut serta hartanah tersebut bebas daripada sebarang sekatan. 50. Lebih-lebih lagi, doktrin ekuiti berkaitan notis adalah tidak terpakai dalam konteks KTN sebagai mana diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Malayan Banking (supra):- [70] Essentially, the decision of the Court of Appeal in the present appeal has introduced the English equitable doctrine of notice/doctrine of constructive notice (under the deed system) into the NLC (which employs the Torrens system). It is trite that the English equitable doctrine of notice/doctrine of constructive notice has no application under the provisions of the NLC. [71] The present system of land tenure provided for in the NLC is that all lands alienated by the state are held under the Torrens system (refer to Teo KS & Khaw LT, Land Law in Malaysia ((1965) 2nd edn Butterworths, p. 7). The intent of the Torrens system is to provide a reliable and efficient framework S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA for registration of interests in lands, thereby simplifying the process of land transactions and create a more commercially friendly environment. Hence, under the Torrens system a purchaser is not to be affected by the English equitable doctrine of notice. "Any knowledge of an existing trust interest or unregistered interest shall not by itself and without any evidence of moral turpitude on the part of the purchaser, be imputed as fraud" (refer to SY Kok inthe textbook, The Torrens System and Equitable Principles). …….. [89] Caveats serve as a substitute for the equitable doctrine of notice under the English land law (See Eng Mee Yong & Ors v. V Letchumanan [1979] CLJU 18; [1979] 1 LNS 18; [1972] 2 MLJ 212 at p. 214). By s. 322(2) of the NLC, the effect of the entry of caveats binds the land itself to prevent any registered disposition of the land except with the caveator's consent until the caveat is removed. In the present appeal, there was no such caveat on the lots as the first plaintiff's private caveat on the land was withdrawn about four years before the lots were sold and transferred to D2. Neither should a duty be imposed on D3 to investigate as to why the private caveat had been withdrawn, particularly if withdrawn years ago. 51. Pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada Defendan oleh PYD berlaku pada 16.11.2011 sementara gadaian tersebut didaftarkan pada 17.09.2020. P bukanlah pihak kepada urusan pindah milik tersebut dan tidak perlu membuat semakan dan siasatan ke atas urusan pindah milik tersebut. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA 52. Mahkamah juga berpuas hati yang P telahpun mengambil kesemua langkah yang munasabah dan berhati-hati semasa memberikan pinjaman kepada LKG dan dalam urusan pendaftaran gadaian tersebut seperti dizahirkan dalam perenggan 17 Afidavit Jawapan P yang secara keseluruhan bertujuan memastikan yang hartanah tersebut bebas daripada sebarang sekatan dan sememangnya Defendan pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut. 53. P juga tidak tahu-menahu tentang Kes 84 memandangkan bukanlah tugas mereka untuk bertanyakan kepada PYD mengenai kes tersebut. 54. Mahkamah juga mendapati tidak munasabah untuk P mengetahui tentang Kes 84 memandangkan ianya di luar pengetahuan P yang hanya mendapat tahu mengenai Kes 84 dan rayuan berbangkit selepas Lampiran 15 difailkan oleh PYD. 55. Pada masa yang sama, PYD gagal untuk membuktikan mereka mempunyai hak di sisi undang-undang ataupun apa-apa kepentingan dalam hartanah tersebut. Bahkan, tuntutan PYD dalam kes 84 juga telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Muar berkenaan tuntutan PYD ke atas hartanah tersebut. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA Penggantungan Perlaksanaan 56. Ianya undang-undang matan yang PYD mempunyai beban untuk membuktikan kewujudan keadaan istimewa untuk satu perggantungan perlaksanaan diberikan oleh Mahkamah ini. 57. Rujuk Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 (Mahkamah Persekutuan):- “The general rule is that an appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution unless the Court so orders. Accordingly, as Brown J said in Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v. Ang Keng [1953] 1 LNS 98; [1953] MLJ 116 while commenting on the discretion to grant a stay: But it is a clear principle that the Court will not deprive a successful party of the fruits of his litigation until an appeal is determined, unless the unsuccessful party can shew special circumstances to justify it. This is a re-statement of the common law rule explained in The Annot Lyle [1886] 11 PD 114 where Lord Esher MR said at p. 116: ... that an appeal shall be no stay of proceedings except the court may so order. We are asked to depart from this rule, although it is admitted that there are no special circumstances in this case which afford a ground for so doing. If in any particular case there is a danger of the appellants not being repaid if their appeal is successful, either because the respondents are foreigners, or for other good reason, this must be shewn by affidavit, and may form a ground for ordering a S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA stay. To grant the present application would, in the absence of special circumstances, clearly be to act contrary to the provisions and intention of the Rules of Court. The need to establish the existence of special circumstances to enable the court to grant a stay of execution has been well established in this country. See, for example, the Federal Court cases of Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v. Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [1974] 1 LNS 136; [1976] 1 MLJ 131; Kerajaan Malaysia v. Jasanusa Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 CLJ 701and Kerajaan Malaysia v. Dato' Hj Ghani Gilong [1995] 3 CLJ 161. There are numerous other cases which have adopted this test. See, for example, Leong Poh Shee v. Ng Kat Chong [1965] 1 LNS 90; [1966] 1 MLJ 86; Ajaib Singh v. Jeffrey Fernandez [1971] 139; Syarikat Berpakat v. Lim Kai Kok [1983] 1 MLJ 406; Matang Holdings Bhd & Ors v. Dato' Lee San Choon & Ors [1985] 1 LNS 42; [1985] 2 MLJ 406; Che Wan Development Sdn Bhd v. Co-operative Central Bank Bhd [1989] 2 CLJ 584; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 366and Wu Shu Chen (sole executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) v. Raja Zainal Abidin Raja Hussain & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 353. However, the need to show special circumstances to justify a stay was declared as bad law in See Teow Guan & Ors v. Kian Joo Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 2 CLJ 299where Gopal Sri Ram JCA, after having referred to Dickson Trading (S) Pte Ltd v. Transmarco Ltd [1987] 1 LNS 139; [1989] 2 MLJ 408, Mohamed Mustafa v. Kandasami (No 2) [1979] 1 LNS 54; [1979] 2 MLJ 126 and Alexander v. Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd [1985] 10 ACLR 42, said at pp. 605-606: At one time it was thought that an appellant had to demonstrate that there were special circumstances warranting a stay of proceedings or of execution. This was founded on the notion that a successful litigant ought not to be deprived of the fruits of S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA his litigation. See the case of The Annot Lyle [1886] 11 PD 114. The authority constantly relied upon in support of the proposition that special circumstances ought to be demonstrated before a stay of execution may be granted is the judgment of Brown J in Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v. Ang Keng [1953] MLJ 116. For my part, having considered the more recent authorities on the subject, I have come to the conclusion that that decision is bad law, and ought no longer to be followed by this court. His Lordship then said at p. 610: In my judgment, the paramount consideration governing an application for a stay, whether of execution or of proceeding, or, in the case of an application for some other form of interim preservation of the subject matter of an appeal, such as the grant of an injunction or other appropriate relief under s. 44(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, is that the appeal to this court, if successful, should not be rendered nugatory. If upon balancing all the relevant factors, this court comes to the conclusion that an appeal would be rendered nugatory without the grant of a stay or other interim preservation order, then, it should normally direct a stay or grant other appropriate interim relief that has the effect of maintaining the status quo.” 58. Berdasarkan keseluruhan hal keadaan kes, Mahkamah ini dapati PYD gagal untuk membuktikan kewujudan keadaan luar biasa (“special circumstances”) bagi mewajarkan penggantungan pelaksanaan dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini. Rujuk Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86 (Mahkamah Tinggi):- S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA “Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be special under the circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excels in some way that which is usual or common.” 59. Kewujudan rayuan PYD kepada Mahkamah Rayuan ke atas keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes 84 juga bukanlah satu keadaan istimewa di sisi undang-undang kerana adanya rayuan semata-mata tidak bermakna penggantungan harus dibenarkan. Rujuk Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd & Ors (No 2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan di muka 132:- “An appeal which would be nugatory if stay was refused by reason of the poverty of the respondent would be an example of special circumstances. See Wilson v. Church (No 2) [1879] 12 Ch D 454. Another example is that payment of a judgment debt would destroy the substratum of the appeal: Metropolitan Real and General Property Trust Ltd v. Slaters and Bodega Ltd [1941] 1 All ER 310. However, an allegation on an appeal that there has been misdirection at the trial would not be sufficient to bring it within the special circumstances: Monk v Bartram [1891] 1 QB 346.” 60. Maka, Mahkamah menolak permohonan PYD untuk mendapatkan perggantungan perlaksanaan. S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA Kesimpulan 61. Berdasarkan alasan-alasan dikemukakan di atas, Lampiran 15 ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM 8,000.00, tertakluk fi alokator. Bertarikh: 25.1.2026 …………………………………………. (NOOR HISHAM BIN ISMAIL) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Johor Bahru Peguam Pihak Pencelah : Tetuan Vin Law Co Yang Dicadangkan Suite 6.05, Tingkat 6 Wisma E & C No 2, Lorong Dungun Kiri Damansara Heights 54090, Kuala Lumpur Peguam Plaintif : Tetuan Lim & Hooi Bilik 1 & 2, Tingkat 3 Bangunan UMNO, Jalan Segget S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA 80000, Johor Bahru S/N 5USlgaWhgkq9xhBu/eZIA