3 CLJ 371, and its sequel, wherein this court when considering defence of the accused has got to be mindful of the Radhi direction, to inquire with curial scrutiny of the explanation by the accused, if in fact he was the real trafficker and not Wan Bunga and his name was made available at the earliest instance or opportunity to the IO of the case, forming an early al contara notice for the IO to inquire and investigate on its truth and veracity. The notice given is akin to a notice of alibi advanced by an accused pursuant to section 402A of the CPC which if established to be true by the IO, could have a refreshing effect on the charges preferred against the accused, as it may be withdrawn, if he is found not to be at the place and time when the offence is alleged to have been committed by the accused. Likewise, in the context of an al contara notice, if it is verified to be true, the real trafficker could be Wan Bunga, as claimed by the accused, if so he would be acquitted and discharged. But is that the case? [32] In the present case, despite bringing Wan Bunga into the picture, the accused has also raised another defence that the impugned drug belongs to one Zamree who was arrested earlier from the same place, and the drugs seized from him were similar in its packaging who was also charged for the offence of drug trafficking in another court. Does it serve as a defence to the accused? [33] Evaluating, credence of that defence, it appears to be dubious and doubtful, as the drugs tendered in this court as proof vide exhibits in this case was afresh and there was no evidence demonstrating it was also tendered earlier in another court involving the alleged accused Zamree. Further, if it is not the same drugs, even if a charge for an offence of drug trafficking was preferred against Zamree, albeit the packaging of the drugs could be similar, those drugs seized from him would have formed part and parcel of that case of the prosecution against him. Evaluation of the defence advanced [34] Defence advanced by the accused is two-fold, but with the sole aim of alienating himself from the impugned drugs found with him at point of arrest, raid and seizure. It was aplenty. Albeit it being two-fold, the defence advanced by him is contradictory and inconsistent with each other. As starter, he said the impugned drugs belongs to Wan Bunga and subsequently that it belongs to Zamree. To fortify his defence vis a vis involvement of Wan Bunga, he had said that keys to all the three cars in which the drugs were found were kept at a shop but accessible to all and sundry, thus could be used by Wan Bunga. In fact, he said Wan Bunga keeps the keys there. The same was told to court by his own brother who was called as prosecution witness SP4. Seemingly, the accused and his brother at the material time was not operating a sundry shop but a paradise shop for use of cars belonging to him and many other people, including Wan Bunga. [35] The defence painted by the accused is clearly an afterthought to suit his explanation that he has nothing to do with the impugned drugs found in his possession. He had tried his best to alienate himself from the impugned drugs, both during the case of prosecution, when his brother SP4 had testified and his testimony from the witness box together with the feigned testimony of SD2 who was supposed to have supported his defence. [36] In a nutshell, core of the defence of the accused is inherently contradictory. He claims not to have any connection to the drugs, its possession and trafficking, yet the same drugs were found in the cars directly associated with him, and even left in a location accessible from the Bezza car belonging to his wife. This inconsistency per se undermines the believability of his version. It is apparent that the accused has access to and control over the vehicles where the drugs were found. Possession does not only mean it has to be found on the body of the accused, but it can also mean having dominion and control over the cars, in which the contraband items were found. His access to the cars establishes a strong inference of possession. His act of blaming two others, Wan Bunga and Zamree without providing substantial evidence to support his claim only portrays his desperate attempt to avoid culpability. The vagueness of his claim, lack of support and it being inherently illogical in terms of time and circumstances presented by the accused, do not dislodge the case of the prosecution, which was helmed by the testimony of SP3, which stood uncontroverted till conclusion of trial, albeit he was vehemently cross-examined by the defence counsel. (See the case of Ling Tee Huah v PP (1982) 2 MLJ 324). To that extent, the defence of the accused is motivated by falsity when he chose to implicate others non-chalantly. [37] Despite the attempt by the accused to alienate himself from the impugned drugs, the case of the prosecution has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had mens rea possession of the dangerous drugs and the location of the drugs within his vehicles is a telling piece of evidence in support. The prosecution has weaved together the discovery of the impugned drugs from the accused person; his access to the vehicles; the quantity and nature of the drugs which suggest trafficking and not for personal use, building a strong inference of guilt. Further, the act of leaving drugs on a tyre area of his wife’s car shows beyond doubt concealment and/or transfer under his direction. In the absence of plausible explanation of how the two individuals named placed the drugs in his vehicles, the credibility of his defence is weakened significantly. Further, the significance of the manner in which the drugs, which are of abundant quantity were packaged, only reveals drug trafficking activity. The implausibility of the narrative of the accused was exposed during his cross-examination by the DPP, tending to show that his story cannot be believed. Questions that arise; why he did not immediately report on the two other individuals and why were the drugs found in areas so closely linked to him? In sum, the attempt by the accused to distance himself from the drugs is not credible in light of the evidence pointing towards his possession with knowledge and involvement in trafficking. [38] Another core issue harped on by the defence, is on the clash of testimonies and the weight to be given to them. The evidence of the brother of the accused, SP4, while being potentially relevant, carries less weight than the RO’s direct observation in the present case, for the following reasons: • The RO SP3 claims to have seen the accused handling the drugs and moving them between vehicles. • As alluded to above, this is direct evidence and it directly supports the fact that the accused was in possession of and dealing with the drugs. • Eyewitness testimony, is credible and reliable because it recounts a personal sensory of sight experience of the event in question. • SP3’s evidence is contemporaneous with the commission of the crime by the accused. Therefore, there is less room for fading memory or be influenced by subsequent events, as it stays with him. • SP3’s testimony also directly links the actions of the accused to the subsequent seizure of drugs in the other vehicles using the keys found on him. This per se creates a cohesive chain of events. • The brother, SP4’s testimony attempts to provide an alternative explanation for the accused possessing the car keys. The aim is to suggest a legitimate reason for the accused to have the keys, thus weakening the inference that possession of the keys implies possession of the impugned drugs. However, his testimony does not directly contradict SP3’s account of seeing the accused move the drugs from one car to another. It also focusses on events leading to the discovery of the drugs in the other cars, with use of the keys found with him. • This court is mindful of the fact that being the accused’s brother, SP4 has a potential bias and motive to protect his sibling. But of course, that does not render his testimony false, but it is a pivotal factor to be taken into consideration when assessing his credibility. • The direct evidence of the crime itself, witnessing the drug transfer and the subsequent finding of the other drugs in another two vehicles, has to be given more weight than the indirect evidence of SP4 who had tried to explain a peripheral detail, as to why the accused had the keys. • SP3’s testimony directly addresses the guilty act of the accused, which is actus reus in criminal law, to wit action of the accused with the drugs. SP4’s testimony does not negate this act. • Moreover, the fact that SP3 saw the accused moving the drugs and in possession of the keys to the vehicles containing the remaining impugned drugs, demonstrates that he is involved in drug offences. The inference is a strong one. On the other hand, SP4’s testimony rendering a possible explanation for the possession of the keys does not in any manner weaken the link between the observed actions by SP3 and the impugned drugs found. • In assessing their credibility, the RO’s evidence who had acted in his official capacity is perceived to be of less bias than a family member. • Further, in this case, there is no room for doubt to disbelieve the RO SP3. But SP4’s demeanour; inconsistency of his testimony and potential bias, renders his testimony to be less reliable. • It has to be noted that his demeanour when cross-examined by the DPP, was cantankerous, to the extent he had said if his brother was in fact trafficking drugs, he would have been wealthier, the height he could take to exculpate his brother accused. • Hence, while the testimony of SP4 is admissible and this court must consider all evidence adduced, it is less credible than the account of the RO SP3, who has offered direct evidence; an eyewitness account of the accused handling the drugs and in possession of it too. • This finding is made, in the wake of the testimony by SP4 whom had admitted the kebun was taken care of him; he did not see Wan Bunga placing the drugs in the cars; the keys to the cars were found with the accused at the time of arrest. • Glaring is also evidence offered by the accused who had said when cross-examined by the DPP that “setuju, saya letakkan kunci Daihatsu dan Proton dalam poket belakang seluar saya.”. He too admitted to have signed the search and seizure list, P27 acknowledging the raid that took place, including the keys found as a result of his body search. • SP3’s evidence directly addresses the principal ingredients of the offences of drug trafficking committed by the accused, but SP4’s evidence only offers explanation for a related but less incriminating fact, on the possession of the keys and the alleged involvement of the two other individuals, allegedly Wan Bunga and Zamree. [39] Premised on totality of the circumstances, this court has found that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, on that plank he was found guilty, and convicted of the preferred charges for offences of drug trafficking. The mantra, if I may say so, is that a conviction cannot be sustained even if the court is satisfied that the prosecution story “may be” true unless and until it is found by the court that the prosecution story “must be true”, which is so in the present case involving the accused. (See again the case of PP v Saimin & Ors). Duty of the court [40] The pivotal issue to be decided by this court at conclusion of the trial, pursuant to section 182A of the CPC would be the following: • After having considered all the evidence adduced, including the evidence led by prosecution, cross-examined by the accused via his counsel and the evidence of the accused and his witness cross-examined by the prosecution via its DPP, was the accused successful in raising a reasonable doubt on the mens rea possession of the dangerous drug which has been proven by the prosecution and has also rebutted the presumption of trafficking invoked against him on a balance of probabilities. • If the accused has been successful in doing so, he would be entitled to an acquittal, if otherwise this court has to conclude that the prosecution has successfully proved a case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused on the preferred charges containing the particulars of offences of drug trafficking, pursuant to section 39B (1) (a) of the DDA, and punishable under section 39B (2) of the DDA. [41] Evaluating his defence at the conclusion of trial, this court finds the following: • After juxtaposing his defence and explanation in its entirety with the proven case of the prosecution, it is found that the accused is unable to raise a reasonable doubt on the case of prosecution which has proved mens rea possession against him by way of credible evidence. • He has also been unable to tilt the balance of probabilities in his favour to displace the presumption of trafficking which has been invoked against him in respect of all the three (3) charges. • To that extent, this court finds that the charges against the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. • Consequently, the accused is found guilty and convicted on all the three (3) charges of drug trafficking against him. Sentence [42] Before meting out an appropriate sentence according to law on the accused, this court has heard his plea in mitigation which was submitted on by his counsel. The record of proceeding which would include the notes of evidence, would detail the plea and the submission on aggravating factors by the DPP. As the current state of law, provides for an alternative sentence of imprisonment for life to the death penalty, this court had chosen the former for the following reason: • Considering the case in its entirety, there was no evidence of buying and selling of cannabis at the time when the accused was arrested; • The involvement of the accused is only limited to being in possession of large quantity of cannabis, kept inside and outside the cars to which he had full access and control; • The evidence adduced in the case reveals the conduct of the accused who was found in possession of large quantity of cannabis and the manner in which it was packaged signifies it is for the purpose of trafficking and not anything else. However, the statutory presumption of trafficking was invoked against him and the plank of the case of prosecution is not premised on section 2 of the DDA by offering evidence of direct trafficking. [43] On the above premise, this court had sentenced the accused to the period of imprisonment of thirty (30) years as prescribed by the law, which is to take effect from the date of his arrest on 4.1.2021. The sentence of imprisonment is also to take effect concurrently, in view of the fact that the preferred charges are for offences of drug trafficking pertaining one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, pursuant to section 164 of the CPC. He is spared of the sentence of whipping, as he is of more than fifty (50) years of age, thus excepted pursuant to section 289 (c) of the CPC. Accused found guilty and convicted on charges for offences of drug trafficking. Dated 12 May 2025 SGD Muniandy Kannyappan Judge, High Court 2 (Criminal) Kuala Lumpur. Parties DPP Zaileen Nadia Zubir of the Attorney General’s Chambers for and on behalf of the Public Prosecutor. DC Dato’ Jagjit Singh a/l Bant Singh together with Wan Muhd Ariff Ameer bin Wan Normazlan and Sofea Shereen binti Mohammad Salim of Messrs. Jagjit Ariff & Co appearing as counsel for the accused.