[Pendakwa Raya] v Vignes A/l Valamarajah (BA-45-24-07/2020)

The only issue that moved this Court to rule that no prima facie case proven was on the non-satisfactory identification of the 1st accused, 2nd and the 3rd. In short, the victim Krishnan (SP12) clearly refute the 1st accused’s role as being the suspect at the crime scene. The 2nd accused said to be ‘Babu’ was not satisfactorily identified according to the Turnbull guidelines. As to the 3rd accused, no evidence was led as to how a 4 distinction was made to show that it was the 3rd accused that was identified and not his twin brother. Prosecution case: findings by this Court on SP1’s evidence [4] It started with Eswaran (SP1) who is the deceased’s son also the brother of the victim Krishnan (SP12) who on 24.6.2017, received a call from someone name Karthik (SP15) at about 4.30am informing him that the deceased and brother Krishnan were hit and had fallen down. SP15 gave SP1 the location of the scene which was on a road of Sri Kembangan, said by SP1 to be of about 600meters from SP1’s home.

On the same date, another son of deceased named Harikumar SP16 also received a call from one Nagarajan informing him that SP16’s father (the deceased) had been slashed and Nagarajan notified SP16 the location. SP16 then headed to the site.

Thus, based on the preliminary story given by SP1 and SP16, the critical point to this Court’s analysis is what was the condition of both the victims and the relevant information conveyed to SP1 and/or SP16 upon their respective arrival at the scene. This Court having heard the testimonies of SP1, found him to be unreliable as SP1 kept changing his story on this material point. These will be laid down below.

It is also important to highlight that the prosecution in putting up together the facts to perform the big puzzle, had called SP15 Karthik the Astro boy to show the presence of motive on the part of the 2nd and 3rd 5 accused in committing this crime against the deceased in particular. SP15 an Astro installer said he could not remember the date but roughly on about 22nd June at about 7.00pm, he was in his car at a parking lot and was about to carry out an installation assignment in that vicinity, when 2 Indian men came from behind his car and asked the purpose of his presence there.

SP15 said he alighted from his car and went to meet them when he was bullied and slapped by one of them. The other man tried to stop and asked why the need to slap SP15. SP15 left and headed to complete his task. When he returned, he met both the 2 men again. The man that slapped him was unhappy and took out a knife. This made SP15 ran away to a nearby police station. SP15 identified the man who had slapped him as the 3rd accused whilst the other man identified as the 2nd accused yet SP15 when cross-examined said he did not both of the suspects and this can be seen in the police report P25 by SP15 as no names of the suspects were mentioned.

However, there was no question asked by the DPP to SP15 if he had attended any ID parade. Thus, any evidence contained in the ID parade report P15 where it was reported that SP15 had in fact identified the 2nd accused or ‘B3’ in P15, ought not to be considered by this Court as either it is hearsay or worst-case scenario, P15 was fabricated. On top of this, the officer in charge (SP10) was not asked to identify SP15 although he said SP15 attended the ID Parade.

As far as SP15’s evidence is concerned; this Court is of the view the 2nd accused had not committed anything wrong when he (2nd accused) attempted to stop the 3rd accused from slapping SP15. Thus, even if SP15 did identify the 2nd accused, there is nothing offensive or any incriminating act committed by the 2nd accused. As to the 3rd accused, there was no identification by SP15 of the 3rd accused by way of an ID parade. Neither did SP15 able to recall the registration number of the Alza said was driven by the 3rd accused as contained in his police report of the incident in P25. Relevancy and admissibility of SP15 and deceased’s statement [11] This incident referred to in short as the ‘Astro boy incident’ contended by the prosecution that triggered a motive on the part of the accused persons against Maganthiran and Krishnan SP12. Based on the ‘Astro boy’ SP15’s evidence, he had communicated the incident to his uncle name Ravi. The son of the deceased Harikumar SP16 said a day before the fatal incident, his father Maganthiran had told him (SP16) of the Astro boy incident but said it involved Babu who had called and scolded Maganthiran (deceased) on this. a [12] As would have been the contention by the prosecution, the deceased in return would have conveyed this to Nagarajan. However, there was no such evidence from Nagarajan SP11 to suggest that he had received this complaint from the deceased pertaining to the ‘Astro boy incident’. With the Astro boy SP15 not knowing who had attacked him at the time of incident as admitted in his evidence and the police report P25, the defence thus raised an objection saying the evidence of the Astro boy SP15 is irrelevant as it merely show bad character evidence and pushed 7 for it to be expunged. Similarly, it was argued that as the deceased was still alive a few days before he became deceased on 30.6.2017, whatever statement made by him does not come under section 32 of the Evidence Act.

