CLC Properties Sdn Bhd v Chye Kwee Yeow (JB-12ANCvC-13-11/2025)

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JB-12ANCvC-13-11/2025 Kand. 22 22/07/2026 14:54:26 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI MUAR DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM RAYUAN SIVIL NO.: JB-12ANCvC-13-11/2025 ANTARA CLC PROPERTIES SDN BHD ... PERAYU

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(1) No appeal shall lie to the High Court in any of the following cases:

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(2) An appeal shall lie from any decision of a subordinate court in any proceedings relating to maintenance of wives or children, irrespective of the amount involved. [5] Namun begitu, Mahkamah ini terikat dengan pendirian Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes MT Ventures Sdn Bhd & Anor v QM Print Sdn Bhd and Another Appeal [2025] 6 MLJ 471. [6] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes MT Ventures (Supra) telah menegaskan bahawa larangan tersebut bukan bersifat mutlak, dan rayuan dibenarkan apabila permohonan strike out melibatkan isu undang-undang tulen yang berupaya melupuskan hak pihak-pihak secara muktamad, termasuk isu locus standi dan had masa. Ini dapat dilihat sebagaimana yang berikut :- [11] As such the court effectively defers the final determination in these cases to enable the adducing of further oral evidence. To allow an appeal at this juncture would effectively mean an unwarranted interruption in the flow of the legal process, given the substantive right of appeal that each litigant is entitled to once the parties' rights have been finally disposed of. The failure to strike out at a preliminary point can comprise the subject matter of the appeal at the end of trial. However, where the striking out is targeted at a specific point of law which has the capacity to determine the entire cause or action finally, the right of appeal accrues or vests at that point. [69] As stated at the outset when the dismissal of a striking out of a writ or pleadings relates to a question of locus or state immunity or other threshold conditions, then section 68(1)(f) CJA does not operate so as to preclude an appeal on such a dismissal. Such a construction allows for the continued bringing of applications to strike out on preliminary points or issues which do not warrant going through a full trial. And the reason why this is permissible under the provisions of the CJA is because the determination of the preliminary point has the effect of disposing of the rights of the parties finally. If a preliminary point or issue does not have such an effect then it remains unappealable. [7] Sehubungan itu, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa rayuan ini adalah boleh diterima dan wajar didengar. FAKTA MATERIAL YANG TIDAK DIPERTIKAIKAN [8] Fakta-fakta utama kes ini tidak dipertikaikan dan boleh dirumuskan seperti berikut: a) Perayu telah memasuki Perjanjian Jual Beli Saham (SSA) bertarikh 22 Februari 2019 dengan 46 pemegang saham (Vendors) bagi pembelian keseluruhan pegangan saham dalam Alinacity Sdn Bhd pada harga RM6,648,670.00. b) Plaintif ialah peguamcara kepada Vendors dan memegang Power of Attorney bertarikh 30 Disember 2017, semata-mata bagi tujuan melaksanakan transaksi tersebut. c) Plaintif bukan pihak kepada SSA, tidak dinamakan sebagai penerima manfaat, dan tidak mempunyai sebarang hak kontraktual peribadi di bawah SSA. d) SSA telah dilaksanakan sepenuhnya, harga belian telah dibayar sepenuhnya dan Perayu telah mengambil alih pengurusan syarikat. e) Pada 19 Februari 2025, Plaintif telah memfailkan satu tindakan civil atas nama peribadi beliau sendiri, menuntut jumlah RM769,999.00, bukan bagi atau atas nama Vendors di Mahkamah Sesyen di Kluang, Johor. ISU-ISU UNTUK DIPUTUSKAN [9] Isu-isu yang timbul dalam rayuan ini adalah: a) Sama ada Plaintif mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan tindakan ini atas nama peribadi; b) Sama ada wujud privity of contract antara Plaintif dan Perayu; c) Sama ada tuntutan Plaintif telah luput di bawah undang-undang had masa; dan d) Sama ada keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen boleh dipertahankan atas neraca kebarangkalian (balance of probabilities). KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH SESYEN [10] Mahkamah Sesyen telah menolak permohonan strike out atas alasan bahawa isu-isu yang dibangkitkan merupakan "triable issues" yang perlu dibicarakan sepenuhnya. [11] Dengan hormat, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pendekatan tersebut adalah tersalah arah dari segi undang-undang. [12] Isu utama seperti locus standi, privity of contract dan had masa bukanlah isu fakta yang memerlukan analisis berdasarkan kebarangkalian, melainkan isu undang-undang yang harus ditentukan secara definitif — iaitu, kewujudan isu-isu tersebut harus diputuskan menurut ketentuan undang-undang, apakah ada atau tidak. "BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES" tidak terpakai kepada isu undang-undang ambang seperti locus standi, privity of contract dan had masa. [13] Mahkamah ini berpendapat, Standard "balance of probabilities" hanya relevan selepas Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa tindakan tersebut wujud dan sah di sisi undang-undang. [14] Mahkamah ini berpendapat, jika Mahkamah bicara tersalah arah dalam menentukan isu undang-undang, dapatan berasaskan kebarangkalian adalah cacat sejak awal (ab initio) dan tidak boleh dipertahankan. [15] Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Sesyen telah tersalah dengan mensubjekkan isu undang-undang ambang kepada analisis kebarangkalian fakta, sedangkan isu tersebut perlu diputuskan secara definitif menurut ketentuan undang-undang. LOCUS STANDI [16] Isu locus standi adalah isu ambang yang perlu ditentukan pada peringkat awal. Ini adalah sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan menerusi kes Tai May Chean v New Way Capital Sdn Bhd & Anor [2020] 12 MLJ 471 yang menyatakan sebagaimana yang berikut :- [15] The applications to strike out the plaintiff's suit were premised on the issue of the locus standi of the plaintiff to commence the instant derivative action. The law in this context is without controversy and can be summarised as follows. The issue of locus standi should be decided as a preliminary point as it is in essence a threshold issue. In this regard, it is trite that the onus is on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case that it is entitled to bring a derivative action. The requirements to be fulfilled in order to succeed on the locus standi issue, include, firstly, that the company itself is unable to sue because the wrongdoers are themselves in control of its decision-making organs. Secondly, it must be established that the wrongdoers will not permit an action to be brought in the name of the company. Thirdly, it is mandatory for all the wrongdoers and the company to be cited as defendants in the derivative action. This is to provide an opportunity for them to respond to the allegations (see Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 3 MLJ 417; Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd And Others (No 2) [1982] Ch 204; Kingdom Seekers Ventures Sdn Bhd v Dato' Sri Chong Ket Pen & Ors [2015] MLJU 390; [2015] 1 LNS 546). [17] Plaintif bertindak sebagai ejen (donee) kepada Power of Attorney, bukan sebagai prinsipal. [18] Mahkamah ini berpendapat, kuasa ejen tidak boleh mewujudkan hak peribadi. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini senada dengan kes Affluent Sdn Bhd v Sumathi K Appukuttan Pillai & Anor [2001] MLJU 635 yang menyatakan sebagaimana yang berikut :-

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(6) An Attorney is only an agent of the principal, the Donor who in this case is the First Respondent. The authority of an agent cannot exceed the limit of authority granted by the principal to the agent. An Attorney cannot question the actions of its principal. The general rule on the authority of an agent can bee seen by reference to the book Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (16th Edition) at page 673. It is very clearly stated that the authority of the agent whether given by power of Attorney, or informally, even if for consideration, and whether or not expressed to be irrevocable, is revocable without prejudice to the fact that such revocation may be wrongful as between principal and agent. An agent has no locus standi to take action against the principal save for instances of wrongful revocation of authority and even then the action is only for breach of contract. Hence the donee has no capacity to sue the donor except under contract. In this case I find that there is clearly a gross abuse of the authority by the Attorney in disposing the Donor's property without the Donor's consent. The purported sale of the property by the Applicant has not been ratified by the First Respondent. In fact, when the First Respondent came to know about the intended disposal to Chew Huey Fen, the First Respondent did whatever a reasonable person would do to revoke the PA which was in fact revoked on 10.5.99. (Exhibit "SAP 3" of First Respondent's Supplementary Affidavit-in-Reply dated 17.5.99). [19] Plaintif menyaman untuk dirinya sendiri, bukan bagi pihak Vendors. Kekurangan locus standi ini adalah fatal dan tidak boleh diperbaiki melalui perbicaraan. [20] Ini bukan suatu persoalan yang bergantung kepada pertimbangan kebarangkalian. Isunya adalah bersifat ambang (threshold), iaitu sama ada Plaintif mempunyai locus standi untuk memulakan prosiding ini. Berdasarkan fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi tersebut. PRIVITY OF CONTRACT [21] Prinsip privity of contract adalah mantap dan tidak dipertikaikan. Mahkamah ini berpendapat, hanya pihak kepada sesuatu kontrak sahaja yang berhak untuk menguatkuasakannya, manakala pihak ketiga yang bukan pihak kepada kontrak tersebut tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk berbuat demikian. Prinsip ini ada dirujuk dalam kes Macon Works & Trading Sdn Bhd V Phang Hon Chin & Anor [1976] 2 MLJ 177 yang juga merujuk kepada kes Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847 di mana Viscount Haldane L.C. memutuskan bahawa: "... One is that only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our law knows nothing ofa jus quaesitum tertio arising by way of contract. Such a right may be conferred by way of property, as, for example, under a trust, but it cannot be conferred on a stranger to a contract as a right to enforce the contract inpersonam..." [22] Plaintif bukan pihak kepada SSA dan oleh itu tidak boleh menguatkuasakan hak di bawah perjanjian tersebut. [23] Sekali lagi, ini adalah isu undang-undang mutlak dan tidak tertakluk kepada imbangan kebarangkalian. HAD MASA [24] Tindakan kontrak tertakluk kepada tempoh enam (6) tahun di bawah Seksyen 6 Akta Had Masa 1953 sebagaimana yang berikut :a) actions founded on a contract or on tort;

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(1) Save as hereinafter provided the following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to saya) actions founded on a contract or on tort; b) actions to enforce a recognisance; c) actions to enforce an award; d) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any written law other than a penalty or forfeiture or of a sum by way of penalty or forfeiture.

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(2) An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of any matter which arose more than six years before the commencement of the action.

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(3) An action upon any judgment shall not be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable and no arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due.

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(4) An action to recover any penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture recoverable by virtue of any written law shall not be brought after the expiration of one year from the date on which the cause of action accrued: Provided that for the purpose of this subsection the expression "penalty" shall not include a fine to which a person is liable on conviction for a criminal offence.

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(5) Nothing in this section shall apply to-

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(6) Subject to sections 22 and 32 of this Act the provisions of this section shall apply (if necessary by analogy) to all claims for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief whether the same be founded upon any contract or tort or upon any trust or other ground in equity. [25] SSA bertarikh 22 Februari 2019 manakala Writ Saman telah difailkan pada 19 Februari 2025 di Mahkamah Sesyen di Kluang. [26] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa tempoh antara 22 Februari 2019 sehingga 19 Februari 2025 masih belum genap enam (6) tahun. Sebaliknya hanya berjumlah lima (5) tahun sebelas (11) bulan dan dua puluh lapan (28) hari. Oleh itu, tindakan Plaintif masih belum melangkaui tempoh had masa enam (6) tahun yang diperuntukkan di bawah undang-undang. UJIAN STRIKE-OUT DAN PENYALAHGUNAAN PROSES [27] Dalam Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, Mahkamah Agung menegaskan bahawa tuntutan yang jelas tidak boleh dikekalkan hendaklah dihentikan pada peringkat awal. Ini dapat dilihat sebagaimana yang berikut :- "... The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd)7, and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable' (see AG of Duchy of Lancaster v L & NW Riy Co8). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (see Wenlock v Moloney & Ors).. "...The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable..." [28] Mahkamah Sesyen telah gagal mengaplikasikan ujian ini dengan betul, dan sebaliknya membenarkan suatu tindakan yang jelas tidak mampan dari segi undang-undang untuk diteruskan. PENEMUAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI [29] Berdasarkan penemuan-penemuan diatas, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa tindakan yang dibawa oleh plaintiff adalah jelas tidak boleh dipertahankan dan hendaklah dihentikan dari awal. Mahkamah ini membuat dapatan bahawa: a) Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi; b) Tiada privity of contract; c) Keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen tidak boleh dipertahankan atas neraca kebarangkalian kerana ia diasaskan kepada salah arah undang-undang (misdirection of law). PERINTAH [30] Oleh yang demikian: Rayuan ini dibenarkan. Keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen Kluang bertarikh 7 November 2025 diketepikan. Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif dibatalkan. Kos diberikan kepada Perayu RM5000-00 tertakluk kepada fi alukator. BERTARIKH PADA 15 MEI 2026 YA DATUK ZAMRI BIN BAKAR PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI (1) MUAR Peguam bagi pihak Perayu TETUAN CHRISTINA CHIA LAW CHAMBERS Peguam bagi pihak Responden-Responden TETUAN RAMESH VASAN & CO.