[Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] v 1. ) MAZIZ AFIQ BIN AWANG (CB-45A-4-03/2021)

MAZIZ AFIQ BIN AWANG

MAHAMA BORAHENG

WAN MOHAMAD KHAROY BIN AWANG (NO. K/P: 860518-29-6249)

OKT-OKT telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan seperti yang berikut: Bahawa kamu pada 09 Mei 2020, jam lebih kurang 11.25 malam, bertempat di Sekatan Jalan Raya KM 98 Jalan Lipis, Merapoh, di dalam Daerah Kuala Lipis, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, dalam mencapai niat bersama kamu telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya berat bersih 3,381 gram Methamphetamine dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama serta dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.

Pada 09.05.2020 lebih kurang jam 11.25 malam SP 4 telah menahan sebuah kenderaan Toyota Hilux nombor pendaftaran W8812U berwarna putih yang mencurigakan di KM 98 Jalan Lipis Merapoh. Pada kejadian tersebut seorang lelaki Melayu yang merupakan pemandu telah ditahan bersama-sama dengan dua orang perempuan melayu. SP 4 telah membuat pemeriksaan fizikal kepada kesemua individu tersebut dan tidak menjumpai apa-apa barang salah. SP 4 telah memaklumkan berkenaan dengan tangkapan tersebut kepada Inspektor Ahmad Shazewan (SP 8). Pemandu yang ditahan tersebut dikenali sebagai Maziz Afiq bin Awang iaitu OKT 1 dalam kes ini.

SP 4 telah dapat mengecam lelaki Melayu yang ditahan pada hari kejadian tersebut. Dia juga dapat mengecam gambar kenderaan Toyota Hilux tersebut. Hasil pemeriksaan SP 4 mendapati kedua-dua wanita tersebut adalah ibu kepada OKT 1 dan ibu tiri OKT 1.

Pada 09.05.2020 lebih kurang jam 11.00 malam SP 3 telah mengetuai satu serbuan dalam satu operasi untuk menangkap seorang warganegara Thailand yang berkait dengan pengedaran dadah jenis syabu di sekitar Bandar Saujana Putra, Selangor. Dalam serbuan tersebut telah dapat ditahan Mahama Boraheng iaitu OKT 2 dalam kes ini serta beberapa orang lain termasuklah Wan Mohamad Kharoy bin Awang iaitu OKT 3 dalam kes ini.

Pemeriksaan telah dilakukan oleh SP 3 dan pengeledahan telah dilakukan namun tidak dijumpai dadah. Semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah SP 3 mengesahkan bahawa tiada rampasan dadah dibuat bagi serbuan di Selangor tersebut.

SP 8 dalam keterangannya mengesahkan bahawa SP 4 telah menghubunginya berkenaan dengan penahanan kenderaan tersebut. SP 8 menyatakan ketika dikemukakan soalan kepada pemandu kenderaan tersebut dia menyatakan bahawa tidak tahu apa-apa dan tidak membawa apa-apa barang salah.

Seterusnya SP 8 telah mengangkat kerusi tempat duduk belakang dan mendapati pada bahagian lantai besi tempat duduk kenderaan tersebut terdapat kesan potong dan seperti ia boleh dibuka. Kemudian SP 8 membuka bahagian lantai besi yang dipotong itu dan mendapati di dalamnya terdapat beberapa bungkusan plastik. Dia telah menjumpai 9 tongkol yang dibungkus dengan plastik, 2 sarung bantal, 16 tongkol bungkusan plastik dan di dalam bantal kedua didapati 27 tongkol bungkusan plastik. Barang-barang tersebut telah dirampas dan disyaki mengandungi pil yaba. Apa yang jelas daripada keterangan setakat ini ialah semasa penahanan kenderaan tersebut ditahan hanya OKT 1 sahaja yang berada di tempat kejadian.

Sementara itu OKT 2 dan OKT 3 telah ditangkap di Selangor. Keterangan tidak mencadangkan bahawa OKT 2 dan OKT 3 itu pada bila-bila masa berada dalam kenderaan Toyota Hilux tersebut di mana OKT 1 ditangkap.

Keterangan daripada pegawai penyiasat (SP 11) menyatakan bahawa kaitan OKT 2 dengan kes ini adalah disebabkan hasil siasatan beliau mendapati seperti yang berikut ketika dikemukakan soalan oleh Mahkamah: Mahkamah: Bagi nombor dua, Mahama Boraheng? SP 11: Mr. Boraheng pula saya rasa dia, berdasarkan hasil siasatan saya lah, dia memang merupakan pemilik walaupun dia tidak mempunyai cap jari lah ataupun sebarang DNA ataupun apa-apa tetapi kenderaan itu memang atas nama dia dan maaf kalau saya katakan, kalau tokan, dia memang tidak pernah ada barang kes ataupun semua benda dengan dia. So, seorang tokan bukannya orang yang biasa-biasa, dia adalah orang yang brilliant. So, dia tahu macam mana untuk... Orang kata... cuci tangan dia lah untuk tidak terlibat secara langsung.

Sementara bagi OKT 3 pula SP11 menyatakan bahawa: Mahkamah: Nombor Tiga? Wan Mohamad Kharoy bin Awang, apa asasnya Puan? SP 11: Kharoy bin Awang, saya tiada pembuktian yang khusus lah untuk dia. Cuma berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang diberikan oleh ketujuh-tujuh saksi yang ada dalam kes ini.

Semasa mengemukakan soalan kepada SP 11, Mahkamah tidak terlepas pandang peruntukan seksyen 165 Akta Keterangan yang memperuntukan seperti berikut: The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form at any time, of any witness or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question: Provided that-

the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant and duly proved;

(ii) this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question or to produce any document which the witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 121 to 131 if the question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under section 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with the primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.

Dalam menggunakan seksyen 165 ini Mahkamah perlu berhati-hati dan tidak termasuk di dalam arena antara Timbalan Pendakwa Raya dan Tertuduh yang diwakili oleh peguam. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu mengambil perhatian dalam nasihat yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lim Tan Yi lwn PP & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2021] 9 CLJ 523 di mana dalam kes tersebut Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: [62] Selain itu, TPR ada membangkitkan isu campur tangan HMT dalam prosiding perbicaraan dalam hujahan bertulisnya. Walaupun isu tersebut tidak disentuh peguam perayu dalam hujahannya, kami dapati ianya wajar diberikan perhatian dan pertimbangan. Menurut TPR, HMT tidak sama sekali melangkaui peruntukan s. 165 AK 1950 apabila turut sama mengemukakan soalan kepada saksi-saksi. Dihujahkan bahawa tidak pada bila-bila masa HMT mengambil alih tugas pihak pendakwaan semasa menyoal saksi-saksi. [63] Hasil penelitian ke atas nota keterangan, kami berpandangan bahawa terdapat keadaan bilamana HMT bukan sahaja mengemukakan soalan kepada saksi, malah turut menyediakan jawapan kepada saksi bagi membetulkan jawapan yang diberikan. Contohnya:

YA: SOP kata apa? J: Keluar tulis station diary YA: Tidak kira awak anggota ke, pegawai ke kena tuliskan. Itu memang SOP? J: Ya YA: Jadi rujuk kepada soalan peguam ini. J: Situasi macam gini Yang Arif. YA: Tapi kamu kena jawab juga. Kejadian ini 3 tahun dahulu. Kejadian ini 3 tahun dahulu, tahun 2005 dan sekarang tahun

Mudah ke nak check balik benda ni. Beritahu cam dengan dia gitu, soalan dia. J: Susah nak check sebab sudah lama. Sebab saya dah pindah 3 kali. (lihat muka surat 61 dan 62 RR Kandungan 6)

(ii) S: Saya katakan kedua-dua laporan ini dibuat oleh anggota polis anda, betul? J: Setuju YA: Saya masih terfikir-fikir lagi, soalan peguam tadi kamu memberi jawapan P25 dan P30 iaitu dua laporan polis kamu mengesahkan dan mengakui cadangan peguam, bukan kamu yang buat tapi anggota yang buat, ya, betul? J: Ya, betul YA: Itu sebabnya, kamu kena fahamkan soalan sebelum menjawabnya. Sebab laporan polis ini, laporan polis ini nama kamu, macam mana kamu jawab laporan polis ini bukan kamu buat tapi anggota yang buat? Apa benda kesannya ini? Laporan polis sepatutnya orang tu yang buatnya. Macamana boleh kamu kata bukan kamu yang buat tapi anggota yang buat. Apa munasabahnya. DPP ini something you kena tengok benda ni. DPP: Ya, saya nak tanya ketika re nanti Yang Arif. (lihat muka surat 67 dan 68 Kandungan 6)

(iii) S: Jadi mana yang betul, keterangan dalam Mahkamah atau keterangan dalam laporan polis? J: Dalam laporan polis. S: Jadi keterangan dalam Mahkamah tidak betul? J: Saya tidak ingat. YA: Saya percaya dua-dua betulkan. Cumanya dalam laporan polis kebiasaannya tidak semua detail tidak dimasukkan sekali ? J: Betul YA: Jawab begitulah, tak kan saya nak jawab bagi pihak awak. (lihat muka surat 71 Kandungan 6)

(iv) S: Sekiranya begitu, kamu setuju boleh bantu siasatan tetapi kenapa dalam kes ini tidak ada perkara itu dibuat? J: Ini sebab pihak kita mengalami masalah man power untuk melakukan siasatan lebih terperinci. YA: That's not the answer. Jangan beri jawapan begitu. Kalau perlu-perlu. Tidak boleh jadikan man power tidak ada sebagai satu jawapan/alasan. That's not the good answer, itu nak escape sahaja. S: Selain daripada kekangan kekuatan boleh Inspektor nyatakan kenapa Inspektor tidak mengambil cap jari, tidak ambil apa-apa DNA pada kereta tersebut? YA: Actually kamu telah jalankan siasatan, kamu dah ambil barang kes tu, cuma tidak hantar sahaja ke Kimia, itu sahaja. Itu leakingnya. Kamu sudah ambil baju daripada rumah tempat kejadiankan, your only duty hantar ke Kimia DNA, apa man power nak pakainya. Any of your constable you can send hantar barang tu kepada Kimia, not necessary yourself. Teruskan. Situation will be different kalau tidak ada apa-apa rampasan dibuat. Ini rampasan ada dibuat cuma kamu tidak hantarnya. (lihat muka surat 29 Kandungan 6) (penekanan ditambah) [64] Adakalanya, HMT juga telah mengambil alih tugas pihak pendakwaan dengan mengemukakan soalan yang tidak ditanya pihak pendakwaan kepada saksi. Ini dapat dilihat di akhir keterangan SP5. HMT telah mengemukakan soalan berhubung dengan pengendalian barang kes yang mana tidak disoal pihak pendakwaan. Bagi mengelak pengulangan, petikan soalan tersebut telah diperturunkan dan dapat dilihat di perenggan [44].

Mahkamah juga mengambil panduan daripada Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Teng Boon How v Pendakwa Raya [1993] 3 MLJ 553 seperti yang berikut: Judicial loquacity has provided grounds for appeal and we need no more than refer to some of the well-known cases in this area. Excessive interventions by the trial judge add ‘great weight to the substance of the appeal’ (Brassington v Brassington 1 at p 281) and taken together with other grounds of appeal may result in the reversal of judgment in a civil case (Yuill v Yuill 2; Jones v National Coal Board 3) or setting aside of a conviction in a criminal case. (See R v Gilson and Cohen 4; R v Clewer 5. In certain circumstances, the criticism of the conduct of the trial judge is of such magnitude as to constitute, by itself, a sufficient ground for reversal of the judgment (see Hobbs v Tinling 6; Jones v National Coal Board 3) or quashing of the conviction. (See R v Green 7 R v Mc Kenna 8.) In other cases, even though the interventions of the judge may not result in the quashing of the conviction, the appellate court may reduce the sentence, thus giving effect to its disapproval (see, eg R v Hircock 9.) It was Lord Greene MR who explained that justice is best done by a judge who holds the balance between the contending parties without himself taking part in their disputations. If a judge, said Lord Greene, in Yuill v Yuill 2, should personally conduct the examination of witnesses, ‘he, so to speak, descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict’. And, it was Lord Denning MR who, in Jones v National Coal Board 3, emphasized the importance of the judge not descending into the arena and thereby depriving himself of the ability to take a detached view when forming his conclusion. This is how he put it [at p 64]: Yes, he [the judge] must keep his vision unclouded. It is all very well to paint justice blind, but she does better without a bandage round her eyes. She should be blind indeed to favour or prejudice, but clear to see which way lies the truth: and the less dust there is about the better. Let the advocates one after the other put the weights into the scales – the ‘nicely calculated less or more’ – but the judge at the end decides which way the balance tilts, be it ever so slightly… So also it is for the advocates, each in his turn, to examine the witnesses, not for the judge to take it on himself lest by so doing he appear to favour one side or the other… And it is for the advocate to state his case as fairly and strongly as he can, without undue interruption, lest the sequence of his argument be lost… The judges’ part in all this is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions of witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates behave themselves seemly and keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude irrelevancies and discourage repetition; to make sure by wise intervention that he follows the points that the advocates are making and can assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind where the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of a judge and assumes the robe of an advocate; and the change does not become him well. Lord Chancellor Bacon spoke right when he said that: ‘Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an over-speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal.’ In R v Matthews & Matthews 10, the Court of Appeal in England said (at p 30 para 6) that the general comment in Jones v National Coal Board 3, emphasizing the importance of a judge not descending into the arena and thereby depriving himself of the ability to take a detached view when forming his conclusion, is equally applicable to a criminal trial. We agree that, notwithstanding the wide ambit of s 165 of the Evidence Act 1950, which provides: Judge's power to put questions or order production. The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form at any time, of any witness or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question: Provided that–

the judgment must be based upon the facts declared by this Act to be relevant and duly proved;

(ii) this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question or to produce any document which the witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 121 to 131 if the question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under section 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with the primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted. the desirable limits of judicial intervention in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses enunciated in Yuill v Yuill 2 and Jones v National Coal Board 3 would apply in this country. These limits apply with double force in the case of interrogation by a judge of an accused person since, in our view, the nature of examination contemplated by s 165 of the Evidence Act 1950 is not examination or cross-examination of an inquisitorial nature for the purpose of entrapping an accused, or of extracting from him damaging admissions, upon which to build up a case against him or to supply a gap in the evidence for the prosecution. Especially is this so, in the case of an accused facing a capital charge. We must, therefore, treat the failure of a trial judge sitting alone, to direct himself correctly in accordance with these principles, in the same way as a failure to direct a jury correctly.

Perkara-perkara itu telah diambil perhatian oleh Mahkamah ini supaya tidak dilihat sebagai tindakan yang mengambil alih tugas Timbalan Pendakwa Raya ataupun peguambela dalam mengemukakan soalan-soalan melainkan soalan-soalan tersebut adalah berkaitan dan pada hemat Mahkamah ini soalan yang dikemukakan kepada SP 11 sebagai seorang pegawai penyiasat adalah untuk mengenalpasti apakah asas dan hasil siasatan yang dilakukan oleh SP 11 sehingga pertuduhan telah dikemukakan kepada OKT-OKT.

Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap bahawa di akhir kes pendakwaan Mahkamah perlu menentukan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah menunjukkan satu kes prima facie. Ini dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 180 KPJ seperti yang berikut:

Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution.

When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence.

For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction. Sorotan perkembangan peruntukan Kanun Prosedur Jenayah berkaitan kes prima facie

Peruntukan ini telah diperkenalkan di bawah Kanun Prosedur Jenayah melalui pindaan yang berkuatkuasa pada 31.01.1997 melalui Akta A979. Sebelum ini peruntukan seksyen 180 KPJ adalah seperti yang berikut:

Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution. When the case for the prosecution is concluded the Court, if it finds that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction shall record an order of acquittal, or, if it does not so find, shall call on the accused to enter on his defence.

Peruntukan berkenaan dengan perbicaraan ringkas sebelum ini berkenaan dengan akhir kes pendakwaan telah memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

If, upon taking all the evidence hereinbefore referred to, the Court finds that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

Peruntukan yang sama juga terdapat di seksyen 173 (f) KPJ iaitu bagi kes-kes yang dibicarakan di Mahkamah Rendah bagi tujuan perbicaraan ringkas di bawah seksyen 173 KPJ seperti yang berikut:

(f)

When the case for the prosecution is concluded the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.

(ii) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

Semenjak hampir 90 tahun lalu Mahkamah telah memberikan penjelasan berkenaan dengan apakah yang perlu dilakukan oleh Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan. Ia dapat dilihat misalnya dinyatakan dalam kes PP v Man bin Abas [1935] 1 MC 160 apabila perkataan prima facie digunakan dalam meneliti seksyen 171 (f) KPJ oleh Hakim Howes dan ia juga dinyatakan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Lee Yee Heng [1938] 1 MLJ 117. Ia juga telah dinyatakan oleh Hakim Laville dalam kes PP v Lim Teong Seng and 2 others [1946] 1 MLJ 108 seperti yang berikut: In my view, the basis of this direction in sec. 173 (f), sec. 180 and sec. 190 is twofold. Firstly, that the onus is on the prosecution and never shifts to prove its case. Secondly, that the circumstances of each of these 3 forms of trial are the same. The presiding officer is sitting not only as a judge but as a jury. If therefore at the close of the prosecution he as a jury comes to the conclusion, not that there is no evidence, but that the evidence produced is not strong enough to warrant a conviction, and only evidence beyond all reasonable doubt is of that nature, he is not by the spirit of English law entitled to say: “I am doubtful of this evidence but let us see if it can be supplemented and improved by what can be elicited from the defence.” The prosecution who have to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt have produced all the evidence they have, and it is on this evidence the conviction if any must rest, even if accused calls evidence. What the prosecution can elicit for its view from them is either supplementary or redundant, or goes to lessen the credibility of the defence evidence. It cannot be the basis of a conviction. If therefore at the close of the prosecution the Court is of opinion that on that evidence it cannot, as a jury, hold the allegations proved beyond all reasonable doubt, there is nothing left for it to do but to acquit the accused. This view point is set out by the sections cited above.

YA Gordon-Smith menyatakan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Chin Yoke [1940] 1 MLJ 47 seperti yang berikut: It is then that it is the duty of the Magistrate or Judge to consider the evidence already led and decide whether or not to call on the accused for his defence, and the question arises what is a prima facie case?

Sebelum pindaan pada 1997, tiada perkataan prima facie di dalam Kanun Prosedur Jenayah kerana ia telah difahami secara lazim dan merujuk kepada definasi prima facie yang terdapat di dalam kamus. Misalnya dalam kes Chin Yoke (supra) YA Gordon-Smith telah menyatakan dalam Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) menyatakan: “A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the other side.” This follows very closely the actual wording of the sections referred to but it does not follow, in my opinion, that the Magistrate or Judge must necessarily accept the whole of the evidence for the prosecution at its face value. There may be good grounds for rejecting some part, or all of it and, therefore, it is necessary to weigh up this evidence and on so doing one may be satisfied that, if unrebutted, it would warrant the accused's conviction. In such case the accused is then called upon to answer the prima facie case which has thus been made out against him. If, however, on the other hand, after weighing up such evidence for the prosecution one is satisfied that it would be wholly unsafe to convict upon such evidence standing alone, then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused should not be called on for his defence.

Ia telah mencapai tahap kematangan dan kemuncaknya dalam keputusan Majlis Privy berkenaan dengan perkara ini melalui kes Haw Tua Tau v PP [1981] 2 MLJ 49 melalui penghakiman Lord Diplock ketika meneliti peruntukan di bawah Kanun Prosedur Jenayah Singapura yang wajar dipetik secara penuh berkenaan dengan perkara ini dalam penghakiman tersebut bagi memahami prinsip yang dinyatakan dalam kes tersebut seperti yang berikut: … For reasons that are inherent in the adversarial character of criminal trials under the common law system, it, does not place upon the court a positive obligation to make up its mind at that stage of the proceedings whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has by then already satisfied it beyond reasonable doubtthat the accused is guilty. Indeed it would run counter to the concept of what is a fair trial under that system to require the court to do so. The crucial words in section 188(1) are the words “if unrebutted”, which make the questionthat the court has to ask itself a purely hypothetical one. The prosecution makes out a case against the accused by adducing evidence of primary facts. It is to such evidence that the words “if unrebutted” refer. What they mean is that for the purposeof reaching the decision called for by section 188(1) the court must act on the presumptions (a) that all such evidence of primary fact is true, unless it is inherently so incredible that no reasonable person would accept it as being true; and (b) that therewill be nothing to displace those inferences as to further facts or to the state of mind of the accused which would reasonably be drawn from the primary facts in the absence of any further explanation. Whoever has the function of deciding facts on the trialof a criminal offence should keep an open mind about the veracity and accuracy of recollection of any individual witness, whether called for the prosecution or the defence, until after all the evidence to he tendered in the case on behalf of either side hasbeen heard and it is possible to assess to what extent (if any) that witness's evidence has been confirmed, explained or contradicted by the evidence of other witnesses. The proper attitude of mind that the decider of fact ought to adopttowards the prosecution's evidence at the conclusion of the prosecution's case is most easily identified by considering a criminal trial before a judge and jury, such as occurs in England and occurred in Singapore until itsfinal abolition in capital cases in

Here the decision-making function is divided; questions of law are for the judge, questions of fact are for the jury. It is well established that in a jury trial at the conclusion of the prosecution's case it isthe judge's function to decide for himself whether evidence has been adduced which, if it were to be accepted by the jury as accurate, would establish each essential element in the alleged offence: for what are the essentialelements in any criminal offence is a question of law. If there is no evidence (or only evidence that is so inherently incredible that no reasonable person could accept it as being true) to prove any one or more of those essential elements, it is the judge'sduty to direct an acquittal, for it is only upon evidence that juries are entitled to convict; but, if there is some evidence, the judge must let the case go on. It is not the function of the jurors, as sole deciders of fact, to make up their minds at that stage of the trial whether they are so convinced of the accuracy of the only evidence that is then before them that they have no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. If this were indeed their function, since any decisionthat they reach must be a collective one, it would be necessary for them to retire, consult together and bring in what in effect would be a conditional verdict of guilty before the accused had an opportunity of putting before them any evidence in his defence.On the question of the accuracy of the evidence of any witness jurors would be instructed that it was their duty to suspend judgment until all the evidence of fact that either party wished to put before the court had been presented. Then and then only should they direct their minds to the question whether the guilt of the accused had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In their Lordships' view the same principle applies to criminal trials where the combined roles of decider of law and deciderof fact are vested in a single judge (or in two judges trying capital cases). At the conclusion of the prosecution's case what has to be decided remains a question of law only. As decider of law, the judge must consider whether there is some evidence (notinherently incredible) which, if he were to accept it as accurate, would establish each essential element in the alleged offence. If such evidence as respects any of those essential elements is lacking, then, and then only, is he justified in finding “thatno case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction”, within the meaning of section 188(1). Where he has not so found, he must call upon the accused to enter upon his defence, and as decider of fact must keep anopen mind as to the accuracy of any of the prosecution's witnesses until the defence has tendered such evidence, if any, by the accused or other witnesses as it may want to call and counsel on both sides have addressed to the judge such arguments and commentson the evidence as they may wish to advance.

Ia telah diterima pakai oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes A Ragunathan v Pendakwa Raya [1982] 1 MLJ 139 di mana YAA Raja Azlan Shah pemangku Ketua Hakim Negara setelah memetik kes Haw Tua Tau (supra) menyatakan seperti yang berikut: Applying that principle, the learned Magistrate at the close of the prosecution's case had to determine as a questionof law whether on the evidence as adduced, and unrebutted, the applicant could lawfully be convicted, that is to say, whether there was with respect to every element in the charge some evidence which, if accepted, would either prove the element directly or enableits existence to be reasonably inferred. That is the question raised in the appeal. It must be distinguished from the question of fact for ultimate decision, which is whether on the evidence as a whole the prosecution has proved to the satisfaction of the court, as a tribunal of fact, that the applicant is guilty as charged.

Mahkamah Agong juga berpeluang untuk memutuskan isu berkenaan dengan prima facie dan prinsip di dalam kes Haw Tua Tau (supra) ini dalam kes Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492 seperti yang berikut: It is obvious that there is nothing in Haw Tua Tau case to suggest that the “prima facie case” approach as understood in criminal trials in this country and enunciated in Public Prosecutor v Chin Yoke [1940] MLJ 47, is wrong in principle. On the contrary, in overruling the various passages in Ong Kiang Kek on the effect of section 188(1) (formerly section 177C) it re-establishes once and for all that there is no duty cast on the prosecution to actually prove their case beyond reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused at the close of case for the prosecution. There is accordingly no rejection of the “established beyond reasonable doubt” test, provided it is applied at that stage of the trial in the hypothetical form. Thus, under section 180, the judge must ask himself on the basis of credible evidence, a mere hypothetical question: “If I were to accept the prosecution's evidence as accurate, would it establish the case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt?”. Putting it in the “prima facie case” form: “On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence was accurate, could the accused be lawfully convicted?”. If the answer to either question is in the affirmative, then a case is said to have been made out which, if unrebutted; would warrant a conviction, and in such a case the accused should be called upon to state his defence. It must necessarily follow that if the accused elected to remain silent and called no evidence the court must convict him since the hypothetical position obtained pursuant to section 180 that the prosecution evidence would not and could not be rebutted, has become a reality (see Public Prosecutor v Man bin Abas (1935) 1 MC 160). Although our Section 173(f) C.P.C. is worded differently, the same test must apply to criminal trials before a magistrate (see Lee Pin Seng v Public Prosecutor [1986] 2 MLJ 416). It is therefore wrong under sections 173(f) 180 and 190 of the C.P.C. for a judge or magistrate to require the prosecution to prove that the accused is actually guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before calling for his defence. That requirement for ultimate decision must be postponed until the end of the trial after the defence has given evidence and close its case. In substance, this is what Gordon Smith Ag. J.A. meant when he held in 1940 in Public Prosecutor v Chin Yoke (ante) at page 38: “. … that the Magistrate or Judge must necessarily accept the whole of the evidence for the prosecution at its face value. There may be good grounds for rejecting some part, or all of it and, therefore, it is necessary to weigh up this evidence and on so doing one may be satisfied that, if unrebutted, it would warrant the accused's conviction. In such case the accused is then called upon to answer the prima facie case which has thus been made out against him. If, however, on the other hand, after weighing up such evidence for the prosecution one is satisfied that it would be wholly unsafe to convict upon such evidence standing alone, then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused should not be called on for his defence.” In 1980, the principle contained in the above passage was applied by Hashim Yeop A. Sani J. (as he then was) in Zahari bin Yeop Baai & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MLJ 160. In the circumstances, we do not find anything wrong in the trial judge's approach, when calling for the appellant to enter on his defence. He was clearly correct in being satisfied that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case for the appellant to answer according to the principle laid down in Haw Tua Tau and explained in Ragunathan. In considering the question of law whether there is some evidence (not inherently incredible) to prove one or more of the essential ingredients of the alleged offence, a judge or magistrate must by necessity, evaluate and weigh all the evidence. If there is no evidence at all to prove one or more of the essential ingredients of the offence, the accused must be acquitted without calling for his defence. The requirement of section 180 or section 173(f) C.P.C. cannot be properly complied with unless the judge or magistrate considers and evaluates all the evidence adduced by the prosecution as tested in cross-examination. There is nothing in Haw Tua Tau to suggest that for the purpose of proving the essential ingredients of the alleged offence, the words “if unrebutted” in section 180 mean that even if the evidence on primary facts adduced by the prosecution are inherently incredible or the witnesses are found to be untruthful or unreliable, the court must presume that they are respectively true and truthful and must in all cases call for the defence. There must be some credible evidence to prove the essential ingredients of the charge, which in all cases must necessarily include the identity of the accused (see Yau Heng Fang v Public prosecutor [1985] 2 MLJ 335). Cases involving the acquittal of the accused without defence being called on ground of identity, such as found in Public Prosecutor v Lim Teong Seng & Ors [1946] MLJ 108, could easily have been justified on the failure of the prosecution to prove an essential ingredient of the charge without the necessity of ignoring or circumventing the statutory burden imposed by sections 173(f), 180 and 190.

Apa yang jelas dalam kes tersebut ialah Mahkamah Agong menggunakan frasa “credible evidence to prove the essential ingredient of the charge”. Frasa ini dapat dilihat digunakan dalam peruntukan terkini seksyen 180(4) KPJ seperti yang berikut:

For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.

Rumusan berkenaan dengan prinsip Haw Tua Tau (supra) dan keputusan Mahkamah Agong dalam kes Munusamy (supra) telah diberikan ulasan yang menarik oleh Professor Tan Sri Datuk Ahmad Ibrahim dalam artikelnya bertajuk The Burden At The End Of The Prosecution Case – Haw Tua Tau Revisited [1987] 2 MLJ lxx di halaman lxxii seperti yang berikut: “What appears to be emphasised both in Haw Tua Tau and in Ragunathan is that at the end of the prosecution case the Magistrate or judge has to decide as a question of law whether the accused can lawfully be convicted on the prosecution evidence – the question of fact as to whether he can be convicted has not arisen at the stage. The approach in the older cases in Malaysia seems however to deal with the question as to whether the Magistrate or judge can and should acquit at the end of the prosecution case. Is this also a question of law only? Surely the Magistrate or judge must decide whether to acquit or not. He is then a decider of fact as well as of law. Contrary to what Lord Diplock said in Haw Tua Tau in Malaysia, the jury can find that there is no case against the accused at the end of the prosecution case and acquit him.”

Walau bagaimanapun terdapat keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan yang berpandangan prinsip dalam Haw Tua Tau (supra) tersebut adalah tidak tepat iaitu dalam kes Khoo Hi Chiang v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [1994] 1 MLJ 265 seperti yang berikut: With the utmost respect, we cannot agree. The Haw Tua Tau test requires a minimal evaluation of the evidence at the close of the prosecution's case to ensure that it is not inherently incredible whereas the test adopted in the pre-Haw Tua Tau cases requires a maximum evaluation of the evidence at that stage of the trial to ensure that on that evidence standing alone the court would be prepared, then and there, to convict should the accused say nothing, before the accused can be called to enter upon his defence.

Mahkamah Persekutuan seterusnya menyatakan dalam kes Khoo Hi Chiang (supra) tersebut di halaman 290 seperti yang berikut: Consequently, the duty of the court, at the close of the case for the prosecution, is to undertake, not a minimal evaluation of the evidence tendered by the prosecution in order to determining whether or not the prosecution evidence is inherently incredible – the Haw Tua Tau test – but a maximum evaluation of such evidence, to determine whether or not the prosecution has established the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. With considerable regret, therefore, we must decline to follow Haw Tua Tau and its progeny Ragunathan, Munusamy and Junaidi, as to the effect of the relevant statutory provisions of the Code to which we have referred and discussed.

Seterusnya Mahkamah Persekutuan melalui keputusan majoriti dalam kes Arulpragasan a/l Sandaraju v Public Prosecutor [1997] 1 MLJ 1 menyatakan seperti yang berikut: Conclusion on the standard of proof point To sum up, therefore – so far as the standard of proof on the prosecution, at the close of its case is concerned – I would uphold Khoo Hi Chiang and with the utmost respect, decline to follow Haw Tua Tau, Ng Theng Shuang and Yeo Tse Soon and overrule Ragunathan v PP [1982] 1 MLJ 139, Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492, Junaidi bin Abdullah v PP [1993] 3 MLJ 217 and Tan Boon Kean v PP [1995] 3 MLJ 514.

Ini bermakna terdapat perubahan yang ketara berkenaan dengan penilaian yang perlu dibuat di akhir kes pendakwaan. Keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan tersebut telah mengubah pendekatan yang dinyatakan dalam kes Haw Tua Tau (supra) yang telah diterima pakai sebelum ini.

Di tengah kemelut undang-undang tersebut, badan perundangan telah memperkenalkan pindaan kepada seksyen 180 dan seksyen 173 (f) KPJ berkaitan dengan perkara tersebut. Ini dapat dilihat melalui pindaan yang dibuat melalui Penyata Rasmi Parlimen ketika Bacaan Kali Kedua dan Ketiga Rang Undang-Undang Kanun Prosedur Jenayah Pindaan 1996 pada 17.12.1996 dan 18.12.1996 seperti yang berikut: Tuan Yang di-Pertua, pada 27hb. Julai, 1996 yang lalu, Mahkamah Persekutuan Malaysia dalam kes Arulpragasan a/l Sundaraju dan Pendakwaraya telah memutuskan dengan majoriti 4-3 bahawa standard pembuktian yang diperlukan pada penutup kes pendakwaan bagi mewajarkan mahkamah memanggil orang tertuduh untuk membela dirinya ialah pembuktian kes "melepasi keraguan yang munasabah," atau dengan izin, "beyond resonable doubt." Itulah tafsiran Mahkamah Persekutuan bagi peruntukan dalam Seksyen 180, Kanun Prosedur Jenayah bagi perbicaraan di Mahkamah Tinggi yang mengatakan bahawa, dengan izin, "The Court, if it finds that no case against the accused have been made out which if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction shall record an order of acquittal". Ungkapan yang sama terdapat dalam perenggan (f), Seksyen 173 Kanun itu, bagi perbicaraan di Mahkamah Rendah. Kes Arulpragasan ini telah mengubah standard pembuktian pada penutup kes pendakwaan seperti mana yang diputuskan dalam kes-kes di Malaysia berikutan dengan keputusan Privy Council dalam kes Haw Tua Tau pada 22hb. Jun, 1981. Dalam kes itu Privy Council membincangkan Seksyen 188 (1), Kanun Prosedur Jenayah Singapura yang sama peruntukannya dengan Seksyen 180, Kanun Prosedur Jenayah Malaysia. Privy Council memutuskan bahawa, dengan izin, "at the conclusion of the prosecution's case, what has to be decided remains a question of law only. As decider of law, the judge must consider whether there is some evidence (not in herently incredible) which, if you were to accept it as accurate, would establish each essential element in the alleged offence. If such evidence ......... is lacking, then and only then if he is justified in finding "that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction, " within the meaning of Section 188(1). Where he has not so found, he must call upon the accused to enter for his defence and if as decider of fact must keep an open mind as to the accuracy or any of the prosecution witnesses until the prosecution has tendered such evidence, if any, by the accused or other witness as it may want to call consel on both sides have addressed to the judge such argument and comments on the evidence as they may wish to advance". Antara kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Agung dan Mahkamah Persekutuan di Malaysia yang mengikuti keputusan dalam kes Haw Tua Tau ini ialah kes Ragunathan v. Pendakwaraya sebagaimana yang dilaporkan dalam tahun 1982 (1 MLJ - 139), kes Munusamy v. Public Prosecutor yang diputuskan dalam tahun 1987 dan kes Junaidi bin Abdullah vs Public Prosecutor yang diputuskan dalam tahun 1983… Seterusnya dinyatakan: Dari satu segi, standard, dengan izin "beyond reasonable doubt" pada akhir kes pendakwaan akan mewujudkan penilaian yang ketat pada peringkat itu dan akibatnya akan lebih mudahlah orang yang sebenarnya bersalah lepas daripada pertuduhan dan oleh itu lepas daripada hukuman. Jika ini berlaku keadilan tidak akan tercapai. Dari segi yang lain pula, apabila mahkamah sudah membuat keputusan pada penutup kes pihak pendakwa bahawa pihak pendakwa sudah mengemukakan keterangan yang dapat membuktikan pertuduhan terhadap orang tertuduh sehingga tiada lagi keraguan yang munasabah, maka sukar untuk dibayangkan bagaimana orang tertuduh itu akan dapat membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah bagi menyangkal kes yang sudah terbukti sedemikian. Hasilnya ialah, apabila orang tertuduh dipanggil membela dirinya, besar kemungkinan apa-apa yang dikemukakannya dalam pembelaan tidak akan berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Ini juga tidak akan menghasilkan keadilan. Kerajaan berpendapat, wajarlah kepentingan masyarakat dan kepentingan mangsa sesuatu jenayah diseimbangkan dengan kepentingan orang tertuduh dengan memastikan bahawa standard pembuktian di peringkat penutup kes pendakwaan standard ialah standard "prima facie". Tuan Yang di-Pertua, pindaan yang utama yang dicadangkan melalui rang undang-undang ini ialah kepada seksyen 180 yang merupakan peruntukan yang dipertikaikan dalam kes Arulpragasan. Peruntukan ini memperkatakan standard pembuktian pada penutup kes pendakwaan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Fasal yang berkenaan dalam Rang Undang-undang ini ialah fasal 4. Oleh sebab standard pembuktian pada penutup kes pendakwaan di Mahkamah Rendah adalah sama, maka perenggan 173(f) yang mengandungi peruntukan yang berkenaan juga perlu dipinda Fasal yang berkenaan dalam Rang Undang-undang ini ialah fasal2(c). Selain itu, bagi memperjelaskan bahawa terdapat dua jenis standard pembuktian di dua peringkat dalam sesuatu perbicaraan kes jenayah di Mahkamah Tinggi, iaitu standard "prima facie" pada penutup kes pendakwaan dan standard "beyond reasonable doubt" pada akhir keseluruhan kes, maka adalah dicadangkan, supaya suatu seksyen baru, iaitu seksyen 182A, dimasukkan ke dalam Kanun Prosedur Jenayah.

Semasa menggulung perbahasan berkenaan dengan pindaan tersebut, Menteri Di Jabatan Perdana Menteri telah menjelaskan sekali lagi berkenaan dengan tujuan pindaan tersebut dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: Rang undang-undang ini bertujuan untuk memperuntukkan tahap pembuktian kes prima facie pada akhir kes pendakwa, manakala tahap pembuktian melepasi paras keraguan munasabah, dengan izin, 'beyond reasonable doubt' merupakan tahap pembuktian pada akhir kes pembela. Adalah jelas bahawa selepas pindaan yang dicadangkan melalui rang undang-undang ini mula berkuatkuasa ungkapan kes prima facie tidak boleh disamakan dengan ungkapan melepasi paras keraguan munasabah. Sarna seperti ungakapan melepasi paras keraguan munasabah, ungkapan kes prima facie tidak perlu ditakrifkan. Ini adalah kerana pertamanya, ungkapan ini telah dijelaskan dalam undang-undang kes yang mantap, dengan izin, 'settled case law', jauh sebelum rang undang-undang ini dibentangkan. Selepas pindaan ini berkuatkuasa, mahkamah boleh merujuk kepada keputusan dalam kes-kes yang terdahulu berkenaan makna ungkapan ini seperti telah dijelaskan oleh rakan saya, Yang Berhormat dari Alor Gajah sebentar tadi. Tambahan pula pemakaian ungkapan adalah semestinya berdasarkan fakta sesuatu kes. Oleh kerana fakta sesuatu kes semestinya berbeza dengan fakta kes yang lain, ungkapan kes prima facie tidak perlu ditakrifkan dengan persis yang terperinci. Suatu takrif kes prima facie yang persis dan terperinci adalah terlalu mengongkong, dengan izin, 'restrictive' dan mungkin tidak sejajar dengan keperluan keadilan. Para hakim dan peguam yang memakai ungkapan kes prima facie di mahkamah adalah dibimbing oleh undang-undang kes, dengan izin, 'case law' berkenaan dengan makna ungkapan ini. Oleh yang demikian, tidak terdapat sebarang kekeliruan berkenaan ungkapan ini di kalangan hakim dan pengamal undang-undang. Justeru itu, mahkamah boleh memakai makna kes prima facie yang diberikan dalam keputusan-keputusan kes yang terdahulu berdasarkan faktor kes yang sedang dibicarakan di hadapan mahkamah tersebut tanpa apa-apa masalah….

Adalah jelas dan nyata berdasarkan kepada pernyataan dalam Penyata Rasmi Parlimen tersebut pindaan kepada seksyen 173

dan 180 KPJ seperti yang tertera dalam teks Kanun Prosedur Jenayah sekarang adalah bertujuan untuk mengembalikan kedudukan kes prima facie seperti yang telah dinyatakan di dalam kes Haw Tua Tau (supra) di atas. Ia juga bertujuan untuk mengelakkan keraguan berkenaan dengan ujian yang perlu digunakan dalam menentukan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya menunjukkan satu kes prima facie.

Selepas pindaan pada tahun 1996 tersebut, terdapat keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 MLJ 65 yang menjelaskan berkenaan dengan apakah yang perlu dilakukan oleh hakim di akhir kes pendakwaan. Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: We are confident in the view we have just expressed because we find nothing in the amended s 180(1) ofthe CPC that has taken away the right of an accused person to remain silent at the close of the prosecution case. Further we find nothing in the legislative intention of Parliament as expressed in the language employed by it to show that there should be a dualexercise by a judge under s 180 when an accused elects to remain silent as happened in Pavone v Public Prosecutor [1984] 1 MLJ 77. In other words we areunable to discover anything in the language of the recently formulated s 180 that requires a judge sitting alone first to make a minimum evaluation and then when the accused elects to remain silent to make a maximum evaluation in deciding whether to convictor not at the close of the prosecution case. It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under s 180 of the CPC has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case. He must subject the prosecution evidenceto maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question: if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer isin the negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal.

Ia juga telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Balachandran v PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 di dalam memberikan takrifan prima facie yang terdapat di bawah seksyen 180 (1) KPJ seperti yang berikut: Section 180 (1) it clear that the standard of proof on the prosecution at the close of its case is to make out a prima facie case while s. 182A(1) enunciates that at the conclusion of the trial the court shall consider all the evidence adduced and decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The standard of proof on the prosecution at the end of its case and at the end of the whole case has thus been statutorily spelt out in clear terms. The submission made must therefore be ratiocinated against the background of the meaning of the phrase"prima facie case"in s. 180. Section 180(2) provides that the court shall record an order of acquittal if a prima facie case has not been made out while s. 180(3) provides that if a prima facie case has been made out the accused shall be called upon to enter his defence. A prima facie case is therefore one that is sufficient for the accused to be called upon to answer. This in turn means that the evidence adduced must be such that it can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal. The phrase"prima facie case"is defined in similar terms in Mozley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary, 11th edn as: A litigating party is said to have a prima facie case when the evidence in his favour is sufficiently strong for his opponent to be called on to answer it. A prima facie case, then, is one which is established by sufficient evidence, and can be overthrown only by rebutting evidence adduced by the other side. The result is that the force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen. On the other hand if a prima facie case has not been made out it means that there is no material evidence which can be believed in the sense as described earlier. In order to make a finding either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established. As the trial is without a jury it is only with such a positive evaluation can the court make a determination for the purpose of s. 180(2) and (3). Of course in a jury trial where the evaluation is hypothetical the question to be asked would be whether on the evidence as it stands the accused could (and not must) lawfully be convicted. That is so because a determination on facts is a matter for ultimate decision by the jury at the end of the trial. Since the court, in ruling that aprima facie case has been made out, must be satisfied that the evidence adduced can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal it follows that if it is not rebutted it must prevail. Thus if the accused elects to remain silent he must be convicted. The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be noprima facie case. As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. However it must be observed that it cannot, at that stage, be properly described as a case that has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt involves two aspects. While one is the legal burden on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt the other is the evidential burden on the accused to raise a reasonable doubt. Both these burdens can only be fully discharged at the end of the whole case when the defence has closed its case. Therefore a case can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt only at the conclusion of the trial upon a consideration of all the evidence adduced as provided by s. 182A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. That would normally be the position where the accused has given evidence. However, where the accused remains silent there will be no necessity to re-evaluate the evidence in order to determine whether there is a reasonable doubt in the absence of any further evidence for such a consideration. The prima facie evidence which was capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt will constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the submission of learned counsel that the burden on the prosecution at the close of its case is to make out a case which is beyond reasonable doubt and not on a prima facie basis is contrary to the clear and plain language of s. 180 and s. 182A. It cannot therefore be sustained.

Oleh yang demikian maka suatu Rang Undang-Undang Kanun Tatacara Jenayah Pindaan 2004 telah dicadangkan bagi memperkemaskan Rang Undang-Undang tersebut suatu Jawatankuasa Pindaan Khas telah ditubuhkan oleh Parlimen untuk mengkaji Rang Undang-Undang Kanun Tatacara Jenayah Pindaan 2004 tersebut. Ia telah menyebabkan pada 13.07.2006 dikemukakan pindaan kepada seksyen 180 dan 173 (f) KPJ berkenaan dengan dengan prima facie tersebut. Perkara ini telah dinyatakan oleh Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri ketika membentangkan Laporan Jawatankuasa Pindaan Khas tersebut dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: Tuan Yang di-Pertua, Fasal 21 dan Fasal 22 ialah fasal-fasal yang meminda seksyen 173 dan seksyen 180 masing-masing. Perenggan 173(h) dan seksyen 180 adalah berhubung dengan tahap pembuktian yang diperlukan pada akhir kes pendakwaan untuk menentukan sama ada pihak pendakwa telah membuktikan kesnya untuk membolehkan pembelaan dipanggil. Dalam tahun 1997, seksyen tersebut telah dipinda melalui Akta Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Pindaan) 1997 [Akta A979]. Pindaan tersebut telah dibuat untuk mengatasi penghakiman dalam kes Khoo He Chiang lawan Pendakwa Raya dan Arul Pragasan a/l Sandaraju lawan Pendakwa Raya yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di mana mahkamah telah menggunakan tahap maximum evaluation di akhir kes pendakwaan seperti yang dijelaskan dalam huraian kepada Rang Undang-undang Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (Pindaan) 1997 dan ucapan menteri berkenaan semasa Rang Undang-undang itu dibentang di Dewan Rakyat. Hasrat Parlimen ketika membuat pindaan tersebut adalah untuk mengembalikan prinsip dalam kes Hor Tua Tau lawan public prosecutor 1981 2 MLJ 49 yang telah menggunakan tahap minimum evaluation di akhir kes pendakwaan. Walau bagaimanapun perkembangan undang-undang tidak memenuhi hasrat tersebut memandangkan ungkapan “prima facie” tidak ditafsirkan dalam pindaan tersebut. Ini telah mengakibatkan kes-kes seperti Lui Kow Chai lawan Pendakwa Raya dan Balachandaran lawan Pendakwa Raya, memberi tafsirannya tersendiri yang telah mengakibatkan situasi undang-undang yang tidak tertentu. Untuk memberi penentuan kepada tahap pembuktian.... Timbalan Yang di-Pertua [Datuk Lim Si Cheng]: Yang Berhormat, Yang Berhormat Menteri sudah berucap panjang, perlukan air minuman? Dato’ Seri Mohd. Radzi bin Sheikh Ahmad: Tidak perlu, Tuan Yang di-Pertua. Terima kasih, Tuan Yang di-Pertua. Timbalan Yang di-Pertua [Datuk Lim Si Cheng]: Baik, teruskan. Tidak ada, Yang Berhormat. Ini memang prihatin kepada semua Ahli Yang Berhormat di sini. Dato’ Seri Mohd. Radzi bin Sheikh Ahmad: Terima kasih, Tuan Yang di-Pertua. Untuk memberi penentuan kepada tahap pembuktian pada akhir kes pendakwaan, jawatankuasa berpendapat satu tafsiran kepada ungkapan prima facie perlu diadakan. Sehubungan dengan itu jawatankuasa setelah mengambil kira representasi orang ramai telah meminda perenggan 173(h) dan seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dengan memasukkan tafsiran ungkapan kepada prima facie bagi perbicaraan di Mahkamah Rendah dan Mahkamah Tinggi. Jawatankuasa berpendapat bahawa tafsiran prima facie adalah seperti berikut, dengan izin: “A prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduce credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unreported or unexplained would warrant a conviction”

Pada hemat Mahkamah ini pemahaman kepada mengapa pindaan dibuat terhadap seksyen 173 (f) dan 180 KPJ dapat membantu Mahkamah untuk meneliti apakah yang perlu diambil kira oleh Mahkamah semasa menentukan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah menunjukkan suatu kes prima facie.

Sekiranya diteliti kepada peruntukan seksyen 180 KPJ sendiri terdapat perbezaan ketika akhir kes pendakwaan dan di akhir kes pembelaan. Ini dapat dilihat seperti yang berikut: 180 Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution

When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence.

For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.

Sementara di akhir kes pembelaan KPJ memperuntukkan seksyen 182A KPJ seperti yang berikut: 182A Procedure at the conclusion of the trial

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the accused guilty and he may be convicted on it.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

Kini Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memperjelaskan berkenaan dengan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 180 (4) KPJ melalui kes Abdullah Atan v PP & Other Appeals [2020] 9 CLJ 151 seperti yang berikut: [42] The purpose of s. 180(4) CPC was thus not to exclude the use of presumptions, inferences, or anything other than direct evidence, to establish a prima facie case. On the contrary

the Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau itself expressly envisaged that inferences may be drawn from the primary facts adduced, and the court must presume such inferences to be true at the close of the prosecution's case; and

(ii) statutory presumptions have often been invoked by the prosecution in order to establish a prima facie case of drug trafficking in previous cases. No concern was raised in Parliament as to the use of presumptions when considering amendments to s. 180 of the CPC (see Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. PP [1991] 3 CLJ 2073; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 311; [1991] 3 MLJ 169; and Tan Boon Kean v. PP [1995] 4 CLJ 456; [1995] 3 MLJ 514). [43] Section 180(4) of the CPC must be read in light of its context and legislative purpose. By so doing, the phrase "credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence" in s. 180(4) means that the prosecution may prove each ingredient of the offence either :

by adducing credible direct evidence of that ingredient;

(ii) by drawing inferences of fact, ie, adducing credible circumstantial evidence, from which the ingredient can be inferred; or

(iii) by invoking presumptions of law, ie, adducing credible evidence of the relevant basic facts, to invoke a statutory presumption that the ingredient exists. [44] As to what constitutes 'a prima facie ' case, the judgment of Vincent Ng J (as he then was) in PP v. Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 4 CLJ 209 is instructive. Although Ong Cheng Heong (supra) was decided prior to the amendment in 2006, we respectfully endorse His Lordship's views, at p. What then constitutes a 'prima facie case'? 'Prima facie ' means on the face of it or at first glance perhaps the most appropriate definition of 'a prima facie case' could be found in the Oxford Companion of Law (p. 987), which has it as: "A case which is sufficient for an answer. While prima facie evidence is evidence which is sufficient to establish a fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, but is not conclusive". It would follow that there should be credible evidence on each and every ingredient of the offence. Credible evidence is evidence which has been filtered and which has gone through the process of evaluation. Any evidence which is not safe to be acted upon, should be rejected. (emphasis added) At p. 224, His Lordship said ... to me, maximum evaluation simply means evaluation, on a prima facie basis, of each and every essential ingredient of the charge as tested in cross-examination. In other words, maximum evaluation connotes quantitative rather than qualitative evaluation of the evidence; with focus more on the evidential burden in terms of evidence led, rather than the persuasive burden in terms of qualitative degree of proof. [45] The only basis of learned counsel's contention that the presumption in s. 37(da) cannot be invoked to establish a prima facie case under s. 180 of the CPC, is that presumption is not evidence. Hence, it was argued that in relying on such presumption, it cannot be said that the prosecution has "adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence" under s. 180(4) of the CPC. The argument is premised purely on semantics."

Setelah menekuni latar belakang prima facie tersebut adakah dalam kes ini pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan keterangan-keterangan yang boleh menunjukkan satu kes prima facie.

Bagi menjawab persoalan ini Mahkamah perlu meneliti sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah menunjukkan elemen-elemen kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan terhadap OKT 1, OKT 2 dan OKT 3. Dalam konteks kes ini adakah telah ditunjukkan bahawa dadah yang dijumpai itu adalah dadah berbahaya, dadah tersebut berada dalam milikan, kawalan dan pengetahuan OKT 1, OKT 2 dan OKT 3 dan adakah OKT 1, OKT 2 dan OKT 3 melakukan aktiviti pengedaran dadah.

Dalam kes ini adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh ahli kimia telah mengesahkan bahawa dadah yang dijumpai itu adalah dadah yang berbahaya di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952.

Seterusnya, Mahkamah perlu melihat elemen yang kedua iaitu, adakah dadah-dadah tersebut berada di dalam milikan, pengetahuan dan kawalan OKT 1, OKT 2 dan OKT 3. Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan di peringkat pendakwaan adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa pada masa serbuan dilakukan oleh SP 3 bersama-sama dengan SP 8 pada hari kejadian tersebut ialah OKT 1 berada bersama-sama dengan kenderaan tersebut atau dikatakan sedang memandu kenderaan tersebut bersama-sama dengan dua orang wanita lain.

Sementara itu OKT 2 dan OKT 3 dalam kes ini tiada keterangan yang dapat menunjukkan bahawa OKT 2 dan OKT 3 berada bersama-sama dengan OKT 1 dengan kenderaan tersebut. Persoalannya ialah adakah dengan ketiadaan OKT 2 dan OKT 3 di tempat kejadian tersebut adalah secara automatik menunjukkan bahawa OKT 2 dan OKT 3 tidak ditunjukkan bahawa mereka mempunyai kawalan, milikan dan pengetahuan dadah-dadah tersebut. Adalah jelas dan nyata pada hemat Mahkamah bagi menentukan perkara tersebut ada dua perkara yang perlu dilihat bahawa pemilikan itu adalah semestinya satu pemilikan fizikal yang mana dalam kes ini kita dapati bahawa perkara tersebut secara jelasnya menunjukkan bahawa ia tidak melibatkan OKT 2 dan OKT 3.

Adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa Mahkamah perlu berhati-hati dalam kes ini kerana jumlah dadah yang diperolehi adalah agak besar. Oleh kerana ini maka adakah disebabkan jumlah dadah tersebut dan juga keterangan daripada SP 4 dan SP 11 yang menyatakan mengaitkan OKT 2 dan OKT 3 dalam kes ini semata-mata dikatakan mereka dipercayai adalah tokan dadah boleh melunaskan tanggungjawab pendakwaan untuk menunjukkan satu kes prima facie. Ia ditambah pula dengan kepercayaan saksi pendakwaan terdapatnya DNA OKT 3 di tempat kejadian tersebut maka sudah memadai untuk menunjukkan mereka mempunyai pemilikan dadah-dadah tersebut dan kawalan dan pengetahuan berkenaan dengan dadah tersebut dan adakah semata-mata OKT 1 disebabkan beliau membawa kenderaan tersebut dan dalam kenderaan tersebut terdapat dadah tersebut sudah memadai menyatakan bahawa beliau mempunyai pengetahuan, kawalan dan milikan dadah tersebut. Ini ditambah pula dengan keterangan SP 8 yang menyatakan ketika menyatakan sama ada terdapat apa-apa barang salah OKT 1 menyatakan beliau tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan dengan apa-apa barang salah yang dibawa dalam kenderaan tersebut.

Selain daripada itu Mahkamah juga perlu meneliti keterangan berkaitan dengan pemilikan hak kenderaan tersebut yang terdapat catatan yang dikemukakan melalui dokumen-dokumen kenderaan yang menyatakan bahawa ia adalah dimiliki oleh seorang bernama Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top dan bukannya OKT 1, OKT 2 dan OKT 3.

Penelitian kepada kertas pertuduhan juga tidak menunjukkan bahawa OKT 2 dan OKT 3 telah dikaitkan dengan kejadian tersebut berdasarkan kepada konspirasi mereka dalam melakukan jenayah tersebut seperti yang terdapat di bawah seksyen 120B Kanun Keseksaan seperti yang berikut:

Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

Subject to subsection (3), whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or with fine or with both.

If the offence, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a minor offence under the Minor Offences Act 1955 the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such minor offence.

Apa yang ada ialah OKT 1, OKT 2 dan OKT 3 dikaitkan melakukan kesalahan itu bersama-sama dengan menggunakan seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap bahawa bagi menunjukkan penglibatan OKT 1, OKT 2 dan OKT 3 di bawah niat bersama Mahkamah perlu mendapati terdapat keterangan bahawa terdapat perancangan awal untuk melakukan kesalahan tersebut atau ianya berlaku secara spontan di antara ketiga-tiga OKT tersebut. Namun keterangan yang ada tidak menunjukkan sedemikian. Ini adalah disebabkan OKT 2 dan OKT 3 tidak berada di tempat kejadian.

Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpendapat tiada keterangan yang dapat mengaitkan OKT 2 dan OKT 3 bagi pertuduhan mempunyai niat bersama dengan OKT 1 untuk melakukan kesalahan seperti yang dipertuduhkan. Ia membawa maksud pihak pendakwaan tidak berjaya menunjukkan satu kes prima facie terhadap OKT 2 dan OKT 3. OKT 2 dan OKT 3 dibebas dan dilepaskan tanpa dipanggil memanggil diri.

Sebaliknya bagi OKT 1 pula pada hemat Mahkamah pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya menunjukkan satu kes prima facie apabila keterangan menunjukkan bahawa OKT 1 telah membawa dadah-dadah tersebut dengan kenderaan Toyota Hilux W8812U. Ia adalah termasuk di dalam takfiran pengedaran dadah di bawah seksyen 2 ADB 1952 yang memberikan takrifan seperti yang berikut: "trafficking" includes the doing of any of the following acts, that is to say, manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping, concealing, buying, selling, giving, receiving, storing, administering, transporting, carrying, sending, delivering, procuring, supplying or distributing any dangerous drug otherwise than under the authority of this Act or the regulations made under the Act;

Mahkamah ini berpendapat keterangan yang ada terhadap OKT 1 tidak memerlukan Mahkamah ini menggunakan anggapan pengedaran dadah di bawah seksyen 37 (da) ADB 1952.

Namun demikian Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan hujahan pihak OKT 1 yang menyatakan bahawa pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh menggunakan anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 (h) ADB 1952 disebabkan keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan menunjukkan bahawa pemilik kenderaan Toyota Hilux W8812U adalah Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top dan bukannya OKT 1. Seksyen 37 (h) ADB 1952 memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut:

if any dangerous drug is found concealed in any compartment, specially constructed for the purpose, on any vehicle, it shall until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been so concealed with the knowledge of the owner of the vehicle and of the person in charge of the vehicle for the time being.

Penelitian kepada seksyen 37 (h) ADB 1952 tersebut mendapati bahawa ia boleh digunakan terhadap pemilik kenderaan atau pihak yang mengendalikan kenderaan tersebut pada suatu masa yang matan. Keterangan dalam kes ini menunjukkan bahawa semasa serbuan dilakukan OKT 1 yang sedang mengendalikan atau memandu kenderaan tersebut. Oleh yang demikian adalah tidak tepat untuk menyatakan anggapan di bawah seksyen 37 (h) itu tidak boleh digunakan kepada OKT 1. Berdasarkan kepada penelitian keterangan dan hujahan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa OKT 1 dipanggil membela diri bagi pertuduhan yang dikemukakan.

OKT 1 telah memberikan keterangan bersama-sama dengan seorang saksi pembelaan. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti keterangan OKT 1 dan mendapati bahawa dia menggunakan kenderaan yang telah diberikan oleh Mahama Boraheng (OKT 2) yang merupakan saudaranya. OKT 2 menyatakan bahawa kenderaan tersebut adalah kepunyaan seorang yang bernama Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top iaitu abang ipar OKT 1.

Keterangan OKT 1 mengatakan bahawa dia telah diminta oleh Mahama Boraheng untuk mengambil kenderaan daripada penama Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top. OKT 1 menyatakan bahawa Mahama Boraheng yang meminta dia untuk untuk memandu kereta tersebut membawa Mahama Boraheng ke rumah sewa Mahama Boraheng di No. 17, Jalan SP 10/15, Bandar Saujana Putra, Jenjarom, Selangor.

OKT 1 pada awalnya enggan untuk membantu Mahama Boraheng untuk datang ke Selangor. Namun setelah Mahama Boraheng menyatakan bahawa dia boleh menyediakan kenderaan untuk membolehkan OKT 1 pulang semula ke Kelantan, OKT 1 setuju membawa Mahama Boraheng ke Selangor.

OKT 1 di dalam keterangan menyatakan bahawa dia diberitahu oleh Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top bahawa tangki minyak kereta tersebut ada sedikit masalah. Namun setelah berpuas hati dengan keadaan kereta tersebut, OKT 1 memulakan perjalanan ke Kelantan. Di sepanjang perjalanan tersebut, kereta yang dipandu oleh OKT 1 telah beberapa kali melalui sekatan jalan raya disebabkan ketika itu Malaysia masih di dalam Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan (PKP).

Apabila tiba di tempat kejadian kereta yang dipandu oleh OKT 1 ditahan oleh pihak polis. OKT 1 telah memaklumkan dia tidak membawa kad pengenalan dan lesen memandu kerana telah tertinggal di Jenjarom, Selangor. OKT 1 dan kedua-dua orang dalam kenderaan tersebut telah diminta turun. Apabila kereta itu diperiksa, pihak polis telah menjumpai dadah di tempat yang diubahsuai pada bahagian lantai besi tempat duduk belakang kereta tersebut.

OKT 1 menafikan pil-pil yang ditemui di tempat tersebut dalam kereta itu adalah miliknya dan memaklumkan kepada pihak polis bahawa kereta itu adalah milik Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top dan OKT 1 hanya menggunakan kereta itu untuk pulang ke Kelantan.

OKT 1 semasa pemeriksaan utama menyatakan bahawa keadaan kereta itu adalah tidak mencurigakan sebelum menggunakannya seperti yang berikut: S : Boleh jelaskan bagaimana keadaan kereta tersebut apabila dipinjamkan kepada kamu? J : Kenderaan masa itu normal, tak ada apa-apa mencurigakan saya.

OKT 1 juga menyatakan telah membuat laporan polis seperti di D106. Laporan polis tersebut dibuat pada 20.04.2022. OKT 1 telah ditahan pada 09.05.2020. Penelitian kepada D106 bersama-sama dengan keterangan pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh OKT 1 adalah didapati saling tak tumpah di antara satu sama lain. Keterangan pembelaan tersebut adalah selari dengan isi kandungan laporan polis D106 tersebut. Apa yang jelas daripada pembelaan OKT 1 ialah kenderaan Toyota Hilux tersebut adalah milik Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top. OKT 1 mengambil kenderaan tersebut daripada Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top setelah diminta oleh Mahama Boraheng. OKT 1 telah diberitahu oleh Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top bahawa terdapat sedikit kelainan pada kenderaan tersebut iaitu tempat pengisian minyaknya adalah berbeza. OKT 1 setelah memeriksa luaran Toyota Hilux tersebut serta memeriksa tayar memutuskan untuk memandu kenderaan tersebut. OKT 1 menyatakan dia tidak dimaklumkan oleh Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top bahawa terdapatnya pengubahsuaian yang dibuat pada kereta tersebut.

OKT 1 menegaskan bahawa dia tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan dengan kewujudan bahagian yang diubahsuai dalam kenderaan tersebut. OKT 1 menyatakan dia tidak juga mengetahui berkenaan dengan dadah-dadah tersebut. OKT 1 juga menyatakan inilah kali pertama dia membawa kenderaan Toyota Hilux tersebut untuk tujuan kembali ke Kelantan. Selain daripada itu semasa OKT 1 ditahan dia berada dalam keadaan cemas disebabkan ketika itu dia tidak membawa kad pengenalan dan lesen memandu.

Peguambela OKT 1 berhujah bahawa kegagalan mengemukakan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top oleh pihak pendakwaan telah mewujudkan lompangan di dalam kes ini. Malahan ia telah menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan yang berjaya ditimbulkan oleh pihak pembelaan.

Sebaliknya Pendakwa Raya berhujah bahawa pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh OKT 1 adalah rekaan semata-mata. Ia tidak sekali-kali berjaya menimbulkan keraguan munasabah. Malahan ketiadaan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top sebagai saksi adalah tidak boleh dipersalahkan kepada pihak pendakwaan kerana usaha untuk mendapatkan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top telah tidak berjaya dilakukan. Pendakwa Raya bukan tidak ingin mengemukakan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top sebagai saksi dalam kes ini. Malahan permohonan telah dibuat di Mahkamah ini untuk mengemukakan kenyataan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top tetapi telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah setelah tidak berpuas hati kenyataan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top boleh dikemukakan di bawah seksyen 32 Akta Keterangan 1952.

Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab perundangan (legal burden) untuk pihak pendakwaan membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan munasabah. Tugas ini berterusan daripada permulaan kes sehingga akhir kes pembelaan. Ia tidak sekali-kali akan berpindah kepada pembelaan. Oleh itu Mahkamah perlu berhati-hati bahawa tugas untuk mengemukakan saksi-saksi untuk membuktikan kes adalah terletak di pundak Pendakwa Raya. Ia tidak sekali-kali boleh dilakukan dengan melihat kepada kelemahan kes pembelaan tetapi kepada kekuatan kes pendakwaan. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Rosli bin Yusof v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 MLJ 479 seperti yang berikut: [45] It is trite law that it is not the duty of the appellant to prove his innocence or to call a particular witness to support his defence (see Tan Foo Su v Public Prosecutor [1967] 2 MLJ 19; Sandra Margaret Birch v Public Prosecutor [1978] 1 MLJ 72). The law places upon the prosecution the burden to prove guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and not on the appellant to prove his innocence. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the appellant must rest not on the weakness of the defence but on the strength of the prosecution. This principle is the corner stone of our criminal law.

Oleh itu walaupun pembelaan tidak mengemukakan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top atau saksi-saksi lain bagi menyokong kes pembelaan ia tidak sekali-kali boleh dijadikan alasan untuk menyatakan bahawa pembelaan gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Ini ditambah pula dengan watak Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top telah dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan sejak daripada awal kes di peringkat pendakwaan. Pihak pendakwaan telah mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan dengan kewujudan Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top tersebut. Ini bermakna adalah tidak tepat untuk menyatakan pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh OKT 1 adalah rekaan semata-mata atau pemikiran terkemudian. Nama-mana individu yang dinyatakan oleh OKT 1 adalah watak sebenar di dalam kes ini. Nama Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top adalah benar, Mahama Boraheng juga benar, Zizah binti Harun dan Fairuz binti Othman adalah juga benar. Ia bukannya watak ciptaan yang boleh dikaitkan dengan pembelaan yang direka palsu atau baru ditimbulkan di peringkat pembelaan yang boleh digolongkan sebagai pemikian terkemudian. Ini bermakna hujahan pendakwaan bahawa pembelaan OKT 1 adalah suatu rekaan atau pemikiran terkemudian tidak dapat dipersetujui oleh Mahkamah ini.

Pada hemat Mahkamah apa yang perlu dilakukan pada peringkat pembelaan ialah dengan meneliti keseluruhan keterangan perbicaraan kes ini seperti yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 182A KPJ seperti yang berikut: 182A Procedure at the conclusion of the trial

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the accused guilty and he may be convicted on it.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

Di samping itu berpaut dan bersandarkan kepada panduan yang dinyatakan dalam kes Mat v Public Prosecutor [1963] 1 MLJ 263 di mana YA Hakim Suffian telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: The correct law for Magistrates to apply is as follows. If you accept the explanation given by or on behalf of the accused, you must of course acquit. But this does not entitle you to convict if you do not believe that explanation, for he is still entitled to an acquittal if it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as the onus of proving his guilt lies throughout on the prosecution. If upon the whole evidence you are left in a real state of doubt, the prosecution has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon it. The position may be conveniently stated as follows:–

If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt Convict.

If you accept or believe the accused's explanation Acquit.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation Do not convict but consider the next steps below.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation and that explanation does not raise in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt Convict.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation but nevertheless Acquit. it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt Magistrates would assist the appellate court if they indicate in their grounds that they are aware of the tests laid down in steps (d) and

above.

Penelitian kepada keterangan pembelaan OKT 1 adakah ia telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan sehingga boleh dikatakan pihak Pendakwa Raya gagal membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan munasabah. OKT 1 secara berterusan menyatakan dia tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan dengan kewujudan compartment dalam kenderaan tersebut. Dia tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan dengan dadah di dalam kompartmen tersebut. Dia hanya memandu kenderaan tersebut ke Kelantan setelah mengambil kenderaan itu daripada Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top. Ia adalah keterangan daripada OKT 1. Begitu juga ia dinyatakan dalam laporan polis D106. Adakah berdasarkan kepada keterangan OKT 1 yang tidak disokong oleh keterangan-keterangan lain boleh menyebabkan Mahkamah ini membuat satu dapatan bahawa keterangan OKT 1 ini perlu diterima dan berjaya menimbulkan keraguan munasabah kepada kes Pendakwa Raya. Adalah seperti yang dinyatakan di atas bukan menjadi tanggungjawab pembelaan untuk menunjukkan ketidakbersalahannya dalam kes ini. Ia hanya perlu menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Persoalannya ialah adakah keterangan-keterangan OKT 1 pada peringkat pembelaan telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah. Adakah suatu yang munasabah untuk seorang Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top membenarkan kenderaan yang mengandungi dadah yang beratnya 17,858 gram yang ditimbang seperti yang terdapat di P81 tanpa pemandunya iaitu OKT 1 tidak mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai dadah tersebut adalah suatu yang munasabah.

Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah perlu berhati-hati dalam kes ini kerana perlu dibezakan di antara pemilikan dadah dengan pemilikan kenderaan Toyota Hilux W8812U tersebut. Pemilik berdaftar seperti yang dikemukakan dalam kes adalah Shaiful Bahari bin Mohd Top tetapi semasa dadah itu ditemui berada dalam Toyota Hilux tersebut OKT 1 sedang mengendalikan kenderaan tersebut.

Akhirnya, Mahkamah berpendapat OKT 1 tidak berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes Pendakwa Raya. Pendakwa Raya telah berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan munasabah. OKT 1 disabitkan dengan pertuduhan.

Peguam OKT 1 yang bijaksana telah mengemukakan rayuan agar Mahkamah mempertimbangkan hukuman yang sewajarnya. OKT 1 telah membangkitkan isu-isu peribadi iaitu OKT 1 berumur 32 tahun, mempunyai seorang anak dan isteri. Ini adalah kesalahan pertama OKT 1. Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan keterangan bagaimanakan kesalahan itu dilakukan oleh OKT 1.

Peguam OKT 1 juga menyatakan bahawa kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh OKT 1 tidak menyebabkan kerosakan dan kecederaan kepada individu yang lain. Sebaliknya Timbalan Pendakwa Raya memohon Mahkamah mengenakan hukuman maksimum bagi pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 39B ADB 1952 iaitu hukuman gantung sampai mati. Timbalan Pendakwa Raya juga berhujah bahawa Mahkamah ini perlu mengambil perhatian kepada kepentingan awam dan jumlah kesalahan-kesalahan jenayah yang melibatkan dadah yang kini berleluasa di kalangan masyarakat.

Seksyen 39B ADB 1952 kini memperuntukkan hukuman setelah disabitkan dengan pertuduhan seperti yang berikut: “(1) No person shall, on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, whether or not such other person is in Malaysia-

traffic in a dangerous drug;

offer to traffic in a dangerous drug; or

do or offer to do an act preparatory to or for the purpose of trafficking in a dangerous drug.

Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be punished on conviction with death or imprisonment for life and shall, if he is not sentenced to death, be punished with whipping of not less than twelve strokes.

A prosecution under this section shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Public Prosecutor: Provided that a person may be arrested, or a warrant for his arrest may be issued and executed, and any such person may be remanded in custody notwithstanding that the consent of the Public Prosecutor to the institution of a prosecution for the offence has not been obtained, but the case shall not be further prosecuted until the consent has been obtained.

When a person is brought before a Court under this section before the Public Prosecutor has consented to the prosecution the charge shall be explained to him but he shall not be called upon to plead, and the provisions of the law for the time being in force relating to criminal procedure shall be modified accordingly.”

Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga perlu mengambil kira pemansuhan hukuman mati seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023. Kini Mahkamah mempunyai pilihan sama ada menjatuhkan hukuman mati atau hukuman pemenjaraan. Persoalan yang timbul dalam kes ini apakah pendekatan yang wajar diambil oleh Mahkamah ini dalam menentukan sama ada hukuman mati wajar diberikan atau hukuman pemenjaraan. Salah satu pendekatan yang ada ialah seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Loh Hock Seng & Anor v PP [1980] 2 MLJ 13. YAA Hakim Raja Azlan Shah, Hakim Besar Malaya (ketika itu) menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Sentencing in a criminal case must of course bear relation to the particular circumstances of the offender as well as the particular circumstances of the offence. The legislature has in its wisdom and in the implementation of its plenary powers in this respect enacted the imposition of the alternative penalties of death or imprisonment for life under section 39B of the Ordinance with the option and discretion in this regard to be no doubt judicially and judiciously exercised according to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, and we can see no reason whatsoever why the statutory enactment of the option for punishment by death cannot and should not be made functionally operative and exercised and applied proprio vigore if the circumstances and facts of the case so warrant, justify, require and perhaps even demand.”

Yang Amat Arif Hakim Besar Malaya juga mengingatkan berkenaan dengan hukuman mati yang dijatuhkan oleh hakim-hakim seperti yang berikut: “We would like to take this occasion to reaffirm expressly, unequivocably and unanimously that where the case justifies it, judges should not develop a phobia against inflicting the death penalty. In our view, the prescribing of a maximum penalty in respect of an offence not only marks the limits of the court's discretionary power as to sentence, it also ordinarily prescribes what the penalty should be in the more serious type of cases falling within the relevant class of the offence meriting the maximum punishment prescribed.” Penelitian kepada fakta kes dalam kes tersebut menunjukkan bahawa berat dadah adalah sebanyak 1550.1 gram heroin.

Kini apabila terdapatnya pemansuhan hukuman mati semasa menimbangkan sama ada hukuman mati wajar dijatuhkan atau hukuman pemenjaraan, doktrin langka atau jarang-jarang berlaku (rarest of the rare) boleh digunakan. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Khairul Azizi Abdul Jalil v. PP [2024] CLJU 1447 seperti yang berikut: “[48] As regards sentence, in light of the Abolition of Death Penalty Act (Act 846), it is now no longer mandatory on the Court to impose the death penalty to everyone convicted of murder. The death sentence should only be imposed in the most extreme and exceptional murders which are the 'worst of the worst' or the 'rarest of the rare' and only after determining the question of the accused' s possibility of reform. Counsel for the appellant urged the court to commute the death sentence to a sentence of imprisonment of 30 years as the murder committed by appellant did not fall within the category of 'the worst of the worst' or 'the rarest of the rare'. The learned deputy did not press for the death sentence to be maintained and left it to the court but submitted that any imprisonment imposed should not be less than 35 years.”

Namun demikian terdapat pandangan Mahkamah Rayuan yang menyatakan bahawa tidak berkeinginan untuk menerima pakai doktrin langka atau jarang-jarang berlaku (rarest of the rare). Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Robin Radjaini Saih v PP [2024] 9 CLJ

Asas kepada penolakan pemakaian prinsip tersebut telah dinyatakan yang antara lain adalah disebabkan sekiranya doktrin itu digunakan ia akan menyekat budi bicara kehakiman dalam menjatuhkan hukuman. Ini dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[31] With respect, we are not in favour of adopting the "rarest of the rare" doctrine in Malaysia. Our reasons are as follows:

…

(ii) our Legislature did not impose any restriction or condition to curtail the wide judicial discretion (s. 302 of the PC ). In other words, the wide judicial discretion (s. 302 of the PC ) is unfettered. If we have applied the "rarest of the rare" doctrine, this will be tantamount to an unlawful curtailment of the wide judicial discretion (s. 302 of the PC );

(iii) …”

Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa doktrin langka atau jarang-jarang berlaku (rarest of the rare) telah diperkenalkan di India melalui penghakiman dalam kes Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR [1980] SC 898. Dalam kes tersebut telah timbul isu berkenaan dengan sama ada hukuman mati di India adalah berperlembagaan atau sebaliknya. Mahkamah Agong di India dalam kes tersebut telah melalui keputusan majoriti menjelaskan berkenaan dengan pendekatan yang perlu diambil dalam menentukan sama ada sesuatu hukuman mati wajar dikenakan atau hukuman pemenjaraan boleh dikenakan. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 207 seperti yang berikut: “207. There are numerous other circumstances justifying the passing of the lighter sentence; as there are countervailing circumstances of aggravation. "We cannot obviously feed into a judicial computer all such situations since they are astrological imponderables in an imperfect and undulating society." Nonetheless, it cannot be over-emphasised that the scope and concept of mitigating factors in the area of death penalty must receive a liberal and expansive construction by the courts in accord with the sentencing policy writ large in Section 354(3). Judges should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging of murderers has never been too good for them. Facts and figures albeit incomplete, furnished by the Union of India, show that in the past Courts have inflicted the extreme penalty with extreme infrequency - a fact which attests to the caution and compassion which they have always brought to bear on the exercise of their sentencing discretion in so grave a matter. It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad illustrative guidelines indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along the highroad of legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3), viz., that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.”

Perincian berkenaan dengan ujian yang perlu dilakukan oleh Mahkamah semasa menimbangkan untuk menjatuhkan hukuman mati atau pemenjaraan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra) telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Agong di India dalam kes Machhi Singh and others vs State of Punjab [1984] 1 MLJ (Crl) 95 seperti yang berikut: “31. Having dealt with the appeals on merits from the standpoint of proof of guilt and validity or otherwise of the order of conviction, we now come face to face with the problem indicated when the curtain was lifted, namely, the application of the rarest of rare cases rule to the facts of individual cases in the context of the relevant guidelines. Some reflections on the question of death penalty may appropriately be made before we tackle the said question in the perspective of the present group of appeals.

The reasons why the community as a whole does not endorse the humanistic approach reflected in “death sentence in no case” doctrine are not far to seek. In the first place, the very humanistic edifice is constructed on the foundation of “reverence for life” principle. When a member of the community violates this very principle by killing another member, the society may not feel itself bound by the shackles of this doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realised that every member of the community is able to live with safety without his or her own life being endangered because of the protective arm of the community and on account of the rule of law enforced by it. The very existence of the rule of law and the fear of being brought to book operates as a deterrent to those who have no scruples in killing others if it suits their ends. Every member of the commuuity owes a debt to the community for this protection. When ingratitude is shown instead of gratitude by ‘killing’ a member of the community which protects the murderer himself from being killed, or when the community feels that for the sake of self preservation the killer has to be killed, the community may well withdraw the protection by sanctioning the death penalty. But the community will not do so in every case. It may do so (in rarest of rare cases) when its collective conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power cent re to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The community may entertain such a sentiment when the crime is viewed from the platform of the motive for, or the manner of commission of the crime, or the anti-social or abhorrent nature of the crime, such as for instance: I Manner of Commission of Murder When the murder is committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting, or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community. For instance,

When the house of the victim is set aflame with the end in view to roast him a live in the house.

(ii) When the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of torture or cruelty in order to bring about his or her death.

(iii) When the body of the victim is cut into pieces or his body is dismembered in a fiendish manner. II Motive for commission of murder When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces total depravity and meanness. For instance when: (a) a hired assassin commits murder for the sake of money or reward; (b) a coldblooded murder is committed with a deliberate design in order to inherit property or to gain control over property of a ward or a person under the control of the murderer or vis-a-sis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or in a position of trust; ( c) a murder is committed in the course for betrayal of the motherland. III Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime.

When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or minority community etc., is committed not for personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath. For instance when such a crime is committed in order to terrorize such persons and frighten them into fleeing from a place or in order to deprive them of, or make them surrender, lands or benefits conferred on them with a view to reverse past in justices and in order to restore the social balance.

In cases of ‘bride burning’ and what are known as ‘dowry-deaths’ or when murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of in fatuation. IV Magnitude of crime When the crime is enormous in propertion. For instance when multiple murders say of all or almost all the members of a family or a large number of persons of a particular caste, community, or locality, are committed. V Personality of victim of murder When the victim of murder is: (a) an innocent child who could not have or has not provided even an excuse, much less a provocation, for murder; (b) a helpless: woman or a person rendered helpless by old age or infirmity; ( c) when the victim is a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a position of domination or trust; ( d) when the victim is a public figure generally loved and respected by the community for the services rendered try him and the murder is committed for political or similar reasons other then personal reasons.

In this background the guidelines indicated in Bachan Singh's easel, will have to be culled but and applied to the facts of each individual case where the question of imposing of death sentence arises. The following propositions emerge from Bachan Singh's case

The extreme penalty of death need, not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability:

(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the ‘offender’ also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the ‘crime’:

(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances;

(iv) A balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances has to be accorded fullweightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.”

Seterusnya Mahkamah Agong di India menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “34. In order to apply these guidelines inter alia the following questions may be asked and answered:

Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls or a death sentence?

Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but to purpose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?

If upon taking an overall global view of all the circumstances in the light of the aforesaid proposition and taking into account are answers to the questions posed herein above, the circumstances of the case are such that death sentence is warranted, the Court would proceed to do so.”

Penelitian kepada kes-kes berkaitan dengan doktrin langka atau jarang-jarang berlaku (rarest of the rare) adalah jelas menunjukkan bahawa pertimbangan yang diperlu diberikan oleh Mahkamah dalam memutuskan sama ada hukuman mati atau pemenjaraan adalah bergantung kepada keadaan dan fakta sesuatu kes. Ia juga tidak membelakangkan kepentingan awam. Kes-kes tersebut adalah berkaitan dengan kesalahan membunuh. Mahkamah juga perlu meneliti berkenaan dengan bagaimana jenayah itu dilakukan dan kesannya kepada masyarakat. Malahan yang penting dalam perkara ini ialah penekanan kepada hukuman pemenjaraan adalah merupakan perkara yang perlu diutamakan. Sementara hukuman mati adalah satu pengecualian.

Kes-kes yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di India berkaitan dengan prinsip tersebut sebenarnya pada hemat Mahkamah tidak mempunyai banyak perbezaan dengan pendekatan yang dinyatakan dalam kes Loh Hock Seng & Anor (supra) ia masih bergantung kepada keadaan sesuatu kes. Ini menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan secara terperinci keadaan bagaimana kesalahan itu dilakukan dan kesan kesalahan tersebut kepada kepentingan awam.

Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah tidak wajar untuk menjadikan peruntukan hukuman pemenjaraan sebagai jalan keluar untuk tidak menjatuhkan hukuman mati sekiranya kesalahan yang dilakukan tersebut adalah wajar untuk dihukum dengan hukuman mati. Pada hemat Mahkamah, ini menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah perlu membuat penelitian yang mendalam sebelum memutuskan sama ada menjatuhkan hukuman mati ataupun hukuman pemenjaraan. Ini bagi membolehkan matlamat undang-undang jenayah dan hukumannya dapat terlaksana. Pada masa yang sama ia juga dapat mencerminkan keseriusan kesalahan yang dilakukan.

Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah ini juga perlu meneliti dan terikat dengan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan berkenaan dengan dengan perkara ini. Misalnya, dalam kes Nia Wai Kong lwn. PP [2025] CLJU 538 Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes tersebut telah mengesahkan sabitan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) ADB 1952 tetapi menggantikan hukuman mati dengan pemenjaraan selama 30 tahun dari tarikh tangkap dan 12 sebatan dan menyatakan asas kepada hukuman tersebut seperti yang berikut: “[83] Bagi hukuman pula, kami telah mengambil pertimbangan faktor kepentingan awam. Kami juga turut memberi perhatian mendalam terhadap segala rayuan mitigasi tertuduh, jumlah dadah yang terlibat, serta lain-lain faktor peringanan yang berkaitan. Dengan ini kami memerintah seperti yang berikut: [84] Rayuan tertuduh terhadap hukuman dibenarkan. [85] Hukuman gantung sampai mati diketepikan dan digantikan dengan hukuman pemenjaraan selama tiga puluh (30) tahun puluh tahun dari tarikh tangkap 8 Mei 2019 dan dua belas (12) kali sebatan.”

Begitu juga dalam kes Ng Mee Yee & Anor v PP [2025] 6 CLJ 343 apabila Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengesahkan sabitan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi namun telah menggantikan hukuman kepada pemenjaraan 30 tahun daripada tarikh tangkap dan 12 sebatan. Ia berasaskan kepada alasan berikut: “[122] After hearing the mitigation submissions made by counsel for both the appellants who requested for the death sentence ordered against them to be substituted with life imprisonment, and considering the submission of learned DPP who did not object to the substitution as prayed for, we arrived at the decision that in light of the coming into force of the Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023, which was subsequent to the order made by the High Court on both the conviction and sentence of the appellants, and taking into account the principles of sentencing and the applicable case law authorities, a commensurate, fair and reasonable sentence is to substitute the death sentence against the two appellants with life imprisonment, specifically for the period of 30 years from the date of their arrests (as not objected to by learned DPP), and additionally, for the second appellant (but not the first appellant, being a female) to be whipped with the minimum 12 strokes.”

Berdasarkan kepada prinsip-prinsip di atas dan penelitian kepada keterangan dalam kes ini menunjukkan bahawa semasa kesalahan itu dilakukan OKT 1 berseorangan. Dadah-dadah yang ditemui adalah sebanyak 3,381 gram methamphetamine. Keterangan saksi-saksi juga tidak menunjukkan sebarang tindakan ganas daripada OKT 1 semasa tangkapan dilakukan. Apa yang ada ialah keterangan menunjukkan tangkapan dilakukan di atas jalan raya. Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang ada dan keadaan kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat hukuman mati tidak sesuai dalam kes ini. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat hukuman yang lebih sesuai ialah pemenjaraan selama 30 tahun penjara dari tarikh tangkap dan 12 kali sebatan. Bertarikh: 11 hb. September 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR Bagi Pihak Pendakwaan - TPR Intan Nor Hilwani binti Mat Rifin Unit Pendakwaan Pejabat Penasihat Undang-undang Negeri Pahang Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur Peguam Bagi Pihak OKT 1 - Jayarubbiny Jayaraj dan Puteri Batrisya Abdul Latif Tetuan Jay & Jay Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan Peguam Bagi Pihak OKT 2 dan OKT 3 - Dato’ N Sivananthan dan Wan Muhd Yusof Wan Hussin Tetuan Sivananthan Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan