Samada Perayu/Defendan dapat membuktikan gantirugi yang dialami. [23] Bagi isu (i) iaitu samada kos sewaan mesin adalah percuma, Mahkamah ini ingin merujuk kepada sebut harga yang dikemukakan yang mana ianya jelas menunjukkan bahawa pihak Perayu/Defendan telah bersetuju untuk menyewa mesin dan peralatan tersebut pada kadar sewaan RM210,000.00 sebulan. Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan Perayu/Defendan bahawa beliau hanya perlu membayar kos diesel sahaja. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Perayu/Defendan telah salah tafsir terhadap sebut harga yang telah dipersetujui sebelum ini. 9 [24] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan dapatan Tuan HMS bahawa sewaan mesin dan peralatan tersebut hendaklah ditanggung oleh Defendan. Tuan HMS telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[12] It is also the finding of the court that, having regard to the fact that the parties had not known to each other before the contract and the scale of the project, for the construction of a highway, it makes no commercial sense for the Plaintiff to rent out the machinery and equipment to the Defendant for free … DW1 had admitted in cross-examination that he or the Defendant did not know the Plaintiff before this. They were introduced to the Plaintiff by an employee of the Defendant. The terms of the quotation were negotiated by both parties and drawn out after both parties had agreed to it. Evidence showed that the Plaintiff had hired out the machinery and equipment on a commercial basis and rental was to be paid by the Defendant. This aspect was admitted and had gone unexamined by the Defendant. This was the intention of the contracting parties and it had not been proven otherwise. [13] In his testimony DW1 had insisted that there had been a practice of renting out expensive equipment amongst companies for free, but had failed to provide examples of such practice and the names of 10 companies involved. As such, this piece of testimony is devoid of any evidential value. Having regard to the evidence adduced by both the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s witnesses, the court found that the Defendant’s contention that rental for machinery and equipment and costs for operators are to be borne by the Plaintiff is a misrepresentation of the terms of the Quotation. They had never been incorporated in the terms of the Quotation …” [25] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah ingin merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Spm Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (2016) 1 CLJ 177 yang memutuskan: “[35] Gopal Sri Ram di dalam kes Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd v. M-Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 CLJ 269; [2010] 1 MLJ 597 at p. CLJ; [42] 620G (MLJ) memutuskan bahawa: “Here it is important to bear in mind that a contract is to be interpreted in accordance with the following guidelines. First, a court interpreting a private contract is not confined to the four corners of the document. It is entitled to look at the factual matrix which forms the background to the transaction. Second, the factual matrix which forms the background to the transaction includes all material that was reasonably available to the parties. Third, the interpreting court must disregard any part of the background that is declaratory of subjective intent only. Lastly, the court should adopt an objective approach when interpreting a private contract.” 11 [36] This objective approach to interpretation is the "ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation which they were at the time of the contract." (K. Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts (5th edn, 2011), Sweet and Maxwell, at 1.03). [37] The purpose of interpretation, as Lord Steryn observed in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408, "is to assign to the language of the text the most appropriate meaning which the words can legitimately bear." [38] Lewison commented upon this, saying: Beguilingly simple though the formulation of Lord Hoffmann's first principle is, it contains the fundamental philosophy underlying the English approach to the interpretation of contracts. That is that interpretation does not involve the search for the actual intentions of parties but for an objective meaning. The purpose of interpretation is not to find out what the parties intended, but what the language of the contract would signify to a properly informed ordinary speaker of English. The refocusing of intention on the impression made by the words on the reader, rather than on the intended message of the writer, is a departure from the traditional formulation of the aim of interpretation, namely to ascertain the presumed intention of the parties. It is this philosophy that explains the rationale for such of the exclusionary rules of evidence as remain in English 12 law. In this respect, as Lord Hoffmann acknowledged, the five principles do not follow the way in which serious utterances are interpreted in ordinary life. (emphasis added) [39] Professor McMeel in G. McMeel, The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication and Rectification (2nd edn, 2011) adds at 1.44 to 1.46: First, construction is concerned with ascertaining the meaning which the document (or utterance) would convey to the reasonable person. It is not concerned with identifying some (fictional) common intention of the parties. The parties are taken to have contracted on the basis that they both accept the determination of an independent tribunal as to the meaning and effect of the language they have deployed, applying the standard of the reasonable person: In this sense the meaning is "objectively ascertained." Secondly, the court adopts a common sense approach to the meaning of contractual language, rather than one based on literalism or technical arguments of syntax and semantics. Whilst the general rule is that a commonsense reading is to be preferred, in respect of some contracts or some species of contractual clause a stricter approach to language may be adopted on the grounds of legal policy, 13 Thirdly, the tribunal considers as relevant not just the immediate context of the remainer of the instrument, but all the admissible surrounding circumstances (legal, regulatory and factual background, albeit not the prior negotiations or declarations of subjective intention) when interpreting the language. Crucially this approach is adopted whether or not a particular phrase or clause is unclear or ambiguous. Ambiguity is no longer a precondition for recourse to such "extrinsic evidence. [40] Consistent with this analysis is the case of Berjaya Times Square (supra) where at p. 297 CLJ; [43] 621E, Gopal Sri Ram, FCJ (as His Lordship then was) adopting the British authorities, states: The most recent statement of the guideline to interpretation of contract statutes and other instruments is to be found in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom [2009] UKPC 10, where delivering the advice of the board, Lord Hoffman said: The Court has no power to improve upon the instrument which it is called upon to construe, whether it be a contract, a statute or articles of association. It cannot introduce terms or make it fairer or more reasonable. If it is concerned only to discover what the instrument means. However, that meaning is not necessarily or always what the authors or parties to the document would have intended. It is the meaning which the instrument would convey to a reasonable person having all the 14 background knowledge which would reasonably be available to the audience to whom the instrument is addressed... It is this objective meaning which is conventionally called the intention of the parties or the intention of Parliament, or the intention of whatever person or body was or is deemed to have been the author of the instrument. [45] As a relevant addendum, the relationship between interpretation and implication are considered in this discussion of the principles of construction. According to Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10; [2009] 1 WLR 1988, PC this characterisation can be traced back to the speech of Lord Pearson in Trollope & Colls Ltd v. North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601, HL, where His Lordship had warned: the court does not make a contract for the parties. The court will not even improve the terms which the parties have made for themselves, however desirable the improvement might be. The court's function is to interpret and apply the contract which the parties have made for themselves. If the express terms are perfectly clear and free from ambiguity, there is no choice to be made between different possible meanings: the clear terms must be applied even if the court thinks some other terms would have been suitable. An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if courts finds that the parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract.” 15 [26] Namun, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa tuntutan Responden/Plaintif bagi kos mobilisasi dan demobilisasi sebanyak RM30,000.00 seperti invois 1001 dan 1002 yang dihantar kepada Perayu/Defendan adalah wajar ditolak. Hal ini adalah kerana ianya telah dipersetujui di dalam sebut harga tersebut yang mana kos bagi mobilisasi dan demobilisasi hendaklah ditanggung oleh pihak Responden/Plaintif. Malahan Responden/Plaintif juga telah bersetuju untuk menanggung kos tersebut. [27] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa Perayu/Defendan hanya perlu membayar kos sewaan dan peralatan tersebut iaitu sebanyak RM210,000.00 dan bukannya kos mobilisasi dan demobilisasi kepada Responden/Plaintif. [28] Bagi isu (ii), iaitu samada wang RM100,000.00 yang dibayar oleh Perayu/Defendan adalah merupakan deposit. Di dalam kes ini Perayu/Defendan mendakwa bahawa bayaran RM100,000.00 yang dibuat kepada Responden/Plaintif adalah merupakan bayaran deposit. Namun, pihak Responden/Plaintif menyatakan bahawa bayaran tersebut adalah merupakan bayaran sebahagian daripada sewaan mesin dan peralatan tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Tuan HMS tidak terkhilaf apabila mendapati bayaran RM100,000.00 tersebut adalah merupakan bayaran sebahagian daripada sewaan mesin dan peralatan tersebut dan bukannya deposit sebagaimana dakwaan pihak Perayu/Defendan. [29] Bayaran tersebut dapat dibuktikan apabila terdapat nota di atas slip bayaran yang dikemukakan yang berbunyi: 16 “Bayaran untuk sewa mesin as per invoice no. 1001 RM 100,000.00 No. cek BBMB 724517” (di bundle B, m/s 3).” [30] Selain dari itu, Klausa A1 dan A2 di dalam sebut harga yang dikemukakan jelas menunjukkan bahawa sewaan adalah sebagai bayaran bagi penggunaan mesin dan peralatan yang dibekalkan. Klausa A1 dan A2 menyatakan seperti berikut: Klausa A1: “The above quoted machinery rentals shall be inclusive of operator and operating overheads which shall be borne by (hereby refers to as “Alpha Focus (M) Sdn Bhad.”). The Hirer (refers as “Chengaljati Sdn Bhd”) shall provide diesel.” Klausa A2 [Klausa A1 hendaklah dibaca bersama dengan Klausa A2] “The normal working hours for operator shall be from 8 am to 5 pm, Saturday to Thursday with one hour lunch break and any usage beyond the time frame shall be paid as overtime for operator.” [31] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan Responden/Plaintif seperti yang dihujahkan berikut: 17 “The learned trial judge also correctly found that the timing of payment proves that this was part payment of rental and not deposit. The RM 100 000.00 was paid only after the Respondent had issued Invoice no. 1001 for RM 196 000.00 being the first month’s rental and Appellant’s own slip payment shows that Appellant was paying this RM 100 000.00 against the same invoice rental and not deposit.” [32] Sekarang Mahkamah akan meneliti dan menganalisa mengenai isu