This Court, having heard the submissions from all parties ruled that the evidence of SP15 is still relevant to show motive, part of same transaction and occasion (see: YB Dato’ Hj Husam Hj Musa v Mohd Faisal Rohban Ahmad [2015]1CLJ 787). As to the statement by the deceased, it is relevant and admissible under section 32 of the Evidence Act even though the maker of the statement only died a few days later (see: Murugan Arumugam lwn. PP [2017] 3 CLJ 377 Federal Court).

This Court in dismissing the said application to have the evidence of SP15 expunged is of the further view that even if the decision by this Court in rejecting the defence application is wrong, it is still open to the defence to submit that SP15’s evidence has no linkage to the current charges of murder and causing grievous hurt. This is added by the fact that SP15 had taken oath and was even cross-examined by the defence. If it did not help to prove anything for the prosecution, the argument by the defence that it merely shows bad character evidence made this Court ponder if the defence by arguing so is admitting, to a certain extent the character of Babu’ and ‘Vicky’ to be the respective accused persons.

This Court however, upon further deliberation on its own volition, refused to entertain this thought nor take this position that there was admission by the defence on the identity as abundance of cases have set 8 the principle that in criminal cases, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the accused. The submission by counsels from the bar table cannot be taken to amount to an admission of any particular fact, the duty of which has been set by the law to be placed on the prosecution’s shoulder. With this finding, the burden to prove the identity of the accused persons who committed the crime rests with the prosecution. Identification: evidence of SP1 [16] SP1 testified that he headed to the scene with his sister Dana Letchumi. On arrival, SP1 saw both deceased and Krishnan (SP12) were on the ground with ‘luka potong’. The deceased was still conscious at that time and had notified SP1 of 3 names Vicky, Babu and Gopal whom he (SP1) had never met. In the ambulance, the deceased told SP1 that he was knocked down by a car with another car which came and slashed ‘potong’ them. As far as the identification of the accused, SP1 was never asked to do so. This Court is of the view that this, rightly so as SP1 said he had never met all the three accused. Hearsay evidence [17] The statement of the deceased to SP1 pertaining to the presence of 2 cars that came and knocked the deceased down and slashed them were objected to by the defence as ‘hearsay’ as it was not in the police report lodged by SP1 tendered as P6. The DPP initially argued that it was a dying declaration but then agreed to have it expunged. This change of the stand by the DPP would probably be triggered by the fact that as found by this Court in P6 (the police report by SP1), it was stated that it was Krishnan who had notified this to SP1 and not the deceased father.

In cross-examination of SP1, SP1 changed his story when he said the deceased was unconscious when he (SP1) arrived at the scene. Hence, rightly so the objection by the defence as being hearsay was raised and agreed to by the DPP.

When SP1 was asked if Krishnan said anything, SP1 said he (Krishnan) said the same. The defence sought for this part of the statement said by Krishnan contained in P6 be expunged as hearsay and the same can still be sought from Krishnan as he would be called to testify as the name was listed in the list of witnesses tendered as P5. The DPP has no objection for it to be expunged hence on that basis that part of the statement is expunged as agreed by the DPP. The objection, again from this Court’s view is because no evidence was led as to when Krishnan had said this to SP1 to make the evidence, appear and sound credible but merely responding to a leading question from the DPP.

As it turned out in cross-examination, SP1 said it was Karthik (SP15) who had told SP1 who had done what on the 2 victims. It also transpired that SP1 was not the first person to be at the scene as SP1 said the ambulance and police were already there and so were the deceased’s sons Kumar and Vaskeran. Karthik, however as observed by SP1, was not at the scene. (As a note in passing, it is rather unfortunate that no question was asked to SP1 who ‘Kumar’ is although as it appears from SP16’s evidence who is the younger brother of SP1 named ‘Harikumar’, ‘Kumar’ mentioned by SP1 would most probably refer to ‘Harikumar’ SP16 who also came to the scene).

The issue on whether the deceased was conscious or not changed drastically in examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination as when asked for clarification in re-examination, SP1 said the deceased only became unconscious when he was in the ambulance and not before. This, would then make SP1’s evidence that the deceased told him (SP1) in the ambulance that 2 cars came and slashed them as undependable. As to the victim Krishnan, SP1 said he was able to talk but was unconscious. There was no re-examination by the DPP on this. Hence, whether Krishnan was sober and did in fact communicate this to SP1 was not satisfactorily proven by the prosecution.

The next crucial witness would be SP16 Harikumar a younger brother of SP1. SP16 said he received a call from Nagarajan (Naga) on that day at about 4.00am informing him (SP16) that SP16’s father was slashed and Naga notified the location. SP16 headed to said location which was just 500 meters away from SP16’s home, together with his sister Dana Letchumi. At the site, SP16 saw the motorbike on the ground with the father Maganthiran on the grass in between the road and the drain. Krishnan (SP12) was lying near the drain. However, Naga was not seen at the site.

SP16 approached the father Maganthiran and saw slash wound on his arm, 2 slash wounds on his abdomen, one near the eye and was breathing with difficulty and Maganthiran said he was knocked down by a car and was slashed by Babu and Vicky. As to Krishnan, SP16 said he saw slash wounds on the head and leg. Both victims were placed in 2 separate ambulance which arrived about 30 minutes later. SP16 said he 11 only managed to speak with his father Maganthiran and with Krishnan for about 5 minutes as the father was unable to speak and Krishnan said he was feeling tired to speak. Identification by SP16 of Babu as the 2nd accused and Vicky the 3rd accused [24] SP16 identified Babu in court as the 2nd accused Elangkovan as SP16 said although he did not know him but he could identify Babu as he stayed nearby SP16’s house and he had seen Babu before. It was this Babu, contended by SP16 as notified by Maganthiran to SP16 a day before, that called Maganthiran and reprimanded him on the argument involving the Astro boy. SP16 said he responded saying that it is not their problem but Naga, and Naga should settle it.

Although in cross-examination, SP16 maintained that he was able to identify the 2nd accused referred to as Babu since he had seen Babu before, his identification of Babu rests solely on the one liner sentence that SP16 had the occasion to see Babu before as he lives nearby. But yet, there was no evidence adduced from SP16 to satisfy the Turnbull guidelines that SP16 was familiar with the facial appearance of Babu that renders it a case of recognition instead of just a fleeting glance that requires a higher standard of proof of identification.

It is important to highlight that no questions were asked to SP16 when or on what occasion did he see Babu before, at which location did he see Babu before when SP16 said Babu lives nearby, how far away 12 were the two of them when SP16 saw Babu, who made known to SP16 that the person he saw in the vicinity is known as ‘Babu’, did they ever come face to face to speak to one another hence making it plausible for SP16 to recognize Babu, the time of day when they met, the lighting surrounding the area when he saw ‘Babu’, all being pertinent matters as laid in the Turnbull guidelines.

It is of significance importance to repeat the guidelines formed in R v Turnbull and others [1976] 3 All ER 549 by Lord Widgery CJ extracted below: “Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the witness have the accused under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way, as for example by passing traffic or a press of people? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his actual appearance? If in any case, whether it is being dealt with summarily or on indictment, the prosecution have reason to believe that there is such a material discrepancy they should supply the accused or his legal advisers with particulars of the description the police were first given. In all cases if the accused asks to be given particulars of such descriptions, the prosecution should supply them. Finally, he should remind the jury of any specific weaknesses which had appeared in the identification evidence. Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but, even when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he 13 knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made. All these matters go to the quality of the identification evidence. If the quality is good and remains good at the close of the accused's case, the danger of a mistaken identification is lessened; but the poorer the quality, the greater the danger…”.

None of the above were sought from SP16. It is also important here to recap that the deceased Maganthiran when asked by SP16 at the scene, of Babu’s full name, SP16 said Maganthiran did not gave an answer. Thus, to this Court’s view the fact that SP16 sought for further identification of the full name of ‘Babu’ could only mean that there must be more than one ‘Babu’ known to Maganthiran and also known to SP16. Otherwise, if both had a common knowledge of the person known as ‘Babu’, there was no further need for SP16 to ask Maganthiran of Babu’s full name. On this basis, this Court is of the view that the identification of the 2nd accused is equally not satisfactorily proven by the prosecution.

Be that as it may, the 2nd accused became deceased in prison on 16.9.2022 a copy of the death certificate shown and confirmed by the prosecution, when SP20 (IO) was in the midst of cross-examination by counsel for accused 1. Court was informed of this on 21.9.2022. The DPP said he had not received any instruction and asked to proceed. Hence, on the date the prosecution closes its case and when called for decision, this Court having evaluated all the evidence pronounced a Discharged and Acquittal against the 2nd accused.

As to Vicky, SP16 was never asked to identify Vicky hence nothing can be deduced from SP16 if the name or person named Vicky mentioned by Maganthiran is the 3rd accused in this case. Identification: evidence of SP12 victim [31] As to the victim Krishnan SP12, SP12 said on that day he was on the motorbike with the deceased Maganthiran travelling back after the drinking session they had with Naga when 2 cars came and knocked them down. When they fell on the ground, Babu identified as the 2nd accused by SP12 and Vicky identified as the 3rd accused came out from their respective cars Alza and Bezza and slashed him.

When asked again subsequently, SP12 said only Babu slashed him and not Vicky as Vicky was behind him slashing Maganthiran. SP12 also said Gopal was there with Preem. SP12 said he had known Preem as Preem is a friend of SP12’s brother Ramesh and he had met Preem 8 months earlier working as security guard with the same company as him (SP12) and SP12 had seen Preem doing his rounds as a security guard.

As to the identity of Gopal, when asked by the DPP, SP12 repeatedly said the Gopal that was at the scene is not the Gopal that was charged and that was present in Court. When asked to explain the ID parade (P14) attended and as reported where an identification of the 1st accused was made by SP12, SP12 maintained the Gopal at the scene is not the 1st accused.

With this evidence from SP12, whose evidence would be the best evidence available to the prosecution to prove the identity and participation of the suspect known as Gopal but with SP12 consistently saying it was a different ‘Gopal’ and not the 1st accused, moves this Court to rule that the 1st accused was not part of the group of people involved in the slashing incident against Maganthiran and Krishnan SP12. Hence, the 1st accused is ordered to be acquitted and discharged.

As to Vicky, SP12 when cross-examined agreed with the defence suggestion that Vicky has an identical twin and the Vicky SP12 was referring to is known as Vicky Vagendesh and not Vicky Vignes (3rd accused), which SP12 agreed. SP12’s knowledge of the existence of another identical twin of ‘Vicky’ came from the police during the ID parade. The identification of which Vicky was at the scene could only come from SP12. By agreeing that he (SP12) was talking about Vicky Vagendesh in his testimony, it can only mean that SP12 himself was uncertain of which between the 2 twins was actually involved.

SP12’s identification of the person ‘Vicky’ only came having seen the Bezza car but nothing was adduced to show the link between the Bezza car and the 3rd accused Vicky Vignes as the evidence from the IO SP20 and SP17 revealed that the Bezza registration number was forged. As a result, who the registered owner of the Bezza car is not known to enable some connection be deduced on the identity of the said ‘Vicky’.

As to the ID parade, based on the evidence of the officer in charge SP8, both the identical twins were placed in the same ID parade to be identified by SP12 (see P13) but the identification process was only done once on 30.4.2020 (P13). This, despite the fact that SP8 was aware at that point in time that there were 2 identical twins present in the said parade. This clearly goes against the IGPSO which provides a safeguard by ensuring that the identification process ought to be conducted twice hence providing a fair opportunity both for the victim to identify the suspect by confirmation of a subsequent fact of a second identification and to the suspect to refute the certainty of the identification alleged by the victim.

The prosecution contended that the subsequent ID parade (report P26) conducted on 3.5.2020 provides proof of SP15’s identification of the 3rd accused suspect ‘Vicky Vignes’. However, in P26 both the twins were labelled as ‘B4’ with no further clarification or amendment although the finding as contained in the summary para 14 said the witness SP15 had identified B4 standing at number 7 in the parade. A similar mistake of labelling of ‘B4’ on both the suspects was also found in ID parade report P13 but an amendment was made on P13 where the second ‘B4’ on P13 was amended, written on ‘B4’ as ‘B5’ (who made the amendment and when is unknown).

Rather unfortunate however, SP15 was never asked if he had attended an ID parade and had identified the 3rd accused in the said parade. This being the best evidence rule, the absence of any evidence from SP15 to show that he did indeed attend an ID parade on 3.5.2020 17 and had in fact identified the 3rd accused as found in P26, with the utmost regret has to be disregard by this Court.

This is added by the fact that SP15 in cross-examination admitted that he did not know the identity of the person who had attacked him during the Astro boy incident when it happened on 22.6.2017. Furthermore, although Harikumar”s name (SP16) was mentioned by SP15 to reside at that same location where the incident happened, SP15 did not say he had notified SP16 of the said Astro boy incident that led to SP16 witnessing or observing the 2 suspects 2nd and 3rd accused at that point of time. Hence, although relevant but yet no evidence was adduced to solidly link the identity of the suspects in the Astro boy incident with the 2 accused in these present charges.

Most importantly, this Court observes that the ID parade report of P13 and P26 reflect that both the suspect Vignes and Vagendash did not require the presence of a counsel during the running of the ID parade but yet no signature by them both were obtained. Hence, whether the ID parade was properly conducted or merely an afterthought created by the police could not be ruled out.

As found by this Court the existence of error in the labelling of both the suspects as ‘B4’, in P13 and P26 and the gross ‘oversight’ by the police to obtain the suspects signature to suggest their consensus with the absence of counsel was a genuine mistake that was unintended or otherwise, to this Court’s view gives rise to an inevitable conclusion that there was confusion on the part of the officer in charge itself on the 18 position of the twins when conducting the ID parade and together with the non-compliance to state a fundamental waiver of a counsel’s presence not once but twice as observed in P13 and P26, the contents of the ID parade reports should carry no weight at all.

SP17 (IO) said the identification made by SP12 of ‘Vicky’ during the ID parade was based on the fact that the 3rd accused identified as ‘Vicky’ in the ID parade has no tattoo on him but this never came out from SP12’s own testimony. With the absence of this explanation from SP12, whether he did in fact able to identify ‘Vicky’ based on the presence of a tattoo or otherwise, is questionable. In particular, nothing was noted in the summary by the officer in charge that this was the position.

In cases involving identical twins and the identification as to who between them committed the actus reus, this Court must be guided by the case laws decided either domestically or in other jurisdictions. In R v Chapman 20000876/Z3 (24th November 2000) (this case in turn, is cited in R v R & Ors (2012) [2012] EWCA Crim 26110) which concerned two identical brothers. Fulford J thought relevant: "... some reference was made to the fact that the appellant had a twin. The thrust of the defence case at trial appears to have been that the two twins were in looks effectively identical, or that any difference lay in fullness of face and changed from time to time. Assuming their looks to have been effectively identical, an identification parade could not have assisted. If both twins were on the same parade, the police officers would have been able to do no more than say that the man seen in Halstead was one or other of the two. If only one or 19 other twin was on a parade, the officers would presumably have identified whichever was on the parade, since he would have appeared identical to the man in the [relevant] photograph. A choice between twins of identical appearance must always have depended on other considerations... Assuming that there were minor (though perhaps changing) features, such as fullness of face, which might have led to some differentiation between the twins, the police do not appear to have had any notice, or reason to think, at the time that it might have been the appellant's twin..."

This Court hence must be very vigilant in the analysis of the presented evidence with the oral testimonies qualifying as the best evidence rule. As observed by this Court, when SP12 was re-examined, SP12 said he knew the distinction between the two but nothing was asked further what the said distinctions that was noted by him. No finger print was lifted from the suspected car Bezza based on SP17 (substitute IO), to support any identification made by SP12. Hence, to this Court’s finding, there is no evidence presented for this Court to deliberate and conclude that SP12 was able to make the distinction between the two twins as the reply given was merely on the surface without any basis to support the answer, hence nothing for this Court to conclude that he had rightly identified the 3rd accused as the Vicky he said he saw slashed Maganthiran and himself (SP12).

With no fingerprint lifted and sent to expert for analysis, the fatal error in the labelling of both the twins as ‘B4’ found in the ID reports, no further explanation by SP12 as to how he was able to identify ‘Vicky’ more so he only knew the existence of an identical pair when notified by the police during the ID parade, the ID parade by SP12 was only held once 20 thus giving rise to a 50% risk of wrong identification, leaves room for doubt on the proof of identity of the 3rd accused. This moved this Court to a finding that the identification of the 3rd accused is not proven on a prima facie standard of credible evidence. Grievous hurt whether proven [47] With the sole and most critical issue on identity not satisfactorily proven, for completeness this Court would summarily state the finding by this Court on the charge of causing grievous hurt whether proven. To satisfy this, 2 medical doctors SP18 and SP19 were called. From the evidence of SP18 (doctor from the emergency unit) and SP19 (doctor from surgical unit), despite what was said by SP12 (the victim) that he was slashed with either a machete or a knife, no incise wound was found on him.

In addition, SP12 was found by SP19 to suffer from retrograde amnesia. In history taking, SP12 mentioned he was hit by a car but nothing was mentioned by him of being slashed by any individuals. This Court finds that the absence of such fact in the history taking explains the absence of any incised wound on SP12.

As to the difference in the diagnosis of SP12, SP19 was of the view that SP12 suffers from mild traumatic head injury as recorded in the medical system of the hospital but the word ‘mild’ was missing from the medical report prepared subsequently by a different person. SP19 was also of the view that with the indication that SP12 was not wearing a 21 helmet (based on the history on the medical report P28), the probability of SP12 to have fallen and faint arising from the accident is high. Thus, this supports the probability of SP1’s evidence as being true when he said that Krishnan SP12 was unconscious at the scene, when SP1 was there.

It is equally crucial to note that the wife of SP12 was present at the emergency unit when history taking was done. SP19 (doctor) said although SP12 mentioned he was hit by a car, he did not mention he was assaulted by someone with a knife, and this despite SP12 was conscious. The further contents of P28 under ‘History from patient’ in the bracket that says ‘wife denied alleged MVA, claimed patient knew the assaulter’ came from the wife and not SP12. The wife was not called thus making this inadmissible as hearsay evidence and pushed this Court to the finding that the fatal incident as alleged did not happen. Defence of Alibi [51] One final point that needs to be addressed by this Court is on the 1st accused Notice of Alibi D30 and investigated by the IOs SP20 and SP17. Based on the investigation by SP20 and SP17 (substitute IO) by interviewing the family of the 1st accused comprising of 4 witnesses, all claimed the 1st accused was at home during that material hours as stated in the charge.

As found by this Court that SP12 when testifying in Court, had openly denied the involvement of Gopal Nair the 1st accused. As explained by SP12, he said he did not deny a person by the name of Gopal was 22 involved but maintained that it is not Gopal Nair. This ought to support the Notice of Alibi put in by the 1st accused as this denial by SP12 itself should amount to sufficient proof that the 1st accused Gopal Nair was not at the scene on that day and on that particular time. Hence, the identification of the 1st accused should collapsed.

In the upshot based on the gaps in the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this Court ruled that the prosecution has failed to prove a prima facie case against all the 3 accused (the 2nd accused included) hence had ordered for all three to be acquitted and discharged. Judicial Commissioner MTJ3 Shah Alam. Dated: 28th October 2022 For the Public Prosecutor: TPR Ho Kwong Chin Tingkat 4, Podium Utara Bangunan Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah 40512 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan. For the 1st accused: En. Sivakumar a/l Govindasamy The Law Chambers of Siva No. 33 1st Floor, Jalan Dato Hamzah 41000 Klang Selangor Darul Ehsan. For the 3rd accused: En. Hasshahari & En. Awang Armadajaya Tetuan Hasshahari & Partners Persiaran Pasak Bumi, Bukit Jelutong Seksyen U8 40150 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan.