Cosco Shipping Lines (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Muhammad Nur Ramadhan B. Abdullah (JA-29NCC-745-12/2022)

Pemiutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JC) telah memulakan suatu tindakan sivil terhadap Penghutang Penghakiman (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai JD) dan terhadap Bonanza Shipping Agencies Sdn Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Bonanza) yang dinamakan sebagai Defendan Kedua, antara lain bagi caj-caj demuraj kontainer-kontainer Defendan-defendan.

JD dan Bonanza telah diwakili oleh peguam yang sama dalam tindakan sivil tersebut. JD dan Bonanza telah memfailkan Pembelaan mereka masing-masing melalui peguam tersebut. Setelah perbicaraan penuh, Mahkamah Majistret telah membenarkan tuntutan JC pada 18.10.2022.

JD tidak merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Majistret tersebut. JC telah mengeluarkan surat tuntutan kepada JD namun JD masih enggan membayar tuntutan JC. Maka, JC telah memfailkan tindakan kebankrapan ini terhadap JD pada 14.12.2022.

JC telah menyampaikan Notis Kebankrapan terhadap JD secara kediri pada 22.12.2022. Lanjutan itu, JD telah memfailkan Saman Dalam Kamar (Lampiran 11) pada 19.4.2023 untuk antara lain mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan tersebut yang menjadi subjek pertikaian di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Analisis dan keputusan Mahkamah Isu Pertama: Jumlah tuntutan dalam Notis Kebankrapan adalah berlebihan

JD berhujah bahawa Penghakiman bertarikh 18.10.2022 hanya memerlukan JD membayar wang sebanyak RM64,083.20 dan bukan keseluruhan RM128,166.40, kerana JD adalah salah satu pihak daripada dua pihak yang perlu membayar tuntutan JC. JD berhujah bahawa Penghakiman tersebut tidak menyatakan bahawa Defendan-defendan perlu membayar JC secara bersesama dan berasingan.

Sebagai sokongan kepada hujahan ini, JD merujuk kepada kes Sumathy a/p Subramaniam v Subramaniam a/l Gunasegaran and another appeal [2017] 6 MLJ 753; [2018] 2 CLJ 305; [2017] MLRAU 280; [2017] 5 AMR 346 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[12] It is the argument of both appellants that while the respondent may be entitled to enter judgment for the same single sum, which the respondent did, the liability of each of them is necessarily joint. This is because, the summary judgment that was entered has not specified that both appellants are jointly and severally liable for that single sum. Where the judgment is silent or has not specified that liability is joint and several, the liability is necessarily joint. Where liability is joint, each of the appellant as defendant, shares that liability equally - see In Re Dato' Dr Elamaran M Sabapathy; ex p RHB Bank Bhd [2011] 10 CLJ 262. And so, when it comes to enforcing the judgment, the respondent has a right to enforce only half the judgment sum against each appellant. The respondent is not entitled to enforce the full sum against both of them, certainly not at the same time. [13] We agree with the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants…”

Sebagai isu permulaan, Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 3(2) Akta Insolvensi 1967 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Akta Tersebut) yang memperuntukkan bahawa:- “(2) A bankruptcy notice under this Act shall be in the prescribed form and shall state the consequences of non-compliance therewith and shall be served personally to a debtor: Provided that a bankruptcy notice- …(ii) shall not be invalidated by reason only that the sum specified in the notice as the amount due exceeds the amount actually due unless the debtor within the time allowed for payment gives notice to the creditor that he disputes the validity of the notice on the ground of such mistake; but if the debtor does not give such notice he shall be deemed to have complied with the bankruptcy notice, if within the time allowed he takes such steps as would have constituted compliance with the notice had the actual amount due been correctly specified therein.”

Peruntukan tersebut dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa setelah menerima Notis Kebankrapan, JD seharusnya memberi notis dalam tempoh masa yang dinyatakan dalam Notis Kebankrapan kepada JC bahawa jumlah yang dituntut adalah melebihi dari apa yang sepatutnya dituntut oleh JC, bagi membolehkan JD mencabar Notis Kebankrapan tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Kuala Excel Sdn Bhd v Chua Liang Hong [2022] MLJU 1350; [2022] 1 LNS 1336; [2022] MLRHU 1179; [2022] AMEJ 0802 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[24] The true meaning and purport of proviso (ii) to s. 3(2) of the Act is that, if within the time allowed for payment under the BN the JD does not object to the amount stated in the BN, he cannot thereafter object to the amount or ask for the BN to be invalidated on that ground.”

Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah, Notis Kebankrapan telah diserahkan kediri kepada JD pada 22.12.2022. JD memfailkan Notis Perlantikan Peguamcara dan Saman Dalam Kamar pada 19.4.2023 iaitu selepas hampir 4 bulan. Namun, tiada sebarang keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah bahawa JD telah memberi notis sebagaimana dikehendaki di bawah seksyen 3(2)(ii) Akta Tersebut kepada JC. Mahkamah juga dapati permohonan JD tersebut hanya difailkan selepas Petisyen Pemiutang difailkan pada 6.3.2023 dan diserahkan secara kediri kepada JD pada 4.4.2023. Malah, JD sendiri mengakui dalam perenggan 5 Afidavit Balasan JD (Lampiran 16) berkenaan kelewatan pemfailan Saman Dalam Kamar dalam Lampiran 11.

Maka, berdasarkan rekod di hadapan Mahkamah, JD jelas telah memungkiri peruntukan seksyen 3(2)(ii) Akta Tersebut. Mahkamah dalam hal ini merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan Goh Kein Hooi v OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad & Another Appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 516; [2014] 4 CLJ 274; [2014] 1 MLRA 287; [2013] 5 AMR 635 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[9] Here, the JD gave no such notice. It must be borne in mind that the JD came into the picture as early as on 14 September 2010 and that was during the stage of the creditors' petition. It has been held in Loh Kok Huah, Re: Ex P; Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1991] 3 CLJ 1817; [1991] 3 CLJ (Rep) 183, that a judgment debtor who seeks to invalidate a bankruptcy notice on the ground that the amount claimed therein exceeds the amount actually due must do so within the time stipulated in the bankruptcy notice for the payment to be made expeditiously. And every bankruptcy notice prescribes that the payment of the amount claimed therein must be made within seven days after the service of the notice not including the day of the service. [10] In so far as this appeal is concerned, on the authority of the Court of Appeal case in David Lim Hong Kee v. Perwira Affin Bank Berhad [2003] 4 CLJ 44, the BN was duly served based on the date of its advertisement and that would be on 12 November 2009. The JD had seven days from 13 November 2009 to challenge the amount claimed in the BN. Unfortunately, the JD did not do so. The challenge is mounted too late in the day - at the time when the CP is being heard.”

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah juga dapati JD tidak pernah memohon sebarang lanjutan masa dalam Lampiran 11 berkenaan keperluan memberi notis dalam tempoh masa yang ditetapkan menurut seksyen 3(2)(ii) Akta Tersebut. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa tempoh yang dinyatakan dalam seksyen 3(2)(ii) Akta Tersebut adalah mandatori dan Mahkamah tidak mempunyai sebarang bidang kuasa untuk merektifikasi pengabaian peruntukan mandatori oleh JD. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Re Liew Choo; Ex P Chuah Teng Heng [2016] MLJU 1836; [2016] 9 CLJ 598; [2016] MLRHU 763; [2016] AMEJ 1611 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan bahawa:- “[20] The preponderance of case law authorities on the point is thus unmistakably well established. Adherence to the time period stated in s. 3(2)(ii) of the BA is mandatory. Non-compliance is not a mere irregularity capable of attracting the curative provisions of s. 131 of the BA for it is established law that not all forms of irregularities will justify the setting aside of a bankruptcy notice… [22] Clearly, s. 131 is designed more to cure defects that would not mislead or prejudice a debtor. In the instant case, the non-compliance and defect was occasioned by the JD himself. In this context, it would be a tautology to speak of the JD being misled by his own mistake.”

Jikapun Mahkamah ingin melanjutkan tempoh masa menurut seksyen 93(4) Akta Tersebut atas usul Mahkamah sendiri, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa JD tidak memberikan sebarang alasan yang munasabah untuk mewajarkan lanjutan tersebut dalam permohonan JD. Mahkamah dapati antara asas untuk permohonan mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan oleh JD adalah keberhutangan di bawah penghakiman tersebut wajar ditanggung oleh kedua-dua Defendan secara sama rata memandangkan Penghakiman yang dimasukkan didakwa tidak menyatakan JD bertanggungan “bersesama dan berasingan” dengan defendan yang lain.

Asas ini sememangnya telah wujud semasa JD menerima Notis Kebankrapan. Selain menyatakan kelewatan yang dialami adalah kesilapan bona fide dan tidak disengajakan oleh JD, tiada sebarang penjelasan yang munasabah dari JD berkenaan kelewatan ini. Malah, JD menyatakan bahawa peguam yang mewakili JD telah memfailkan dokumentasi di Mahkamah Majistret tanpa pengetahuan JD dan walaupun nama JD tersenarai dalam senarai saksi, JD tidak pernah dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan di Mahkamah. JD mendakwa hanya mengetahui berkenaan penghakiman yang dimasukkan selepas perbicaraan penuh, hanya selepas menerima penghakiman tersebut dari peguam JD. Namun, JD tidak pernah mengambil langkah mengetepikan Penghakiman tersebut. Malah, apabila JD diserahkan dengan Notis Kebankrapan pada 22.12.2022, wujud persoalan mengapa JD tidak mengambil sebarang tindakan terutama untuk memberi notis mengenai tuntutan berlebihan sehingga CP diserahkan kepada JD pada 4.4.2023.

Maka, atas alasan ini sendiri, permohonan JD untuk mengetepikan Notis Kebankrapan atas dakwaan JC menuntut melebihi apa yang sepatutnya dalam Notis Kebankrapan wajar ditolak kerana JD gagal memenuhi keperluan di bawah seksyen 3(2)(ii) Akta Tersebut. Namun, bagi kesempurnaan, Mahkamah akan meneliti merit permohonan JD.

JD berhujah bahawa jumlah yang dituntut oleh JC adalah salah dan berlebihan kerana JC menuntut RM128,166.40 iaitu jumlah keseluruhan penghakiman tersebut. JD berhujah bahawa berdasarkan terma-terma penghakiman tersebut, penghakiman yang dimasukkan adalah terhadap kedua-dua Defendan tanpa menyatakan bahawa JD dikehendaki untuk membayar jumlah penghakiman tersebut secara bersesama dan berasingan dengan Defendan yang lain.

JC dalam hujahannya menafikan dakwaan JD dan berhujah bahawa penghakiman telah dimasukkan terhadap JC dan Bonanza secara bersesama dan/atau berasingan. Maka, JC berhujah bahawa dakwaan JD bahawa JD hanya perlu membayar separuh daripada penghakiman adalah tidak benar.

Mahkamah merujuk kepada penghakiman yang dimasukkan dalam tindakan asal seperti berikut (Eksibit A-2 Lampiran 15):- “MAKA ADALAH PADA HARI INI DIHAKIMI bahawa Penghakiman dimasukkan terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua secara bersesama dan/atau berasingan bagi:-

RM68,200.00;

Faedah pada kadar 0.1% sehari berdasarkan jumlah penghakiman dari 24.9.2020 sehingga tarikh pembayaran penuh; dan

Kos sebanyak RM4,588.00 dibayar kepada Plaintif.”

Mahkamah dapati adalah jelas penghakiman dimasukkan terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua secara “bersesama dan berasingan”. Berdasarkan penghakiman tersebut, JC telah membuat tuntutan terhadap JD dalam Notis Kebankrapan seperti berikut:-

Jumlah RM68,200.00

Faedah pada kadar 0.1% sehari RM55,378.00

berdasarkan Jumlah Penghakiman dari 24.9.2020 sehingga 14.12.2022 (dan berterusan) Kos RM4,588.00 Jumlah RM128,166.40

Mahkamah dapati tuntutan JC adalah menurut penghakiman bertarikh 18.10.2022 yang memasukkan penghakiman terhadap Defendan-defendan secara bersesama dan berasingan. Penghakiman tersebut tidak pernah diketepikan dan/atau dirayu oleh JD. Maka, Penghakiman tersebut adalah Penghakiman yang sah dan kebergantungan JD terhadap keputusan Sumathy Subramaniam (supra) adalah salah arah kerana penghakiman dalam kes ini dengan jelas menetapkan pembayaran secara “bersesama dan berasingan” oleh Defendan-defendan. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Sri Bukit Tunku Sdn Bhd v Ariffin Ab Hamid & Ors [2021] MLJU 1395; [2021] 1 LNS 1144; [2021] MLRHU 1038 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[13] It is trite law that a perfected judgment which has been sealed cannot be set aside except by a fresh action (See: Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75; [1998] 1 MLJ 393; Adam Primus Varghese bin Abdullah v. Wee Loke Choon & Ors and another appeal [2019] 2 CLJ 190; [2019] 3 MLJ 402 Rohaya bt Ali Haidar v. AmBank (M) Bhd (previously known as 'MBf Finance Bhd') [2016] 4 CLJ 563; [2016] 2 MLJ 819).”

Dalam apa jua keadaan, Mahkamah dapati prinsip dalam kes Sumathy Subramaniam (supra) telah dikaji semula dan diterbalikkan dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 5 MLJ 253; [2021] 7 CLJ 823; [2021] 5 MLRA 178; [2021] 6 AMR 429. Perkara ini ada dirumuskan dalam kes Re Mohd Saiful Azuar Md Isa; Ex P Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd [2021] 12 MLJ 474; [2021] 8 CLJ 785; [2021] MLRHU 895; [2021] AMEJ 1029 seperti berikut:- “Postscript [75] I had settled the grounds of this judgment on 14 July 2021 in preparation for the delivery of my decision on 16 July 2021. However, before releasing the grounds of this judgment, it came to my attention that the Federal Court had delivered its grounds of decision on 19 July 2021 in Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v.Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 7 CLJ 823 wherein the Federal Court overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal in Edwin Cassian (supra), overruled the Court of Appeal decision in Sumathy (supra) and approved the reasoning which led to the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko (supra) that a judgment entered for payment of a sum of money against several judgment debtors imposed upon each of them, a joint and several liability to honour the entire judgment debt, and not merely an equal portion of it, unless otherwise stated…”

Memandangkan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut mengikat kesemua Mahkamah bawahan, Mahkamah merujuk kepada prinsip-prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes tersebut seperti berikut:- “The Position In Malaysia [24] In this jurisdiction in any event, the common law is inapplicable, as we are governed by the Contracts Act 1950. Section 44 of the Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136) ("the Contracts Act") is the relevant provision relating to joint liability… [26] In summary therefore, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the contract, all joint contracts effectively impose a full liability for the debt on each of the promisors, by virtue of s. 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: see Pollock & Mulla: Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts - vol. 1, 13th edn., (India: LexisNexis, 2009), at p. 1043-1044. Thus, where the debts are jointly incurred, each promisee is liable for the whole amount: see Dhanki Mahajan v. Rana Chandubha Vakhatsing AIR 1969 SC 69. [27] Accordingly, so long as a judgment debt remains unrealised, the judgment creditor is entitled to proceed against one or any number of judgment debtors to secure the performance of an obligation in its entirety… [39] In our considered opinion, the courts below erred in law in invoking the presumption that joint liability means liability for only half the debt and not the full amount. As mentioned earlier, joint and several liability gives rise to one joint obligation and to as many several obligations as there are joint and several promises. The promisee, ie, the Board, is therefore entitled to proceed against one promisor, or the other, or both, in order to procure full performance as is evident from s. 44 of the EPF Act.”

Secara spesifik, Mahkamah Persekutuan juga memutuskan bahawa ketiadaan perkataan “joint and several” dalam penghakiman tidak menghalang Pemiutang Penghakiman dari menuntut keseluruhan penghakiman dari setiap Defendan. Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[40] Furthermore, there is a notable absence of terms creating "joint" liability in the judgment itself. Even if such a term had been inserted that would not entitle the courts to conclude that liability is somehow halved between the two obligors or promisors. Given the prevailing interpretation of s. 44 of the EPF Act, merely inserting the word "jointly" in the consent judgment would not suffice to halve liability as there must be express words to that effect to state that the liability of the joint promisors is to be borne in equal proportions. Moreover, such halved liability should take root from the original promise whereby the liability of a promisor for a debt owed to a creditor is expressly stated to be only half of the debt. If we are to accept the premise that "joint and several liability" cannot be read into the judgment due to an absence of such words, it similarly follows that a silent judgment cannot automatically be inferred to impose "joint" liability where there is no such mention. This is especially so when the liability that arises is explicitly stipulated by statute. In the circumstances, liability under the consent judgment must necessarily be both joint and several in light of our discussion above.”

Mahkamah merujuk kepada hujahan tambahan JD bahawa prinsip kes Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut tidak mengikat Mahkamah ini kerana kes ini tidak melibatkan tafsiran peruntukan Akta Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 1991, sebagaimana dalam kes Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat, walaupun petikan di atas merujuk kepada seksyen 44 Akta KWSP, namun prinsip tersebut tidak hanya terhad kepada kes-kes KWSP semata-mata tetapi juga kepada kesemua kes lain secara am. Perkara ini ada diputuskan dalam kes Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “[6] Thus, based on the above Federal Court decision, it is clear that the said decision was not limited to the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 only but that the liability of the JD herein is joint and several and as the said Judgment has not been satisfied, the JD continues to remain in law jointly and severally liable for the same under section 44 of the Contracts Act 1950.”

Malah, perkara ini juga kelihatan jelas apabila Mahkamah Persekutuan mengendors prinsip-prinsip kes Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Fong Soon Leong [2021] 2 MLJ 234; [2021] 5 CLJ 1; [2021] 3 MLRA 594; [2021] 2 AMR 676 seperti berikut:- “…The Court of Appeal, speaking through Justice Darryl Goon Siew Chye, in a meticulous and comprehensive judgment examining a long line of cases, concluded that it differed in reasoning with Sumathy. However, the Court of Appeal was constrained to dismiss the appeal as it regarded itself bound by the decision in Sumathy based on the rule of stare decisis as enunciated in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718. We would, with respect concur with the reasoning in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v. Fong Soon

Dalam kes Kejuruteraan Bintai (supra), Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa:- “[49] Where an order is made or judgment recovered against two or more parties for payment of a sum of money, without more, it simply means that all the judgment debtors and each of them is liable for the amount adjudged to be due. There is no need to read into such a judgment or order the idea of joint and several liability because in the manner of its pronouncement that is already its effect, unless stated otherwise. In this, we agree with the observation of Lee Swee Seng JC in Lim Koon Chow v. AmBank (M) Bhd at para. [109] of His Lordship's judgment, referred to above. [50] Indeed, what should also not be done is to read into and to qualify such a judgment as only creating a "joint liability" for the sum adjudged or ordered, with the additional consequence that each defendant is only liable for an equal portion of the judgment debt. [51] If a borrower of a fixed sum of money is adjudged liable to repay that sum, he remains liable for that sum. It cannot be that if there exists a guarantor found to be jointly liable, the principal debtor's debt and liability therefore becomes half the amount if judgment is entered against both the principal debtor and his guarantor. Without having to be expressed, the liability of the principal for the whole amount borrowed remains. The guarantor's liability is also necessarily for the same amount guaranteed. They are both thus jointly liable for the same amount adjudged or ordered. They are also each individually liable for that amount. They are both jointly and severally liable… [56] Upon the authorities discussed and the consistency of judicial views expressed, we are inclined to conclude that a judgment entered for payment of a sum of money against several judgment debtors imposes upon them and each of them, a joint and several liability to honour the entire judgment debt, and not merely an equal portion of it, unless otherwise stated. It is unfortunate that the conclusion that has been arrived at in this case is at variance with the decision in Sumathy.”

Berdasarkan nas-nas di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hujahan JD bahawa JD hanya bertanggungan secara sama rata terhadap keseluruhan hutang tertunggak adalah tidak bermerit.

Mahkamah juga dapati JD mendakwa bahawa JC berniat jahat apabila hanya membawa tindakan kebankrapan terhadap JD di sini dan bukan terhadap Syarikat Bonanza. Mahkamah dapati aduan JD tersebut tidak berasas kerana syarikat Bonanza telah digulungkan pada 25.5.2022 dan JC telah memfailkan borang bukti hutang terhadap syarikat Bonanza melalui surat peguam JC kepada Jabatan Insolvensi bertarikh 28.12.2022 (Eksibit A3 Lampiran 15). Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa setelah sesuatu syarikat digulungkan dan bukti hutang telah difailkan, tiada lagi tindakan pelaksanaan lain yang dapat diambil terhadap syarikat tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Gan Khian Pin v Malayan Banking Berhad [2021] MLJU 3039; [2021] 1 LNS 2433; [2021] AMEJ 2100 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “The principal debtor has been wound-up on 13.5.2020 and Proof of Debt has been filed by the JC against the principal debtor. There is no confirmation by the Liquidator that the assets or property of the principal debtor company, if any, is sufficient to satisfy all the claims lodged by its creditors. The effect of a winding up order was to deprive the company of the beneficial ownership of all its property. See Yamamori (Hong Kong) Ltd v. Borneo Hotel Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 4 CLJ Rep 235. Hence, there is no avenue left for the JC to recover the debt from the principal borrower by using other modes of execution and enforcement within the meaning of s. 5(4) & (6) of the IA

From the Affidavit evidence, this Court is satisfied that the JC has exhausted all modes of execution and enforcement to recover the debt owed to them by the JD. See KKRMC Trading Sdn Bhd v. Tan Tiang Lai [2020] 1 LNS 852 (HC).”

Maka, atas alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah menolak hujahan JD atas isu pertama yang ditimbulkan. Isu Kedua: Sama ada terdapat “set-off” terhadap

JD mendakwa bahawa JD mempunyai tuntutan set-off terhadap JC dalam guaman sivil yang mana penghakiman bertarikh 18.10.2022 dimasukkan. JD mendakwa bahawa semasa JD berjumpa dengan peguam yang mewakili JD pada ketika itu, JD dimaklumkan bahawa tuntutan tersebut tidak melibatkan JD dan hanya syarikat Bonanza (Defendan Kedua) yang terlibat. JD mendakwa bahawa JD tidak mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai kes tersebut sehingga mendapat sesalinan penghakiman daripada peguam tersebut.

JD mendakwa bahawa dokumen-dokumen yang difailkan dalam guaman tersebut oleh peguam tersebut dibuat tanpa pengetahuan atau kelulusan oleh JD. JD mendakwa bahawa walaupun nama JD diletakkan dalam senarai saksi Defendan-defendan, JD langsung tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan dalam perbicaraan tersebut.

Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah dapati JD tidak pernah mengambil sebarang langkah untuk mengetepikan penghakiman yang dimasukkan terhadap JD selepas perbicaraan penuh walaupun JD mendeposkan isu-isu yang dinyatakan di atas. Undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa sesuatu penghakiman yang tidak diketepikan adalah penghakiman yang sah dan perlu dihormati oleh kesemua pihak. Undang-undang juga adalah jelas bahawa Mahkamah Kebankrapan tidak boleh mengkaji merit penghakiman tersebut melainkan terdapat isu fraud atau perlanggaran kaedah keadilan dalam memperolehi penghakiman tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Chan Wai Fong (supra) di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa :- “[7] As the said Judgment has not been stayed or overturned, the Judgment remains valid and binding and the JD must obey the said Judgment. I refer to Re Tioh Ngee Heng [2000] 1 LNS 197 where Steve Shim J (as His Lordship then was) held: "It is trite law that an order, even if irregular, is valid and enforceable until set aside. This principle is particularly relevant in bankruptcy proceedings where the court generally will not look behind the judgments or order save in very limited circumstances of fraud or illegality, etc. In Isaacs v. Robertson [1985] AC 97, Lord Diplock speaking for the Privy Council approved the proposition advanced by Romer LJ in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952] 2 All ER 567 who said at p. 569:- It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, LC, said in Chuck v. Cremer [1846] 1 Coop temp Cott 338 at p 342, 47 ER 884 at p. 885): 'A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid-whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general, follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. This principle has been followed by our Supreme Court in Sovereign General Insurance Sdn Bhd v. Koh Tian Bee [1988] 1 CLJ 277 (Rep); [1988] 1 CLJ 155; [1988] 1 MLJ 304." [8] Following from the above, this Court cannot go behind the Judgment as stated by the Supreme Court in Sovereign General Insurance Sdn Bhd v. Koh Tian Bee [1988] 1 CLJ Rep 277; [1988] 1 MLJ 304 where it was held that "In the exercise of his jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings, the learned judge cannot go behind the judgment.”

Lebih-lebih lagi, keperluan JD untuk memohon mengetepikan penghakiman yang dimasukkan menjadi lebih mustahak memandangkan penghakiman tersebut adalah dimasukkan setelah perbicaraan penuh. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Jacob Rabindranath M Krishnan v GP Autobat Sdn Bhd [2009] MLJU 106; [2009] 5 CLJ 104; [2009] 2 MLRA 49 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa;- “[5] The leading case on the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court to go behind a judgment and inquire into the validity of the debt is of course Re Flatau; Ex Parte Scotch Whisky Distillers Ltd [1888] 22 QBD 83 where Lord Esher MR also said this at p. 85: It is not necessary now to repeat that, when an issue has been determined in any other Court, if evidence is brought before the Court of Bankruptcy of circumstances tending to show that there has been fraud, or collusion, or miscarriage of justice, the Court of Bankruptcy has power to go behind the judgment and to inquire into the validity of the debt. But that the Court of Bankruptcy is bound in every case as a matter of course to go behind a judgment is a preposterous proposition. There is no statute which imposes any such obligation on the Court of Bankruptcy; s. 7 does no more than give a judicial discretion. [6] In Re Tunku Mariam bt Tuanku Zainal Abidin Ex Parte Arab Malaysian Finance [2007] 8 CLJ 626; [2007] 8 MLJ 714, Vincent Ng Kim Khoay J (now JCA) had occasion to consider what Lord Esher meant by the expression "miscarriage of justice". Our learned brother referred in his judgment to Re Howell [1915] 84 LJKB 1399 where the court held as follows: I have only been troubled in this case to what is the meaning of the words 'miscarriage of justice' in Flatau, In Re (22 QBD 83). I think that the working rule is that the Registrar can go behind the judgment where it is a judgment by default or compromise. He ought not to go behind it, when the judgment has been given in open Court against a person who is represented. [7] In our judgment the foregoing passage really concludes the point against the appellant. Since this was the case in which parties were represented and there was a full trial, the exception provided for in Re Flatau has no application. To reiterate, there was here no miscarriage of justice within the meaning of that expression as employed by a court of bankruptcy.”

Dalam kes ini, JD tidak mendeposkan sebarang fakta yang menunjukkan penghakiman tersebut diperolehi secara frod. Hujahan JD adalah JD mempunyai set-off yang sah dan memandangkan JD tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan di Mahkamah bicara, JD tidak dapat mengetengahkan pembelaan ini. Dalam hal ini, setelah meneliti kertas-kertas kausa yang difailkan JD dalam kes ini, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan JC bahawa JD tidak pernah menghuraikan apakah tuntutan balas atau set off yang bersamaan atau melebihi jumlah penghakiman yang diperolehi JC. Faktor ini bertindak fatal kepada JD sebagaimana dihujahkan JC dengan merujuk kes Datuk Lim Kheng Kim v Malayan Banking Bhd [1993] 2 MLJ 298; [1993] 3 CLJ 324; [1993] 1 MLRA 288; [1993] 2 AMR 1285 di mana Mahkamah Agung memutuskan bahawa:- “It is, therefore, necessary that the affidavit in question should, on the face of it, show a counterclaim, set-off, or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the Judgment debt, and which the debtor could not have set up in the action in which the judgment or order was obtained. We are concerned here with the content of the said affidavit. It merely denies and disputes that the appellant was indebted to the respondent in the sum of RM2,603,913.28, but fails to disclose that he has a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand etc. against the respondent, which he is required to depose under s. 3(1)(i) of the Act and provided for in Form 7.”

Dalam hal ini, JD tidak seharusnya sekadar hanya membuat dakwaan bahawa tindakan atau peninggalan peguam JD yang menyebabkan JD tidak dapat menimbulkan pembelaan set-off dalam tindakan asal. JD seharusnya mengambil langkah lanjut untuk mengidentifikasi apakah pembelaan set-off yang tidak mungkin dibawa semasa tindakan asal tersebut masih berterusan. Kegagalan berbuat demikian akan bertindak fatal kepada JD sebagaimana diputuskan dalam kes Tan Suan Kin v Evelyn June Charlie [2015] MLJU 705; [2015] 1 LNS 898; [2015] MLRHU 251; [2015] AMEJ 1537 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:- “The JD has not explained why she could not have set up the counterclaim, if any, in the action in which the judgment was obtained. She merely blamed her former solicitor. It is obvious that any potential counterclaim of the JD is directly related to the agreement that she signed with JC and therefore it should have been set up in the earlier action. Therefore, she ought to satisfy the court why it "could not have been set up" in the earlier action. In my opinion, the words "could not have been set up" refer to some legal impediment that had prevented the counter claim from being filed. However, the JD has only implied that her former solicitor did not do his job. Therefore, she has only explained why the counterclaim was not filed and not why it "could not have been set up". On this ground as well, the learned Deputy Registrar ought to have dismissed the application of the JD.”

Maka, berdasarkan alasan-alasan ini, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa isu kedua yang ditimbulkan JD bahawa JD mempunyai set-off terhadap tuntutan JC juga turut tidak bermerit.

Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah menolak lampiran 11 dan setelah mendengar hujahan berkenaan kos, JD diperintahkan untuk membayar JC kos RM1,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Bertarikh: 25 September 2023 Disediakan oleh, ………………………………….

Tetuan C.S.Tan Seah & Partners Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman Unit 312, (Lobby 6), 3rd Floor, Block C, Damansara Intan, No.1, Jalan SS 20/27, 47400 Petaling Jaya, Selangor (Ruj: SS/CSL/12223.20) …

Tetuan M Manoharan & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman Suite C5-5, 5th Floor, Tower C, Wisma Goshen, Plaza Pantai, Off Jalan Pantai Baru 59200 Kuala Lumpur (Ruj: MM/CV3169/BB) … Puan Seetahpriya Sivanathan Kes-kes yang dirujuk:

Sumathy a/p Subramaniam v Subramaniam a/l Gunasegaran and another appeal [2017] 6 MLJ 753; [2018] 2 CLJ 305; [2017] MLRAU 280; [2017] 5 AMR 346

Kuala Excel Sdn Bhd v Chua Liang Hong [2022] MLJU 1350; [2022] 1 LNS 1336; [2022] MLRHU 1179; [2022] AMEJ 0802

Goh Kein Hooi v OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Berhad & Another Appeal [2014] 1 MLJ 516; [2014] 4 CLJ 274; [2014] 1 MLRA 287; [2013] 5 AMR 635

Re Liew Choo; Ex P Chuah Teng Heng [2016] MLJU 1836; [2016] 9 CLJ 598; [2016] MLRHU 763; [2016] AMEJ 1611

Sri Bukit Tunku Sdn Bhd v Ariffin Ab Hamid & Ors [2021] MLJU 1395; [2021] 1

LNS 1144; [2021] MLRHU 1038 Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 5 MLJ 253; [2021] 7 CLJ 823; [2021] 5 MLRA 178; [2021] 6 AMR 429

Re Mohd Saiful Azuar Md Isa; Ex P Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd [2021] 12 MLJ 474; [2021] 8 CLJ 785; [2021] MLRHU 895; [2021] AMEJ 1029

Per: Chan Wai Fong v Ex-Parte: Everest Web Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 1253; [2022] 1 LNS 1277; [2022] AMEJ 0733

Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Fong Soon Leong [2021] 2 MLJ 234; [2021] 5 CLJ 1; [2021] 3 MLRA 594; [2021] 2 AMR 676

Gan Khian Pin v Malayan Banking Berhad [2021] MLJU 3039; [2021] 1 LNS 2433; [2021] AMEJ 2100

Jacob Rabindranath M Krishnan v GP Autobat Sdn Bhd [2009] MLJU 106; [2009] 5 CLJ 104; [2009] 2 MLRA 49

Datuk Lim Kheng Kim v Malayan Banking Bhd [1993] 2 MLJ 298; [1993] 3 CLJ 324; [1993] 1 MLRA 288; [1993] 2 AMR 1285

Tan Suan Kin v Evelyn June Charlie [2015] MLJU 705; [2015] 1 LNS 898; [2015] MLRHU 251; [2015] AMEJ 1537