[Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] v PANG SIAT FUI (CB-45B-1-03/2021)

Orang Kena Tuduh (OKT) dikemukakan dengan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan seperti yang berikut: “Bahawa kamu pada 06.03.2020 jam lebih kurang 0800hrs bertempat di hadapan rumah beralamat No. T 54, Kampung Cina Sempalit di dalam Daerah Raub, di dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur telah melakukan bunuh dengan menyebabkan kematian ke atas Yap Chin Nam, No. KPT: 670927-06-5495, dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan.”

Pendakwa Raya telah mengemukakan 15 orang saksi sebelum menutup kes pendakwaan. SP1 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa pada 06.03.2020 lebih kurang jam 8.00 pagi seorang lelaki cina telah masuk ke Pejabat Kaunter Pertanyaan Balai Polis Raub dan duduk di kerusi. Lelaki cina itu menyatakan bahawa “Saya sudah tikam orang kat Kampung Cina Sempalit”. SP1 menyatakan lelaki itu kelihatan gelisah, gelabah dan mencurigakan. Lelaki cina itu menurut SP1 telah memberitahunya bahawa dia telah menikam seorang lelaki cina dengan menggunakan sebilah pisau. Lelaki cina itu telah dicamkan di Mahkamah sebagai OKT oleh SP1. Kejadian tersebut telah dirakamkan oleh SP1 melalui laporan polis Raub Rpt. 911/20 (P4).

Pendakwa Raya juga telah mengemukakan Dr. Sri Marni Zainal Abidin, Pakar Patalogi Forensik (SP12) yang telah menyediakan laporan post mortem yang telah dikemukakan sebagai P22. Dalam laporan tersebut dinyatakan bahawa sebab kematian adalah “stab wound of the torso”. Dalam keterangannya, SP12 menyatakan bahawa luka tikaman pada badan simati adalah konsisten dengan luka yang disebabkan oleh objek tajam.

Seterusnya terdapat saksi awam yang dikatakan melihat kejadian tersebut iaitu SP6 dan SP7 yang mana keterangan mereka mengesahkan ada melihat pisau telah dicampak oleh OKT sejurus selepas kejadian itu berlaku. Mahkamah juga mendapati terdapat keterangan-keterangan berkenaan dengan laporan DNA yang dikemukakan sebagai P26.

Apa yang lebih menarik dalam kes ini ialah pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan satu laporan psikatri (P21) daripada Dr. Johari bin Khamis, Pakar Perunding Psikiatri Forensik Hospital Permai Johor Bahru (SP11). Laporan tersebut telah dibuat ekoran daripada perintah Mahkamah Majistret Raub di bawah seksyen 24(5) Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (KPJ). Dalam laporan tersebut telah dibuat rumusan bahawa seperti yang berikut: “21. Hasil daripada pemerhatian rapi 24 jam, meneliti sejarah penama dan pemeriksaan mental berkala yang dilakukan ke atas beliau sepanjang berada di hospital ini, saya berpendapat bahawa: a) Penama didapati menghidapi penyakit Skizofrenia (Schizophrenia). Ianya merupakan sejenis penyakit mental yang dicirikan dengan gejala psikosis seperti halusinasi dan delusi serta perubahan tingkah laku serta kemerosotan fungsi psikososial. b) Penama juga mempunyai masalah penyalahgunaan dadah (Polysubstance Use Disorder). Pengambilan dadah terlarang yang berulang dan berterusan bukan sahaja boleh menyebabkan gejala intoksikasi dan kebergantungan tetapi juga menyebabkan kecelaruan mental serta menjejaskan fungsi psikososial. c) Ketika kejadian seperti yang didakwa, penama adalah berada dalam keadaan fikiran yang siuman dan berupaya untuk mengetahui keadaan perbuatan atau apa yang dilakukannya adalah salah atau bersalahan di sisi undang-undang. d) Penama adalah layak untuk dibicarakan dan layak untuk memberi pengakuan di mahkamah bagi tujuan pembelaan diri pada tarikh laporan ini dibuat.”

Pendakwa Raya juga telah mengemukakan saksi-saksi awam, anggota polis dan pegawai polis yang menjalankan siasatan kes ini dan melakukan tangkapan terhadap OKT serta mengendalikan eksibit-eksibit yang berkaitan dengan kes ini.

Isu dalam kes ini adalah:

Adakah Pendakwa Raya telah menunjukkan satu kes prima facie di peringkat pendakwaan terhadap OKT;

Adakah Pendakwa Raya berjaya membuktikan kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan terhadap OKT melampaui keraguan munasabah; dan

Adakah pembelaan di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan berjaya ditimbulkan oleh OKT.

Seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan telah memperihalkan seperti yang berikut: “300 Murder Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder-

if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death;

if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused;

if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury as aforesaid.

A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.

A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death.

A, without any excuse, fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual. Exception 1 - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation, or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos:

that the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person;

that the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant;

that the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation - Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder, is a question of fact.

A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z's child. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.

Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.

A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers.

A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A's deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.

A attempts to pull Z's nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B's rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B's hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder. Exception 2 - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law, and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence, without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. ILLUSTRATION Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A, believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide. Exception 3 - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant, or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant, and without ill will towards the person whose death is caused. Exception 4 - Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation - It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. Exception 5 - Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death, or takes the risk of death with his own consent. ILLUSTRATION A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z's youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death. A has therefore abetted murder.”

Intisari kesalahan bunuh telah dirumuskan dengan jelas oleh Hakim Low Hop Bing di dalam kes PP v Nomezam Apandy Abu Hassan (No. 2) [2008] 7 CLJ 168 seperti yang berikut: “[3] From the above provisions, it is clear that in order to establish a prima facie case of murder, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove:

the death of the deceased;

the deceased's death was caused by injury or injuries inflicted on the deceased;

the accused had caused the injury or injuries which resulted in the deceased's death; and

the act causing the death was committed with the mens rea under s. 300(a), (b), (c) or (d). (see also PP v. Brahim b Rais [1999] 1 LNS 263 per Ian Chin; PP v. Soo Tai Leng [2005] 7 CLJ 218 per Azahar Mohamed JC (now J); and PP v. Norazam bin Ibrahim [2006] 8 CLJ 462; [2006] 3 AMR 524 HC).”

Dalam konteks kes ini elemen-elemen yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan ialah:

Kematian simati;

Kematian simati adalah berpunca dari kecederaan yang dialami oleh simati;

OKT yang menyebabkan kecederan-kecederaan kepada simati sehingga menyebabkan kematian simati; dan

Tindakan yang menyebabkan kematian tersebut telah dilakukan oleh OKT dengan mens rea di bawah seksyen 300 (a), (b), (c) atau (d) Kanun Keseksaan.

Pendekatan yang sama telah dinyatakan juga oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Vincent Marcos v. PP [2026] 1 CLJ 419 seperti yang berikut: “[22] The ingredients that must be established to constitute the offence of murder under s. 302 of the Penal Code as charged are:

that Yohanes anak Vincent had died;

(ii) that he died as a result of the bodily injuries sustained by him;

(iii) that the injuries of the deceased were caused by or the result of the act of the accused/appellant; and

(iv) that in inflicting the injuries upon the deceased, the accused/appellant must be proved to have either:

caused them with the intention of causing death;

caused them with the intention of causing such bodily injuries as the accused/appellant knew to be likely to cause death;

caused them with the intention of causing bodily injuries and such bodily injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

caused them knowing that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and did so without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury. (see Sainal Abidin Mading v. PP [1999] 4 CLJ 215; [1999] 4 MLJ 497; Untung v. PP [2023] CLJU 1168; [2023] 1 LNS 1168; [2023] MLJU 1352; [2023] 4 MLJ 929 at para. [11] to [12]).”

Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa di akhir kes pendakwaan, Pendakwa Raya adalah berkewajipan untuk menunjukkan satu kes prima facie. Ini dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 180 (2) KPJ seperti yang berikut: “180 Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution

When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.

If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence.

For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.”

Ia dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Abdullah bin Atan v Public Prosecutor and other appeals [2020] 6 MLJ 727 seperti yang berikut: “[43] Section 180(4) of the CPC must be read in light of its context and legislative purpose. By so doing, the phrase ‘credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence’ in s 180(4) means that the prosecution may prove each ingredient of the offence either:

by adducing credible direct evidence of that ingredient;

by drawing inferences of fact, ie adducing credible circumstantial evidence, from which the ingredient can be inferred; or

by invoking presumptions of law, ie adducing credible evidence of the relevant basic facts, to invoke a statutory presumption that the ingredient exists. [44] As to what constitutes ‘a prima facie’ case, the judgment of Vincent Ng J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Ong Cheng Heong [1998] 6 MLJ 678; [1998] 4 CLJ 209 is instructive. Although Ong Cheng Heong was decided prior to the amendment in 2006, we respectfully endorse His Lordship’s views, at p 691 (MLJ); p 225 (CLJ): What then constitutes a ‘prima facie case’? ‘Prima facie’ means on the face of it or at first glance. … perhaps the most appropriate definition of ‘a prima facie case’ could be found in the Oxford Companion of Law (p 987), which has it as: ‘A case which is sufficient for an answer. While prima facie evidence is evidence which is sufficient to establish a fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, but is not conclusive’. It would follow that there should be credible evidence on each and every ingredient of the offence. Credible evidence is evidence which has been filtered and which has gone through the process of evaluation. Any evidence which is not safe to be acted upon, should be rejected. (Emphasis added.) At p 691 (MLJ); p 224 (CLJ), His Lordship said: … to me, maximum evaluation simply means evaluation, on a prima facie basis, of each and every essential ingredient of the charge as tested in cross-examination. In other words, maximum evaluation connotes quantitative rather than qualitative evaluation of the evidence; with focus more on the evidential burden in terms of evidence led, rather than the persuasive burden in terms of qualitative degree of proof.” Adakah Pendakwa Raya telah menunjukkan satu kes prima facie di peringkat pendakwaan terhadap OKT?

Bagi menjawab persoalan ini Mahkamah perlu meneliti sama ada terdapat keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Pendakwa Raya bagi menunjukkan elemen-eleman kesalahan seperti yang dinyatakan di atas.

Keterangan menunjukkan bahawa simati adalah seorang yang dikenali dan disahkan sebagai Yap Chin Nam. Ia telah dicamkan oleh Pakar Patalogi Forensik dan saksi-saksi awam yang mengesahkannya semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah melalui gambar-gambar yang ditunjukkan kepada saksi-saksi tersebut. Mahkamah juga mendapati identiti simati dalam kes ini tidak dipertikaikan oleh pembelaan. Ini bermakna elemen pertama pertuduhan dalam kes ini telah berjaya ditunjukkan oleh Pendakwa Raya.

Seterusnya Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa keterangan-keterangan menunjukkan luka tikaman yang dialami oleh simati adalah disebabkan oleh senjata tajam. Ia kemudiannya disahkan sebagai pisau yang telah dikemukakan sebagai P12(E1). Pada masa yang sama terdapat saksi yang dikatakan melihat OKT telah mencampakkan pisau tersebut. Mahkamah juga mendapati terdapat keterangan ibu simati yang menyatakan bahawa sejurus selepas kejadian itu berlaku simati telah pulang ke rumah dan memberitahu bahawa dia telah ditikam oleh seseorang. Mahkamah mendapati pihak pembelaan tidak secara serius mempertikaikan berkenaan dengan OKT adalah individu yang menyebabkan tikaman sehingga menyebabkan kematian simati.

Mahkamah juga berpuas hati bahawa OKT telah menyebabkan tikaman tersebut. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa pada masa yang sama kematian simati adalah akibat daripada kecederaan yang dialami olehnya ekoran daripada tikaman tersebut. Dalam erti kata lain elemen kedua kesalahan tersebut telah dapat ditunjukkan oleh Pendakwa Raya.

Sementara itu berkenaan dengan adakah OKT yang melakukan perbuatan sehingga menyebabkan kematian simati sudah jelas lagi bersuluh seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan 17 di atas. Keterangan tidak menunjukkan penglibatan individu lain yang ditunjukkan melakukan tikaman tersebut kepada simati. Oleh itu Mahkamah juga berpuas hati bahawa Pendakwa Raya telah menunjukkan OKT adalah individu yang menyebabkan kematian simati.

Ini bermakna di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa Pendakwa Raya telah berjaya menunjukkan satu kes prima facie. Oleh itu OKT dipanggil membela diri. Isu (b) dan (c)

OKT telah memberikan keterangan pada 19.11.2025 serta telah diperiksa balas oleh Timbalan Pendakwa Raya dan hasil daripada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan tersebut adalah asas utama yang digunakan oleh pihak pembelaan ialah pembelaan di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan yang dikatakan bahawa OKT semasa melakukan perbuatan tersebut adalah berada dalam keadaan yang tidak siuman. Seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “84 Act of a person of unsound mind Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.”

Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Mohd Rozani bin Yahaya [2025] 1 MLJ 50 telah menggariskan perkara yang perlu diteliti oleh Mahkamah ketika pihak OKT membangkitkan pembelaan kecelaruan fikiran atau tidak siuman dengan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[42] For the accused, to succeed on the defence of legal insanity, the accused must establish, often through psychiatric or psychological evaluations, that he/she was not in control of his/her reasoning during the commission of the offence. This defence is anchored in s 84 of the Penal Code, which outlines the conditions under which an accused can be considered legally insane. [43] The burden of proof for medical and legal insanity also differs. In legal insanity, the onus lies with the accused to prove his/her mental state at the time when the offence was committed pursuant to s 105 of the Evidence Act 1950. This burden though significant is not as onerous as the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt. It is on a balance of probabilities and not merely to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case (see Rajagopal v Public Prosecutor [1977] 1 MLJ 6; [1976] CLJU 122 and Goh Yoke v Public Prosecutor [1970] 1 MLJ 63; [1969] CLJU 48). [44] To establish legal insanity, the accused must present a prima facie case, supported by reasonable materials. This involves presenting evidence of the accused’s conduct, before, during and immediately after the commission of the alleged offence, corroborated with the relevant medical documentation. The purpose is to convince the court that due to the accused’s mental capacity, the accused should be exempt from full criminal responsibility. [45] In support of the above propositions of law, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tiong Ing Soon (L) v Public Prosecutor [2019] 6 MLJ 542 which was affirmed by the Federal Court on 24 September 2019 set out the procedure to be followed in determining legal insanity. [30] From the authorities, firstly, there must be a finding based upon medical evaluation that the accused was suffering from some kind of psychiatric condition that impaired his cognitive faculties at the material time so as to be classified as medically insane. This of course is a matter for a medical expert to determine. But is not conclusive. Secondly, in order to be legally insane, the accused must be determined by reason of that psychiatric condition to have lost his cognitive faculties to a degree such that he is incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he is doing is wrong or contrary to the law. This stage is for the court to determine from the evidence adduced during the trial. The defence of insanity under s 84 of Penal Code is concerned with the accused’s legal responsibility at the time of the alleged offence and not whether he was medically insane at that time (see Pendakwa Raya v Zainal Abidin bin Mat Zaid [1993] 1 CLJ 147; Public Prosecutor v Misbah bin Saat [1997] 3 MLJ 495; [1998] 1 CLJ 759). The burden is on the appellant to prove his insanity as required under s 84 of the Penal Code and the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities (see Goh Yoke v Public Prosecutor [1970] 1 MLJ 63; [1969] 1 LNS 48; Rajagopal v Public Prosecutor [1977] 1 MLJ 6; [1976] 1 LNS 122). (Emphasis added.) See also Mohd Ferdaus bin Suwardi v Public Prosecutor [2022] MLJU 1690; [2022] CLJU 1658 (CA) which was affirmed by the Federal Court on 4 January 2024 in MPRJ No 05(M)-110–05 of 2022(B) (unreported) and John a/k Nyumbei v Public Prosecutor [2007] 7 MLJ 206; [2007] 2 CLJ 509 (CA). [46] Hence, when the defence of insanity is raised, there is a two-stage process before the defence of legal insanity is available to the accused. Firstly, there must be a finding that the accused was medically insane at the time when he committed the alleged offence. This is based on medical evaluation as explained in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment and lies with the medical expert to determine. This is not conclusive to qualify that the accused as being legally insane. To determine whether the accused is legally insane, one must proceed to the second stage, namely, whether the accused, by reason of his psychiatric condition, has lost his cognitive faculties to a degree that he is incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he is doing is wrong or contrary to law. This stage is for the court to determine from the evidence adduced at trial. This is in line with the ingredients which are listed under s 84 of the Penal Code, namely:

(a)firstly, due to unsoundness of mind or mental illness at the time of commission of the act (medical requirement of mental illness); and

(b)secondly, the accused is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or incapable of knowing that his act was wrong, or incapable of knowing that the act is contrary to law (loss of reasoning requirement). [47] Both the medical requirement of mental illness (first stage) and the loss of reasoning requirement (second stage) would constitute legal insanity, which is a complete defence. In other words, legal insanity means, at the time of the commission of the offence, the person should be suffering from mental illness and also have loss of reasoning power, which is clearly depicted in s 84 of the Penal Code. [48] The mere abnormality of the mind or a partial delusion, irresistible impulse or compulsive behaviour of a psychopath does not accord any protection under s 84 of the PC. The term insanity carries different meanings in different contexts and describes varying degrees of mental disorders. It does not mean that every person suffering from mental illness is exempted from criminal responsibility. A person who is odd, irascible, and his brain is not quite right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and affected his emotions or indulges in certain unusual acts, or has fits of insanity at short intervals or that the behaviour is queer are insufficient to invoke the protection under s 84 of the PC. This falls under medical insanity. A court is concerned with legal insanity, and not with medical insanity (see Bapu @ Gajraj Singh v State of Rajasthan 2007 AIR SCW 38086). [49] Section 84 of the PC embodies a fundamental maxim of the criminal jurisprudence, that an act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty intention called mens rea. ‘To constitute an offence, the intent and the act must concur; but in the case of insane persons, no culpability is fastened on them as they have no free will’ (see Bapu @ Gajraj Singh v State of Rajasthan 2007 AIR SCW 38086). [50] Applying the principle of law to the facts of the present appeal, it is pertinent to analyse the relevant facts and evidence tendered before the High Court which was the trial court. The prosecution at the prosecution stage had called SP9, a forensic psychiatrist who served at Hospital Bahagia Tanjung Rambutan, Perak. SP9 testified that the accused was admitted to Hospital Bahagia for observation. Having examined the accused and observed his conduct during the period under his supervision, SP9 found that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and mild intellectual disability and also substance dependence. SP9 found that the accused was of sound mind and aware that what he did was wrong or contrary to law at the time of the commission of the offence. … [55] It is trite that the court is not obliged to accept the opinion of the medical expert and the question of whether a defence of legal insanity has been made out or not is a matter for the court to decide. However, the burden of proof for establishing an insanity defence under s 84 of the Penal Code lies with the accused. [56] In the present appeal, what was before the court was the evidence of SP9 which established the mental state of the accused at the time of the offence, namely, that the accused was of sound mind at the material time. Expert medical evidence is necessary as the question of whether he was medically insane at any particular time is in the realm of forensic science. It is not something that the court can determine without the benefit of expert opinion. This does not yet meet the threshold for legal insanity. There was no evidence in rebuttal led by the defence to challenge the evidence of SP9 and to support his claim of insanity at the time of the offence, thus, the forensic expert’s testimony of SP9 remains unrefuted, ie that the accused was mentally sound at the time of the commission of the offence. [57] Even the fact that the accused was diagnosed with schizophrenia or other mental illness does not automatically meet the threshold of legal insanity for s 84 to be applicable (refer to Bapu @ Gajraj v State of Rajasthan). That will only pass for medical insanity, which is insufficient for the defence of legal insanity to be applicable. The accused must prove that his unsoundness of mind was of a degree to satisfy one of the tests, namely that he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act as being wrong or against the law. We reiterate the position of the law which is trite that the defence of insanity under s 84 of the Penal Code is concerned with the accused’s responsibility at the time of commission of the offence and not with whether the accused was medically insane at that time (see: Pendakwa Raya v Zainal Abidin Mohd Zaid [1993] 1 CLJ 147; Public Prosecutor v Misbah bin Saat [1997] 3 MLJ 495; [1998] 1 CLJ 759). [58] At the prosecution’s stage, what was before the court was only medical evidence which does not qualify for the defence of legal insanity under s 84 of the Penal Code, as legal insanity relates to the question of whether the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law, which are matters to be inferred from the proved facts and circumstances, not from medical opinion. Legal insanity is not for the medical witnesses to decide but a matter for the court to consider and determine together with medical evidence and other relevant evidence. In this regard, the antecedents and subsequent conduct of the accused are also relevant to show the state of mind of the accused at the time of committing the offence. To earn an acquittal, it is for the defence to give evidence on the facts to show that he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law until the end of the trial after the defence had given evidence and close his case. As the onus is upon the defence to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities, it is purely a question of fact which essentially rely upon oral evidence, the credibility of which is for the trial judge to determine at the end of the defence case. … [66] Firstly, to support the finding of insanity that qualifies as a defence under s 84 of the Penal Code by the two courts below based on the opinion of SP3, a police officer, while rejecting the medical evidence of SP9, Dr Yeoh Chia Minn, a forensic consultant in psychiatry in Hospital Bahagia, Ulu Kinta, Perak is certainly flawed. [67] Secondly, after having found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case as charged, it is incumbent for the learned trial judge to call for the accused to enter his defence. It is premature for the learned trial to acquit the accused at the end of the prosecution’s case based solely on medical evidence, as that is not a complete defence in law as envisaged under ss 84 or 85(2)(b) of the Penal Code. The learned trial judge should have continued with the trial and heard the defence’s version. It is certainly premature for the learned trial judge at the end of the prosecution’s case to determine whether or not the accused was of unsound mind when he committed the offence as the onus of proving the defence on a balance of probabilities was on the accused at the defence stage of the trial. Having found that the offence of murder had been established by the prosecution, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to direct the accused to state his defence. By failing to do so, the learned trial judge had fallen into a serious error of law, which was repeated by the Court of Appeal, which warranted appellate intervention.”

Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa pembelaan akal tidak waras telah berpunca daripada prinsip Daniel M'Naghten's Case [1843] 8 ER 718. Adalah wajar Mahkamah ini menelusuri prinsip dalam kes M’Naghten’s (supra) ini dan pemakaiannya. Ia bermula dengan ujian yang digariskan oleh Tindal CJ dalam kes tersebut seperti yang berikut: “ The first question proposed by your Lordships is this: "What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or more particular subjects or persons: as, for instance, where at the time of the commission of the alleged crime the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but. did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some supposed public benefit?" In answer to which question, assuming that your Lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labour under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion that, notwithstanding the party accused did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such crime that he was acting contrary to law; by which expression we understand your Lordships to mean the law of the land. Your Lordships are pleased to inquire of us, secondly, "What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, where a person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence? And, thirdly, "In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when [210] the act was committed?" And as these two questions appear to us to be more conveniently answered together, we have to submit our opinion to be that the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such, a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong: which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with, the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in, respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction; whereas the law is administered upon the principle that every one must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course therefore [211] has been to leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong: and this course we think is correct, accompanied with such observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require. The fourth question which your Lordships have proposed to us is this:—"If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts, commits an, offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused?" To which question the answer must of course depend on the nature of the delusion: but, making the same assumption as we did before, namely, that he labours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if under the influence of his delusion he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that"the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.” Ia turut juga diperjelaskan oleh Mahkamah dalam kes R v Kemp [1956] 3 All ER 249 di halaman 252 para g.

Pemakaian Peraturan M’Naghten ini dapat dilihat dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes PP v. Muhamad Suhaimi Abdul Aziz [2004] 1 CLJ 378 di mana dalam kes tersebut salah satu keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi pakar psikiatri yang dikemukakan setelah menjalankan pemeriksaan kepada OKT adalah seperti yang berikut: “Daripada situ timbulnya delusion di mana beliau percaya bahawa arwah isterinya telah berlaku curang. Suara-suara ghaib adalah apa yang Mohd. Suhaimi beritahu kepada saya. Dan juga dari temubual saya dengan keluarga Encik Suhaimi.”

Malahan semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes PP v Muhamad Suhaimi bin Abdul Aziz [2002] 5 MLJ 233 keterangan pakar psikiatri daripada Hospital Bahagia Ulu Kinta telah diperturunkan secara terperinci oleh hakim bicara kes tersebut seperti yang berikut: “As she said in her evidence: Pemeriksaan yang telah saya lakukan ke atas En Muhd Suhaimi ialah pemeriksaan mentalnya. Pemeriksaan mental merangkumi (includes) temubual-temubual yang kerap, pemeriksaan makmal dan juga dari pemerhatian segala perbuatan dan tingkahlaku beliau semasa bersama kami. Untuk melengkapkan pemeriksaan saya, keluarga Muhd Suhaimi telah ditemubual, keluarga Faizah telah ditemubual dan kami juga telah temubual kawan-kawan sekerja mereka. 'Mereka' maksud Muhd Suhaimi dan Faizah. Menjadi kebiasaan apabila saya perlu membuat sesuatu laporan mengenai kes-kes yang berat seumpama ini, sesi-sesi perbincangan, in other words, clinical group discussions akan diadakan bersama pengarah hospital saya sendiri dan pakar-pakar psychiatry yang lain untuk second opinion. Hasil daripada pemeriksaan, diagnosa yang saya telah berikan ialah Muhd Suhaimi ada menghidap sejenis penyakit psikotik yang dinamakan delusional disorder. Delusional disorder ialah sejenis penyakit dan psikotik. It is of the jealous type. Delusional disorder itu ada kurang-kurang empat kategori iaitu persecutory, grandiose, erotomanic type and jealous type and mixed type. Kes ini diberi diagnosa delusional disorder jealous type. Kesimpulan yang telah saya buat selepas pemeriksaan yang rapi dan intensive, saya berpendapat bahawa semasa kejadian, beliau di dalam keadaan yang tidak waras. Di masa kejadian, beliau di dalam keadaan yang tidak waras dan tidak tahu bahawa perbuatan beliau itu adalah salah dari segi undang-undang. In her cross examination she said: Encik Suhaimi telah ditemubual berkali-kali. Pada hari-hari awal kemasukan beliau ke hospital kami perbualan kami agak susah. Hasil dari temubual, Muhd Suhaimi boleh menceritakan segala apa yang telah berlaku. Ini termasuk perbuatan beliau menikam isterinya. Antara symptoms yang menandakan adanya penyakit mental/psikotik yang saya telah perolehi ialah suara-suara ghaib (auditory hallucinations), visual hallucinations. Daripada situ timbulnya delusion di mana beliau percaya bahawa arwah isterinya telah berlaku curang. Suara-suara ghaib adalah apa yang Muhd Suhaimi beritahu kepada saya. Dan juga dari temubual saya dengan keluarga En Suhaimi. In her re-examination, she said that the accused was under her observation from 6 February 2001 to 17 April 2001. I considered it necessary to subject DW2 to some examination in order to determine whether to accept her evidence. The questions that I asked and the answers that DW2 gave run as follows: court: Is it possible to ascertain a person's mental condition for a period about 1½ years prior to the examination? a: I thank the court for recognizing our difficulty. We, the psychiatrists, get as much information as we can from as many sources as possible and that includes interviewing both sides of the family, interviewing their colleagues, getting detailed information from the police. We also obtained the autopsy report from the pathologist together with repeated questions of En Suhaimi to see the consistency of his information with the rest of the information we get from other sources. The group discussions that we had with the other psychiatrists include all the psychiatrists interviewing En Suhaimi themselves at great length. That is the best we could do to arrive at our conclusion. court: Essentially your finding is based on your interviews? a: It is the interview plus the intensive observation for three months. For observation we look at his behaviour, his sleep pattern and his emotions. court: Is it possible for you to distinguish a malingerer from a genuine one? a: It is quite easy for a psychiatrist to identify a malingerer. In this case, I am absolutely positive that En Muhd Suhaimi was not malingering. court: Can you explain why the accused explained the events of 25 September 1999 to you when in court today he said he does not know. a: There is something special about therapist-patient relationship. Therefore, as a summary of all my interviews, I was able to get the necessary information. One needs psychiatric skills in asking such questions.”

Berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi pakar tersebut dan ketiadaan keterangan sanggahan (rebuttal evidence) oleh pihak pendakwaan maka Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes tersebut telah berpuas hati bahawa OKT telah berjaya pada tahap perimbangan kebarangkalikan membuktikan pembelaan akal tidak waras di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan. Dapatan tersebut telah disahkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes PP v. Muhamad Suhaimi Abdul Aziz [2005] 2 CLJ 826.

Penelitian kepada perkembangan undang-undang berkaitan pembelaan akal tidak waras adalah didapati bahawa fakta bahawa Tertuduh mendengar bisikan-bisikan daripada suara-suara ghaib sehingga menyebabkan Tertuduh melakukan suatu tindakan jenayah telah dinyatakan dalam kes R. v. Kopsch [1925] 19 Cr. App. Rep. 50 di mana Mahkamah di United Kingdom menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “In the present case the judge at the trial fully and clearly explained the law to the jury, but it is said that misdirected the jury, as he omitted to direct them that “a person charged criminally with an offence is irresponsible for his act when it is commited under an impulse which the prisoner is by mental disease in substance deprived of any power to resist.” In other words, the complaint against the judge is that he did not tell the jury that something was the law which was not the law. The argument of counsel for difference began with the proposition that the law was as he represented, but, as it proceeded, drifted into the different position that the law ought to become, or ought to have become, what he represented. It is the fantastic theory of uncontrollable impulse which, if it were to become part of our criminal law, would be merely subversive. It is not yet part of the criminal law, and it is to be hoped that the time is far distant when it will be made so.”

Apa yang jelas daripada prinsip dalam Peraturan M’Naghten ialah pembelaan berdasarkan kepada akal yang tidak waras perlu dibuktikan secara jelas bahawa semasa melakukan perbuatan tersebut Tertuduh telah dirundung dengan kerosakan aqli (defect of reason) yang berpunca daripada penyakit akal sehingga menyebabkan tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan hakikat dan kesan tindakan yang telah dilakukannya atau dia tidak tahu mengenainya dan juga dia tidak tahu bahawa apa yang dilakukan itu adalah salah.

Pemakaian Peraturan M’Naghten ini telah diperjelaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di United Kingdom dalam kes R v Keal [2022] 4 WLR 41 seperti yang berikut: “ …….. In order to establish the defence of insanity within the M’Naghten Rules on the ground of not knowing the act was “wrong”, the defendant must establish both that (a) he did not know that his act was unlawful (ie contrary to law) and (b) he did not know that his act was “morally” wrong (also expressed as wrong “by the standards of ordinary people”). In our judgment, “wrong” means both against the law and wrong by the standards of ordinary reasonable people. Strictly a jury must be satisfied that the defendant did not know that what he was doing was against the law nor wrong by the standards of reasonable ordinary people. In practice how the jury is directed on this issue will depend on the facts and issues in the particular case.”

Mahkamah Rayuan di United Kingdom juga dalam kes tersebut membincangkan secara menarik sama ada prinsip dalam Peraturan M’Nagthen ini termasuk elemen ketiadaan pilihan dan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “43 This is the question posed in Mr Campbell-Tiech QC’s narrow approach. Whilst, in accordance with the answer to the fourth question in the Rules, it is necessary to assess the defendant by reference to the facts as perceived through the delusion, in our judgment, that does not obviate the need to consider the primary question of knowledge of “wrongdoing” (under the answer to the second and third questions). 44 First, we do not accept that, in principle, the concept of knowledge (or being conscious) of wrongdoing necessarily imports “choice” (or “agency” in Mr Campbell-Tiech QC’s terms). Nor do we accept that, unless the M’Naghten Rules comprise an element of “choice”, the availability of the defence will depend upon the nature of the delusion. 45 Secondly, the principle advanced by Mr Campbell-Tiech QC is contrary to established authority. In R v Kopsch (1927) 19 Cr App Rep 50 there was evidence that the defendant, when he murdered the victim, was acting under the “direction of his sub-conscious mind”. He contended that the judge should have directed the jury that a person who commits an act under an impulse which, by mental disease, he cannot control, is not criminally responsible at all. Lord Hewart LCJ rejected the contention that, under the M’Naghten Rules, the judge misdirected the jury by failing to direct them that “a person charged criminally with an offence is irresponsible for his act when it is committed under an impulse which the prisoner is by mental disease in substance deprived of the power to resist”. Such a proposition neither represented the law as it, nor as it ought to be. Lord Hewart described it as “the fantastic theory of uncontrollable impulse”. 46 Thirdly, the Law Commission in the 2013 Discussion Paper recognised that the defence of insanity as it presently stands does not include an element reflecting lack of capacity to control one’s action, ie a defence of irresistible impulse. The Commission recommended the inclusion of such an element in its proposed reform of the existing law, noting that previous proposals for such reform in 1924 and in 1953 had not been adopted (see para 4.42 and fn 38 and para 4.43). 47 Finally, the direction proposed by Mr Campbell-Tiech QC (set out in para 27 above) is, as a matter of language, confused and confusing. In his modified definition of “wrong”, sub-paragraph (i), the word is defined by reference to knowledge of wrongdoing; whilst in sub-paragraph (ii) it is defined by reference to “choice” (positively to do the act). The fact that the proposed direction is difficult to understand is indicative of the underlying conceptual difficulty in the defendant’s case of fitting the element of “choice” into the concept of “wrongdoing” and knowledge of wrongdoing. 48 For these reasons, we conclude that under the M’Naghten Rules, the defence of insanity is not available to a defendant who, although he knew what he was doing was wrong, he believed that he had no choice but to commit the act in question.”

Namun demikian bagi konteks seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan, Mahkamah perlu meneliti kembali pemakaianya yang telah diterangkan oleh Mahkamah di negara ini. Ini telah dirumuskan dengan jelas oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes John Nyumbei v. PP [2007] 2 CLJ 509 seperti yang berikut: “12. Thus, under s. 84 Penal Code, criminality has to be determined according to that legal test and not merely by the mental state of an accused person according to the medical test.

There is a distinction between the notion of a legal insanity and medical insanity. Not every form of insanity exempts a person from criminal responsibility. Only legal insanity provides that exemption under s. 84 Penal Code. The specie of insanity addressed by s. 84 is the one that impairs the cognitive faculties of a person. Its nature and extent must be that to make the offender incapable of knowing the nature of his act, or that he is doing is wrong or contrary to law. The criminality of an act therefore must be determined by this test laid down in s. 84 as distinguished from the medical test (see Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, 25 edn. p. 280). As was stated recently by this court through the judgment of Ariffin Zakaria JCA (as he then was) in PP v. Muhammad Suhaimi Abdul Aziz [2004] 1 CLJ 378: It is settled law that the defence of insanity under s. 84 is concerned with the accused's legal responsibility at the time of the alleged offence and not with whether he was medically insane at that time. See Pendakwa Raya v. Zainal Abidin bin Mat Zaid [1993] 1 CLJ 147; PP v. Misbah bin Saat [1998] 1 CLJ 759; [1997] 3 MLJ 495.

When the defence of insanity is raised the court thus needs to consider two matters, namely:

whether the accused person has successfully established, as a preliminary issue, that at the time of committing the act he was of unsound mind, and

(ii) if he was of unsound mind, whether he has proven that his unsoundness of mind was of a degree to satisfy one of the tests earlier mentioned ie, that the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of his act as being wrong or against the law. (see Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, 5th edn., p. 289 et seq).

It is also settled law that the burden of proof rests on the person who raises the defence of insanity (seeJuraimi bin Hussein v. PP [1998] 2 CLJ 383 also Baharom v. PP [1960] 1 LNS 9; [1960] 26 MLJ 249). And it is only the accused person who has this right to raise a defence of insanity. It is not open to the court or the prosecution to raise it (see PP v. Misbah bin Saat, supra).

The standard of proof upon the accused raising the defence of insanity is on a balance of probabilities, as in a civil case (Rajagopal v. PP [1976] 1 LNS 122; [1977] 1 MLJ 6, Goh Yoke v. PP [1969] 1 LNS 48; [1970] 1 MLJ 63). So, if the appellant here is able to show, either from the prosecution or other evidence that he committed the crime but was at that time insane, he cannot be culpable by virtue of s. 84 Penal Code.”

Apa yang jelas daripada penelitian pemakaian prinsip Peraturan M'Naghten's tersebut dan seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan ia adalah merupakan pengecualian umum di bawah Kanun Keseksaan. Beban membuktikan pengecualian tersebut adalah terletak kepada pihak pembelaan. Ini selari dengan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 105 Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: “105 Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the general exceptions in the Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the court shall presume the absence of those circumstances.

A accused of murder alleges that by reason of unsoundness of mind he did not know the nature of the act. The burden of proof is on A.

A accused of murder alleges that by grave and sudden provocation he was deprived of the power of self control. The burden of proof is on A.

Section 325 of the Penal Code provides that whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt shall be subject to certain punishments. A is charged with voluntarily causing grievous hurt under section 325. The burden of proving the circumstances, bringing the case under section 335, lies on A.”

Oleh yang demikian sebelum Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa terdapatnya pengecualian di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan, Mahkamah perlu meneliti keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan pihak pembelaan. Mahkamah tidak boleh melepas dan membebaskan OKT dengan bersandarkan kepada seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan tanpa terlebih dahulu mendengar pembelaan OKT. Inilah yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Mohd Rozani bin Yahaya (supra) seperti yang berikut: “[58] At the prosecution’s stage, what was before the court was only medical evidence which does not qualify for the defence of legal insanity under s 84 of the Penal Code, as legal insanity relates to the question of whether the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law, which are matters to be inferred from the proved facts and circumstances, not from medical opinion. Legal insanity is not for the medical witnesses to decide but a matter for the court to consider and determine together with medical evidence and other relevant evidence. In this regard, the antecedents and subsequent conduct of the accused are also relevant to show the state of mind of the accused at the time of committing the offence. To earn an acquittal, it is for the defence to give evidence on the facts to show that he was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law until the end of the trial after the defence had given evidence and close his case. As the onus is upon the defence to satisfy the court on a balance of probabilities, it is purely a question of fact which essentially rely upon oral evidence, the credibility of which is for the trial judge to determine at the end of the defence case.”

Pada masa yang sama adalah wajar juga Mahkamah ini membezakan di antara seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan dengan peruntukan yang terdapat di bawah seksyen 342 KPJ yang menjadi asas kepada laporan psikiatri (P21) yang disediakan oleh Dr. Johari bin Khamis. Ini adalah disebabkan tujuan penyediaan laporan di bawah seksyen 342 (3) KPJ telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Hamzah Osman v. PP [2017] 7 CLJ 273 seperti yang berikut: “[8] It must be emphasised, that ss. 342 & 343 of the CPC is concerned with the mental state of mind of the appellant at the time of the plea. These aforesaid sections afford protection to an accused who is suspected of being of unsound mind and would be incapable of understanding the nature of the charges against him and the meaning and import of evidence adduced against him. The "raison d'etre" of these sections is that the mental state of the accused renders him in capable of making his defence thereby reducing his presence at the proceedings to a nullity. These sections do not apply to a situation where the accused is going to rely on a plea of insanity as a defence at the time of the commission of the offence. In our instant case a plea of insanity was never raised by the appellant. To encapsulate, we are dealing with the concept of fitness to plead, or fitness to stand trial, fitness to be tried and fitness to make defence which is the phraseology in ss. 342 and/or 343 of CPC, but which terms are used interchangeably. (See Muthurama Kesavarajah v. The Queen [1994] 4 CLJ 464; [1994] 181 CLR at p. 232 NB p. 234). [10] The Court of Appeal in its grounds of judgment dealt with the issue at paras. 27-29 of their grounds appearing at pp. 30, 34 and 40 of the same. The essence of the approach of the Court of Appeal was as the trial had proceeded in earnest, the issue of fitness to plead had been overtaken by circumstances and at any rate no prejudice had befallen the appellant. This was echoed by the respondents in their submissions before this court. We would hold that the statutory injunctions in s. 342(1) & 343 of the CPC are sacrosanct to the fundamental right of the appellant in our Criminal Justice System to avail himself of the right to ensure that he is in law fit to plead and understand the consequence of proceedings against the appellant. These are mandatory provisions and non-compliance with the same would in our view render a trial a nullity as in our instant case and under those circumstances the Court of Appeal misdirected itself in considering prejudice in this instant appeal where there had be non-compliance of the said section.”

Apa yang jelas ialah bagi menentukan sama ada pembelaan di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan ini dapat ditunjukkan dalam kes ini ialah dengan Mahkamah meneliti keterangan semasa kejadian itu berlaku, keadaan sejurus selepas kejadian itu berlaku, dan keadaan sekeliling semasa kejadian itu berlaku. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah ialah bagi Mahkamah menentukan keadaan fikiran OKT semasa kejadian itu berlaku. Ia juga dalam usaha untuk menentukan sama ada terdapatnya ketidakwarasan perundangan yang telah berjaya ditunjukkan oleh OKT bagi membolehkan pemakaian seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan.

Pada hemat Mahkamah semasa menggunakan seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan, ia perlu dilakukan dengan penuh teliti dan tanggungjawab dan memastikan bahawa ia benar-benar mematuhi kehendak seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan berdasarkan kepada duluan-duluan kehakiman dan prinsip-prinsip yang berkaitan dengannya. Ini adalah bagi mengelakkan mana-mana pihak menggunakan seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan semata-mata bagi mengelakkan tanggungjawab perundangan terhadap tindakan yang dilakukan semasa kejadian tersebut. Apa yang penting ialah Mahkamah perlu memastikan kedudukan keadaan fikiran OKT semasa kejadian itu. Ia bukannya bergantung kepada semata-mata kepada tingkah laku OKT semasa berada dalam prosiding di Mahkamah bagi menggunakan seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan. Sekiranya semasa prosiding didapati bahawa OKT disyaki sebagai seorang yang tidak waras, maka Mahkamah perlu menggunakan Bab XXXII iaitu seksyen 342 hingga 352 KPJ bagi mengendalikan keadaan sedemikian. Ia harus dibezakan dengan pengecualian di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan. Kekhilafan dalam memahami perbezaan tersebut boleh menjerumuskan kepada penelitian pengecualian di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan menjadi tidak tepat dan tidak berlandaskan undang-undang.

Penelitian keterangan dalam kes ini mendapati bahawa laporan P21 tersebut telah menyatakan antara lain bahawa OKT menghidapi penyakit skizofrenia. Ia merupakan sejenis penyakit mental yang dicirikan dengan gejala psikosis seperti halusinasi dan delusi serta perubahan tingkah laku serta kemerosotan fungsi psikososial. OKT juga dikatakan mempunyai masalah penyalahgunaan dadah yang boleh menyebabkan kecelaruan mental serta menjejaskan fungsi psikososial disebabkan kebergantungan kepada dadah tersebut. Ini adalah apa yang tersurat di dalam laporan P21. Semasa memberikan keterangan Dr. Johari bin Khamis telah menjelaskan berkenaan dengan kedudukan OKT dan keupayaannya untuk menceritakan kejadian yang berlaku. Dr. Johari bin Khamis dalam keterangannya menyatakan beliau berpendapat bahawa semasa kejadian tersebut berlaku adalah ia adalah satu perbuatan OKT yang tidak mempunyai niat untuk menyebabkan kematian simati.

Mahkamah perlu berhati-hati dalam menangani keterangan ini dalam konteks seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan. Ini adalah disebabkan laporan P21 itu adalah berkaitan dengan ketidakwarasan perubatan (medical insanity). Keterangan yang menyatakan bahawa OKT tidak mempunyai niat untuk membunuh pada hemat Mahkamah ini tidak sepatutnya dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah ini sebagai asas untuk menyatakan bahawa seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan terpakai kepada OKT dalam kes ini. Penentuan sama ada seseorang itu mempunyai niat atau tidak pada hemat Mahkamah adalah terletak kepada Mahkamah bagi memutuskannya dan bukannya tanggungjawab pihak lain.

Apa yang jelas daripada laporan P21 tersebut menunjukkan bahawa OKT telah mempunyai masalah kesihatan mental yang dikenali sebagai skizofrenia. Ia telah disahkan secara perubatan. Ia bukannya tergolong di dalam ketidakwarasan perundangan. Walau bagaimanapun laporan P21 tersebut boleh diambil kira oleh Mahkamah dalam mempertimbangkan sama ada terdapatnya ketidakwarasan perundangan. Namun ia bukan penentu kepada ketidakwarasan perundangan. Ia masih tergolong di dalam ketidakwarasan perubatan yang bukan menjadi isu dalam kes ini.

Keterangan juga menunjukkan bahawa sejurus selepas kejadian tersebut terdapat saksi-saksi awam yang mendapati OKT masuk ke dalam kedai kopi dan menjerit-jerit. Persoalannya adakah keterangan ini dapat menunjukkan bahawa fikiran OKT tidak membolehkan dia mempunyai daya upaya untuk membezakan perbuatan yang dilakukan terhadap simati adalah menyalahi undang-undang. Adakah itu boleh dijadikan sandaran untuk ketidakwarasan perundangan atau adakah ia hanya merupakan senario biasa bagi seseorang yang mempunyai sifat pemarah yang tidak boleh digolongkan sebagai ketidakwarasan perundangan? Mahkamah ini perlu mengambil perhatian bahawa kejadian di kedai kopi itu adalah sejurus selepas kejadian yang melibatkan simati. Mahkamah ini berpendapat tindakan OKT yang sedemikian adalah konsisten dengan tindakan seseorang yang telah melakukan satu perbuatan yang dia tidak berkeupayaan untuk memahami bahawa ia adalah satu kesalahan. Ini adalah disebabkan sekiranya OKT mempunyai kebolehan kognitif untuk menyatakan atau mempertimbangkan bahawa perbuatannya terhadap simati adalah satu kesalahan ia akan mengambil tindakan bagi melarikan diri atau tidak mendedahkan identiti sebagai individu yang terlibat dalam kejadian pembunuhan tersebut. Ini tidak berlaku dalam kes ini. Adalah tidak munasabah untuk seseorang yang melakukan kesalahan yang boleh membawa hukuman yang berat untuk mendedahkan dirinya bagi tindakan undang-undang melainkan dia tidak memahami dan mengetahui bahawa tindakannya itu bukannya satu kesalahan di sisi undang-undang.

Pihak peguam OKT telah bersandarkan kepada laporan P21 dan berhujah bahawa semasa kejadian, keadaan minda dan pemikiran OKT mewajarkan pemakaian seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan. Sebaliknya Timbalan Pendakwa Raya berhujah bahawa laporan-laporan tersebut tidak dapat menunjukkan ketidakwarasan akal perundangan telah berjaya ditunjukkan oleh

Seterusnya Timbalan Pendakwa Raya di dalam hujahannya menyatakan bahawa keterangan menunjukkan sebaik sahaja kejadian berlaku, OKT telah pergi ke balai polis dan telah membuat pengakuan berkenaan dengan tindakan yang dilakukan terhadap simati. Ini dapat dilihat melalui eksibit yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Seterusnya pihak pendakwaan juga menyatakan bahawa OKT mempunyai pengetahuan dan juga mempunyai kesedaran bahawa tindakan yang dilakukan oleh OKT itu adalah suatu yang menyalahi undang-undang. Oleh kerana itu tidak timbul persoalan bahawa OKT mempunyai ketidakwarasan akal perundangan dalam kes ini.

Sebaliknya peguam OKT pula menyatakan bahawa tindakan OKT untuk membuat laporan polis atau datang ke balai polis membuat pengakuan pada masa sejurus selepas kejadian tersebut menunjukkan ia adalah satu tindakan yang menggambarkan bahawa OKT tidak mempunyai kesedaran dan tidak mengetahui bahawa tindakannya adalah satu yang menyalahi undang-undang. Ini adalah disebabkan pada hujahan peguam OKT bahawa sekiranya seseorang itu melakukan satu perbuatan jenayah dan ia menyedari bahawa perbuatan itu adalah satu kesalahan, tindakan yang munasabah adalah beliau tidak akan berurusan dengan pihak berkuasa dan mungkin akan mengambil tindakan-tindakan yang menyembunyikan perbuatan jenayah tersebut. Ini menyokong dakwaan pihak peguam bahawa tindakan OKT selepas kejadian tersebut menunjukkan ia konsisten dengan keterangan laporan perubatan yang menyatakan bahawa pada masa itu OKT tidak sedar dan tidak mengetahui apa yang dilakukannya. Oleh itu ia tergolong di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan.

Seterusnya Timbalan Pendakwa Raya berhujah dengan menyatakan bahawa keterangan-keterangan saksi bebas terutamanya keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa simati telah pulang ke rumah dan memberitahu ibunya bahawa beliau telah ditikam oleh seseorang menunjukkan bahawa pengecualian di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan tidak boleh digunakan dalam kes ini kerana OKT mempunyai pengetahuan dan kesedaran berkenaan dengan tindakan yang dilakukan itu adalah sesuatu yang bercanggah dengan undang-undang.

Seterusnya peguam OKT juga berhujah bahawa kematian simati berlaku bukannya sejurus selepas kejadian tetapi setelah tidak mendapat rawatan yang sewajarnya ketika dibawa ke hospital. Ini disokong dengan keterangan SP12 yang menyatakan bahawa sekiranya rawatan yang sewajarnya diberikan kepada simati, ia tidak akan membawa kepada kematian simati. Ini ditambah pula dengan kecederaan yang dialami oleh simati adalah pada satu tempat sahaja yang mana itu menunjukkan bahawa OKT tidak mempunyai niat untuk melakukan kesalahan tersebut.

Penelitian kepada laporan P21 tersebut juga menunjukkan bahawa berdasarkan hasil temubual SP11 dengan OKT, OKT telah menceritakan kejadian tersebut bahawa dia telah tertikam simati dan sebenarnya pada awalnya ia adalah untuk menakut-nakutkan simati sahaja. Oleh kerana itu tidak timbul persoalan bahawa OKT mempunyai niat. Oleh kerana itu pihak pembelaan dalam hujahan balas menyatakan bahawa ia menunjukkan bahawa pertuduhan ini tidak sepatutnya diteruskan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan kerana terdapat keterangan yang menyatakan OKT sendiri tidak mempunyai niat untuk melakukan kesalahan tersebut.

Timbalan Pendakwa Raya menyatakan kebolehan OKT untuk menceritakan kejadian tersebut secara panjang lebar kepada SP11 melalui laporan P21 tersebut menunjukkan bahawa OKT mempunyai pengetahuan dan sedar tentang tindakan yang telah dilakukan oleh beliau pada masa kejadian tersebut. Ini menambahkan lagi fakta bahawa sepatutnya pembelaan di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan itu tidak boleh dipertimbangkan dalam kes ini kerana OKT telah berjaya menjelaskan keseluruhan kejadian tersebut.

Dalam kes ini Mahkamah telah meneliti keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pembelaan OKT sendiri. Apa yang Mahkamah dapat lihat daripada keterangan tersebut ialah OKT tidak dapat menjelaskan tentang kejadian tersebut. Mahkamah juga mendapati bahawa OKT dalam keterangannya hanya menyatakan dia tidak mengetahui, tidak tahu dan tidak faham apa yang telah berlaku. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah perlu berhati-hati agar Mahkamah tidak mengambil kira keterangan-keterangan OKT ketika di Mahkamah atau mengambil kira tingkah lakunya semasa memberi keterangan di Mahkamah bagi menjadi sandaran untuk pemakaian seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan. Ini adalah disebabkan OKT berkemungkinan memberikan keterangan sedemikian bagi mengelakkan tanggungjawab perbuatan jenayah yang dilakukannya.

Seterusnya keterangan juga menunjukkan bahawa OKT telah pergi ke balai polis dan mengaku bahawa dia telah menikam seorang lelaki cina. Pada hemat Mahkamah keterangan itu juga menunjukkan bahawa OKT tidak mempunyai pengetahuan dan keupayaan kognitif untuk mempertimbangkan bahawa tindakannya menikam simati adalah satu kesalahan. Ini adalah disebabkan seseorang yang munasabah akan tidak berbuat sedemikian. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa tindakan OKT pergi ke balai polis dan mengakui telah menikam seseorang juga mungkin didorong oleh rasa bersalah dia terhadap kejadian tersebut dan mengetahui ianya adalah suatu kesalahan. Namun keterangan yang ada tidak dapat membantu Mahkamah ini membuat kesimpulan sedemikian. Malahan ia menunjukkan bahawa OKT tidak berupaya untuk faham bahawa tindakan itu adalah tindakan yang menyalahi undang-undang. Ia ditambah pula dengan latar belakang masalah skizofrenia yang dinyatakan dalam laporan P21 tersebut.

Setelah menimbangkan keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan pembelaan, Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kesnya melampaui keraguan munasabah bahawa OKT telah menyebabkan kematian simati yang terjumlah kepada kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan.

Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa OKT telah berjaya melunaskan tanggungjawabnya di bawah seksyen 105 Akta Keterangan 1950 pada perimbangan kebarangkalian bahawa semasa dia melakukan kesalahan tersebut dia tergolong di dalam pengecualian di bawah seksyen 84 Kanun Keseksaan. Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa OKT dibebas atas alasan ketidakwarasan fikiran di bawah seksyen 347

Akhirnya, Mahkamah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: OKT telah melakukan kesalahan menyebabkan kematian Yan Chin Nam di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan. Namun Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa semasa melakukan kesalahan tersebut disebabkan kecelaruan mental, dia tidak mempunyai keupayaan untuk mempunyai pengetahuan bahawa tindakannya itu adalah merupakan satu kesalahan yang bercanggah dengan undang-undang. Oleh itu sejajar dengan peruntukan di bawah seksyen 347 KPJ, OKT ditempatkan di satu tempat yang selamat dan Mahkamah ini akan menyediakan laporan di bawah seksyen 348 (1) KPJ. Bertarikh: 10 hb. Februari 2026 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR Bagi Pihak Pendakwa Raya - TPR Intan Nor Hilwani binti Mat Rifin Pejabat Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Cawangan Temerloh Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur Peguam Bagi Pihak OKT - Richard Bong dan Ivan Bong Tetuan Bong & Co Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur