[Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] v Muhammad Fazrin Bin Kamarolzaman (CB-45A-9-03/2022)

MUHAMMAD FAZRIN BIN KAMAROLZAMAN

MOHAMAD SYAFIQ BIN DZULKARNAIN (NO. K/P: 910825-06-5339) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Pada asalnya kedua-dua Tertuduh telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan-pertuduhan berikut: Kes No. CB-45A-9-03/2022 Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 2hb November 2021, jam lebih kurang 2145 hrs, bertempat di kawasan Ladang Kelapa Sawit Agropolitan Felda Kemahal Manchis, di dalam Daerah Bentong, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, dalam mencapai niat bersama kamu telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya berat bersih 23.1 gram (16.1 gram Heoin dan 7.0 gram Monoacetylmorphines) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B (2) Akta yang sama serta dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Kes No. CB-45-5-03/2022 Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 2hb November 2021, jam lebih kurang 2145 hrs, bertempat di kawasan Ladang Kelapa Sawit Agropolitan Felda Kemahal Manchis, di Dalam Daerah Bentong, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, dalam mencapai niat bersama telah didapati dalam kawalan kamu dadah berbahaya berat bersih 1.34 gram Cannabis dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 6 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 6 Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Kes No. CB-45-6-03/2022 Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 2hb November 2021, jam lebih kurang 2145 hrs, bertempat di kawasan Ladang Kelapa Sawit Agropolitan Felda Kemahal Manchis, di dalam Daerah Bentong, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, kamu telah didapati dalam kawalan kamu dadah berbahaya berat bersih 0.09 gram Methamphetamine dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12 (2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 12(3) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Kes No. CB-45-13-08/2022 Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 2hb November 2021, jam lebih kurang 2145 hrs, bertempat di kawasan Ladang Kelapa Sawit Agropolitan Felda Kemahal Manchis, di dalam Daerah Bentong, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, dalam mencapai niat bersama telah didapati dalam milikan kamu dadah berbahaya berat bersih 27.07 gram Methamphetamine dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39A (1) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [2] Pada 05.02.2024, Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telah memaklumkan bahawa Pendakwa Raya telah menerima surat representasi yang dikemukakan oleh Tertuduh Pertama dan ekoran itu Timbalan Pendakwa Raya memohon untuk mengemukakan pertuduhan pilihan. Namun demikian Timbalan Pendakwa Raya memohon penangguhan untuk mendapat arahan lanjut berkenaan pertuduhan pilihan tersebut. [3] Seterusnya pada 07.02.2024 Timbalan Pendakwa Raya setelah menimbangkan pertuduhan pilihan dan mengemukakan pertuduhan pilihan seperti berikut: Pertuduhan Pilihan - Kes No. CB-45A-9-03/2022 Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 2hb November 2021, jam lebih kurang 2145 hrs, bertempat di kawasan Ladang Kelapa Sawit Agropolitan Felda Kemahal Manchis, di dalam Daerah Bentong, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, dalam mencapai niat bersama kamu telah didapati dalam milikan kamu dadah berbahaya berat bersih 23.1 gram (16.1 gram Heroin dan 7.0 gram Monoacetylmorphines) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12 (2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39A (2) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” Pertuduhan [4] Dalam sesuatu perbicaraan jenayah secara umumnya terdapat tiga jenis pertuduhan. Ia adalah terdiri daripada:

pertuduhan;

pertuduhan pindaan; dan

pertuduhan pilihan. [5] Tatacara berkenaan pertuduhan dinyatakan di Bahagian XVIII Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (KPJ) yang meliputi seksyen 152 sehingga seksyen 172. [6] Pertuduhan yang dibacakan kepada Tertuduh akan memberikan notis kepada Tertuduh apakah kesalahan yang dilakukan, dimanakah ianya dilakukan dan bilakah ia dilakukan. Adalah didapati terdapat deretan nas undang-undang yang boleh dijadikan suluh panduan untuk menyediakan sesuatu pertuduhan, PP v Leong Yoon Meow [1953] MLJ XXXV, Ahmad Shah bin Yassin v PP [1952] MLJ 28, PP v Margarita B Cruz [1988] 1 MLJ 539. Pertuduhan Pindaan [7] Semasa perbicaraan berjalan terdapat keadaan apabila pertuduhan asal perlu dipinda. Jika ini berlaku di bawah seksyen 158 KPJ pula diberikan perhatian. Seksyen 158 KPJ memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “158 Court may alter or add to charge

Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced.

Every such alteration or addition shall be read and explained to the accused.” [8] Bidang kuasa untuk meminda atau menambah pertuduhan adalah terletak kepada Mahkamah. Ini dapat dilihat seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes PP v Datuk Haji Dzulkifli [1982] 1 MLJ 340 dan PP v Sarjit Kaur a/p Najar Singh [1998] 1 MLJ 184. Walau bagaimanapun dalam kes PP v Heng You Hang [1949] 1 MLJ 285 Hakim Spenser-Wilkinson menyatakan bahawa adalah wajar untuk permohonan pindaan dibuat oleh Pendakwa Raya. Hakim Spenser menyatakan seperti berikut: “I doubt whether section 158 imposes any duty upon a Court to alter or amend the charge. I think, rather, that it is for the prosecution to apply to the Court to exercise its power under that section. Under section 173(h), Subordinate Courts have a duty to consider the charge and amend it if necessary. Nevertheless I do not think that this section makes it incumbent on the Court to search the law for offences which an accused person may have committed. It is for the prosecution to decide what their real complaint against the accused is and to frame their charges or to submit amendments accordingly. No doubt, in a clear case, a President or a Magistrate ought to alter a charge to fit the proved facts; but if the prosecution is unable to reach a conclusion as to the proper charge, which appears to have been the position in this case, it is in my view quite improper to criticise the President for failing to carry out the functions of the prosecuting officer.” [9] Sekiranya pindaan dibuat di bawah seksyen 158 KPJ maka tatacara yang perlu dilakukan selepas pindaan itu perlu mematuhi seksyen 159, seksyen 161 dan seksyen 162 KPJ. [10] Mahkamah yang mendengar sesuatu kes jenayah juga boleh meminda pertuduhan sekiranya keterangan yang dikemukakan telah menunjukkan kesalahan lain telah dibuktikan seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 173 (h) (ii) KPJ seperti berikut: “173 Procedure in summary trials

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(i) If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged, the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence.

(ii) If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on an offence other than the offence charged which the Court is competent to try and which in the opinion of the Court it ought to try, the Court shall amend the charge.

(iii) For the purpose for subparagraphs (i) and (ii), a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.” Dalam keadaan sedemikian, pindaan kepada pertuduhan perlu dilakukan. Pertuduhan Pilihan [11] Penelitian kepada Kanun Prosedur Jenayah mendapati seksyen 166 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “166 Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of those offences; and any number of the charges may be tried at once, or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. ILLUSTRATIONS

A is accused of an act which may amount to theft or receiving stolen property or criminal breach of trust or cheating. He may be charged with theft, receiving stolen property, criminal breach of trust, and cheating, or he may be charged with having committed theft, or receiving stolen property, or criminal breach of trust, or cheating.

A states on oath before the committing Magistrate that he saw B hit C with a club. Before the High Court A states on oath that B never hit C. A may be charged in the alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false evidence although it cannot be proved which of these contradictory statements was false.” [12] Adalah didapati bahawa pertuduhan pilihan di bawah seksyen 166 KPJ telah diberikan penjelasan berkenaan penggunaannya di dalam kes Quinn and Howland v Rex [1949] 1 MLJ 217. Hakim Murray-Aynsley, CJ semasa memberikan penjelasan berkenaan seksyen 176 KPJ Strait Settlement yang pari materia dengan seksyen 166 KPJ telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “It will be seen that it is closely linked with section 176 which reads as follows:—

If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and any number of such charges may be tried at once or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences.

A is accused of an act which may amount to theft or receiving stolen property or criminal breach of trust or cheating. He may be charged with theft, receiving stolen property, criminal breach of trust and cheating, or he may be charged with having committed theft or receiving stolen property or criminal breach of trust or cheating.

A states on oath before the committing Police Magistrate that he saw B hit C with a club. Before the High Court A states on oath that B never hit C. A may be charged in the alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false evidence although it cannot be proved which of these contradictory statements was false. It is I think desirable to consider the latter section first. For that section to have effect it is necessary to presuppose a state of affairs in which a person has the duty of framing a charge and it is uncertain what offence can be proved against the accused. Uncertainty in this respect can be of three kinds. The facts can be quite certain but there may be doubt as a matter of law which section covers such facts. There may be a case where the prosecution is in a position to prove certain facts from which the Court may draw one of several inferences. A common instance of this state of affairs arises in cases of recent possession of stolen goods, where the Court may draw the inference of stealing or receiving. The third case is where, as so often happens, the prosecution is uncertain how much the evidence produced will convince the Court when the case comes on for trial.” [13] Malahan dalam kes PP v Paw Sei Puan and Nine Others [1939] MLJ 159 telah dijelaskan bagaimanakah pemakaian seksyen 166 KPJ apabila terdapatnya pertuduhan yang berbeza melibatkan orang yang sama dan hubung kaitnya dengan prinsip pertuduhan berulang di mana Hakim Howes menyatakan seperti berikut: “It will be noted that the plea of previous acquittal or conviction given by section 302 (i) is limited to cases in which a different charge from the one made against the Accused might have been made under section 166 or of which he might have been convicted under section 167. It does not apply to section 165 under which, if in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. It is clear that rioting would be a distinct offence within section 302

(ii) for which a separate charge might have been made against the Accused in the former trial under section 165, but could not have been made under section 166. In the present state of our Code, I can see no legal objection to the addition, in a charge of murder, of another charge of a different character, provided that the other offence was so connected with the murder as to form one transaction, and provided that the Accused is not embarrassed in any way in his defence; notwithstanding the fact that, following the English practice, it is unusual in these States to combine a charge of a different offence with one of murder.” [14] Dalam kes Rex v Tay Thye Joo [1933] MLJ 35 Terrell J telah menjelaskan berkenaan dengan pemakaian seksyen 166 KPJ dengan merujuk kepada seksyen 172 seperti berikut: “Mr. Battenberg further argues that Section 172 the alternative charge section, was very limited in its operation. The section reads as follows:– "If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and any number of such charges may be tried at once or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences." [15] Mahkamah dalam kes Rex v Tay Thye Joo (supra) berpendapat bahawa pertuduhan yang dikemukakan dalam konteks seksyen 166 KPJ tidak hanya terikat kepada satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen yang sama di bawah Kanun Keseksaan dengan menyatakan seperti berikut: “I think that section 172 means what it says, namely that it is doubtful what facts can be proved. Until they can be proved it is difficult to say what offence has been committed and accordingly an alternative charge can be framed. Another way of putting it is that the exact relation of the accused to the offence in question has not been fully ascertained. There can I think be no doubt that Section 172 contemplates a slightly different set of circumstances sufficiently different in fact to make it possible that the proper charge is under a different section of the Penal Code.” [16] Penelitian kepada kes-kes tersebut mencadangkan bahawa pertuduhan pilihan boleh dibuat apabila terdapatnya kekeliruan berkenaan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh di mana ianya boleh tergolong di dalam kesalahan yang lain daripada pertuduhan asalnya. [17] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Jamali Adnan v. Public Prosecutor [1985] CLJ Rep 167 telah menegaskan berkenaan dengan pemakaian seksyen 166 KPJ. Isu dalam kes tersebut ialah berkenaan terdapatnya pertuduhan berulang yang dikatakan telah berlaku apabila Tertuduh dikemukakan dengan dua pertuduhan dan dalam konteks ini Mahkamah Persekutuan menerangkan tentang pemakaian seksyen 166 KPJ seperti berikut: “In our opinion, s. 166 provides for a situation where it is doubtful what offence has been committed. When a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, that section permits that the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and any number of such charges in the alternative with having committed some one of such offences. Section 167, on the other hand, enables the trial Court to convict an accused charged with one offence for a different offence where the facts show that a different offence has been committed [see Kharkan v. State of U.P. [1965] AIR SC 83 @ p. 86]. In our judgment, neither of these provisions is applicable to the facts of this case because here, there was no doubt at all as to the offences which the appellant had committed over a period of time with different accomplice or accomplices and on various victims. In fact, the appellant had no hesitation in pleading guilty to all the four charges of robberies with a deadly weapon when he appeared before the Sessions Court at Johor Bahru.” [18] Ini bermakna pertuduhan pilihan sewajarnya dikemukakan dalam keadaan terdapat kekeliruan terhadap kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh berdasarkan kepada tindakan atau siri tindakan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh. [19] Semasa mempertimbangkan pertuduhan pilihan perkara-perkara tersebut perlu diberikan perhatian, iaitu:

pertuduhan pilihan itu tidak semestinya atas seksyen kesalahan yang sama dengan pertuduhan asal.

pertuduhan pilihan adalah wajar dikemukakan pada masa awal perbicaraan atau dibacakan ketika pertuduhan asal dikemukakan kepada Tertuduh.

pertuduhan pilihan yang dikemukakan hendaklah juga mengambil kira seksyen 158 KPJ yang berkaitan dengan pindaan pertuduhan.

pertuduhan pilihan tersebut hendaklah di bawah seksyen 166 KPJ dan bukannya dengan tujuan untuk memberi Tertuduh membuat pilihan sama ada membuat pengakuan salah bagi pertuduhan asal atau pertuduhan pilihan yang dikemukakan. Dalam erti kata lain ia tidak boleh dijadikan langkah taktikal untuk memastikan bahawa seseorang Tertuduh itu mengaku salah. [20] Sesungguhnya kebebasan seseorang itu bukannya barang jualan untuk dijual beli. Di samping itu kebebasan juga tidak boleh mengorbankan kepentingan awam yang mesti dilindungi oleh Pendakwa Raya dalam konteks undang-undang jenayah. Perimbangan tanggungjawab Pendakwa Raya dan perlindungan kepada hak Tertuduh akan menyebabkan matlamat sistem pentadbiran jenayah akan tercapai dan tidak tersasar. [21] Penelitian kepada kes-kes Mahkamah Atasan mencadangkan bahawa terdapat keadaan apabila perbicaraan telah berjalan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan pertuduhan pilihan. Misalnya, dalam kes Mohd Shaiful bin Saad v Public Prosecutor [2015] 3 MLJ 657. Dalam kes tersebut pertuduhan pilihan telah dibuat pada hari pertama perbicaraan. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan [17] kes tersebut. Begitu juga dalam kes Tong Kam Yew & Anor v PP [2013] 4 MLJ 888. [22] Sementara itu terdapat juga pandangan Mahkamah Rayuan yang menyatakan bahawa pertuduhan pilihan boleh digunakan di bawah seksyen 166 KPJ dan ianya adalah sesuatu yang teratur jika dibaca bersama dengan seksyen 158(1) KPJ. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Mohd Taufik Peter bin Abdullah lwn Pendakwa Raya [2019] 4 MLJ 542 seperti berikut: “[40] Pada hemat kami, tindakan oleh pendakwa raya untuk mengemukakan pertuduhan alternatif di atas adalah teratur seperti diperuntukkan di bawah s 158(1) atau s 166 Kanun Acara Jenayah (‘KAJ’). Pada umumnya, sesuatu pertuduhan boleh dipinda atau ditambah pada bila-bila masa sebelum penghakiman dizahirkan (before judgment is pronounced). Dan, adalah undang-undang mantap bahawa pertuduhan alternatif adalah satu pertuduhan tambahan yang terangkum di bawah s 158(1) KAJ. [41] Peruntukan ini (s 158(1) KAJ) sewajarnya dibaca bersama-sama dengan s 173(h)(ii) Kanun yang sama yang memberi kuasa kepada mahkamah untuk meminda sesuatu pertuduhan di akhir kes pendakwaan. [42] Selanjutnya, nas dari kes-kes yang telah diputuskan menyatakan masa yang terbaik untuk meminda atau menambah sesuatu pertuduhan adalah semasa kes pendakwaan sedang berlangsung atau pun di akhir kes pendakwaan, melainkan hak-hak orang kena tuduh akan terjejas dengan tindakan tersebut — lihat Public Prosecutor v Salamah binte Abdullah [1947] 1 MLJ 178; Lew Cheok Hin v Reg [1956] 1 MLJ 131; Public Prosecutor v Tan Kim Kang & Ors [1962] 1 MLJ 388. [43] Seterusnya, s 158(2) memperuntukkan bahawa sekiranya sesuatu pertuduhan itu dipinda atau ditambah, maka pindaan atau tambahan tersebut hendak dibacakan semula kepada orang kena tuduh dan pengakuannya (plea) hendaklah direkodkan — lihat Singah Mohamed Hussin v Public Prosecutor [1973] 2 MLJ 109; Hee Nyuk Fook v Public Prosecutor [1988] 2 MLJ 360. [44] Kami mendapati bahawa kesemua kehendak undang-undang ini telah dipatuhi oleh hakim bicara pertama. Tidak wujud sebarang kekeliruan atau ketidakjelasan prosedur pengemukaan pertuduhan alternatif tersebut seperti didakwa atau dihujahkan oleh peguambela yang bijaksana.” [23] Ia juga dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Fam Meng Siong & Anor v PP [2012] 5 MLJ 464 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[18] The notes of proceedings at the High Court showed that the alternative charge was read to all the accused, including the appellants and that they claimed trial to the alternative charge. The appellants were represented by counsel, who did not raise any objection to the alternative charge nor applied to recall any prosecution's witnesses pursuant to the introduction of the alternative charge. The court, which had control of the whole proceedings, did not object to the tendering of the alternative charge. [19] It is within the discretion of the public prosecutor to decide what charges should be preferred in the course of the trial. In Long bin Samat & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1974] 2 MLJ 152 at pp 156– 158, Suffian LP, after citing s 376 of the CPC said: … from this it would appear that the public prosecutor has a discretion as to what charges should be preferred, subject of course to the power of the court to amend charges in the course of trial. That the law intends to give a wide discretion over criminal prosecutions to the public prosecutor appears from other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code providing that for the prosecution of certain offence his complaint is required (s 130) and yet for other offences his written sanction (s 120). [20] In respect of art 145(3) of the Constitution, Suffian LP said: In our view this clause from the supreme law clearly gives to attorney general very wide discretion over the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions. Not only may he institute and conduct any proceedings for an offence, he may also discontinue criminal proceedings that he instituted, and the courts cannot compel him to institute any criminal proceedings he does not wish to institute or to go on with any criminal proceedings which he decided to discontinue. [21] The discretionary power of the public prosecutor to prefer an alternative charge before the close of the prosecution's case is not a transgression of the power of the court to alter or add a charge at any time before judgment under s 158 of the CPC. In our view the appellants were not in any way prejudiced by the introduction of the alternative charge to which they claimed trial. There is no ground before us to conclude that there was a miscarriage of justice.” [24] Ini bermakna pertuduhan pilihan berdasarkan kepada keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Atasan boleh dilakukan hatta setelah perbicaraan dijalankan. Ia tidak menjejaskan keesahan pertuduhan tersebut. Ini bersandarkan kepada budi bicara Pendakwa Raya yang dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 376 KPJ dan Perkara 145 (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini kuasa yang diberikan kepada Pendakwa Raya dalam mengemukakan suatu pertuduhan adalah tertakluk kepada undang-undang dan tidak boleh dilakukan dengan sewenang-wenangnya. Dalam konteks undang- undang jenayah ialah kanun prosedur jenayah yang jelas tujuannya adalah terdapat dalam seksyen 3 KPJ yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “All offences under the Penal Code shall be inquired into and tried according to the provisions hereinafter contained, and all offences under any other law shall be inquired into and tried according to the same provisions: subject however to any written law for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of inquiring into or trying such offences.” [25] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada pandangan Hakim Abdoolcader berkenaan dengan budi bicara Pendakwa Raya di bawah Perkara 145 (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan seksyen 376 (1) KPJ dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 2 MLJ 116 seperti berikut: “'Conduct' in Article 145(3) cannot but refer to the conduct of prosecutions in court, as it indeed appears ipsissimis verbis in section 377 of the Code. And 'control and direction' in section 376(i) of the Code is in respect of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings, and not of criminal procedure orthe jurisdiction of the courts. 'Conduct' of criminal prosecutions and proceedings in Article 145(3) cannot connote the regulation of criminal procedure or of the jurisdiction of the courts or the power or discretion to do so. Any contrary contention would in effect in my view be tantamount to the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor arrogating to himself the legislative powers vested in Parliament under Item 4 and in particular paragraph (b) thereof in List I (Federal List) in the NinthSchedule to the Constitution, with perhaps also the not inconceptible resultant intrusion or at least a more than peripheral incursion into the sphere of Article 121(1) of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the Federation is vested intwo High Courts and in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law – namely, the Subordinate Courts Act, 1948 which specifies the subordinate courts and their respective civil and criminal jurisdiction.” [26] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga sedar bahawa Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan telah dipinda yang berbeza dengan keadaan Perkara 121 semasa keputusan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors (supra). Kini Perkara 121 Perlembagaan Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut:

There shall be two High Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely—

one in the States of Malaya, which shall be known as the High Court in Malaya and shall have its principal registry at such place in the States of Malaya as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine; and

one in the States of Sabah and Sarawak, which shall be known as the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak and shall have its principal registry at such place in the States of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine;

(Repealed) and such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law and the High Courts and inferior courts shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law.

The courts referred to in Clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.

There shall be a court which shall be known as the Mahkamah Rayuan (Court of Appeal) and shall have its principal registry at such place as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine, and the Court of Appeal shall have the following jurisdiction, that is to say—

jurisdiction to determine appeals from decisions of a High Court or a judge thereof (except decisions of a High Court given by a registrar or other officer of the Court and appealable under federal law to a judge of the Court); and

such other jurisdiction as may be conferred by or under federal law.

There shall be a court which shall be known as the Mahkamah Persekutuan (Federal Court) and shall have its principal registry at such place as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may determine, and the Federal Court shall have the following jurisdiction, that is to say—

jurisdiction to determine appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal, of the High Court or a judge thereof;

such original or consultative jurisdiction as is specified in

such other jurisdiction as may be conferred by or under federal law.

Subject to any limitations imposed by or under federal law, any order, decree, judgment or process of the courts referred to in Clause (1) or of any judge thereof shall (so far as its nature permits) have full force and effect according to its tenor throughout the Federation, and may be executed or enforced in any part of the Federation accordingly; and federal law may provide for courts in one part of the Federation or their officers to act in aid of courts in another part.

In determining where the principal registry of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak is to be, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall act on the advice of the Prime Minister, who shall consult the Chief Ministers of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the Chief Judge of the High Court.” [27] Namun demikian prinsip yang dinyatakan dalam kes Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors (supra) itu menunjukkan tiada mana-mana pihak yang diperuntukkan kuasa boleh menjalankannya dengan membelakangkan Perlembagaan Persekutuan atau undang-undang yang berkaitan. Dalam konteks pertuduhan adalah di bawah Bab XVIII KPJ. [28] Namun demikian Mahkamah ini hendaklah mengikuti duluan kehakiman berkenaan dengan perkara ini dan tidak boleh mengutamakan pandangan peribadi berkenaan isu yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Atasan. Ia adalah termasuk dalam prinsip duluan kehakiman yang perlu dipatuhi oleh Mahkamah ini. Ini sejajar dengan nasihat murni yang diberikan oleh YAA Ketua Hakim Negara dalam Ucapan Pembukaan Tahun Perundangan 2024 pada 15hb. Januari 2024 seperti berikut: “[38] Beginning with internal judicial independence, it is my view that a Judge must continue to hear cases without fear or favour and without any motivations, hope of reward or any bias. In particular, I would like to remind myself as well as my Sister and Brother Judges about the crucial significance of stare decisis or the doctrine of judicial precedent. [39] Courts lower in the judicial hierarchy must remember to abide by precedents set by higher Courts. The Federal Court, being the apex Court, must continue to remember that it cannot depart too easily from precedent especially so if a previously decided authority is questioned not so long after it was decided. The Federal Court cannot afford to be inconsistent as that interferes with the public who organises their affairs upon legal clarity and certainty. [40] In this regard, the individual opinion of a Judge, so to speak, is irrelevant on account of stare decisis. Even if a Judge or Court believes a decision of the higher Court to be wrong, he is under the obligation to abide by it. It would be for the parties to bring that case to the higher court to argue in favour of departing from the previously established precedent if the circumstances so warrant it.” [29] Keakuran dan kepatuhan kepada keputusan Mahkamah Atasan adalah merupakan tonggak penting dalam pentadbiran keadilan. Pematuhan kepada keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Atasan dapat memastikan kestabilan pentadbiran undang-undang disebabkan terdapatnya kepastian di dalam prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Atasan. Oleh itu adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah bawahan sentiasa mengemaskini maklumat-maklumat berkenaan dengan keputusan Mahkamah Atasan agar keputusan yang dibuat tersebut adalah mematuhi keputusan Mahkamah Atasan. Jika ini tidak dilakukan ia akan menimbulkan kekacauan dalam pentadbiran keadilan apabila terdapatnya keputusan Mahkamah Bawahan yang bercanggah dengan keputusan Mahkamah Atasan. Ini wajar dan perlu dielakkan. [30] Dalam kes ini pertuduhan pilihan yang dikemukakan hanya meletakkan seorang sahaja Tertuduh. Ia tidak seperti pertuduhan asal. Oleh yang demikian Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telah memohon penangguhan kes ini untuk mendapatkan arahan selanjutnya berkenaan dengan pertuduhan pilihan tersebut. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telahpun mengemukakan pertuduhan pilihan yang muktamad seperti berikut: “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 2hb November 2021, jam lebih kurang 2145 hrs, bertempat di kawasan Ladang Kelapa Sawit Agropolitan Felda Kemahal Manchis, di dalam Daerah Bentong, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, dalam mencapai niat bersama kamu telah didapati dalam milikan kamu dadah berbahaya berat bersih 23.1 gram (16.1 gram Heroin dan 7.0 gram Monoacetylmorphines) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12 (2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39A (2) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” [31] Setelah pertuduhan dibacakan dan fakta kes serta barang kes diakui oleh Tertuduh Pertama Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa pengakuan salah Tertuduh Pertama adalah dilakukan mengikut undang-undang dan ianya tidak bersyarat. Oleh itu Mahkamah telah menerima pengakuan salah Tertuduh Pertama terhadap pertuduhan pilihan dan pertuduhan-pertuduhan asal lain seperti sebelum ini. Tertuduh Pertama disabitkan dengan pertuduhan pilihan dan pertuduhan asal lain tersebut. Ketika mempertimbangkan hukuman yang sewajarnya kepada Tertuduh Pertama, Mahkamah telah mengambil kira faktor-faktor berikut:

Pengakuan Salah Tertuduh Pertama [32] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa Tertuduh Pertama telah membuat pengakuan salah pada kali pertama pertuduhan dikemukakan atau dibacakan kepada Tertuduh Pertama. Ia menurut Peguambela Tertuduh Pertama telah menjimatkan masa Mahkamah disebabkan kes ini dapat diselesaikan tanpa perlu perbicaraan penuh. [33] Pengakuan salah sebagai faktor peringanan telah acap kali dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah misalnya dalam kes Melvani v Public

Prosecutor [1971] 1 MLJ 137 dan Sau Soo Kim v PP [1975] 2 MLJ Walau bagaimanapun pengakuan salah tidak secara automatik menjadikan Mahkamah berkewajipan untuk memberikan peringangan hukuman sebaliknya ia bergantung kepada keadaan sesuatu kes. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Govindnan a/l Chinden Nair [1998] 2 MLJ 181. [34] Dalam kes ini Tertuduh Pertama telah membuat pengakuan salah. Namun demikian Mahkamah perlu mempertimbangkan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh Pertama adakah ia mewajarkan pengakuan salah tersebut diambil kira sebagai faktor peringanan? Mahkamah berpendapat ia perlu diseimbangkan dengan kepentingan awam. Ini adalah disebabkan oleh kesalahan yang dilakukan adalah melibatkan pemilikan dadah.

Berat dan Jenis Dadah [35] Seterusnya Mahkamah juga mempertimbangkan berat dan jenis dadah yang terlibat iaitu 23.1 gram (16.1 gram Heroin dan 7.0 gram Monoacetylmorphines).

Rayuan berkenaan dengan keadaan peribadi Tertuduh Pertama [36] Dalam rayuan peringanan peguambela Tertuduh Pertama dinyatakan bahawa berlaku penyesalahan terhadap kesalahan yang dilakukan dan juga memperihalkan tanggungan keluarga yang perlu dilunaskan oleh Tertuduh Pertama. [37] Mahkamah berpendapat rayuan tersebut perlu dilihat dan diberikan perhatian oleh Mahkamah bersama-sama dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh Pertama. Rayuan peribadi tersebut tidak sewajarnya mengatasi kepentingan awam dan tanggungjawab Mahkamah untuk memastikan bahawa tiada perlakuan jenayah dilakukan oleh individu-individu dalam masyarakat. Oleh yang demikian adalah tidak wajar kini Tertuduh Pertama membangkitkan isu peribadi mereka bagi memohon Mahkamah ini mempertimbangkan hukuman yang rendah. [38] Mahkamah juga mengambil kira umur Tertuduh Pertama iaitu 29 tahun dalam menentukan hukuman yang sewajarnya dijatuhkan. Ia bagi memberi peluang kepada Tertuduh Pertama untuk membolehkan dia memperbaiki dirinya setelah tamat hukuman pemenjaraan kelak. Mahkamah juga mempertimbangkan bahawa ini adalah merupakan kesalahan pertama Tertuduh Pertama. Ia tidak dipertikaikan oleh pihak Pendakwa Raya berkenaan fakta tersebut. [39] Mahkamah juga mempertimbangkan tren hukuman bagi kesalahan di bawah seksyen 12 (2) dan seksyen 39A (2) ADB 1952 yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Atasan. Di samping itu Mahkamah juga mengambil kira keputusan-keputusan yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah lain berkaitan dengan pertuduhan yang sama. Apakah tempoh pemenjaraan yang wajar dikenakan kepada Tertuduh-Tertuduh? [40] Mahkamah mempunyai budi bicara untuk mempertimbangkan tempoh pemenjaraan yang wajar berdasarkan kepada prinsip undang-undang dan keadaan fakta dalam sesuatu kes. Ini telah dinyatakan dalam Buku The Process of Criminal Justice Part 11 Trial Proceedings, Sentencing and Appeals, Lee Chong Fook dan Che Audah Hassan LexisNexis 2011 di halaman 371 seperti berikut: “The punishable section provides for the type and, sometimes, the minimum and/or the maximum term of imprisonment which the court has discretion to impose. The court has the discretion to be severe or lenient within the limits set by the punishable section. As a general rule, the facts of the case must be considered and its gravity assessed according to the ‘yardstick’ afforded by the legislative in providing for a maximum punishment.” [41] Ini adalah berdasarkan kepada keputusan dalam kes Abdul Karim v. Regina [1954] 1 MLJ 86 oleh Hakim Brown Pemangku Ketua Hakim seperti berikut: “In the matter of punishment, the "type of offence– is the concern of the Legislature, which has provided the maximum punishment which can be inflicted for a serious offence of that type. The particular offence, and the particular offender, are the concern of the Court, whose business it is to decide what punishment is merited upon the facts of the individual case within the limits which the Legislature has provided. Any tendency to standardise punishment for any type of offence is to be deplored because it means that the individual offender is being punished not upon the facts of his particular case but because he has committed an offence of that type. This tendency is particularly to be resisted in imposing punishment for an offence for which the Legislature has not left a wide field of discretion to the Court.” [42] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Kesavan Senderan v. PP [1999] 1 CLJ 343. Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur setelah menimbangkan kes Yap Teng Chai v PP [1959] 25 MLJ 205, PP v Nazarudin Ahmad & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 9 dan Lim Yoon Fah v PP [1971] 1 MLJ 37 merumuskan seperti berikut berkenaan dengan perkara-perkara yang perlu diambil kira di dalam penentuan hukuman: “These cases only illustrate that while there are common general principles in fixing sentence, the judge fixing sentence must look at each case individually. He must consider firstly, the nature and seriousness of the particular offence; secondly, the deliberateness with which and the circumstances in which the offence was committed; thirdly, to give a discount for genuine regret; and fourthly, the balance between the public interests in deterrence not only of the accused but of others, and of enabling the accused a chance to turn over a new leaf. Given that some offences may in their commission and circumstances be more serious than others, a sentence of 40% to 50% of the maximum sentence would be an appropriate median point to start with. It would sufficiently reflect the legislature's intent as to the nature and seriousness of the offence. The second consideration comes next. In the event that the circumstances show that the commission of the offence was very much planned, it would warrant a sentence higher than that 40% to 50% of the maximum sentence. So also if the offence is committed against an infant, a child, the weak and defenceless and the old. If the offence was committed accidentally, it would warrant a substantial reduction from that median point. As to the third consideration, a valid factor is whether an accused person is genuinely contrite and regrets what he has done. There are many ways to show such regret. It could be shown by cooperation with investigation, pleading guilty and making amends with the victim of the offence. Cooperation and pleading guilty saves considerable public money and time in investigation and prosecution as well as the time of the court. The public interest in such money and time being saved is considerable since the limited resources could then be utilised or directed to where it is most needed. In cases where a victim is involved, the making of amends with the victim, such as payment of compensation, would contribute substantially to the public's perception and acceptance that justice has been done. In such circumstances a very substantial reduction from the median point would be warranted. Thus on a plea of guilty alone, a discount of 20 to 30% from the sentence that would otherwise have been passed is warranted. The fourth consideration is more tenuous. It would have to be a fine balance between the need for deterrence of others from committing similar offences, and a consideration of the likelihood of the offender from committing the same offence again. Regarding the latter, the age of the offender, that he is first offender, that he has responsibilities of which he may have become even more aware since the specter of imprisonment hung over him and similar circumstances come into consideration. But these matters on their own are secondary to the main issue, which is the balance between the public interest in deterrence and enabling the convict to turn over a new leaf.” [43] Dalam menjalankan budi bicara berkenaan dengan hukuman yang wajar dikenakan Mahkamah ini perlu berhati-hati dan memahami bahawa budi bicara tersebut hendaklah dilaksanakan dengan sewajarnya dan berkaitan dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan serta nilai sosial masyarakat. Ini dapat dilihat dalam artikel menarik oleh Ralph Henham, Emeritus Professor of Criminal Justice and Senior Research Fellow, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University, UK dalam artikel beliau bertajuk Sentencing Policy, Social Values and Discretionary Justice, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2022 Vol. No. 4, 1093 seperti berikut: “The relationship between judicial discretionary power in sentencing and social values is infinitely complex. The origins and meaning of ‘discretion’ in sentencing, the concept and exercise of judicial discretionary power and citizens’ perceptions of what constitutes discretionary ‘justice’ are interrelated issues. ‘Discretion’ implies a degree of individual freedom in judicial decision making with a capacity to interpret or deploy sentencing law and procedure in reaching innovative or constructive solutions. However, the nature of discretionary decision making in sentencing, how decisions are justified and the contextual influences that inform them remain unclear.” [44] Beliau juga turut menyatakan istilah budi bicara perlu dikaitkan dengan kesan penggunaan budi bicara tersebut kepada kepentingan awam seperti berikut: “As suggested, the term ‘discretion’ implies a degree of freedom and capacity in decision making, whereas the notion of ‘justice’ ascribes value to the decisions themselves. ‘Justice’ has interrelated individual and social dimensions whose social meaning should be contextualised relative to time and place. Accordingly, notions of ‘discretionary justice’ should reflect the extent to which sentencers are able to take account of factors which impact the social value of sentencing decisions; for example, the relative impact of social deprivation on criminality. This approach requires a meaningful engagement by decision makers with the moral and social contexts of crime and punishment.” [45] Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh Pertama adalah melibatkan dadah yang telah menjadi masalah utama kepada masyarakat. Mahkamah juga mengambil maklum bahawa terdapat kesalahan-kesalahan jenayah yang berpunca daripada kegiatan pemilikan dadah. Mahkamah tidak wajar menutup mata serta mengunci minda terhadap hakikat bahawa kesalahan dadah telah berleluasa dalam masyarakat sehingga meruntuhkan sistem nilai dan moral masyarakat. Ia juga telah menjerumuskan anggota masyarakat kepada kegiatan jenayah yang berkaitan dengan dadah serta kesalahan-kesalahan jenayah yang lain. Selain daripada menimbangkan kepentingan kepada Tertuduh Pertama berdasarkan kepada rayuan yang dikemukakan untuk peringanan hukuman dan juga kepentingan awam seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Pendakwa Raya, Mahkamah berpendapat bagi mengimbangkan kepentingan antara Tertuduh Pertama dengan masyarakat, Mahkamah perlu mempertimbangkan kepentingan masyarakat awam melebihi daripada kepentingan individu di dalam kes ini. [46] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah ingin menyatakan bahawa adalah menjadi amalan yang baik sekiranya rujukan yang diberikan terhadap kes-kes yang telah diputuskan perlulah dikemukakan alasan penghakiman kes tersebut. Ini ialah bagi membolehkan Mahkamah meneliti apakah asas kepada keputusan yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah untuk dijadikan sandaran. Mahkamah berpendapat adalah tidak memadai untuk Peguambela hanya mengemukakan perintah Mahkamah tanpa alasan penghakiman. Dalam kes ini satu Perintah Bersih keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Rayuan Jenayah No. B- 05(M)-307-07/2022 Hong Kah Hin v PP yang diputuskan pada 05.12.2023 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 9 tahun berkuatkuasa dari tarikh tangkap. Pada hemat Mahkamah perintah sedemikian tidak sewajarnya dikemukakan bagi tujuan menunjukkan tren hukuman yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. Ini adalah disebabkan Mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai peluang untuk meneliti apakah fakta dan keterangan yang menyebabkan Mahkamah Rayuan menjatuhkan hukuman sedemikian rupa. Oleh itu adalah penting untuk Mahkamah dikemukakan dengan alasan penghakiman penuh berkenaan suatu hukuman yang dijatuhkan bagi membolehkan penelitian sewajarnya dibuat. [47] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah merujuk kepada ingatan yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Tetuan Wan Shahrizal, Hari & Co v PP [2023] 4 CLJ 843 di mana YAA Hakim Abdul Rahman Sebli, Hakim Besar Sabah Sarawak telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “[11] With due respect to the learned judge, none of the grounds constitute valid reasons for allowing the claim. The Court of Appeal was absolutely correct in reversing the decision. First of all, the learned judge was wrong in holding in para. 37 that he was bound by stare decisis to follow the decision of the Court of Appeal in Md Sukri Shahudin Dan 10 Yang Lain (Rayuan Jenayah: W-09-432-11-2016) ('Md Sukri '), which allowed the claims by several law firms, among them the law firms of Messrs Isharidah Chong & Menon, Messrs Stanley Agustine & Co and Messrs Haresh Mahadevan & Co for their legal fees to be paid from the seized properties. As confirmed by the learned judge himself, no written grounds were delivered by the Court of Appeal in that case. [12] Without the benefit of the written grounds, there was no way that the learned judge could have known of the actual reason or reasons why the Court of Appeal decided the way it did in that case. In any case, it was wrong for him to have engaged in guesswork on the basis for the unwritten decision, which undoubtedly had weighed heavily in his mind in deciding whether or not to allow the appellant's claim. [13] What binds the lower courts under the stare decisis doctrine is the ratio decidendi of the case and not mere similarity in the facts or in the law, or in the arguments of counsel, nor the obiter dicta of the case. [14] A lower court relying on an earlier unwritten decision of an appellate court must not assume that by affirming the decision of the lower court, the appellate court must have affirmed every finding of fact and law that the lower court had decided in favour of the winning party. Experience will tell that it is not uncommon for an appellate court to affirm or reverse the decisions of the lower courts on grounds other than those relied on by the lower courts. [15] Nor must the court, in the absence of the written grounds, accept the argument that the appellate court in the earlier case decided the way it did because it accepted counsel's argument, even where the earlier case involved the same counsel. Such acceptance of counsel's argument must be reflected in the written grounds of judgment. The role of counsel is to assist and the court to decide.” [48] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan dalam kes ini, kes-kes yang dirujuk ke Mahkamah ini adalah berkaitan dengan kecenderungan hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh Mahkamah lain dan juga Mahkamah atasan. Namun demikian adalah wajar untuk alasan penghakiman berkenaan hukuman tersebut dikemukakan. Ini adalah disebabkan Mahkamah ini perlu meneliti sama ada terdapat pertimbangan dalam kes tersebut yang boleh dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ini berdasarkan kepada fakta, keadaan kes, dan faktor peringangan dan pemberatan yang dijadikan asas dalam kes-kes tersebut. Pada hemat Mahkamah ketiadaaan alasan penghakiman tidak memberi peluang kepada Mahkamah ini untuk meneliti sama ada fakta-fakta dan keterangan dalam kes tersebut adalah sama atau bersesuaian untuk dijadikan suluh panduan untuk Mahkamah ini menjatuhkan hukuman yang sewajarnya. [49] Pada hemat Mahkamah ini proses menjatuhkan hukuman bukan hanya melihat kepada trend hukuman dalam kes yang lain tetapi perlu mempertimbangkan fakta dan eksibit-eksibit yang terdapat dalam sesuatu kes. Keputusan hukuman yang dijatuhkan dalam kes lain adalah sebagai panduan agar keputusan hukuman yang diberikan tidaklah tersasar daripada trend hukuman. Walau bagaimanapun adalah penting untuk alasan penghakiman lengkap berkenaan hukuman tersebut dikemukakan untuk tujuan pertimbangan Mahkamah. Ia tidak memadai dengan hanya mengemukakan perintah Mahkamah berkenaan hukuman atau sekadar menukilkan nama kes dan hukuman yang diberikan. Hukuman [50] Setelah menimbangkan rayuan pemberatan oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya dan peringanan hukuman oleh Tertuduh Pertama, serta meneliti fakta kes di samping merujuk kepada hujahan kedua-dua pihak Tertuduh Pertama dan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa:

Tertuduh Pertama dikenakan hukuman penjara 12 tahun dari tarikh tangkap 02.11.2021 dan 10 sebatan; dan

(ii) Hukuman penjara berjalan serentak dengan kes No. CB-45- 5-03/2022, CB-45-6-03/2022 dan CB-45-13-08/2022. Pertuduhan kepada Tertuduh Kedua tidak diteruskan oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya [51] Setelah Tertuduh Pertama membuat pengakuan salah dan dijatuhkan hukuman Timbalan Pendakwa Raya dengan wewenang beliau telah memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa Pendakwa Raya tidak ingin meneruskan pendakwaan terhadap Tertuduh Kedua bagi semua pertuduhan. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya memohon agar Tertuduh Kedua dibebas tanpa dilepaskan. Sebaliknya Peguambela Tertuduh Kedua memohon agar anak guamnya dibebas dan dilepaskan. Dalam konteks ini penelitian kepada seksyen 254 KPJ memperuntukkan bahawa perintah yang diberikan di bawah seksyen 254 (3) KPJ adalah tidak membawa kepada perintah dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D). Ini dapat dilihat seperti berikut: “254 Public Prosecutor may decline to prosecute further at any stage

At any stage of any trial, before the delivery of judgment, the Public Prosecutor may, if he thinks fit, inform the Court that he will not further prosecute the accused upon the charge and thereupon all proceedings on the charge against the accused shall be stayed and the accused shall be discharged of and from the same.

At any stage of any trial before a Sessions Court or a Magistrates Court before the delivery of judgment, the officer conducting the prosecution may, if he thinks fit, inform the Court that he does not propose further to prosecute the accused upon the charge, and thereupon all proceedings on the charge against the accused may be stayed by leave of the Court and, if so stayed, the accused shall be discharged of and from the same.

Such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the Court so directs.” [52] Bidang kuasa Pendakwa Raya untuk tidak meneruskan perbicaraan terdapat di bawah seksyen 376 KPJ yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “376 Public Prosecutor

The Attorney General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code. …” [53] Malahan di dalam Perkara 145 (3) Perlembagaan Persekutuan pula memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “(3) The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, a native court or a court-martial.” [54] Frasa yang digunakan adalah menggantung (stay) sesuatu prosiding jenayah. Seksyen 254 KPJ ini adalah menyerupai nolle prosequi yang membawa maksud pihak pendakwaan boleh menangguhkan prosiding jenayah kepada seseorang. Ia disamakan dengan nolle prosequi di United Kingdom seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Poh Cho Hing v PP [1982] 1 MLJ 86 di mana YA Hakim Wan Yahya menyatakan seperti berikut: “The reasoning is indeed a novel one if withdrawal of a charge against the giver negates involvement in the act, which he was alleged to have committed, or the withdrawal of charges against him was affected before the acceptor pleaded guilty. But would such an implication arise in our present case? I do not think so. The power to withdraw a charge against any person and to discontinue proceedings is spelt out in section 254 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article No. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, which read as follows: "254.(i) At any stage of any trial, before the delivery of judgment, or in the case of a trial by jury before the return of the verdict, the Public Prosecutor may, if he thinks fit, inform the court that he will not further prosecute the accused upon the charge and thereupon all proceedings on such charge against the accused shall be stayed and the accused shall be discharged of and from the same.

(ii) At any stage of any trial before a Sessions Court or the Court of a Magistrate before the delivery of judgment, the officer conducting the prosecution may, if he thinks fit, inform the court that he does not propose further to prosecute the accused upon the charge, and thereupon all proceedings on such charge against the accused may be stayed by leave of the court and, if so stayed, the accused shall be discharged of and from the same.

(iii) Such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the court so directs." "Art. 145 (3). The Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Muslim court, a native court or a court-martial." This power, exercisable by the Public Prosecutor, who is the Attorney-General, is similar to the power to stay proceedings in English courts and better known technically as nolle prosequi. This power may be invoked by the Attorney-General in various instances, to cite one instance, in cases where he requires a co-accused. to give evidence for the crown against the other accused person. This power undoubtedly confers upon the Attorney-General an unrestricted discretion in respect of which he is expected to exercise extreme fairness and sagacity. But whether he does so or not, it is not for the courts to decide. The exercise of such power by the Attorney-General is not subject to control by our courts but in most democratic governments is questionable elsewhere — perhaps in Parliament. It is not for the courts, therefore, to enquire into the manner or reasons for the exercise of nolle prosequi. In the absence of this information this court is unable to imply that mere withdrawal of a charge against a co-accused by the Public Prosecutor presupposes that the co-accused had taken part in the offence.” [55] Penelitian kepada sejarah perundangan di United Kingdom mendapati bahawa nolle prosequi telah dimulakan semasa pemerintahan Raja Charles II. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Goddard against Smith (1704) 87 ER 1008 seperti berikut: “Holt, Chief Justice, said, that he had known it thought very hard that the Attorney General should enter nolle prosequi upon indictments, and that it began first to be practised in the latter end of King Charles the Second's reign, but that on informations it had been frequently doue : and he ordered precedents to be searched if any were in Mr. Attorney Palmer or Nottingham's time. Harcourt, Master of the Office. There never has been any proceedings after a nolle prosequi.” [56] Penelitian kepada undang-undang di negara lain berkenaan dengan nolle prosequi misalnya di Queensland di Australia yang memperuntukkan prinsip tersebut dalam undang-undang prosiding jenayahnya. Ini dapat dilihat dalam Queensland Criminal Code Act 1899 seperti berikut: 563 Nolle prosequi

A Crown Law Officer may inform any court, by writing under the officer’s hand, that the Crown will not further proceed upon any indictment, or in relation to any charge contained in any indictment, then pending in the court.

A Crown prosecutor or a person appointed by the Governor in Council to present indictments in any court of criminal jurisdiction may inform that court, by signed writing, that the Crown will not further proceed upon any indictment, or in relation to any charge contained in any indictment, then pending in that court.

When such information is given to the court the accused person is to be discharged from any further proceedings upon that indictment or charge. [57] Sementara itu di United Kingdom istilah yang digunakan adalah penamatan prosiding (termination of proceedings). Ia terdiri daripada penarikan balik pertuduhan, pemberhentian (discontinue), tidak menawarkan keterangan (offering no evidence) dan nolle prosequi. Ini dapat dilihat misalnya dalam Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 seperti berikut: 23 Discontinuance of proceedings in magistrates’ courts.

Where the Director of Public Prosecutions has the conduct of proceedings for an offence, this section applies in relation to the preliminary stages of those proceedings.

In this section, “preliminary stage ” in relation to proceedings for an offence does not include—

any stage of the proceedings after the court has begun to hear evidence for the prosecution at a summary trial of the offence; or

any stage of the proceedings after the accused has been sent for trial for the offence.

Where, at any time during the preliminary stages of the proceedings, the Director gives notice under this section to the designated officer for the court that he does not want the proceedings to continue, they shall be discontinued with effect from the giving of that notice but may be revived by notice given by the accused under subsection (7) below.

Where, in the case of a person charged with an offence after being taken into custody without a warrant, the Director gives him notice, at a time when no magistrates’ court has been informed of the charge, that the proceedings against him are discontinued, they shall be discontinued with effect from the giving of that notice.

The Director shall, in any notice given under subsection (3) above, give reasons for not wanting the proceedings to continue.

On giving any notice under subsection (3) above the Director shall inform the accused of the notice and of the accused’s right to require the proceedings to be continued; but the Director shall not be obliged to give the accused any indication of his reasons for not wanting the proceedings to continue.

Where the Director has given notice under subsection (3) above, the accused shall, if he wants the proceedings to continue, give notice to that effect to the designated officer for the court within the prescribed period; and where notice is so given the proceedings shall continue as if no notice had been given by the Director under subsection (3) above.

Where the designated officer for the court has been so notified by the accused he shall inform the Director.

The discontinuance of any proceedings by virtue of this section shall not prevent the institution of fresh proceedings in respect of the same offence.

In this section “prescribed” means prescribed by Criminal Procedure Rules.” [58] Begitu juga di bawah seksyen 23A seperti berikut: “23A Discontinuance of proceedings after accused has been sent for trial.

This section applies where—

the Director of Public Prosecutions, or a public authority (within the meaning of section 17 of this Act), has the conduct of proceedings for an offence; and

the accused has been sent for trial . . . for the offence.

Where, at any time before the indictment is preferred, the Director or authority gives notice under this section to the Crown Court sitting at the place specified in the notice under section 51D(1) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 that he or it does not want the proceedings to continue, they shall be discontinued with effect from the giving of that notice.

The Director or authority shall, in any notice given under subsection (2) above, give reasons for not wanting the proceedings to continue.

On giving any notice under subsection (2) above the Director or authority shall inform the accused of the notice; but the Director or authority shall not be obliged to give the accused any indication of his reasons for not wanting the proceedings to continue.

The discontinuance of any proceedings by virtue of this section shall not prevent the institution of fresh proceedings in respect of the same offence.” [59] Persoalan yang menarik dalam kes ini ialah adakah dengan pemakluman Timbalan Pendakwa Raya bahawa tindakan yang akan dilakukan seterusnya terhadap Tertuduh Kedua membolehkan Mahkamah ini memberikan perintah dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D) dan bukannya perintah pelepasan tidak terjumlah kepada satu pembebasan (DNAA). [60] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes PP v Ambika M A Shanmugam [2021] 2 CLJ 522 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah mempunyai kuasa untuk melepaskan dan membebaskan Tertuduh di bawah seksyen 254 (3) KPJ. Fakta dalam kes tersebut menunjukkan bahawa terdapat perhubungan surat antara Peguam Tertuduh dan Kamar Peguam Negara dan terdapat pengesahan daripada Jabatan Peguam Negara yang menyatakan seperti berikut “Pendakwaan terhadap anak guam Tuan tidak akan diteruskan di bawah seksyen 254 Kanun Prosedur Jenayah”. Semasa perbicaraan kes ini di Mahkamah Tinggi apabila dikemukakan soalan sama ada ingin meneruskan semula pertuduhan ini atau tidak Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telah menyatakan jawapan seperti yang terdapat di perenggan [4] kes tersebut seperti berikut: “TPR: untuk kes ini terdapat representasi yang dimasukkan oleh pihak peguam. Saya ingin kes ini diDNAA di bawah seksyen 254 CPC. Mahkamah: Kenapa? TPR: Atas arahan. Mahkamah: Kenapa DNAA? Nak tarik balik tuduhan ke tak mahu teruskan ke. Apa alasan? TPR: Arahan kepada saya adalah untuk memohon DNAA, Yang Arif. Mahkamah: tidak mahu meneruskan pendakwaan? TPR: Ya, Yang Arif, setakat ini. Mahkamah: Arahan untuk tidak meneruskan pendakwaan ini? TPR: Arahan untuk DNAA dahulu. Mahkamah: Mesti ada sebab. Peguambela ada apa-apa hendak kata? Peguambela: Memandangkan arahan telah diperolehi. Mahkamah: Setuju dengan DNAA atau tidak? Peguambela: Tidak, Yang Arif. Memandangkan mereka tidak ingin teruskan perbicaraan pada hari ini, saya percaya mereka menggunakan seksyen 254 CPC, saya pohon budibicara Mahkamah untuk menggunakan seksyen 254(3) di mana Mahkamah mempunyai budibicara mutlak dalam menentukan sama ada kes ini dilepaskan dan dibebaskan. Untuk makluman Mahkamah beberapa representasi telah pun dihantar kepada pihak Pendakwaan. Saya percaya this is the deserving case. Saksi telah memberi keterangan. There is no evidence at all in use. This case saksi telah memberi keterangan pada peringkat ini arahan untuk tidak diteruskan DNAA. Therefore, I'm praying to my Lord to use section 254(3) given acquittal from the trial. Looking at the age, actually she is about 65 and health conditions as well. Pohon pertimbangan dan budibicara Mahkamah untuk melepaskan dan membebaskan OKT.” [61] Inilah yang menjadi asas pada hemat Mahkamah ini apabila Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan bahawa tiada alasan untuk pihak pendakwaan memohon satu perintah pelepasan tidak terjumlah kepada satu pembebasan (DNAA). Ini dinyatakan di perenggan [25] penghakiman tersebut seperti berikut: “[25] In the instant case, the prosecution had decided not to proceed with the prosecution against the respondent and this decision was conveyed to the respondent's counsel by the letter dated 16 April 2019. There is no issue of the prosecution having temporary impediment to proceed with the prosecution of the case. In fact, the prosecution had agreed for the charge against the respondent to be dropped. As such, there is no good grounds available for the prosecution to ask for the case to be DNAA.” [62] Persoalan berkenaan dengan seksyen 254 (3) KPJ juga telah dinyatakan dalam kes Vigny Alfred Raj Vicetor Amratha Raja v. PP [2022] 8 CLJ 1. Dalam keputusan majoriti berkenaan tafsiran seksyen 254 (3) KPJ telah dinyatakan berkenaan seksyen 254 (3) seperti berikut: “[88] However, I differ with my learned sister on the interpretation to be accorded to s. 254(3) of the CPC with specific reference to para. [37] of the judgment, which reads as follows: [37] But, s. 254 does not stop there. Section 254(3) goes on to provide for the effect of the discharge; it expressly states that "such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the court so directs"; and it is the meaning and operation of s. 254(3) which lies at the heart of this appeal. In my view, the court has to specifically direct that the discharge does not amount to an acquittal. Otherwise, the default position is that the discharge amounts to an acquittal. This is the plain and clear meaning of s. 254(3), that the court has to so direct that the discharge does not amount to an acquittal, otherwise, the discharge amounts to an acquittal. (emphasis added) [89] The same interpretation was also applied by Her Ladyship in paras. [39], [50] until [55] and [65] in the judgment. [90] For ease of reference, I reproduced s. 254(3) of the CPC hereunder: 254 (1) At any stage of any trial, before delivery of judgment, the Public Prosecutor may, if he thinks fit, inform the court that he will not further prosecute the accused upon the charge and thereupon all proceedings on the charge against the accused shall be stayed and the accused shall be discharged of and from the same.

At any stage of any trial before a Sessions Court or a Magistrate's Court before the delivery of judgment, the officer conducting the prosecution may, if he thinks fit, inform the court that he does not propose further to prosecute the accused upon the charge, and thereupon all proceedings on the charge against the accused may be stayed by leave of the court and, if so stayed, the accused shall be discharged of and from the same.

Such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal unless the court so directs. (emphasis added) [91] It is my view that, a plain and literal reading of s. 254(3) of the CPC means that any discharge granted by the court under s. 254, is a discharge not amounting to an acquittal. But for a discharge amounting to an acquittal, it must be specifically directed by the court. The opening wordings of the section are clear and unambiguous, hence the court must give effect to its plain and literal meaning. In this regard the remarks by Suffian LP in PP v. Sihabduin Hj Salleh & Anor [1981] CLJ 39; [1981] CLJ (Rep) 82; [1980] 2 MLJ 273 are relevant when His Lordship said: the words of Lord Diplock in an authority cited by my Lord President, Duport Steels Ltd v. Sirs seems to me to be particularly apt, for the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. (emphasis added) [92] I have read and examined the authorities and cases referred to, in the judgment and found that, they never ruled on the interpretation to be accorded to s. 254(3) of the CPC to the effect that "the court has to specifically direct that the discharge does not amount to an acquittal. Otherwise, the default position is that the discharge amounts to an acquittal." In my view, what those cases held were that, the court is vested with the discretionary power to direct an acquittal of an accused person pursuant to s. 254(3) of the CPC and that such discretion is to be exercise judiciously. In other words, s. 254(3) of the CPC does not fetter the discretion of the court in directing that the discharge to amount to an acquittal, if circumstances warrant it. The following cases support this proposition:

PP v. Ambika M A Shanmugam [2021] 2 CLJ 522; [2021] 2 MLJ 723;

(ii) Mohamed Kanathi Meerah Mydin v. PP [2019] 2 CLJ 28; [2019] 2 MLJ 194;

(iii) Goh Cheng Chuan v. PP [1990] CLJU 85; [1990] 1 LNS 85; [1990] 3 MLJ 401;

(iv) Koh Teck Chai v. PP [1967] CLJU 72; [1967] 1 LNS 72; [1968] 1 MLJ 166;

Seet Ah Ann v. PP [1950] CLJU 81; [1950] 1 LNS 81; [1950] MLJ 293;

(vi) Goh Oon Keow & Anor v. Rex [1948] CLJU 14; [1948] 1 LNS 14; [1949] MLJ 35; and

(vii) Tan Ah Chan v. Regina [1955] CLJU 155; [1955] 1 LNS 155; [1955] MLJ 218. [93] The case of Goh Cheng Chuan v. PP (a Singapore case) and PP v. Ambika Shanmugam are two cases which dealt specifically with the phrase "unless the court so directs" which appears in s. 254(3) of the CPC which is in pari materia with s. 184(2) of the Singapore Criminal Procedure Code. PP v. Ambika relied on Goh Cheng Chuan v. PP, which agreed with the decision of Lai Kew Chai J in K Abdul Rasheed v. PP; Ah Chak Arnold v. PP [1985] CLJU 54; [1985] 1 LNS 54; [1985] 1 MLJ 193, at p. 195 (MLJ) which states: Subsection [184(2)] begins with the proposition of law that such discharge shall not amount to an acquittal, followed by the crucial words "unless the court so directs..."... These crucial words plainly confer on the court the discretionary power to direct an acquittal and the power arises the moment the prosecution informs the court that it is not going on with the prosecution of the defendant upon the charge, whether or not the prosecution has decided forever to withdraw the charge. If an accused applies for a discharge amounting to an acquittal, a court must bear in mind that the legislature has in the opening words of sub-s. [184(2)] set down the principle that the discharge 'shall not' amount to an acquittal. There must be circumstances in the proceedings so far on record or the accused must show sufficient reasons to displace the principle that the discharge shall not amount to an acquittal. In exercising its power under sub-s. [184(2)] of the Code, a court must bear in mind and give due regard to the right of the prosecution to proceed at a later stage; Seet

Ah Ann v. PP [1950] CLJU 81; [1950] 1 LNS 81; [1950] MLJ On the other hand, there is ample persuasive authority for the proposition that unless some good ground is shown it would not be right to leave an individual saddled with a charge in which proceedings are stayed for an indefinite period: Goh Oon Keow v. Rex [1948] CLJU 14; [1948] 1 LNS 14; [1949] MLJ 35, the dicta of Mr Justice Spencer-Wilkinson in PP v. Suppiah Pather reported in the Editorial Note to Ariffin bin Cassim Jayne v. PP [1953] CLJU 3; [1953] 1 LNS 3; [1953] MLJ 126 which were approved in Koh Teck Chai v. PP [1967] CLJU 72; [1967] 1 LNS 72; [1968] 1 MLJ 166, 167, by Ong Hock Sim J (as he then was). It is not desirable to set down any principle which a court must follow when acting under sub-s. [184(2)] of the Code as if it is writ in stone and thereby fetter the discretion of the court which has to be judicially exercised. Circumstances do vary from case to case. Each case has to be dealt with on its merits, with the court bearing in mind the public interest and the right of the individual to which I have alluded. (emphasis added) [94] In addition, a perusal of the written submissions by the appellant's counsel never alluded to the proposition that s. 254(3) of the CPC means that "the court has to specifically direct that the discharge does not amount to an acquittal. Otherwise, the default position is that the discharge amounts to an acquittal." It is limited to the concern that the court has the discretion/power/jurisdiction to order a discharge amounting to an acquittal to an accused person when the facts warrant it under s. 254 of the CPC. [95] Save as aforesaid, I agreed that in the present appeal, the facts and circumstances herein justified for an order of a discharge amounting to an acquittal. The appeal was allowed. The orders of the High Court and the Court of Appeal were set aside. [96] My learned brother Mohd Zawawi Salleh, FCJ has read this judgment in draft and agreed with its contents.” [63] Ini bermakna Mahkamah ini mempunyai budi bicara untuk memberikan perintah dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D) di bawah seksyen 254 (3) KPJ. Berdasarkan kepada autoriti-autoriti di atas didapati bahawa pendekatan yang perlu diambil pada hemat Mahkamah ini ialah apabila Pendakwa Raya menggunakan budi bicaranya di bawah seksyen 254 KPJ, Mahkamah hendaklah memberikan perintah pelepasan tidak terjumlah kepada satu pembebasan (DNAA). Sekiranya Mahkamah ingin memberikan perintah dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D), Mahkamah boleh mengarahkannya. Namun Mahkamah perlu meneliti alasan-alasan yang mewajarkan perintah dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D) tersebut diberikan. [64] Ini dapat difahami disebabkan kewujudan seksyen 254 KPJ adalah bertujuan untuk membolehkan sesuatu tindakan prosiding perbicaraan jenayah boleh ditangguhkan atas pemakluman oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya bagi melakukan tindakan-tindakan yang sewajarnya. Sekiranya Pendakwa Raya berpendapat ingin meneruskan perbicaraan tersebut maka ia boleh diteruskan dan seksyen 254A KPJ adalah terpakai bagi membolehkan kes tersebut disambung pada peringkat di mana ia ditangguhkan sebelum ini. Seksyen 254A KPJ menyatakan seperti berikut: “254A Reinstatement of trial after discharge

Subject to subsection (2), where an accused has been given a discharge by the Court and he is recharged for the same offence, his trial shall be reinstated and be continued as if there had been no such order given.

Subsection (1) shall only apply where witnesses have been called to give evidence at the trial before the order for a discharge has been given by the Court.” [65] Apa yang menjadi persoalan ialah terdapat keadaan apabila suatu perintah diberikan di bawah seksyen 254 (3) KPJ iaitu perintah pelepasan tidak terjumlah kepada satu pembebasan (DNAA), tiada sebarang maklum balas yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah berkenaan dengan kedudukan kes tersebut sama ada ia akan diteruskan atau tidak akan diteruskan. Ini yang menyebabkan Tertuduh tidak mempunyai kedudukan yang jelas berkenaan kes jenayahnya di Mahkamah sama ada ia akan diteruskan atau tidak diteruskan. Adakah Tertuduh tersebut telah dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D) atau masih mempunyai kes jenayah di Mahkamah. [66] Oleh itu adalah menjadi amalan yang baik sekiranya Pendakwa Raya berpendapat bahawa setelah Mahkamah memberikan perintah di bawah seksyen 254 (3) KPJ perintah pelepasan tidak terjumlah kepada satu pembebasan (DNAA) untuk memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah sama ada ingin meneruskan kes terhadap Tertuduh atau sebaliknya. Jika keadaan sedemikian dimaklumkan kepada Mahkamah maka Mahkamah berkemungkinan boleh mengambil tindakan sewajarnya di bawah undang-undang bagi membolehkan keputusan muktamad dibuat terhadap kes tersebut iaitu Tertuduh boleh dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D) atau perintah-perintah lain yang bersesuaian dengan undang-undang dengan perintah Mahkamah. Ini adalah disebabkan dengan ketiadaan keputusan muktamad berkenaan kedudukan pertuduhan di Mahkamah ia akan menjejaskan urusan yang melibatkan Tertuduh. Ini adalah disebabkan berkemungkinan berkaitan dengan rekod jenayah dan maklumat di dalam sistem pentadbiran agensi pentadbiran keselamatan. [67] Bagi melengkapkan penghakiman ini wajar juga dirujuk kepada keadaan di mana apabila terdapat lebih daripada satu pertuduhan, Pendakwa Raya boleh setelah sabitan terhadap Tertuduh bagi salah satu pertuduhan tersebut menarik balik baki pertuduhan. Mahkamah ini berpendapat ia tidak termasuk kepada pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 166 KPJ. Ini dapat dilihat di bawah seksyen 171 KPJ seperti berikut: “171 Withdrawal of remaining charges on conviction on one of several charges

When more charges than one are made against the same person and when a conviction has been had on one or more of them, the officer conducting the prosecution may, with the consent of the Court, withdraw the remaining charge or charges, or the Court of its own accord may stay the inquiry into or trial of the charge or charges.

Such withdrawal or stay shall have the effect of an acquittal on such charge or charges, unless the conviction is set aside, in which case the said Court (subject to the order of the Court setting aside the conviction) may proceed with the inquiry into or trial of the charge or charges so withdrawn or not proceeded with.” [68] Keputusan untuk menarik balik baki pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 171 KPJ ini akan memberi kesan kepada pembebasan penuh (acquittal) Tertuduh. Ia tidak memerlukan penggunaan seksyen 254 KPJ. Ia hanya boleh dilakukan apabila terdapatnya pertuduhan lebih daripada satu yang mana salah satu daripadanya telah disabitkan. [69] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Timbalan Pendakwa Raya telah memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa tiada lagi tindakan yang akan dibuat kepada Tertuduh Kedua. Oleh yang demikian adalah sesuai dan adil untuk Mahkamah menggunakan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 254 (3) KPJ bagi Tertuduh Kedua dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D). Ini adalah disebabkan tiada alasan untuk mengekalkan pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh Kedua tanpa menyelesaikannya dengan perintah dilepaskan yang membawa kepada pembebasan (A&D). Bertarikh: 21hb. Februari 2024 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Pendakwa Raya Ain Nur’Amiyerra Awod Abdullah dan Lee Wai Yi Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur Bagi Pihak Tertuduh Pertama dan Kedua Mohmamad Salehin bin Mastor Tetuan Alif, Hafiz & Partners Ipoh, Perak Darul Ridzuan