Cimb Bank Berhad v Tan Hoo Eng (WA-24NCvC-6409-12/2025)

This is the Plaintiff's application under Section 25(2) and Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, read together with Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012, seeking a declaration that the Defendant is a vexatious litigant and consequential orders requiring the Defendant to obtain leave of a Judge of the High Court before instituting any further proceedings against the Plaintiff, its officers, agents, employees or solicitors in relation to matters already adjudicated.

The application arises from a long and complex litigation history between the parties, spanning more than a decade, involving AMLA freezing and seizure orders, a global settlement agreement dated

1.2020, the Ipoh High Court Order dated 23.7.2020, and repeated attempts by the Defendant to pursue what she describes as "accretions on accretions".

The Court has considered all affidavits, the Defendant's Written Submissions dated 22.5.2026, the Plaintiff's Written Submissions dated 25.5.2026, the Plaintiff's Submissions in Reply dated 29.5.2026, and the authorities cited by both parties.

As a starting point, I am satisfied that this Court possesses the requisite jurisdiction and power to grant the reliefs sought in the present Originating Summons. The Court's authority to restrain vexatious litigation arises both from its inherent jurisdiction and from the express statutory powers conferred by Section 25(2) and Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ("CJA 1964"). These powers exist to prevent continued abuse of the Court's process and to safeguard the proper administration of justice.

Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 affirms the breadth of the Court's inherent jurisdiction. It provides: "Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court."

This provision makes clear that the Court retains a residual reservoir of powers to intervene whenever necessary to prevent injustice or misuse of judicial machinery.

It is trite that the Court's inherent jurisdiction is a broad and flexible source of judicial authority. It may be invoked whenever the administration of justice is threatened by oppressive, abusive, or vexatious conduct. The inherent jurisdiction is not confined to procedural matters; it extends to any situation where intervention is required to uphold the integrity of the Court's process.

The Federal Court in Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v Public Prosecutor (No.1) [2007] 2 MLJ 101 authoritatively affirmed that the Court possesses a wide residual source of powers pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction. The Federal Court recognised that these powers may be invoked to secure justice, fill procedural gaps, and ensure observance of due process.

In doing so, the Federal Court referred to R Rama Chandran v Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 and the seminal writing of Sir Jack Jacob (The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 23). The Federal Court adopted the following definition: "... the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be defined as the reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to ensure the observance of due process, to prevent improper vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial."

This definition encapsulates the protective nature of the Court's inherent powers.

The power to restrain vexatious litigants is not merely incidental to the Court's inherent jurisdiction. It is expressly recognised and codified in Section 25(2) of the CJA 1964, read together with Paragraph 17 of the Schedule.

Section 25(2) provides that the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule, in addition to the powers vested in it under Article 121 of the Federal Constitution.

Paragraph 17 of the Schedule expressly empowers the Court to restrain any person who has habitually and persistently, and without reasonable cause, instituted vexatious legal proceedings in any court. The paragraph further requires that any such restraining order be published in the Gazette.

The governing principles on what constitutes a vexatious litigant were succinctly articulated by the Court of Appeal in Sim Kooi Soon v Malaysia Airlines System (No.2) [2011] 4 MLJ 728.

The Court observed that the hallmark of a vexatious litigant is the repeated institution of proceedings against the same party based on essentially the same cause of action, often with minor variations, and without any real legal foundation. Such proceedings serve only to subject the opposing party to inconvenience, harassment, and unnecessary expense.

Accordingly, the inquiry before this Court is not whether the Defendant should be barred entirely from accessing the courts. Rather, the question is whether her conduct demonstrates a habitual and persistent pattern of instituting repetitive, meritless proceedings arising from substantially the same subject matter, notwithstanding repeated judicial determinations against her.

The sole question before this Court is: Whether the Defendant's conduct, after the conclusive determinations of the High Court (7.9.2022), the Court of Appeal (18.12.2024), and the Federal Court (28.8.2025), constitutes persistent, meritless, and abusive litigation such that she ought to be declared a vexatious litigant under Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

Banking and investment relationship

It is common ground that the Defendant maintained a substantial and sophisticated banking relationship with the Plaintiff, one that combined both credit facilities and investment instruments of considerable value.

The documentary record shows that CIMB extended to the Defendant an overdraft facility of RM26.5 million and a flexi loan of RM3.5 million, both of which were actively utilised and periodically renewed. In parallel, the Defendant held 55 fixed deposits and 7 structured products under the RSP 15971 series, forming a sizeable investment portfolio.

The operational mechanics of these investments are not in dispute. Under the Defendant's express instructions, coupon payments generated by the structured products were to be credited into her Money Multiplier Account (MMA), an interest-bearing current account designed to generate further returns on incoming credits.

Likewise, interest accruing on the fixed deposits was to be channelled into her Savings Account (SA), where it would similarly earn additional interest. In effect, the Defendant's investment architecture was intentionally structured to produce continuous financial growth, with each inflow whether coupon or interest serving as the basis for further accretions.

This arrangement is central to the present dispute. It explains why the Defendant later characterised the growth of her funds as "accretions on accretions": a description that accurately reflects the compounding nature of her investment strategy.

It also explains why the Defendant views any interruption to the flow of coupon payments or FD interest into the MMA and SA as a material deprivation. The Plaintiff, for its part, does not contest the Defendant's chosen structure; the disagreement lies in whether the AMLA orders lawfully prevented the movement of these funds during the relevant period, and whether any further sums remain legally payable after the release of the accounts in August 2020. AMLA freezing and seizure orders

The evidence establishes, without controversy, that the Defendant's accounts and investment instruments were subjected to a series of statutory restraints imposed under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 ("AMLA").

Two Section 44 freezing orders, dated 30.4.2014 and 15.5.2014, were first issued by the investigating authorities. These orders required CIMB to immobilise the Defendant's accounts, including her fixed deposits, structured products, MMA and SA, and prohibited any dealing, transfer or disposal of the funds identified therein.

Subsequently, on 24.7.2014, a Section 50 seizure order was issued by the Deputy Public Prosecutor. This order went further than the freezing orders: it required CIMB to seize and retain custody of the Defendant's accounts specified in the annexure, including the RSP 15971 series and the MMA. The combined effect of these AMLA orders was to impose a strict statutory embargo on the movement of funds between the Defendant's accounts.

The practical consequence of these restraints is central to the present dispute. Because the AMLA orders prohibited CIMB from transferring or crediting funds between the affected accounts, coupon payments generated by the structured products and interest accruing on the fixed deposits could not be credited into the Defendant's MMA and SA as originally instructed.

Instead, these sums remained trapped within the RSP and FD accounts, accumulating internally but unable to flow into the interest-bearing MMA and SA where they would have generated further returns.

This "trapping" of accretions a direct result of statutory prohibitions rather than any discretionary act by CIMB forms the factual foundation of the Defendant's later claim that she was deprived of "accretions on accretions". The Plaintiff does not dispute that the AMLA orders prevented the usual flow of funds; the dispute lies in whether those statutory restraints lawfully interrupted the Defendant's investment architecture, and whether any further sums remain legally payable after the accounts were released in August 2020.

The documentary record shows that on 24.1.2020, after years of contentious litigation and multiple overlapping proceedings, the parties entered into a Global Full and Final Settlement Agreement.

This agreement was not a casual or informal arrangement; it was a carefully negotiated instrument intended to draw a definitive line under all disputes arising from the Defendant's banking facilities, investments, and the AMLA orders. The Defendant was legally represented, and the terms were expressly accepted by her.

Central to the present matter is Clause 3.2, which is drafted in broad and unequivocal language. In that clause, the Defendant agreed that she: "shall have no further claim of whatsoever nature against the Bank and/or its servants, agents and/or employees for damages or costs or any other compensation whatsoever arising from all and any accounts, credit facilities and/or investments held by Tan Hoo Eng with the Bank including without limitation Tan Hoo Eng's Overdraft Facility... Flexi Loan Facility... Structured Investment Account (RSP 15971) and/or the Tan Hoo Eng AMLATFA Orders or by reason of any matter connected to or arising therefrom."

The breadth of Clause 3.2 is legally significant. It is not confined to past claims; it extinguishes all future claims, including those arising from the Defendant's structured products, fixed deposits, and the AMLA freezing and seizure orders. The clause is drafted in language commonly recognised in settlement jurisprudence as a "complete bar" or "full release clause".

Clause 3.2 is precisely such a clause. The Defendant's acceptance of Clause 3.2 is further reinforced by Preamble K, which records the parties' intention to resolve "all actions/demands pending" between them. This includes, without limitation, the Defendant's earlier lpoh writ action, her complaints arising from the AMLA orders, and any alleged deprivation of accretions or interest.

The Settlement Agreement also contained a clear condition precedent: the Defendant was required to pay the Settlement Sum of RM21,843,250.00 on or before 30 June 2020. This sum represented a substantial concession by CIMB, being far below the amount outstanding under the Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff waived significant interest (October 2016-June 2020) in reliance on the Defendant's warranties and undertakings.

It is undisputed that the Defendant did not pay the Settlement Sum by the stipulated deadline. The failure to pay was not a minor procedural lapse; it constituted a breach of a fundamental term of the agreement. Under Clause 1.3, the consequence of non-payment was automatic: the entire judgment sum revived, and CIMB was entitled to enforce the Summary Judgment without further notice.

The Defendant's breach also meant that she could not rely on the Settlement Agreement selectively. She could not, as the Court of Appeal later observed, "go around the comprehensive Clause 3.2" to resurrect claims for accretions or interest.

In Tan Hoo Eng v CIMB Bank Berhad (Appeal 1716 & 686, 18.12.2024), the Court of Appeal held that Clause 3.2 was a complete answer to the Defendant's claims, and that she had made no reservation for future claims. This finding is binding and remains undisturbed after the Federal Court refused leave on 28.8.2025.

Thus, the Settlement Agreement is not merely background context; it is a dispositive legal instrument that extinguishes the Defendant's entitlement to pursue any further claims arising from her accounts, facilities, investments, or the AMLA orders.

Her subsequent attempts to revive such claims whether framed as "Amount A vs Amount B", Section 52A AMLA compliance, or alleged misapplication of the Ipoh Order must be viewed against the finality she herself agreed to in January 2020.

On 23.7.2020, the Ipoh High Court, presided over by YA Dato' Hashim bin Hamzah, (as his Lordship then was) delivered a pivotal decision in Criminal Application No. AA-44-1-01/2020.

In that proceeding brought by the Defendant against the Public Prosecutor His Lordship held that the AMLA freezing and seizure orders imposed on the Defendant's accounts had expired by operation of law, pursuant to Section 52A and Section 56(3) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 ("AMLA").

His Lordship found that because the Defendant had not been charged within the statutory period, the AMLA orders could not continue to subsist beyond the mandatory twelve-month limit. The consequence was clear and unequivocal: the Defendant's accounts, including the structured products and fixed deposits held with CIMB, were to be released and returned.

His Lordship's decision was not merely declaratory; it carried immediate operative effect. The Public Prosecutor initially filed an appeal but subsequently withdrew it, thereby rendering the Ipoh Order final and binding. The Defendant promptly served the order on CIMB on 24.7.2020, triggering the bank's obligation to act.

After seeking clarification from the Ipoh High Court on 11.8.2020 a hearing during which CIMB's counsel expressly stated that the bank "will comply with the order" — CIMB proceeded to release the Defendant's accounts.

On 11.8.2020, CIMB credited RM7,901,934.74 into the Defendant's Money Multiplier Account (MMA), representing the balance of the structured product proceeds after setting off the Settlement Sum (as requested by the Defendant in her letter dated 24.7.2020).

Shortly thereafter, on 17.8.2020, CIMB released an additional RM355,455.60, representing interest accrued on the Defendant's fixed deposits. These releases are not disputed. They form the factual foundation of the Plaintiff's position that it has fully complied with the Ipoh Order and that no further sums are legally payable.

The Defendant, however, contends that CIMB's compliance was incomplete. She argues that CIMB wrongfully failed to release additional "accretions on accretions" — sums she says represent seven years of compounded interest and coupon-based growth that would have accrued had the AMLA orders not been in place.

This contention lies at the heart of her subsequent committal applications and declaratory proceedings. It is important to note that the Defendant's reliance on the Ipoh Order has already been judicially examined.

In Tan Hoo Eng v CIMB Bank Berhad (KL OS 541 & KL OS 599), YA Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad considered the Ipoh Order in detail. His Lordship held that CIMB had complied with the Ipoh Order and that the Defendant's claims for further accretions were barred by the Settlement Agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal (18.12.2024) affirmed that even if Section 52AAMLA applied, "the question of granting any relief to the appellant against CIMB cannot arise... because of the Settlement Agreement."

Federal Court subsequently refused leave on 28.8.2025, leaving the High Court and Court of Appeal findings undisturbed.

Thus, while the Ipoh Order is an important factual milestone, its legal effect has already been fully adjudicated. The Defendant's continued reliance on the Ipoh Order as a basis for fresh claims particularly claims for additional accretions must be viewed in light of the appellate findings that the Settlement Agreement constitutes a complete bar to such claims. The "accretions on accretions" dispute

Following CIMB's release of the Defendant's accounts on 11.8.2020 and 17.8.2020, the Defendant did not regard the matter as concluded. Instead, she issued a series of demands asserting that CIMB remained obliged to pay additional sums representing what she termed "accretions on accretions" namely, interest that she says should have been earned on (i) coupon payments generated by the structured products, and (ii) interest accruing on her fixed deposits, during the period when the AMLA orders prevented those sums from being credited into her MMA and SA.

The Defendant's position was that because the AMLA orders had expired by operation of law in 2015 (as held by YA Hashim), CIMB ought to have released not only the principal amounts and accrued interest within the RSP and FD accounts, but also the additional compounded interest that would have been generated had those sums been allowed to flow into the MMA and SA.

In her correspondence dated 15.9.2020, 5.10.2020 and 7.10.2020, she quantified these alleged additional accretions at RM2,890,421.42, though no supporting tabulations or workings were provided. CIMB rejected these demands.

In its letter dated 30.9.2020, CIMB stated that no further sums were payable, emphasising that the AMLA orders had lawfully prevented the movement of funds between the Defendant's accounts and that the bank had fully complied with the Ipoh High Court Order.

CIMB also pointed to the Settlement Agreement (24.1.2020), particularly Clause 3.2, under which the Defendant expressly agreed that she "shall have no further claim of whatsoever nature" arising from her accounts, facilities, investments or the AMLA orders.

The Defendant's dissatisfaction with CIMB's response led her to escalate the matter through committal proceedings, alleging non-compliance with the Ipoh Order. These committal applications filed on 10.8.2020 and 15.12.2020 were premised entirely on the same contention: that CIMB had failed to release the full quantum of accretions allegedly due to her.

The legal significance of this dispute has already been addressed in subsequent judicial determinations. In KL OS 541 and KL OS 599, YA Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad examined the Defendant's claim for "accretions on accretions" in detail.

His Lordship held that the AMLA orders prohibited the movement of funds between the accounts, that CIMB had complied with the Ipoh Order, and that the Defendant's claims for further accretions were barred by the Settlement Agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal (18.12.2024) affirmed that even if Section 52AAMLA applied, "the question of granting any relief to the appellant against CIMB cannot arise... because of the Settlement Agreement." The Federal Court's refusal of leave on 28.8.2025 left these findings undisturbed.

Thus, the "accretions on accretions" dispute is not merely a factual disagreement about quantum. It is the central axis around which the Defendant's subsequent litigation has revolved including committal applications, declaratory actions, appeals, and repeated demands.

It is also the very subject matter that has been conclusively adjudicated at every tier of the Malaysian courts, forming the foundation of the Plaintiff's present application to restrain further re-litigation. Declaratory proceedings (KL OS 541 & KL OS 599)

The next significant milestone in the litigation chronology occurred on 7.9.2022, when the Kuala Lumpur High Court, presided over by YA Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad, delivered two coordinated decisions in KL OS 541 and KL OS 599.

These proceedings were heard together because they arose from the same factual matrix, involved the same parties, and concerned the same underlying dispute — namely, whether CIMB owed the Defendant any further sums arising from the AMLA period, including the alleged "accretions on accretions".

In KL OS 541, CIMB sought declaratory relief to confirm that it was not liable for any further sums to the Defendant following the release of RM7,901,934.74 and RM355,455.60 in August 2020. After reviewing the extensive affidavit evidence, the Settlement Agreement dated 24.1.2020, and the Ipoh High Court Order dated 23.7.2020, YA Atan allowed CIMB's application in full. His Lordship held that: - the AMLA orders had prohibited the movement of funds between the Defendant's accounts during the relevant period; - CIMB had complied with the Ipoh Order; - and most critically, Clause 3.2 of the Settlement Agreement barred the Defendant from pursuing any further claims arising from her accounts, facilities, investments, or the AMLA orders.

In KL OS 599, the Defendant sought the opposite relief a declaration compelling CIMB to release additional accretions allegedly due from 30.4.2014 to 11.8.2020 and 17.8.2020. She also sought interest at 5% per annum and constitutional declarations under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution.

YA Atan dismissed the Defendant's originating summons in its entirety. His Lordship found that the Defendant's claims were legally unsustainable, factually unsupported, and barred by the Settlement Agreement. His Lordship also held that Article 13 could not be invoked against CIMB, a private entity, consistent with established constitutional jurisprudence.

These twin decisions were not isolated findings; they formed a comprehensive judicial determination of the entire accretions dispute. The High Court's reasoning was later affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 18.12.2024, which held that Clause 3.2 was a "complete answer" to the Defendant's claims and that she had made no reservation for future claims.

The appellate court further held that even if Section 52A AMLA applied, "the question of granting any relief to the appellant against CIMB cannot arise... because of the Settlement Agreement." The Federal Court's refusal of leave on 28.8.2025 left these findings undisturbed.

Accordingly, the decisions in KL OS 541 and KL OS 599 represent the final judicial resolution of the Defendant's entitlement to any further sums arising from the AMLA period. They also form the legal foundation for the Plaintiff's present application, as they demonstrate that the Defendant's subsequent attempts to revive the same claims whether through committal proceedings, fresh demands, or collateral motions amount to re-litigation of matters already adjudicated to finality. Appeals and leave application

The Defendant did not accept the High Court's determinations in KL OS 541 and KL OS 599. She pursued two separate appeals - Civil Appeal No. W-02(NCC)(A)-1716-09/2022 and Civil Appeal No. W-01(NCC)(A)-686-09/2022 challenging, respectively, the High Court's declaration that CIMB was not liable for any further sums and the dismissal of her own originating summons seeking additional accretions. Both appeals were heard together before a three-Judge panel of the Court of Appeal on 18.12.2024.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals in unequivocal terms. The appellate court agreed with the High Court that the Defendant's claims for further accretions were barred by the Settlement Agreement dated 24.1.2020, particularly Clause 3.2, which the Defendant had voluntarily and knowingly accepted. In its broad grounds, the Court of Appeal held: "Clause 3.2 is a complete answer to the claim against the bank... she cannot now go around the comprehensive Clause 3.2 to mount the instant claim with respect to the uncredited accretions."

The Court of Appeal further observed that even if the AMLA orders had expired earlier under Section 52A AMLA a point the Defendant repeatedly emphasised no relief could arise against CIMB because the Defendant had contractually extinguished her right to pursue such claims. The appellate court also affirmed the High Court's finding that Article 13 of the Federal Constitution could not be invoked against CIMB, a private entity.

Having failed at the Court of Appeal, the Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Federal Court via Civil Application No. 08(f)-28-01/2025 (W). The Federal Court heard the application on 28.8.2025.

After considering the record and submissions, the apex court refused leave. The refusal of leave did not create new findings; rather, it confirmed that the Defendant's proposed appeal did not meet the statutory threshold for further review.

Crucially, the Federal Court made no variation to the High Court Orders dated 7.9.2022 or the Court of Appeal's affirmations. The legal consequence is that the High Court's determinations that CIMB is not liable for any further sums and that the Defendant's claims for accretions are barred remain final, conclusive, and binding between the parties.

The Defendant's subsequent attempts to revive the same issues through collateral proceedings, committal applications, and repeated demands must therefore be viewed against this backdrop of finality.

The appellate pathway has been fully exhausted. The subject matter has been adjudicated at every tier of the Malaysian judicial hierarchy. No further judicial reconsideration of the same issues is permissible without undermining the principle of finality of litigation. Parties' Submissions Defendant's submissions (Encl. 18)

In her written submissions (Enclosure 18), the Defendant advances a multi-layered critique of CIMB's conduct throughout the litigation history. Her arguments are framed around a central thesis: that CIMB has consistently misrepresented the legal effect of the AMLA orders and has used procedural mechanisms to avoid accountability.

The Defendant contends, first, that CIMB misled YA Atan during the hearing of KL OS 541 and KL OS 599 by failing to disclose that the AMLA freezing and seizure orders had expired in 2015 pursuant to Section 52A AMLA a fact expressly recognised by YA Hashim in the Ipoh Criminal Application. She argues that CIMB's silence on this point caused the High Court to proceed on an incorrect factual premise, namely that the AMLA orders subsisted from 2014 until 2020.

Second, the Defendant submits that CIMB wrongfully released what she terms "Amount A",representing only the principal sums and internal accretions trapped within the RSP and FD accounts, instead of "Amount B", which she says should have included seven years of compounded accretions from 30.4.2014 onwards.

She argues that CIMB's failure to release "Amount B" constitutes a breach of the Ipoh Order dated 23.7.2020, and that CIMB's reliance on the Settlement Agreement cannot override a judicial order directing the release of her property.

Third, the Defendant asserts that CIMB failed to comply with the Ipoh Order. She points to the transcript of the clarification hearing on 11.8.2020, where CIMB's counsel stated that the bank "will comply with the order".

She argues that CIMB's subsequent release of only RM7.9 million and RM355,455.60 without the additional accretions she claims amounts to partial compliance at best, and non-compliance at worst.

She further contends that CIMB's refusal to release the alleged additional accretions forced her to initiate committal proceedings, which she characterises as necessary rather than vexatious.

Fourth, the Defendant argues that CIMB's present reliance on Clause 3.2 of the Settlement Agreement is opportunistic and selective. She emphasises that CIMB did not appeal YA Atan's findings on Clause 3.2, particularly His Lordship's interpretation that the clause barred only claims arising "during the subsistence of the AMLA orders".

The Defendant contends that CIMB is now attempting to broaden the clause beyond what YA Atan decided, and that CIMB's failure to appeal those findings means CIMB is bound by the narrower interpretation.

Finally, the Defendant characterises CIMB's vexatious-litigant application as an "instrument of oppression", relying on the Court of Appeal's decision in Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 CLJ 533, where Gopal Sri Ram JCA observed that abuse of process occurs when litigation is used not to remedy a genuine grievance but to oppress the opposing party.

The Defendant argues that CIMB is attempting to use this application to shield itself from scrutiny, avoid compliance with Section 52A AMLA, and silence her efforts to obtain what she believes are the correct sums due under the Ipoh Order.

Taken together, the Defendant's submissions portray CIMB as a party seeking to rewrite the litigation history, suppress material facts, and weaponize procedural mechanisms to avoid substantive accountability.

Whether these assertions withstand legal scrutiny is addressed in the Court's analysis below, but they form the backbone of the Defendant's resistance to the present application. Plaintiff's submissions (Encl. 23 & 30)

In its written submissions, the Plaintiff presents a structured and methodical response to the Defendant's allegations. CIMB's position is that the Defendant's litigation conduct, viewed in its full chronology, reveals a persistent pattern of re-litigation of matters already adjudicated to finality.

The Plaintiff emphasises that despite multiple judicial pronouncements at the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Federal Court the Defendant continues to pursue the same underlying subject matter: her alleged entitlement to "accretions on accretions" arising from the AMLA period.

The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant's present complaints, whether framed as non-compliance with Section 52A AMLA, misapplication of the Ipoh Order, or alleged suppression of material facts, are merely new labels attached to the same substantive grievance.

CIMB argues that the Defendant's litigation strategy has been to repeatedly re-characterise the same claim in different procedural forms committal applications, declaratory actions, appeals, and collateral motions but the essence remains unchanged: she seeks additional sums beyond those released in August 2020.

CIMB further contends that the issue has been conclusively decided at every tier of the Malaysian judiciary. The High Court's decisions in KL OS 541 and KL OS 599 on 7.9.2022 represent a comprehensive adjudication of the Defendant's entitlement to further accretions.

The Court of Appeal's dismissal of both appeals on 18.12.2024, coupled with its express finding that Clause 3.2 of the Settlement Agreement is a "complete answer" to the Defendant's claims, reinforces the finality of the matter.

The Federal Court's refusal of leave on 28.8.2025 confirms that no further appellate review is available. CIMB argues that these decisions collectively extinguish any legal basis for the Defendant's continued pursuit of the same subject matter.

The Plaintiff also highlights the multiplicity and overlap of proceedings initiated by the Defendant. CIMB points to the Defendant's two committal applications (10.8.2020 and 15.12.2020), her declaratory action in KL OS 599, her appeals, her leave application, and her repeated demands for additional accretions.

CIMB submits that these proceedings are not isolated or independent; they are interconnected attempts to revive the same claim, often filed in parallel or in rapid succession. CIMB argues that this pattern satisfies the criteria for abuse of process as articulated in authorities such as Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759, where vexatious litigation is defined as the habitual and persistent institution of proceedings without reasonable grounds.

CIMB further contends that the Defendant's conduct has imposed unreasonable pressure, inconvenience, and hardship on the bank, its officers, and its solicitors. The Plaintiff notes that its officers have been repeatedly named in committal applications, compelled to respond to allegations of non-compliance, and subjected to ongoing litigation despite clear judicial findings in their favour.

CIMB argues that this is precisely the mischief contemplated by Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which empowers the Court to restrain litigants who misuse judicial processes to harass or oppress others.

Finally, CIMB submits that the relief sought is proportionate and necessary. The Plaintiff emphasises that it does not seek to bar the Defendant from accessing the courts entirely. Instead, it seeks a leave requirement, which serves as a judicial filter to ensure that any future proceedings are bona fide and not a continuation of matters already decided.

In summary, CIMB's submissions portray the Defendant's conduct as a sustained attempt to reopen a dispute that has already travelled through every tier of the judicial hierarchy. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's continued pursuit of the same subject matter despite clear, final, and binding judicial determinations constitutes an abuse of process warranting the intervention of this Court under Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. ANALYSIS What is the true subject matter of the Defendant's continuing litigation?

Having examined the Defendant's affidavits, written submissions, and the numerous proceedings she has initiated since August 2020, the Court is compelled to distil the essence of her continuing grievances.

Although the Defendant presents her complaints under various legal and factual labels Section 52A AMLA expiry, "Amount A vs Amount B", alleged non-compliance with the Ipoh Order, constitutional deprivation under Article 13, and misleading conduct by CIMB these formulations do not alter the underlying substance of her claim.

Each label is a different narrative wrapper placed around the same core contention: that CIMB owes her additional accretions, accruals, benefits, interest, or other monetary sums arising from the manner in which her accounts were handled during the AMLA period.

The Defendant's own submissions confirm this. She repeatedly asserts that CIMB wrongfully withheld "seven years of accretions", that CIMB released "Amount A" instead of "Amount B", and that CIMB deprived her of compounded interest that would have been earned had coupon payments and FD interest been credited into the MMA and SA. These assertions, regardless of how they are framed, all point to a single substantive claim the alleged entitlement to further accretions on accretions.

This Court notes that such reframing of the same grievance is not uncommon in vexatious litigation. As observed in Attorney General v Barker [supra], vexatious litigants often "recast old claims in new forms" in an attempt to reopen matters already adjudicated. The Defendant's conduct fits this pattern.

Whether she invokes Section 52A AMLA, the Ipoh Order, alleged misrepresentation, or constitutional rights, the relief she ultimately seeks is the same: payment of additional sums beyond those released in August 2020.

It is therefore essential to recognise that the Defendant's continuing litigation is not about AMLA compliance in the abstract, nor about the correctness of the Ipoh Order, nor about procedural fairness. It is about money specifically, her belief that CIMB owes her further accretions. This is the true subject matter of her continuing litigation. This subject matter has already been conclusively adjudicated.

In KL OS 541, YA Atan declared that CIMB "is not liable to the Defendant for any or further or other sums" arising from her accounts, facilities, deposits, or the AMLA orders.

In KL OS 599, His Lordship dismissed the Defendant's attempt to compel CIMB to release additional accretions.

The Court of Appeal (18.12.2024) affirmed these findings, holding that Clause 3.2 of the Settlement Agreement is a complete answer to the Defendant's claims.

The Federal Court (28.8.2025) refused leave, leaving the High Court and Court of Appeal decisions undisturbed.

Accordingly, the Defendant's continuing pursuit of further accretions regardless of the legal or factual labels she attaches to it constitutes an attempt to re-litigate matters already decided. The subject matter is not new.

It is not distinct. It is not unresolved. It is the same claim that has travelled through every tier of the Malaysian judicial hierarchy and has been rejected at each stage. Has the subject matter been conclusively decided?

In assessing whether the subject matter of the Defendant's continuing litigation has already been conclusively determined, the Court must examine the entire appellate trajectory of the dispute. Having done so, the answer is unequivocally yes.

The Defendant's entitlement to any further sums whether described as accretions, accruals, benefits, interest, or "accretions on accretions" has been adjudicated at every tier of the Malaysian judicial hierarchy. Each court has reached the same conclusion: no further sums are payable.

The starting point is the High Court's decision on 7.9.2022 in KL OS 541. After a detailed examination of the Settlement Agreement, the AMLA orders, the Ipoh High Court Order, and the Defendant's investment structure, YA Atan Mustaffa Yussof Ahmad declared that CIMB: "is not liable to the Defendant for any or further or other sums arising from and/or connected to the Defendant's accounts, credit facilities, deposits, structured products and/or the AMLATFA Orders."

This declaration was not limited to the sums released in August 2020. It was a global determination that CIMB owed no further sums whatsoever arising from the Defendant's accounts or the AMLA period.

In KL OS 599, His Lordship dismissed the Defendant's attempt to compel CIMB to release additional accretions, thereby rejecting the very claim the Defendant continues to pursue today. The Defendant appealed both decisions.

On 18.12.2024, the Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals in clear and emphatic terms. The appellate court held that the Defendant's claims were barred by the Settlement Agreement, particularly Clause 3.2, which the Defendant had voluntarily accepted. The Court of Appeal stated: "The Settlement Agreement is a complete answer... she cannot now go around the comprehensive Clause 3.2 to mount the instant claim with respect to the uncredited accretions."

This finding is legally significant. It confirms that even if the Defendant's factual assertions about AMLA expiry or the Ipoh Order were accepted, no relief could arise against CIMB because the Defendant had contractually extinguished her right to pursue such claims. The appellate court also affirmed that Article 13 of the Federal Constitution could not be invoked against CIMB, a private entity.

The Defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Federal Court. On 28 August 2025, the Federal Court refused leave. The refusal of leave did not create new findings; rather, it confirmed that the Defendant's proposed appeal did not meet the statutory threshold for further review.

Importantly, the Federal Court made no variation to the High Court Orders or the Court of Appeal's affirmations. The legal consequence is that the High Court's determinations that CIMB is not liable for any further sums and that the Defendant's claims for accretions are barred remain final, conclusive, and binding between the parties.

In light of this appellate history, the Court finds that the subject matter of the Defendant's continuing litigation has been fully and finally adjudicated. The Defendant's attempts to revive the same issues whether through committal applications, fresh demands, or collateral motions amount to re-litigation of matters already decided. The principle of finality of litigation, a cornerstone of judicial process, precludes any further reconsideration of the same claims. Is the Defendant attempting to re-litigate decided matters?

The Court has carefully examined the chronology of proceedings initiated by the Defendant after the release of her accounts in August 2020. That chronology reveals a clear and sustained pattern: the Defendant has repeatedly attempted to revive the same accretions claim that was conclusively determined in KL OS 541 and KL OS 599.

Her subsequent actions including fresh monetary demands, new affidavits reiterating the same factual assertions, two committal applications alleging non-compliance with the Ipoh Order, and collateral motions filed within the Ipoh criminal proceedings all share a common objective.

Each filing seeks, in substance, to compel CIMB to release additional accretions allegedly due from the AMLA period. The Defendant's litigation strategy has been to re-package the same grievance under different procedural vehicles, but the underlying claim remains unchanged.

This conduct constitutes re-litigation of matters already decided, which is precisely the mischief addressed by Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. The provision exists to protect the judicial process from being used as a revolving door through which decided matters are continually reintroduced.

The Defendant's filings demonstrate the hallmark features of vexatious litigation identified in Attorney General v Barker [supra] namely, the habitual and persistent institution of proceedings without reasonable grounds, often by re-casting old claims in new forms. The Defendant's repeated attempts to revisit the accretions dispute, despite clear and binding determinations by the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Federal Court, fall squarely within this definition.

The Court also notes that the Defendant's collateral motions in the Ipoh criminal proceedings which were not directed at CIMB and did not involve CIMB as a party nonetheless sought to revive the same accretions claim indirectly. This form of collateral attack is impermissible.

In light of this sustained pattern of re-litigation, the Court finds that the Defendant's conduct is not a bona fide attempt to ventilate new issues. It is a continuation of a dispute that has already been adjudicated to finality.

The Defendant's persistence, despite clear judicial pronouncements at every appellate level, constitutes an abuse of process warranting intervention under Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the CJA 1964. Does the Defendant's reliance on Section 52A AMLA create a new issue?

The Defendant places considerable emphasis on Section 52A AMLA, arguing that because the AMLA freezing and seizure orders expired by operation of law in 2015, CIMB was obliged to release not only the principal sums and internal accretions within the RSP and FD accounts, but also the additional compounded interest she claims would have accrued had the funds been credited into her MMA and SA.

The Defendant contends that this statutory expiry creates a fresh legal issue that was not properly ventilated before YA Atan and therefore warrants renewed judicial scrutiny. This argument cannot withstand analysis.

The Court of Appeal, in its broad grounds dated 18.12.2024, expressly addressed Section 52A AMLA. The appellate court accepted, for the sake of argument, the Defendant's position that the AMLA orders may have expired earlier.

However, the Court of Appeal held that even if Section 52A AMLA applied in the manner the Defendant asserts, no relief could arise against CIMB because the Defendant had contractually extinguished her right to pursue such claims under the Settlement Agreement dated 24.1.2020. The Court of Appeal stated: "Even assuming Section 52A applied... the question of granting any relief to the appellant against CIMB cannot arise because of the Settlement Agreement."

This finding is dispositive. It means that Section 52A AMLA whether correctly interpreted, misinterpreted, or even accepted entirely in the Defendant's favour does not reopen the Defendant's claim against CIMB. The contractual bar in Clause 3.2 operates independently of the statutory expiry of the AMLA orders.

The Defendant cannot rely on Section 52A AMLA to circumvent a binding contractual release that she voluntarily entered into and which has been judicially affirmed at every appellate level.

Furthermore, the Defendant's reliance on Section 52A AMLA does not introduce any new factual or legal issue. The expiry of the AMLA orders was already considered by YA Hashim in the Ipoh Criminal Application, by YA Atan in KL OS 541 and KL OS 599, and by the Court of Appeal in the Defendant's appeals.

The matter has travelled through the full appellate hierarchy. The Federal Court's refusal of leave on 28.8.2025 confirms that no arguable point of law of public importance arises from the Defendant's interpretation of Section 52A AMLA.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Defendant's reliance on Section 52A AMLA is not a new issue. It is a re-assertion of a point already adjudicated, and one that cannot revive a claim extinguished by the Settlement Agreement and conclusively rejected by the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Federal Court. Does the Defendant's conduct meet the threshold of vexatious litigation?

Having considered the full chronology of proceedings initiated by the Defendant, the Court is satisfied that her conduct meets the statutory and jurisprudential threshold of vexatious litigation under Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 provides the statutory foundation: "Power to restrain any person who has habitually and persistently and without reasonable cause instituted vexatious legal proceedings in any court, whether against the same or different persons, from instituting any legal proceedings in any court save by leave of a Judge. A copy of any such order shall be published in the Gazette."

The governing principles on what constitutes a vexatious litigant were succinctly articulated by the Court of Appeal in Sim Kooi Soon v Malaysia Airlines System (No 2) [2011] 4 MLJ 728. The appellate court explained that the hallmark of a vexatious litigant is not merely the filing of multiple suits, but the repeated institution of proceedings against the same party on essentially the same cause of action, often with minor variations or repackaged arguments. The mischief lies in the litigant's habitual and persistent pursuit of claims that have already been adjudicated, thereby burdening the opposing party and the judicial system with repetitive, meritless litigation.

The Defendant has, over a sustained period, habitually and persistently instituted proceedings on the same subject matter, namely her alleged entitlement to further accretions arising from the AMLA period.

These proceedings have taken multiple forms fresh monetary demands, new affidavits repeating the same factual assertions, committal applications, declaratory actions, appeals, leave applications, and collateral motions in the lpoh criminal proceedings.

Despite the clear and binding determinations of the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Federal Court, the Defendant has continued to pursue the same claim, demonstrating a refusal to accept final judicial outcomes.

The Court finds that the Defendant has done so without reasonable grounds after final adjudication. Once the High Court declared on 7.9.2022 that CIMB was not liable for any further sums, and once the Court of Appeal affirmed that Clause 3.2 of the Settlement Agreement was a complete bar to her claims, the Defendant no longer had any legal basis to pursue additional accretions.

Her persistence thereafter cannot be characterised as bona fide litigation. Instead, it reflects a determination to reopen matters conclusively decided, a hallmark of vexatious conduct as recognised in Attorney General v Barker [supra].

The Defendant's conduct has also caused harassment, inconvenience, and unreasonable pressure to the Plaintiff, its officers, and its solicitors. CIMB's officers have been repeatedly named in committal applications, compelled to respond to allegations of non-compliance, and subjected to ongoing litigation despite clear judicial findings in their favour. This is precisely the mischief contemplated by Paragraph 17, which empowers the Court to restrain litigants who misuse judicial processes to oppress or harass others.

The Defendant has further engaged in collateral attacks on final orders, particularly through motions filed in the Ipoh criminal proceedings. These motions, though not directed at CIMB, sought indirectly to revive the same accretions claim. Such collateral attacks are impermissible.

The Defendant's use of committal proceedings also warrants scrutiny. Committal is a coercive remedy reserved for clear and deliberate breaches of court orders. It is not a vehicle for re-litigating quantum disputes or for compelling a party to pay sums already adjudicated as not owing.

The Defendant's repeated committal applications premised entirely on her belief that CIMB owes her additional accretions demonstrate a misuse of the committal jurisdiction, inconsistent with its purpose and contrary to established principles of procedural fairness.

Taken together, these features habitual and persistent litigation, absence of reasonable grounds, harassment of the opposing party, collateral attacks on final orders, and misuse of committal proceedings constitute the hallmarks of vexatious litigation.

They fall squarely within the scope of Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the CJA 1964 and justify the Court's intervention to restrain further abuse of process. Is the relief sought proportionate?

The Court is satisfied that the relief sought by the Plaintiff is measured, calibrated, and proportionate to the mischief disclosed. It is important to emphasise that the Plaintiff does not seek a blanket prohibition preventing the Defendant from accessing the courts.

The order sought is far narrower. It merely requires the Defendant to obtain leave of a Judge before initiating any further proceedings on the same subject matter namely, her claim for additional accretions arising from the AMLA period.

The leave requirement functions as a procedural safeguard, not a substantive bar. It ensures that any future proceedings are first screened to determine whether they raise genuinely new issues or whether they constitute yet another attempt to re-litigate matters already decided.

In Sim Kooi Soon v Malaysia Airlines System (No 2) [2011] 4 MLJ 728, the applicant had filed 11 similar review applications with minor variations against Malaysia Airlines. The applications repeatedly sought to challenge matters already determined by the Courts. The applicant also made scandalous and baseless allegations against members of the judiciary and opposing counsel. In declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant, the Court of Appeal held as follows: "[1] What is the hallmark of a vexatious litigant? The claimant who sues the same party repeatedly in reliance on essentially the same cause of action, perhaps with minor variations, is termed as a vexatious litigant. [2] And a vexatious proceeding is one where the vexatious litigant had little or no basis in law and its effect was to subject the opposing party to inconvenience. [5] Sim Kooi Soon, you are a vexatious litigant. You keep on filing the same application one after another. You do not know when to stop. You exhibit the classic symptoms of a variant of de Clerambault's syndrome. It is a syndrome named after a French psychiatrist, Ga tan de Clerambault who described such syndrome as 'litigious behaviour' (see Baruk H, Les d lires passionels in (1959) 1 Trait de Psychiatrie at pp 532-540 reproduced in Themes and Variations in European Psychiatry [1974] (editors Hirsch S and Shepherd M)). According to the French psychiatrist Baruk H, patients who undertake a series of lawsuits, the first leading to others along with numerous pleas and hearings... become threatening and insulting and often denounce magistrates, lodge repeated complaints and sometimes become dangerous. The writer further explained that de clerambault's syndrome does not involve hallucinations. Sufferers, according to the writer, display a vehement and passionate attitude of filing unsustainable claims against others."

The relief sought here mirrors these principles. It does not extinguish the Defendant's right to litigate; it merely ensures that any future proceedings are bona fide, non-repetitive, and not an abuse of process.

In Tan Sri Dato' Kam Woon Wah & Ors v Dato' Sri Andrew Kam Tai Yeow [2025] MLJU 1302, the High Court confronted an extreme pattern of abusive litigation. The defendant had initiated no fewer than 24 separate proceedings, excluding appeals, injunction applications and interlocutory skirmishes all arising from the same underlying dispute concerning alleged indirect shareholding interests. Despite adverse findings by the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court's refusal of leave, the defendant persisted in filing fresh suits, committal proceedings, garnishee applications, mental-health proceedings and repeated judicial recusal attempts. The litigation history revealed a sustained and escalating pattern of re-litigation. In declaring the defendant a vexatious litigant, the High Court observed: [34] For this OS... the legal actions by the Defendant, and when he had initiated them, were also taken into account to determine whether to declare him a vexatious litigant. There were several key issues to consider whether the Defendant has 'habitually and persistently and without reasonable cause instituted vexatious legal proceedings' as required under Paragraph 17... including: (a) whether the number of proceedings instituted... is sufficient to establish 'habitual and persistent' vexatious litigation, considering both the quantity and character of the proceedings; and (b) whether the Defendant's overall conduct of litigation demonstrates vexatious behaviour."

The Court emphasised that the threshold is high, and courts must act with caution because such orders restrict access to justice. However, Malaysian jurisprudence recognises that where litigation becomes repetitive, oppressive, and devoid of legitimate legal purpose, judicial intervention is not only permissible but necessary.

The High Court adopted the test in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759, which asks whether the litigant has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds, such that a restraining order is required to prevent further abuse.

The Court of Appeal's guidance in Sim Kooi Soon v Malaysia Airlines System (No 2) [2011] 4 MLJ 728 was reaffirmed, and the Singapore Court of Appeal's reasoning in Lai Swee Lin Linda v AG [2016] SGCA 54 was found persuasive.

The High Court concluded: [36] In the present case, the Defendant's conduct satisfies that test. The hallmark indicators of vexatious litigation identified in Barker and adopted in local jurisprudence are all present. The Defendant has shown a habitual pattern of instituting proceedings that re-litigate issues already conclusively determined, see Ching Suet Yeen v Mageswaran a/l Rajangom & Ors [2025] MLJU 435. In particular, despite the ruling of the Court of Appeal and the refusal of leave by the Federal Court, he has persisted in asserting his alleged indirect shareholding... thus contravening the principle of res judicata."

This authority is directly relevant to our instant case. It demonstrates that: - quantity alone is not determinative the character of the proceedings matters; - re-litigation after final appellate determination is a hallmark of vexatious conduct; - collateral attacks (committal, garnishee, mental-health proceedings, recusal attempts) are classic indicators of abuse; - Paragraph 17 CJA 1964 is engaged when litigation becomes a vehicle for harassment rather than genuine dispute resolution.

This pattern has imposed significant burden on the Plaintiff, its officers, and the judicial system. A leave requirement is therefore a necessary and proportionate safeguard to protect the integrity of the judicial process, prevent harassment of the Plaintiff, and ensure that court resources are not diverted to repetitive or meritless proceedings.

In these circumstances, the Court finds that the relief sought is not punitive, not excessive, and not exclusionary. It is a balanced and appropriate response to the Defendant's sustained pattern of re-litigation.

It preserves her access to justice while ensuring that the judicial process is not misused. It is, in short, a proportionate safeguard entirely consistent with the purpose of Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

This Court reiterates that the leave requirement does not extinguish the Defendant's right of access to justice. That right remains intact. What the order does is introduce a judicial gatekeeping mechanism a safeguard ensuring that any future proceedings are genuinely meritorious and not merely another attempt to reopen matters already adjudicated to finality.

The Court does not close the doors of justice; it simply places a filter at the doorway, so that only claims with a legitimate foundation may pass through, while repetitive or abusive filings are kept at bay. This safeguard protects both the integrity of the judicial process and the proper administration of justice.

For the reasons analysed above namely, the Defendant's persistent re-litigation of matters conclusively determined; her repeated institution of overlapping and collateral proceedings without reasonable grounds; her misuse of committal processes; her continued pursuit of the same accretions claim under shifting legal labels; and the harassment, inconvenience and unreasonable pressure imposed upon the Plaintiff and its officers the Court finds that the Defendant's conduct squarely satisfies the statutory criteria for a vexatious litigant under Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

The mischief contemplated by the provision is precisely the mischief disclosed on the facts of this case. The intervention of the Court is therefore necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial process and to prevent further abuse. Orders Of The Court

Accordingly, and having considered the affidavits, submissions, authorities and the full litigation history, the Court makes the following orders: i. A declaration is hereby granted that the Defendant, TAN HOO ENG, is a vexatious litigant within the meaning and scope of Paragraph 17 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. ii. The Defendant be restrained and/or prohibited from instituting any further applications in Ipoh Criminal Court Application No. AA-44-01-01/2020 ("2020 Ipoh Criminal Application") and/or legal proceedings in any Court in Malaysia against the Plaintiff, its officers, its agents and/or its solicitors pertaining to the facts, cause of action and issues litigated in the Kuala Lumpur High Court (via Originating Summons No. WA- 24NCC-541-11/2020 and Originating Summons No. WA 24NCC-599-12/2021) ["Declaratory Actions"], the Court of Appeal (via Civil Appeal No. W-02(NCC)(A)-1716-09/2022 and Civil Appeal No. W-01(NCC)(A) 686-09/2022) ["Declaratory Appeals"] and the Federal Court (via Civil Application No. 08(f)-28-01/2025 (W)) ["Declaratory Leave Motion"] without first applying for and obtaining leave of a Judge of the High Court; iii. Any new legal proceedings instituted by the Defendant against the Plaintiff, its officers, its agents and/or its solicitors relating to the 2020 Ipoh Criminal Application and/or the Declaratory Actions, Declaratory Appeals and Declaratory Leave Motion in any Court after the filing of this Originating Summons but prior to the making of this Order, shall not be continued without first applying for and obtaining the leave of this Honourable Court; iv. A copy of this Order shall be published in the Gazette; v. Any application for leave referred to in prayer (2) above or any application to amend or discharge this Order by the Defendant must be served to the Plaintiff and/or its solicitors on record at least fourteen (14) days prior to the date of hearing; vi. Any legal proceedings instituted by the Defendant against the Plaintiff, its officers, its agents and/or its solicitors relating to the 2020 Ipoh Criminal Application and/or the Declaratory Actions, Declaratory Appeals and Declaratory Leave Motion without leave of Court shall be struck off immediately with costs payable to the Plaintiff; vii. Costs of this application are awarded to the Plaintiff. The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff's costs of RM10,000.00. I hereby order so. Date: 29.7.2026 NIXON ANAK KENNEDY KUMBONG Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Kuala Lumpur PARTIES For the Plaintiff: Solicitor: Sathya Kumardas / Daud Sulaiman Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co 7th Floor, Wisma Hamzah-Kwong Hing, No.1, Leboh Ampang, 50100 Kuala Lumpur. For the Defendant: Solicitor: Gurbachan Singh A/L Bagawan Singh Messrs Messrs Sandeep Gobindeep & Co. Wisma Pannu, No.10, Medan Istana 1, Bandar Ipoh Raya, 30000 Ipoh, Perak