Content
1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI JENAYAH DI SHAH ALAM DI DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA PERBICARAAN JENAYAH (DIBICARA BERSAMA) NO. BA-45A-73-09/2020, 45-31-09/2020, 45-32-09/2020 DAN 45-33-09/2020 ANTARA
Loading…
/akn/my/judgment/high-court/2022/7015c846-5cd4-4b52-aef0-a80c3a9270f3
High Court of Malaysia16 Mar 2022BA-45-33-09/2020
The written judgment as the court issued it, with the coram, case number, and source links. Every paragraph has its own anchor.
Citations and treatment detected automatically from later judgments and the authorities this decision relies on.
Later cases and laws citing this decision
Not yet cited by a later decision.
Earlier cases and laws this decision relies on
“were confirmed by the chemist to contain 540.9g of methamphetamine. Possession without lawful authority of 50g or more of this drug attracts the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da)(xvi) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('the DDA'). [6] On these facts the learned trial judge was satisfied that a prima facie case h”
“ossession in law has been established by a long line of cases. We find it unnecessary to discuss all of them here. Suffice that we refer to two of them. In Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v. R [1948] 1 LNS 72; [1949] MLJ 54, Gordon-Smith Ag CJ when delivering judgment of the Singapore Court of Appeal explained the meaning in law”
“one of the elements necessary to **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 constitute possession. As Taylor J said in Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] MLJ 28 : … It is often said that 'possession must be exclusive'. This is ambiguous. Possession need not be exclusiv”
“d with the evidence by which it is to be proved. It is essential to keep this distinction clearly in mind, especially when applying presumptions. [18] Thomson J in Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 237, said that 'possession' for the purposes of criminal law involves possession itself — which some authoriti”
Auto-detected from judgment text; not a substitute for a citator check.
Content
1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI JENAYAH DI SHAH ALAM DI DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA PERBICARAAN JENAYAH (DIBICARA BERSAMA) NO. BA-45A-73-09/2020, 45-31-09/2020, 45-32-09/2020 DAN 45-33-09/2020 ANTARA
1
1.
2
MOHD MUNAWIR BIN MOHAMED ANUAR AHMAD REDZLAN BIN ZAINUDIN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Tertuduh Mohd Munawir bin Mohamed Anuar (T1) dan Ahmad Redzlan bin Zainuddin (T2) telah dituduh dengan niat bersama mengedar dadah berbahaya di bawah s. 39B Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (ADB). Disamping itu, T1 dan T2 juga secara bersama dituduh di bawah s. 12(2) dan s. 6 ADB. Selain itu, T1 juga di tuduh di bawah s. 30(3) Akta Racun 1952 (Akta Racun). Kesemua pertuduhan itu dibicara secara bersama dalam perbicaraan ini. Pertuduhan-pertuduhan itu adalah sebagaimana berikut: Kes 45A-73-09/2020 (T1 dan T2) “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 13/1/2020 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang bertempat di alamat no.118, Blok D, Palma Puteri, Jalan Cecawi 6/6, Kota Damansara, Petaling Jaya di dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Cannabis seberat 229.0 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) akta yang sama dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” Kes 45-34-09/2020 (T1) & 45-31-09/2020 (T2) “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 13/1/2020 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang bertempat di alamat no.118, Blok D, Palma Puteri, Jalan Cecawi 6/6, Kota Damansara, Petaling Jaya di dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Methamphetamine seberat 1.73 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 12(3) akta yang sama dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” Kes 45-32-09/2020 (T1 dan T2) “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 13/1/2020 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang bertempat di alamat no.118, Blok D, Palma Puteri, Jalan Cecawi 6/6, Kota Damansara, Petaling Jaya di dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu Cannabis seberat 9.38 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 6 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” Kes 45-33-09/2020 (T1) “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 13/1/2020 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang bertempat di alamat no.118, Blok D, Palma Puteri, Jalan Cecawi 6/6, Kota Damansara, Petaling Jaya di dalam daerah Petaling, dalam negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah didapati memiliki racun berjadual iaitu Etizolam seberat 26.03 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 30(3) Akta Racun 1952 dan boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 30(5) akta yang sama.” Versi Pihak Pendakwaan [2] Bertindak atas maklumat, pada 13.01.2020 jam lebih kurang 5.30 petang ASP Muhamad Izhar bin Sani (SP2) bersama sepasukan anggota telah pergi membuat serbuan ke rumah nombor 118, Blok D, Palma Putri, Jalan Cecawi 6/6, Kota Damansara, Petaling Jaya, Selangor. [3] Setibanya di rumah tersebut SP2 mendapati pintu rumah dalam keadaan terbuka. Apabila SP2 dan pasukan masuk ke dalam rumah, SP2 mendapat seorang perempuan melayu (kemudian dicam sebagai SP3) sedang berdiri di ruang tamu rumah. SP2 memperkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai polis kepada SP3. [4] Kemudian SP2 bersama anggota pasukan telah pergi ke bahagian dapur dan mendapati seorang perempuan melayu, seorang lelaki melayu dan seorang lelaki cina sedang berdiri di bahagian dapur. Pemeriksaan telah dijalankan ke atas ketiga-tiga mereka. Pemeriksaan atas perempuan dan lelaki melayu tidak menjumpai apa-apa barang salah. Pemeriksaan atas lelaki cina, SP2 telah menjumpai satu beg pinggang bertulis FILA BIELLA ITALIA dipinggang lelaki itu (P26). Pemeriksaan atas beg itu SP2 menjumpai satu plastik lutsinar P8 (1) yang berisi bahan disyaki dadah ketamin dan satu kad pergigian (P27) atas nama Yap Wai Loon. [5] Pemeriksaan SP2 selanjutnya ialah di bilik utama yang ketika itu dalam keadaan terbuka. SP2 mendapati di bilik utama itu terdapat dua lelaki melayu iaitu Mohd Munir bin Mohamed (T1) dan Ahmad Radzlan bin Zainudin (T2) sedang berdiri di dalam bilik tersebut. Apabila diperiksa di dalam bilik tersebut SP2 mendapati satu (1) beg berceloreng hijau bertulis Quechuan (P13) di atas tilam dalamnya mengandungi : • satu (1) lipatan aluminium foil P8(3) yang di dalamnya berisi ketulan daun-daun kering di syaki ganja, satu (1) alat kaca (P14) dan satu (1) alat penimbang digital (P15). Pemeriksaan di atas lantai bilik menjumpai: • satu (1) kayu pemotong (P16), pisau pemotong P8(25), satu bungkus plastik lutsinar (P17) berisi peket-peket plastik dan satu (1) penimbang digital (P18). Di atas sebuah kerusi dijumpai : • (1) bekas berzip plastik lutsinar (P19) yang di dalamnya mengandungi empat (4) peket plastik lutsinar [P8(4)-P8(7)] berisi dadah disyaki syabu, dua (2) peket plastik lutsinar [P8(8) dan P8(9)] berisi helaian daun kering disyaki ganja, satu (1) botol kaca (P20) dan satu (1) pemetik api (P21). [6] Di dalam bilik yang sama di atas almari solek SP2 menjumpai: • (1) keping gambar penama Mohd Munawir bin Mohamed Anuar
Subsection
(1) helai baju; dan
Subsection
(1) helai seluar diperolehi dari dalam almari pakaian. [7] Selepas itu SP2 dipandu arah oleh T1 ke bilik bahagian belakang. Di bilik itu T1 telah mengambil satu (1) beg berzip warna pink (P28) dari dalam laci plastik dan menyerahkannya kepada SP2. Apabila diperiksa SP2 mendapati di dalamnya mengandungi (14) papan aluminium foil, setiap foil berisi (10) biji pil [P8(12)-P8(23) dan P23(A-C)]. [8]
Preamble
Menurut SP2 semua bilik di rumah itu tidak berkunci dan pintu bilik utama dalam keadaan terbuka SP2 turut menyatakan kunci rumah P25 di berikan kepada SP2 oleh T1 apabila SP2 bertanyakan kunci kepada T1. [9] Dalam masa yang sama D/KPL 1437292 telah menahan seorang lelaki melayu yang masuk ke dalam rumah dan setelah diperiksa oleh SP2 tidak menjumpai apa-apa barang salah. Kesemua mereka yang berada di rumah tersebut kemudiannya ditangkap dan barang-barang rampasan dibawa ke balai polis Bandar Utama, IPD Petaling Jaya. [10] Setelah selesai urusan dokumentasi, SP2 telah menyerahkan semua barang rampasan dan kesemua tangkapan kepada Pegawai Penyiasat (SP4). [11] SP4 telah menghantar barang kes dadah untuk dianalisa oleh ahli kimia SP1. Hasil analisa SP1 mendapati: i. bahan tumbuhan dalam plastik aluminium P8(3) sebagai cannabis berjumlah 229.0 gram yang dijumpai dalam beg Quechua di atas tilam bilik; ii. bahan kristal jernih dalam empat peket plastik lutsinar [P8(4) hingga P8(7)] sebagai methamphetamine berjumlah 1.73 gram dan bahan tumbuhan dalam dua plastik lutsinar [P8(8) dan P8(9)] sebagai cannabis berjumlah 9.38 gram yang dijumpai di dalam bekas berwarna biru di atas kerusi bilik; iii. pil dalam 14 papan aluminium foil yang setiap satu mengandungi 10 biji pil sebagai mengandungi etizolam berjumlah 26.03 gram yang dijumpai di dalam beg bezip berwarna pink di dalam bilik belakang ; dan iv. bahan kristal dalam peket plastik lutsinar P8(1) sebagai methamphetamine berjumah 0.07 gram yang dijumpai dalam beg pinggang FILA BIELLA ITALIA dipinggang Yap Wai Loon. [12] SP1 mendapati cannabis dan mathamphetamine itu adalah seperti yang ditafsirkan di bawah s.2 dan disenarai dalam Jadual Pertama Akta serta etizolam adalah bahan analog 1,4-benzodiazepine yang ditetapkan dalam Jadual Pertama dan Ketiga (Bahan Psikotropik) Akta Racun. Kes prima facie [13] Tugas Mahkamah di akhir kes pihak pendakwaan sepertimana yang ditetapkan di bawah s. 180 (1) KAJ bahawa di akhir kes pihak pendakwaan Mahkamah untuk memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan satu kes prima facie dengan menilai keterangan saksi pihak pendakwaan yang kredible yang telah membuktikan segala intipati pertuduhan. [14] Perkataan prima facie tidak ditakrifkan di bawah KAJ. Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Balacahandran v PP [2005] 1 AMR 321; [2005] 2 MLJ 301 menghuraikan akan ujian prima facie sebagaimana berikut : …The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie case. [15] Bagi mengemukakan satu kes prima facie bagi kes ini pihak pendakwaan harus menunjukkan intipati kesalahan telah dibuktikan iaitu dadah atau racun yang merupakan hal perkara pertuduhan adalah dadah berbahaya sepertimana yang ditetapkan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta) atau di bawah Akta Racun, Tertuduh dalam milikan dadah atau racun tersebut dan bagi pertuduhan pertama, Tertuduh mengedar dadah itu. [16] Bagi intipati pertama, tidak dipertikaikan dadah Cannabis yang menjadi hal perkara tuduhan pertama dan ketiga serta Methamphetamine bagi pertuduhan kedua dan racun Etizolam bagi tuduhan keempat adalah dadah atau racun sebagaimana yang ditafsirkan di bawah s. 2 Akta atau seperti yang dijadualkan dalam Jadual Pertama Akta atau Akta Racun melalui keterangan ahli kimia SP1 yang menjalankan analisa terhadap bahan yang dijumpai dan dirampas di rumah kejadian itu. Mahkamah ini berdasarkan kes PP v Lam San [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 391, Munusamy Vengadasalam v PP [1987] (Rep) 221 dan Balachandran v PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 menerima keterangan SP1 berhubung dengan jenis dan kuantiti dadah yang dianalisanya itu. Intipati pemilikan [17] Pemilikan dalam ertikata undang-undang dihuraikan dalam kes Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v R [149] MLJ 54 yang menjelaskan: …Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise no presumption of mens rea, without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal. Sehubungan dengan itu, Thomson J dalam kes Chan Pean Leon v PP [1956] 1 MLJ 237 memutuskan bahawa : Once possession is proved then before the accused person can be convicted it is necessary in addition to prove mens rea. And for this purpose as was pointed out by Gordon-Smith Ag. C.J. in the case of Toh Ah Lam and Mak Thim v Rex (1949) MLJ 54, supra, it is necessary to prove that the person in possession knows the nature of the thing possessed. [18] Dalam keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes PP v Hafiszamri b Ahmad & Anor [2007] 1 AMR 483 Hassan Lah HMR (beliau ketika itu) menghuraikan di m.s 490: [14] What constitutes possession? In Pendakwa Raya v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 the Federal Court has made the following observation on this point: [13] Now, as to what the ingredients of possession in law has been established by a long line of cases. We find it unnecessary to discuss all of them here. Suffice that we refer to two of them. In Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v. R [1948] 1 LNS 72; [1949] MLJ 54, Gordon-Smith Ag CJ when delivering judgment of the Singapore Court of Appeal explained the meaning in law of the word "possession" when appearing in the statute. His Lordship said: Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise no presumption of mens rea, without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal. [14] The second is Saad Ibrahim v. PP [1967] 1 LNS 154; [1968] 1 MLJ 158 where Yong J stressed the necessity of establishing the ingredient of knowledge on the part of an accused before he could be incriminated with possession. His Lordship there said: In my opinion mere possession is one thing and possession with mens rea is another. Possession which incriminates must have certain characteristics. The possessor must be aware of his possession, must know the nature of the thing possessed and must have the power of disposal over it. Without these characteristics possession raised no presumption of mens rea. Without mens rea possession cannot be criminal except in certain cases created by statute, which is not applicable in this case. [15] We would also mention the learned judgment of Lim Beng Choon J in PP v. Badrulsham b Baharom [1987] 1 LNS 72; [1988] 2 MLJ 585, which contains a full discussion of the several cases on the point. [19] Dengan itu pemilikan harus mempunyai ciri-ciri kawalan atau jagaan dan pengetahuan akan barang yang dimilikinya. Dalam kes Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 MLJ 237, milikan dihuraikan sebagai: "Possession" itself as regards the criminal law is described as follows in Stephen's Digest (9th Edition, page 304):- "A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need." To put it otherwise, there is a physical element and a mental element which must both be present before possession is made out. The accused must not only be so situated that he can deal with the thing as if it belonged to him, for example have it in his pocket or have it lying in front of him on a table. It must also be shewn that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so, in other words, that he had some animus possidendi. Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case. If a watch is in my pocket then in the absence of anything else the inference will be clear that I intend to deal with it as if it were my own and accordingly I am in possession of it. On the other hand, if it is lying on a table in a room in which I am but which is also frequently used by other people then the mere fact that I am in physical proximity to it does not give rise to the inference that I intend to deal with it as if it belonged to me. There must be some evidence that I am doing or having done something with it that shews such an intention. Or it must be clear that the circumstances in which it is found shew such an intention. It may be found in a locked room to which I hold the key or it may be found in a drawer mixed up with my own belongings or it may be found, as occurred in a recent case, in a box under my bed. The possible circumstances cannot be set out exhaustively and it is impossible to lay down any general rule on the point. But there must be something in the evidence to satisfy the Court that the person who is physically in a position to deal with the thing as his own had the intention of doing so. [20] Dari huraian itu kawalan atau jagaan membawa maksud mempunyai penjagaan dan pengawalan atas barang tersebut. Seterusnya pengetahuannya akan sifat barang yang dalam pengawalan dan penjagaan itu merupakan pemilikan atas barang tersebut. Dengan itu pemilikan adalah apabila seseorang dalam keadaan mempunyai kuasa untuk menguruskan barang itu sebagai pemunya dengan mengecualikan orang lain. [21] Pemilikan pula tidak semistinya harus secara eklusif kepada tertuduh seorang sahaja dan ia boleh secara bersama dengan seorang lain. Dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Denish a/l Madhavan [2009] 2 MLJ 194 Mahkamah persekutuan mengatakan : [16] Before proceeding to consider the reasons for the Court of Appeal's decision, we will say a few words about 'exclusive' possession. It is inappropriate to speak of possession of an article in criminal law as exclusive possession. One is either in possession or not in possession, although one could be in possession jointly with another or others. To say that the prosecution of a drug case fails because there has been no proof of exclusive possession is apt to convey the wrong impression that it is only in cases where possession is entirely with one person, — that is, 'exclusive' — that a conviction is possible. When the learned trial judge said 'The accused sought to negative the proof of exclusive possession…', we take it that he meant no more than that the respondent sought to show that he was not in possession of the drugs because he had no knowledge of their existence and that the drugs could have been placed in his bags by some other person or persons. [17] The idea of exclusivity features in the meaning of 'possession' in criminal law as one of the elements necessary to constitute possession. As Taylor J said in Leow Nghee Lim v Reg [1956] MLJ 28 : … It is often said that 'possession must be exclusive'. This is ambiguous. Possession need not be exclusive to the accused. Two or more persons may be in joint possession of chattels, whether innocent or contraband. The exclusive element of possession means that the possessor or possessors have the power to exclude other persons from enjoyment of the property. Custody likewise may be sole or joint and it has the same element of excluding others. The main distinction between custody and possession is that a custodian has not the power of disposal. The statement that 'possession must be exclusive' is often due to confusion of the fact to be proved with the evidence by which it is to be proved. It is essential to keep this distinction clearly in mind, especially when applying presumptions. [18] Thomson J in Chan Pean Leon v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 237, said that 'possession' for the purposes of criminal law involves possession itself — which some authorities term 'custody' or 'control' — and knowledge of the nature of the thing possessed. As to possession itself he cited the following definition in Stephen's Digest (9th Ed), at p 304), in which the exclusive element mentioned by Taylor J appears: A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. [19] Once the elements needed to constitute possession are established, including the element of exclusive power to deal, then what is established is possession, not exclusive possession. So much for exclusive possession. [22] Dari huraian itu, jelas bahawa milikan haruslah secara eksklusif dalam ertikata tidak secara eksklusif hanya kepada Tertuduh seorang sahaja tetapi juga boleh secara bersama dengan yang lain apabila si pemilik itu mempunyai kuasa untuk mengecualikan orang lain daripada menguasai barang itu. [23] Dalam kes Ghasem Hozouri Hassan v Public Prosecutor [2019] 6 MLJ 231 Mahkamah Persekutuan dengan merujuk kepada kes Siew Yoke Keong v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 630 mengatakan sekali lagi bahawa: [30] In Siew Yoke Keong this court held that the presence of the ladies clothing (two female upper garments and two pairs of female jeans) along with male clothing in the third room of the first house did not mean that no possession was established against the accused. The crucial question was whether accused was so situated with respect to the proscribed drugs found in the second and third rooms of the first house that he had the power to deal with the drugs as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances were such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. [31] Thus, from the above, when we talk about the issue of custody and control what is crucial is that the accused must be so situated that he can deal with the proscribed drugs as if it belonged to him, and it must be shown that he had the intention of dealing with it as if it belonged to him should he see any occasion to do so (he had animus possidendi). The intention to deal with the drugs here refer to the element of knowledge. [32] We must not lose sight of the fact that more often than not the accused claims ignorance of the drugs to rebut/negate the element of knowledge. Thus, in the end, the finding of the mental state of knowledge, or the rebuttal of it, is an inference to be drawn by a trial judge from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, giving due weight to the credibility of the witnesses. [24] Dalam kes Husin Sitrus v Public prosecutoe [2012] 7 CLJ 205 menjelaskan akan keperluan kepada pihak pendakwaan untuk mengecualikan orang lain kepada dadah yang dipersoalkan itu dengan mengatakan: [15] There is a welter of authoritative precedents which have held that for possession to be established, accessibility by others to the place where the drugs are found should be excluded by evidence by the prosecution (PP v. Kang Ho Soh [1991] 3 CLJ 2914; [1991] 3 CLJ (Rep) 557 HC, PP v. Tang Chew Weng [1969] 1 LNS 141 HC. The onus is not on the defence to prove possibility of access by others but on the prosecution to exclude such possibility and the issue must be answered in favour of the appellant if there were more than one way in which the evidence adduced by the prosecution might be viewed such as in the present case, implicating the appellant or the other persons who were present in the boat. (Abdullah Zawawi Yusoff v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1 SC). In other words exclusivity of custody and control of the drugs ought to be established by the prosecution. [25] Dengan itu pihak pendakwaan harus membuktikan Tertuduh mempunyai kawalan atau jagaan dan pengetahuan akan dadah yang dalam jagaannya itu dengan mengecualikan orang lain mempunyai akses pada tempat dimana dadah itu dikatakan dijumpai. Serta pengetahuan itu boleh ditunjukkan dari fakta hal keadaan sesuatu kes itu. [26] Bagi kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini disamping fakta yang dikatakan oleh SP2, terdapat fakta lain yang diberitahu oleh saksi pihak pendakwaan iaitu melalui Nor Faziela binti Abdul Wahid (SP3) yang merupakan salah seorang penghuni rumah kejadian. SP3 mengatakan:
1
Semasa pemeriksaan utama: • berada di rumah semasa serbuan dan pemeriksaan dijalankan oleh SP2; • Rumah ada tiga bilik dan satu bilik stor; • T1 tinggal di billik utama; • sebelum T1 ditangkap ada seorang menumpang di bilik utama yang sama yang namanya Sharil; • pernah nampak Sharil tidur di bilik utama; • sehari sebelum tangkapan Sharil telah berada dirumah itu; • SP3 ada memberitahu menggenai Sharil kepada polis; • masa polis buat serbuan ada tujuh (7) orang di rumah kejadian; dan • pernah lihat dua atau tiga kali T2 datang ke rumah kejadian.
2
Semasa diperiksa balas: • Sharil datang menumpang di rumah kejadian sementara dapat tempat tinggal baru; • Sharil menumpang sejak dua minggu sebelum tangkapan; • Sharil simpan beg dia di dalam bilik utama; • setuju beg celoreng (P13) Sharil punya; • sebelum Sharil datang SP3 tidak pernah lihat beg P13; • setuju bilik utama adalah bilik melepak kawan-kawan T1 yang hadir di rumah itu; • penama-penama berikut adalah mereka yang tinggal di rumah itu: o Nurisah duduk di bilik stor bersama: o Bad atau Irwan Hezry kerap kali tinggal di bilik utama: o Yap Wai Loon; o Awee, Izat, Jaja @ Nor Izati, Abang Wan, Acheh atau Asraf, Firdus, Farzul atau Dedan, Munawar dan Nurliza Zainol; • Setuju masa serbuan T1 berada di dapur baru sedia hendak makan dan kemudian polis bawa T1 masuk ke bilik utama; • setuju kunci rumah (P25) boleh dipakai oleh semua orang dan P25 bukan kunci T1; • setuju kunci P25 sering kali diletak di dalam kasut di bawah pengelap kaki supaya semua orang boleh guna kunci; • T1 seorang yang buat sarong parang dan keris dan setuju rumah kejadian dijadikan oleh T1 sebagai tempat buat kerja kayu sarong parang dan keris; dan • SP3 tidak tahu dari mana polis dapat kunci P25. Kunci P25 bukan kunci T1; • SP3 pernah nampak T2 datang ke rumah dua tiga kali. [27] Dari keterangan SP3 ini, setelah mahkamah ini nilaikan secara maksima, yang mahkamah tidak mempunyai apa-apa sebab untuk tidak mempercayainya walaupun beliau merupakan anak angkat kepada T1, yang Mahkamah ini dapati seorang saksi yang kredibel, menunjukkan rumah dan bilik utama itu terbuka kepada akses oleh orang lain khususnya mereka yang tinggal di rumah itu selain daripada T1 mahupun T2. [28] Keterangan SP3 mengenai mereka yang ada di dalam rumah termasuk kedua-dua Tertuduh adalah seramai 7 orang. SP2 menyatakan ketika serbuan dan pemeriksaan oleh SP2 pintu bilik utama di mana kedua-dua Tertuduh ditangkap dalam keadaan tidak berkunci malah terbuka. Dari keterangan SP3 yang tidak dicabar oleh pihak pendakwaan menyatakan dan menunjukkan bilik utama itu boleh dimasuki oleh mereka yang tinggal di situ dan merupakan tempat kawan-kawan T1 yang hadir dirumah itu melepak. Antara mereka yang berada dan ditangkap di rumah tersebut selain dari pada T1, T2 dan SP3 adalah Yap Wai Loon (B4), Nurisa binti Jili (B2), Zulhazmi bin Jaya (B3), dan Irwan Hezry bin Daud (B7) (rujuk report yang dibuat oleh SP2 iaitu P30). Kesemua mereka ini tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan untuk mengecualikan mereka dari akses kepada bilik utama dan bilik stor dan barang kes dadah dan bahan racun yang dijumpai dalam bilik utama dan bilik stor itu. Malah penama Nurisah yang dikatakan duduk di bilik stor tidak memberi keterangan mengenai bahan racun yang dijumpai di biliknya itu. [29] Dalam kes Pang Chee Meng v PP [1992] 1 MLJ 137 Mahkamah Rayuan mengatakan: ...In the instant case the accused denied that he led the police to the discovery of the drugs and that in any event he did not have exclusive possessions of the room where the heroin was found, in that there were at least three others with access to the room, namely, Ah Seng, Ah Fatt and the accused's sister, Phang Sow Ying… [30] Dalam kes PP v Tukiman bin Demin [2008] 8 CLJ 856 YA Mohd Zawawi Salleh menghuraikan beberapa keadaan mengenai hal yang sama: [14] Thus, to sum up, the common usage, plain, natural and ordinary meaning of "exclusive" is "excluding or to exclude all others; not shared or divided". In the context of drug possession, "exclusive possession" can be construed to mean that the place where the drugs are found must be exclusive to the accused. However, possession of the drugs need not be exclusive. Possession may be joint, that is, two or more persons may jointly have possession of the contraband, exercising custody and control over it. In that case, each of these persons is considered to be in possession of that contraband. (See Leow Nghee Lim v. Regina [1955] 1 LNS 53). In the present case, the issue of joint possession does not arise…… ….. [16] There is a plethora of cases decided by the courts on this point. The principle as discernible from those cases is simply these: there is a burden of proof on the prosecution to exclude the possibility of access by others to the place where the drugs are found. A failure by the prosecution to establish this would result in an acquittal of the accused; for example:
i
(i) PP v. Chan Peng Fatt [1999] 8 CLJ 414. The court found that the accused did not have exclusivity to the attic where the drugs were found; therefore he was acquitted and discharged.
Subparagraph
(ii) PP v. Md Alim Samad [1998] 5 CLJ 590. The rooms where the drugs were found were accessible by different people frequenting the house. The court held that knowledge alone was not enough to establish control.
Subparagraph
(iii) Lee Chee Meng v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 CLJ 345; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 168, SC. There were access by third parties to the premises, thus exclusivity of use of the premises had not been proved and the accused was acquitted.
Subparagraph
(iv) Pang Chee Meng v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 CLJ 39; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 265, SC. The accused was acquitted even though the drugs were found in his room, but, as he shared the room with several others, the prosecution had not proved exclusive use of the room or exclusive custody or control of the drugs.
v
(v) Public Prosecutor v. Basri Salihin [1993] 1 CLJ 420. The bin where the drugs were found was accessible to the general public and the accused had no exclusive control over it. Therefore, the accused was acquitted and discharged. [17] In 3 (three) celebrated cases of Abdullah Zawawi bin Yusof v. PP [1993] 4 CLJ 1, Choo Yoke Choy v. Public Prosecutor [1992] 4 CLJ 1791; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 43, SC and Public Prosecutor v. Muhamad Nasir bin Shaharuddin & Anor [1992] 1 LNS 8, the court emphasized that the exclusivity of custody and control of the drugs by the accused must be established by the prosecution. Therefore, for possession to be established, accessibility by others to the place where the drugs are found must be excluded. [18] In the first case, the drugs were found in the appellant's tool box in a locked cupboard, the keys of which were with the appellant's wife, in the appellant's house which was still under construction. The appellant's wife was jointly charged but was acquitted at the end of the prosecution's case. Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ said: Given the fact that this was a case where the police were acting on a tip-off, the onus was not on the defence to prove possibility of access by others but on the prosecution to exclude such possibility. He adds further: This question must be answered in favour of the appellant considering that there was more than one way in which the evidence adduced by the prosecution might be viewed. The evidence indeed could have been regarded as implicating the appellant or the wife or both of them or the informer or even the other man living in the house. [19] In the second case, the drugs were found in a room occupied by the accused and his wife as well as from the common kitchen of the same house which was accessible to all the occupants of the house. Only the accused was charged. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant alone had possession of the drugs or that both he and his wife had joint possession of the drugs. Here, the prosecution had not shown that the accused had sole possession or joint possession of the drug, ie, a common intention to possess. Doubt existed as there were two people in the room and there was no evidence of common intention and further, there was access by others to the kitchen. [20] In the third case, it was held that generally, if exclusive occupation of premises cannot be established, especially where other persons also had access to the premises, it cannot be said that the occupier had custody and control over everything found in the premises. Furthermore, where two or more persons were found in a place where an offence had been committed, and if the evidence did not clearly point to one or the other, the guilt of neither had been established. [21] Now, reverting back to the present case, the court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused had the exclusive possession of the offending drugs on the following : …. ….
21
21.4 The drugs were not found on the accused but in the room to which several persons have equal access. The presence of SP7, SP10 and Samiun bin Mohd Dah and other bachelors ("budak-budak bujang") in the house, raise some doubts as to whether it could be said affirmatively that the drugs were in the possession of the accused or either one of them or all of them are in joint possession of the said drugs. Where possession is not clear, as in the present case, when the offending drugs may be attributed to more than one individual, possession requires some nexus, link, or other connection between the accused and the offending drugs. In this case, there is no evidence of additional incriminating circumstances implicating the accused such as finger prints, incriminating statements, efforts to avoid arrest or the offending drugs were concealed in any portion of the room. The bare-bones of the prosecution case is the contraband was found in the accused's room. Under the circumstances, the prosecution's case is barren of establishing linking or demonstrating a nexus between the accused and the offending drugs. Dalam perkara yang sama kes Azizah Yahaya v PP [2012] 8 CLJ 405 Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: [8] We find from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that though the room where the drugs were found was occupied only by the appellant and SP4 but it is pertinent to note that evidence also showed that the room was accessible to all the other occupants in the house. SP4 testified that she and the appellant occupied the main bedroom and the children occupied the other two rooms. In cross-examination SP4 agreed that everybody in the house had access to the room (p. 28 appeal record). The room was unlocked. Thus, whilst the occupants of the room were the appellant and SP4 both of whom would have had complete access to the room, it is also apparent that their three children too had access to the room. Yet SP4 was not charged although she was remanded. [9] We find that the testimony of SP4 regarding access to the room was hardly challenged. SP5 under cross-examination had also agreed that the appellant's children probably had access to the appellant's room. He was not re-examined on this issue. We agreed with learned counsel that the learned judge had failed to analyse or assess these testimonies. The prosecution has failed to discharge its bounden duty of excluding access to the appellant's room by others. [31] Yap Wai Loon yang dikatakan oleh SP2 ada bersamanya dadah yang setelah dianalisa jenisnya dadah methamphetamine juga tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan atau ditawar sebagai saksi untuk mengecualikan dadah yang dijumpai dalam bilik utama dan bilik stor tidak di dalam pengetahuannya. Jika diambil jenis dadah yang dikatakan dijumpai pada beg pinggang yang dipakai oleh Yap Wai Loon merupakan jenis yang sama dengan dadah methamphetamine yang antara dijumpai di bilik utama yang boleh memberi gambaran kaitan dengan pengetahuan Yap Wai Loon dengan dadah di dalam bilik utama itu. Dalam kes Ali Hosseinzadeh Bashir v Public Prosecuter [2015] 1 CLJ 918 Mahkamah Rayuan mempertimbangkan fakta jenis dadah yang sama yang dibawa di tubuh Perayu tidak menimbulkan keraguan mengenai pengetahuannya akan dadah yang tersorok di dalam beg yang dibawanya. Walaupun prinsip dinyatakan kepada Tertuduh tetapi secara bandingnya boleh juga dibuat kepada seorang saksi yang tidak memberi keterangan untuk menjelaskan pengetahuannya akan dadah yang sama jenisnya yang di jumpai dengan dadah yang ada bersamannya di tempat dan pada masa yang sama itu. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes itu mengatakan: [4] When the bag was opened and the contents removed, Senior Customs Officer Elangovan a/l Rethnesamy ('SP5') found two packets of crystalline substances hidden in two secret compartments on the right and left walls of the bag. A check on the jacket also revealed a hidden packet containing crystalline substances. SP5 had to make a small cut at the bulging section of the jacket to retrieve the packet. [4] When the bag was opened and the contents removed, Senior Customs Officer Elangovan a/l Rethnesamy ('SP5') found two packets of crystalline substances hidden in two secret compartments on the right and left walls of the bag. A check on the jacket also revealed a hidden packet containing crystalline substances. SP5 had to make a small cut at the bulging section of the jacket to retrieve the packet. [5] The crystalline substances found in the appellant's bag and jacket were sent for analysis and were confirmed by the chemist to contain 540.9g of methamphetamine. Possession without lawful authority of 50g or more of this drug attracts the presumption of trafficking under s. 37(da)(xvi) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ('the DDA'). [6] On these facts the learned trial judge was satisfied that a prima facie case had been established against the appellant and he then called upon the appellant to enter his defence. Having heard the defence he found that the appellant's explanation failed to cast any reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. Accordingly, he found the appellant guilty as charged… …[30] But the fact is he was also carrying a packet of drug hidden in his jacket and it was not his case that he was also asked by Ashgar to wear the jacket on his trip to Malaysia. To our mind the presence of the same type of drug in the appellant's jacket dispels any doubt as to his knowledge about the drugs in the bag. The learned trial judge was therefore right in finding that the appellant had knowledge of the drugs. This finding by necessary implication means that the appellant had failed to rebut the presumption of knowledge. Failure to rebut the presumption means that he had knowledge of the drugs… [32] Di samping itu, keterangan SP3 yang menyatakan penama Sharil yang menumpang dan tidur dibilik utama sejak dua minggu sebelum ditangkap yang dikatakan pemunya kepada beg celoreng P13 dan perkara mengenai Shahril ini telah beliau beritahu kepada polis. Malah SP2 mahupun SP6 sebagai pegawai penyiasat tidak sesekali menyiasat dan mengenalpasti penama Sharil ini. Keterangan ini tidak pernah di persoalkan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Fakta ini menyumbag kepada keterangan kukuh bahawa bilik utama dan dadah yang dijumpai di dalamya boleh diakses oleh Sharil dan tanpa siasatan dibuat kebarangkalian beg celoreng yang mengandungi dadah itu adalah milik dan boleh diakses oleh Sharil tidak boleh dikecualikan. [33] Selain itu T2 bukanlah penghuni rumah tersebut. Menurut SP3 beliau pernah nampak T2 datang dua tiga kali ke rumah itu. [34] Dengan itu dari keseluruhan keterangan kes pihak pendakwaan ini didapati pihak pendakwaan tidak sesekali telah atau dapat mengecualikan orang lain selain dari T1 dan T2 mempunyai akses kepada bilik utama dan stor serta dadah dan bahan racun yang dijumpai itu. Oleh itu kedua-dua T1 dan T2 tidak mempunyai jagaan atau kawalan eksklusif terhadap dadah dan bahan racun tersebut yang membolehkan mahkamah ini menyatakan mereka mempunyai milikan atas hal perkara tersebut. [35] Dengan alasan-alasan dan dari fakta kes pihak pendakwaan tidak terdapat sebarang keterangan yang menunjukkan kedua-dua atau salah seorang daripada T1 dan T2 mengedar dadah berkenaan. [36] Oleh itu Mahkamah ini dapati pihak pendakwaan telah gagal mengemukakan satu kes prima facie terhadap kedua-dua T1 dan T2 atas kesemua pertuduhan yang dihadapi oleh mereka. T1 dan T2 dengan itu dilepas dan dibebaskan dari kesemua pertuduhan itu. (AB. KARIM BIN AB. RAHMAN) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA SHAH ALAM TARIKH: 1 JUN 2022 COUNSEL Bagi Pihak Responden(1): En. Mohd Shafiq bin Ahmed Bazari Tetuan Bazari & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara Bagi Pihak Responden(1): En. Muhammad Razman Tetuan Amin, Iqhmar & Razman Peguambela dan Peguamcara Bagi Pihak Perayu: TPR Tuan Heikal Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor
Wrong text, a broken link, out-of-date content, or a removal request — tell us and we'll check it against the official source.