[Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] v HAZRAF ALI BIN HASSAN (CF-83-169-05/2022)

Evidence-The prosecution must prove: i. that the accused caused by his act bodily pain, disease or infirmity to the complainant; S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw ii. that he did such act intentionally or with knowledge that it would cause the pain, etc; iii. that it was unprovoked iv. that the accused caused it by means of an instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or by an instrument, which used as a weapon is likely to cause death; or by means of any animal [26] Based on the above, the prosecution, in order to establish a prima facie case under section 324 of the Penal Code, must prove the following elements: a. That the complainant sustained "hurt" within the meaning of section 319 of the Penal Code; b. That the accused voluntarily caused such hurt to the complainant; c. That the hurt was inflicted by means of an instrument which, when used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death; d. That the act was committed voluntarily and without provocation. [27] If the prosecution succeeds in proving all the above elements, a prima facie case would be said to have been established, and it is the statutory duty of the court to call upon the accused to enter his defence. First Element: Whether the complainant sustained "hurt" within the meaning of section 319 of the Penal Code [28] The first element to be proven by the prosecution is whether the complainant sustained “hurt” as defined under section 319 of the Penal Code. [29] Section 319 of the Penal Code provides: Whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt. [Emphasis added] [30] Accordingly, the prosecution must establish that the complainant suffered either bodily pain, disease, or infirmity in order to satisfy this element. [31] Based on the evidence of the complainant, the medical officers (PW3 and PW6), the Medical Memo dated 11 July 2017 (Exhibit P25), and the Medical Report dated 25 October 2020 (Exhibit P28), the Court finds that the complainant sustained soft tissue injuries to the abdomen and left S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw arm. These injuries, in the Court’s view, clearly fall within the ambit of “bodily pain” as contemplated under section 319 of the Penal Code. [32] It is also the Court’s findings that the complainant’s testimonies and and police report (Exhibit P26), wherein the complainant stated: “Di dalam kejadian ini saya telah mendapat kesakitan di tangan kiri dan juga bahagian perut saya telah luka, bengkak dan berdarah.” are consistent with the medical findings. [33] Although the defence raised issues concerning inconsistencies in the preparation of Exhibit P28, the Court finds the evidence of PW3 (medical officer) who personally examined the complainant to be credible and reliable. PW3’s clinical observations are consistent with the complainant’s testimony and are corroborated by Exhibit P25 and Exhibit P28. [34] Accordingly, the Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proven the first element of the charge under section 324 of the Penal Code. Second Element: Whether the accused voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant [35] In addressing the second element of the offence, the prosecution must prove that the accused had voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant. The Court refers to section 321 of the Penal Code, which defines "voluntarily causing hurt" as follows: Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt" (Emphasis added) [36] Further, section 39 of the Penal Code provides: “A person is said to cause an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it” (Emphasis added) [37] Based on the above statutory provisions, the prosecution must establish that the accused either acted with the intention to cause hurt to the complainant or, at the very least, knew or had reason to believe that his actions were likely to cause such hurt. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw [38] In determining the element of intention, this Court is guided by the decision of the Federal Court in PP v. Muhammad Khairuanuar Baharuddin & Another Appeal [2025] 1 CLJ 517 which succinctly enunciated the concept of intention as follows: [32] To begin with, an intention is a question of fact that cannot be proved by direct evidence. Inference from the evidence presented and the surrounding circumstances has to be made to determine this fact. This too is stated lucidly by Thompson J in Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] CLJU 17; [1956] 1 LNS 17; [1956] MLJ 237 in the following words: Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case." (emphasis added) [39] This court also sought guidance from the Federal Court case of Kenneth Fook Mun Lee v. PP [2006] 4 CLJ 359, Richard Malanjum, FCJ (as he then was) explained at paragraph 25 the distinction between intention and knowledge as follows: I shall now consider the mens rea under which the accused acted. Before doing so it is necessary to consider the distinction between intention and knowledge. Generally stated intention is the purpose or design with which an act is done. It is the fore-knowledge of the act, coupled with the desire of it. Knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. There is a close relationship between intention and knowledge. ... Thus, knowledge of a consequence which is virtually certain will be evidence of intention. An intention can be inferred from the nature of the act of a person (see R v. Monkhouse [1849] 4 Cox CC 55). The nature of the weapon used and the part of the body to which the injury is caused may also facilitate the drawing of such an inference. (emphasis added) [40] Hence, based on the above authorities, this Court must analyse the facts of the case to determine whether the prosecution has proven that the accused voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw a. The Testimony of Complainant [41] The complainant testified that he was injured by the accused using a besi kuku kambing. For ease of reference, the complainant’s testimony during examination-in-chief is reproduced below: : Apa yang berlaku pada 11.7.2017? : Pada hari tersebut pada jam 7 malam, saya sedang berehat dan ada kereta yang dipandu oleh seorang Dato Hazraf. Beliau turun dari kereta dengan membawa sebatang besi dan menyuruh saya segera beredar dari situ. Saya bertanya kepada beliau kenapa nak saya bereda segera. Ada apa-apa yang boleh dibincang dan beliau terus memukul saya dengan batang besi yang dipegang olehnya. Akibat pukulan beliau, saya menerima kecederaan di bahagian perut dan tangan kiri. (paragraph 50 at page 2 of the Notes of Evidence) : Hazraf Ali pukul kamu berapa kali? : 1 kali sahaja. (paragraph 165 at page 6 of the Notes of Evidence) [42] Based on the complainant’s testimony, it is evident that the accused had driven to the scene, removed a besi kuku kambing from his car, and used it to strike the complainant. This Court finds that the act of voluntarily taking the besi kuku kambing from his car and using it to strike the complainant constitutes voluntarily causing hurt. The nature of the weapon and the body parts injured (the abdomen and left arm) support the findings that the accused knew or ought to have known that such an act would likely cause bodily injury to the complainant. [43] Hence, this court finds that the accused had voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant. b. The Testimony of PW5 [44] The complainant’s testimony had also been corroborated by the testimony of PW5. PW5 testified that he saw the accused took the besi kuku kambing from his car and use it to strike the complainant. For ease of reference, the relevant portion of PW5’s examination in chief is reproduced below: : Apa yang terjadi pada 11.7.2017? : Masalah yang saya nampak Dato Hazraf bawa saya naik ke dusun dia di bukit turun bukit jumpa cina itu. Lepas itu Dato buka kereta dan marah dengan tauke cina. Dato mengamuk, ambil besi dan pukul cina S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw itu dekat peha dia. Saya terus tarik Dato dan tolak di ke tepi sebab tak nak jadi lagi teruk. Lepas itu, dia dah kurang masalah bila saya tarik dia. Lepas itu kami balik. Itu yang saya nampak depan saya. (paragraph 670 at page 23 of the Notes of Proceedings) [45] PW5 still maintained consistency in his testimony, including during cross-examination and re-examination. The relevant excerpts are reproduced below: Cross-examination S: Tadi kamu katakan Dato memukul orang cina di peha. Saya katakan bahawa Dato tidak pukul tangan dan peha. Setuju? Setuju. (paragraph 745 at page 26 of the Notes of Proceedings) Re-examination S: Jelaskan kenapa jawab tak nampak Dato pukul tangan dan perut Yang saya nampak pukul peha sahaja. (paragraphs 770 at page 27 of the Notes of Evidence) [46] Based on PW5’s testimony, it appears that he observed the accused striking the complainant on the thigh. This is inconsistent with the complainant’s own testimony and the medical evidence, which indicate that the injuries were to the abdomen and left arm. [47] However, the Court finds that PW5’s testimony remains credible and reliable. It is pertinent to note that the complainant was seated during the incident. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that from PW5’s vantage point, the blow may have appeared to strike the thigh, when in fact it landed on the abdomen or arm. [48] Accordingly, the inconsistency is not material and does not undermine the substance of PW5’s evidence, which clearly corroborates that the accused struck the complainant using the besi kuku kambing. [49] Further, the Court also observed PW5’s demeanour throughout the trial and finds him to be a trustworthy, reliable, and credible witness. PW5 gave his evidence spontaneously, consistently, and without hesitation. [50] Based on PW5’s testimony, this Court finds that the accused did in fact voluntarily cause hurt to the complainant as the accused knew or S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw ought to have known that such an act would likely cause bodily injury to the complainant. Third Element: The accused caused the hurt to the complainant by using an instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death to the complainant a. The accused used a besi kuku kambing as a weapon to cause hurt to the complainant [51] The prosecution contends that the accused used a besi kuku kambing to cause hurt to the complainant. Their case hinges on the discovery of the weapon, which was made possible by information supplied by the accused himself. [52] During examination-in-chief, PW7 testified as follows regarding the discovery of the weapon: : Setelah membuat laporan soal siasat, apakah tindakan Inspektor? : Setelah saya buat Laporan Polis Bentong 3854/ 17 saya telah melengkapkan keterangan suspek dan setelah keterangan suspek dilengkapkan, saya telah dipandu arah oleh suspek sendiri telah pergi ke rumah suspek di Rumah Rakyat Batu Satu Bentong. Sampai di hadapan rumah, suspek telah menunjukkan 1 kereta jenis Hilux Warna Putih. Nombor pendaftaran saya kurang ingat. Suspek sendiri membuka kereta tersebut dengan kunci yang dipegang dan disaksikan suspek saya buat pemeriksaan dalam kereta tersebut dan pada masa yang sama suspek telah merebahkan kerusi pemandu ke hadapan dan di bawah kerusi tersebut ada 1 batang besi dan suspek kata itu adalah besi yang digunakan semasa kejadian. Saya telah bertindak merampas besi berkenaan ke atas suspek. Saya juga telah membuat 1 Laporan Rampasan ke atas Barang tersebut. (paragraphs 1190 to 11200 at pages 40 and 41 of the Notes of Proceedings) [53] Following the recovery of the besi kuku kambing, PW7 filed a police report, which was tendered as Exhibit P33. The accused also signed the Senarai Pemeriksaan (Exhibit P34) confirming that the weapon was recovered from his vehicle, which was parked at his residence. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw b. Whether the information that led to the recovery of the besi kuku kambing is admissible under section 27 (1) of the Evidence Act 1950 (EA 1950). [54] The subsequent issue for this Court to consider is whether the information that led to the recovery of the besi kuku kambing is admissible under section 27 (1) of the EA 1950. [55] Section 27 (1) of the EA 1950 reads as follows: section 27 How much of information received from accused may be proved

When any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a police officer, so much of that information, whether the information amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. (emphasis added) [56] In Siew Yoke Keong v. PP [2013] 4 CLJ 149; [2013] 3 MLJ 630 the Federal Court held: [28] In the light of the authorities referred to, we hold that information admissible under s. 27 of the Evidence Act includes accused's statement, or his act or conduct such as pointing out which leads distinctly to the discovery of a fact. For such information to be admissible in evidence, there is no duty on the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of the information. Hence it is not necessary to conduct a trial within a trial to determine the voluntariness of the information. (see Amathevelli R Ramasamy v. PP [2008] 4 CLJ 413, CA per Raus Sharif JCA (now PCA), Francis Antonysamy v. PP [2005] 2 CLJ 481; [2005] 3 MLJ 389 FC, Mohd Ya'cob Demyati v. PP [2011] 4 CLJ 758; [2010] 1 LNS 1763, CA (affirmed by the Federal Court in Criminal Appeal No. 05-122-2008(N) on 2 November 2010, and the application to review the aforesaid decision was also dismissed by the Federal Court on 10 February 2011). (emphasis added) [57] Based on the above, section 27 of the EA 1950 permits the admission of information given by an accused in police custody when it directly leads to the discovery of a material fact. This includes statements, or acts such as pointing out a location, as long as they are directly related to the fact discovered. There is no requirement to prove the voluntariness of such information. [58] In the present case, PW7’s evidence, along with Exhibits P33 and P34, clearly shows that the accused provided information which led directly to the recovery of the besi kuku kambing from his vehicle at his S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw residence. This Court finds that the weapon would not have been discovered without the information given by the accused. [59] Accordingly, this Court holds that the information provided by the accused, which directly led to the discovery of the besi kuku kambing, is admissible under section 27(1) of the EA 1950. c. Whether the conduct of the accused in showing the location of the weapon is admissible under section 8(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 [60] This Court also considers whether the accused’s conduct in showing the location of the besi kuku kambing is admissible as subsequent conduct under section 8(2) of the EA 1950. [61] Section 8 of the EA 1950 provides: Section 8: Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct

Any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact.

The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding in reference to that suit or proceeding, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant if the conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto. Explanation 1 - The word "conduct" in this section does not include statements unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act. Explanation 2 - When the conduct of any person is relevant any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing which affects his conduct is relevant. (emphasis added) [62] In Pathmanabhan Nalliannen v. PP & Other Appeals [2017] 4 CLJ 137; [2017] 3 MLJ 141, the Federal Court held: [127] At any rate it is apposite to clarify here that even if information pursuant to s. 27 of the EA is found inadmissible, that piece of inadmissible evidence does not automatically affect the admissibility of the evidence of subsequent conduct under s. 8 of the EA (Amathevelli a/p P Ramasamy S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw v. Public Prosecutor [2009] 2 MLJ 367; [2009] 3 CLJ 109;Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration)). [128] That conduct of pointing to the places where the items were discovered by the second and fourth accused persons, which was subsequent to an offence, falls squarely within the ambit of 'the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding'. [129] As held by the Court of Appeal, we hold that the conduct of pointing to the places where the items were found is relevant and admissible (Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration) 1979 AIR 400). Chinnappa Reddy J said at p 404: The evidence of the circumstances, simpliciter, that an accused person led a Police Officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct, under section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of section 27 of the Evidence Act... [130] The conduct of the second and fourth accused persons is consistent with them knowing of the places where the items connected to the crime of murder were disposed of. This view is consistent with the view held by the learned trial judge where he said: The only inference that I could make on the conduct of the second and fourth accused in providing the information in this case was that they were in possession of the items found and had tried to destroy and conceal these items by scattering and leaving them at various places. [131] We are also satisfied that the act of pointing by the second and fourth accused persons at the spots where items connected to the murder were found is admissible as conduct, as provided for under s. 8 of the EA. (emphasis added) [63] Based on the above authorities, the act of leading or pointing to the location where an item connected to the crime is found constitutes relevant subsequent conduct and is admissible under section 8(2) of the EA 1950 , even if the accompanying statement is not admissible under section 27 of the EA 1950. [64] In our present case, the accused brought the police to his home, unlocked his vehicle with his own key, and retrieved the besi kuku kambing from underneath the driver’s seat. This conduct, witnessed by PW7, clearly shows the accused’s knowledge of the location of the weapon. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw [65] The Court finds that the accused’s conduct in showing the exact location of the besi kuku kambing supports the inference that he had knowledge and possession of the weapon used in the offence. d. Comparison of Exhibits P1, P4(d), and P6 [66] This Court has carefully examined the injuries sustained by the complainant as shown in Exhibit P4(a) to P4(d). The injuries, particularly those shown in P4(c) and P4(d), are consistent with the nature, shape, and physical characteristics of the weapon shown in Exhibits P1 and P6. [67] Accordingly, the Court finds that the besi kuku kambing (Exhibit P1) recovered from the accused’s car is indeed the weapon used to inflict the injuries upon the complainant. e. Whether the besi kuku kambing, if used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death. [68] The issue before this Court is whether the besi kuku kambing, when used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death within the meaning of section 324 of the Penal Code. [69] This court refers to Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes (24th Edition, para 7, p. 1601), which states as follows:

‘Likely to cause death’- The instrument must be one, not which is ‘liable’ but which is ‘likely’ to cause death. It must be one of which one can predicate that the probable result of its use will be by virtue of its very nature, death. It must be inherent in the nature of the instrument used that death is likely to ensue. [Emphasis added] [70] Based on the authority above, the Court is required to assess the nature of the weapon used. It is not necessary to prove that the weapon did cause death, but rather that, by its very nature, when used as a weapon of offence, it is likely to cause death. [71] In the present case, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor referred Exhibit P6(a) to (d), the besi kuku kambing to PW3, the medical officer, and sought his expert medical opinion on whether the injuries sustained by the complainant could have been caused by such a weapon. PW3 S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw confirmed that the injuries were consistent with those caused by a blunt object, and that the besi kuku kambing could indeed have caused such injuries. For ease of reference, the relevant excerpt of PW3’s testimony is reproduced below: Kecedaraan mangsa disebabkan oleh trauma, objek tumpul. Mangsa ada beritahu dia diserang oleh seorang guna senjata tapi tak tahu jenis senjata. DPP : Rujuk saksi pada P6(A-D). Kecedaraan mangsa mungkin boleh disebabkan senjata ini. Objek tumpul yang saya maksudkan boleh menyebabkan kematian bergantung kepada lokasi serangan seperti contoh jika terkena kepala dengan kuat hingga menyebabkan pendarahan dalam kepala. Bahagian perut,jika serangan kuat atau menyebabkan pendarahan dalaman juga boleh menyebabkan kematian. (paragraphs 100 at page 115 of the Notes of Evidence) [72] Based on PW3’s expert medical opinion and the Court’s own examination of Exhibits P1 and P6, this Court finds that the besi kuku kambing, due to its solid and blunt nature, is inherently capable of causing death when used as a weapon of offence particularly if it strikes a vulnerable area of the body such as the head or abdomen with sufficient force. [73] Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the besi kuku kambing used by the accused in this case, when used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death within the meaning of section 324 of the Penal Code. Fourth Element: The accused unprovokedly voluntarily causing hurt to the complainant. [74] To establish a prima facie case under section 324 of the Penal Code, the prosecution must prove that the accused voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant, and that the act was committed without provocation from the complainant. [75] Accordingly, the issue before this Court is whether the accused, without provocation, voluntarily caused hurt to the complainant by using an instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death. [76] In addressing this issue, the Court refers to section 334 of the Penal Code and the Explanation to section 335 of the Penal Code, S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw which both adopt the principles under Exception 1 of section 300 of the Penal Code. Exception 1 provides as follows: Explanation - The last two sections are subject to the same provisos as Exception 1 of section 300. [77] Exception 1 of section 300 of the Penal Code states as follows: Exception 1 - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation, or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos:

that the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person;

that the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant;

that the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation - Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder, is a question of fact [Emphasis added] [78] The Federal Court in Che Omar bin Mohd Akhir v PP [2007] 4 MLJ 309; [2007] 3 CLJ 281 held that: [14] The question whether the provocation was grave and sudden such as to make the accused to lose his self-control is a question of fact and not one of law (see Explanation to Exception 1 to s. 300 of the PC; Kuan Ted Fatt v. Public Prosecutor [1985] CLJ (Rep) 174; [1985] 1 CLJ 150 FC). Each case is to be considered according to its own facts. The court must decide on the particular circumstances of that case whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to permit an indulgent view of the crime committed by the accused, (see Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 29th edn. 2002 p 1194). [15] The test of grave and sudden provocation was clearly stated in the Supreme Court case of Lorensus Tukan v. Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 162; [1988] 1 CLJ 143. Seah SCJ in delivering the judgment of the court said: S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw The test of 'grave and sudden' provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, placed in the situation in which the accused was placed would be so provoked as to lose his selfcontrol (see Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR [1962] SC 605, 530). In determining what amounts to grave and sudden provocation the court may take into account the habits, manners and feelings of the class or community to which the accused belongs, but not of the particular idiosyncrasies of the accused: Madhavan v. State of Kerala AIR [1966] Ker. 258 (260). [16] It is also said that the defence of provocation is a dual one: the alleged provocative conduct must be such as (i) actually causes in the accused, and

(ii) might cause in a reasonable man, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control as the result of which he kills the deceased. [17] Thus, in order to successfully set up provocation as a defence for the reduction of the offence of murder to one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, it is not enough to show that the accused was provoked into losing his self-control; it must be shown that the provocation was grave and sudden and must have by its gravity and suddenness caused a reasonable man to lose his self-control and induced him to do the act which caused the death of the deceased. In determining that question the court may also consider, along with other factors, the nature of the retaliation by the accused, having regard to the nature of the provocation. [Emphasis added] [79] Hence, based on the authorities cited above, this Court must determine: i. whether there was grave and sudden provocation when the incident occurred. ii. whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused and placed in similar circumstances, would have been so provoked as to lose his self-control. iii. In determining what amounts to grave and sudden provocation the court may take into account the habits, manners and feelings of the class or community to which the accused belongs, but not of the particular idiosyncrasies of the accused iv. whether such provocation would cause a reasonable person to suffer a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, leading him to cause hurt using an instrument which, when used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death v. the nature of the retaliation by the accused, having regard to the nature of the provocation S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw a. The complainant was sitting when the incident took place [80] Based on the testimonies of the complainant, PW5 (see paragraphs 720 to 730, page 25 of the Notes of Evidence) and careful examination of the video recordings in Exhibits P12 to P23, it is observed that the complainant was seated when the incident occurred. It is also evident that the complainant remained calm even when the accused was shouting at him. [81] Accordingly, the Court finds that there was no grave and sudden provocation when the incident occurred. A reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused and placed in similar circumstances, would not have been so provoked as to lose self-control. b. Testimony of PW5 [82] Based on the testimony of PW5, it is clear that the accused drove from his kebun to another location for the purpose of confronting the complainant (see paragraph 670, page 23 of the Notes of Evidence). [83] The Court finds that this deliberate act of travelling to the scene undermines any suggestion of grave and sudden provocation. A reasonable man in similar circumstances would not have lost his self-control. c. The accused did not call the police [84] During the course of the trial, the learned Defence Counsel informed the Court that the accused is a Special Officer to the Deputy Prime Minister 2. Given his background, he ought to have known better than to take matters into his own hands. If there was provocation, the accused should have reported the matter to the police and sought lawful redress. [85] Accordingly, this Court finds that a reasonable person with such background and position would not have been so provoked as to lose self-control. Ancillary Issue: Whether the Charge Framed Against the Accused is Defective [86] The defence submits that the charge preferred against the accused is defective on the ground that it does not specify a clear and proper address for the place of the alleged offence. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw [87] Section 153 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) provides as follows: The charge shall contain such particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence and the person, if any, against whom or the thing, if any, in respect of which it was committed as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. [Emphasis added] [88] Further, Section 156 (1) of the CPC states: No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars shall be regarded, at any stage of the case, as material unless the accused was in fact misled by that error or omission. [Emphasis added] [89] Upon a careful examination of the charge, this Court finds that the particulars relating to the location of the alleged offence do not give rise to any prejudice to the accused. The location was stated as "belakang Kem Askar, Bentong," which, although general, is not ambiguous in the context of the case. [90] The line of cross-examination undertaken by the learned Defence Counsel further demonstrates that the defence was fully aware of the place in question. There is no indication in the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses that the accused or his counsel were misled or confused as to the place of the incident. On the contrary, the defence’s questioning clearly reflects familiarity with the place of the alleged offence. [91] Accordingly, the Court finds that the accused was neither misled nor prejudiced by the level of detail provided in the charge. The particulars stated were adequate, sufficient and in compliance with the requirements of sections 152, 153, 154, and 155 of the CPC. Ancillary Issue: Whether The Prosecution’s Application To Amend The Charge Should Be Allowed [92] Three days before this Court was scheduled to deliver its ruling on whether the prosecution had established a prima facie case against the accused, an email was sent by the Court to both parties, requesting them to address the issue of whether the charge framed against the accused S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw sufficiently contained all the elements of the offence under section 324 of the Penal Code. [93] On the date fixed for hearing that issue, the learned DPP applied to amend the charge under section 158(1) of the CPC. The proposed amendment involved the insertion of the phrase “iaitu satu alat yang digunakan sebagai senjata untuk melakukan kesalahan yang mungkin menyebabkan kematian”, in order to clearly reflect the element of "dangerous weapon" required under section 324 of the Penal Code. [94] The learned Defence Counsel objected strongly to the application on the ground that it was made at the eleventh hour, on the very day the Court was scheduled to deliver its decision. [95] In response, the learned DPP contended that section 158 of the CPC allows the prosecution to amend the charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. [96] Accordingly, the issue before this Court is whether the prosecution’s application to amend the charge should be allowed. Section 158(1) of the CPC provides as follows:

Any Court may alter or add to any charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. [Emphasis added] [97] In PP v. Azman Ismail & Anor [2007] 10 CLJ 469, the High Court held: [30] In considering the application of the learned DPP pursuant to s. of the CPC to add the proposed new charge, an offence under s. 365 of the Penal Code, this court must consider if there are sufficient materials before the court in the evidence produced during this trial to justify the exercise of its discretion. Section 158 of the CPC expressly and clearly gives the power to the court to alter or add to the charge at anytime before the pronouncement of judgment. … [31] However, this discretionary power must be exercised judicially. In order for this court to exercise its discretionary power, this court must be satisfied that there are sufficient materials before the court to consider or justify invoking its powers under s. 158 of the CPC and it must be invoked only at the appropriate time as expressly regulated by s. 158 of the CPC. The procedure expressly regulated by s. 158 of the CPC cannot be varied by consent or be waived. [Emphasis added] S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw [98] Based on the above authority, it is clear that the Court has the discretion to amend or alter the charge at any time before judgment is pronounced. However, such discretion must be exercised judicially, and only where there is sufficient evidence before the Court to justify the amendment. [99] Upon perusal of the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the testimony of PW3 at paragraph 100, page 115 of the Notes of Evidence, this Court finds that there is sufficient material on record to justify the proposed amendment. [100] Furthermore, the Court is satisfied that no prejudice would be occasioned to the accused. The accused has been legally represented throughout the proceedings and has the right to recall any of the prosecution witnesses, should it be necessary. [101] In the circumstances, although the application was made on the day fixed for the Court’s decision, the fact remains that judgment had not yet been delivered. The application is therefore procedurally proper, supported by the evidence, and does not result in prejudice to the accused. [102] Accordingly, the Court allows the prosecution’s application to amend the charge under section 158(1) of the CPC. G. DECISION AT THE END OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE [103] Upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence, and for the reasons stated above, this Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case against the accused in respect of the charge, in accordance with section 180(3) of the CPC . The accused was therefore called upon to enter his defence [104] After the three alternatives were explained to him, the accused elected to give sworn testimony. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw H. DEFENCE’S CASE [105] Based on the testimonies of the accused and his witnesses, the defence contends that the complainant had made repeated visits to the accused’s kebun due to dissatisfaction over the dismissal of his brother, who was allegedly terminated for misconduct. During the most recent visit, the complainant allegedly arrived with several individuals and began recording videos, which, according to the accused, were intended to provoke him. The accused, who claimed to have been working at the time, stated that he requested them to leave the place. Feeling threatened, he retrieved besi kuku kambing from his vehicle for the purpose of self-defence. [106] The accused admitted to swinging the besi kuku kambing near the complainant but denied making physical contact. He asserted that the besi kuku kambing struck a nearby tin can and not the complainant. The accused further stated that had he struck the complainant, the resulting injuries would have been significantly more severe or even fatal. He claimed that he left the scene to avoid further confrontation and denied causing any harm. The accused also alleged that the complainant and his family were attempting to provoke and trap him in retaliation for the dismissal of the complainant’s brother. I. DUTY OF THE COURT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL [107] The statutory duty of the Court at the conclusion of the Defence’s case is provided under section 182A of the CPC which states:

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the accused guilty and he may be convicted on it.

If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall record an order of acquittal [108] This Court also finds guidance in the Federal Court decision of Md Zainudin bin Raujan v. Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 773, where it was held: [59] At the conclusion of the trial, s. 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code imposes a duty on the trial court to consider S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw all the evidence adduced before it and to decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defence of the accused must be considered in the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, as well as in the light of the well established principles enunciated in Mat v. PP [1963] CLJU 82; [1963] 1 LNS 82; [1963] 1 MLJ 263 with regard to the approach to be taken in evaluating the evidence of the defence. [109] In Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 29 MLJ 263 where it was held by Suffian J (as he then was) explained the duty of the Court in the following: The position may be conveniently stated as follows:

If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accused's guilt ........ Convict.

If you accept or believe the accused's explanation.. Acquit.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation.. Do not convict but consider the next steps below.

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation and that explanation does not raise in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt........ Convict

If you do not accept or believe the accused's explanation but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.. Acquit [110] Therefore, based on the above authorities, it is the duty of this Court to evaluate the entirety of the evidence at the close of the trial. Even where the Court does not accept or believe the Defence’s version, the law requires that a conviction must not be entered unless the Court is satisfied that the explanation offered does not raise any reasonable doubt. If a reasonable doubt arises, even from an explanation that the Court finds unconvincing or difficult to accept, the accused is nevertheless entitled in law to an acquittal. [Emphasis added] S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw J. FINDINGS OF THE DEFENCE CASE i. Accused Testimony [111] The accused claimed that he did not strike the complainant, but instead struck a tin can using the besi to frighten the complainant and his employee into leaving the land. He further asserted that had he truly struck the complainant, the injuries would have been more severe or fatal. [112] This Court has carefully evaluated the accused’s testimony in light of the medical evidence and the testimonies of PW3, PW4, PW5, and PW6. Based on the testimonies of the complainant and PW5, the evidence of the medical officers (PW3 and PW6), the photographs of the injuries (Exhibits P4(a) to P4(d)), the Medical Memo dated 11 July 2017 (Exhibit P25), and the Medical Report dated 25 October 2020 (Exhibit P28), the Court finds that the complainant sustained soft tissue injuries to the abdomen and left arm. These injuries are consistent with injuries caused by a solid metal object, such as Exhibit P1. [113] Moreover, the accused’s version is contradicted by PW5, who was at the scene and testified that he saw the accused retrieve the besi kuku kambing from his vehicle and use it to strike the complainant. PW5’s testimony was coherent, unshaken during cross-examination, and consistent with that of the complainant. [114] Accordingly, due to the credible and corroborated prosecution evidence, the Court finds the accused’s assertion that he struck a tin can, and not the complainant, to be uncorroborated and lacking in evidential value. It does not raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. [115] The accused also alleged that he left the scene to avoid confrontation and denied causing any harm. He claimed that the complainant and his family provoked him due to a grudge related to the dismissal of the complainant’s brother. [116] In evaluating the defence of provocation, this Court applies the legal standard set out by the Federal Court in Che Omar bin Mohd Akhir v PP [2007] 4 MLJ 309; [2007] 3 CLJ 281. Applying the reasonable man test, namely, whether a reasonable man, placed in the accused’s circumstances would have lost self-control, this Court finds that the alleged acts of provocation, such as facial expressions, gestures, or verbal taunts, do not amount to grave and sudden provocation within the meaning of the law. [117] This court also referred to DW3’s testimony whereby he said that the complainant had never provoked the accused and this contradicts the S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw accused’s testimony. (Refer to paragraphs 2780 to 2785 at page 92 of the Notes of Evidence) [118] Accordingly, this Court finds that the accused’s defence of provocation fails to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. ii. DW2 Testimony [119] DW2 testified that he saw the complainant inflict injury upon himself using a piece of wood (kayu). The relevant portion of the Notes of Evidence read: Adakah anda berada di tempat kejadian pada waktu tersebut? Saya tak ada di tempat kejadian. Saya ada di tempat saya iaitu kebun saya. Di mana lokasi kebun anda? Lokasi kebun di bawah lokasi kebun Dato Hazraf Apa yang anda ingin beritahu kepada mahkamah berkenaan dengan kejadian pada hari itu? Saya nampak kereta mari depan tempat saya dan Lau keluar dan Lau bising-bising. Lau cakap cina dan tak tau apa dia cakap dan dia berhenti di situ dan lepas itu dia ambil kayu 1 dan dia cucuk dekat perut Lau. (paragraphs 2455 to 2465 at page 81 of the Notes of Evidence) [120] The Court has scrutinised this testimony against the physical evidence, particularly Exhibits P4(a)–P4(d), P25 and P28, and the testimonies of the complainant, PW3, PW5, and PW6. The injuries sustained, as seen in the photographs and medical reports, are inconsistent with those that could plausibly be caused by a wooden object. DW2’s version lacks logic, medical and forensic plausibility. [121] Additionally, DW2 admitted that he was not present at the scene during the actual incident or altercation. He claimed to have only witnessed events after the incident had occurred, when the complainant purportedly came to his kebun and allegedly inflicted injuries upon himself. In view of this, DW2’s version appears to be an afterthought and lacks credibility or evidential value. His version is neither persuasive nor capable of raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw iii. DW3 Testimony [122] DW3 testified that the accused did not strike the complainant but merely pretended to swing an object at a chair. For ease of reference, the relevant portion of DW3’s testimony is reproduced below: : Apa berlaku semasa kejadian? : Dato suruh dia keluar dari kawasan tanah Dato tapi Lau berdegil. Lepas itu Dato hayun pada kerusi macam acah-acah. Kami datang dan cakap Dato jangan macam ini. Lepas tu kami cakap dekat Lau janganlah buat macam ini. : Semasa kejadian, En Lau tengah duduk atas kerusi? : Ya (paragraphs 2770 to 2775 at page 91 of the Notes of Evidence) [123] This Court finds that DW3’s testimony contradicts the version given by the accused himself, who claimed that he swung the object at a tin can, not a chair. This inconsistency undermines the reliability of the defence’s narrative. [124] Furthermore, upon evaluating the entirety of DW3’s evidence, the Court finds that his testimony must be treated with caution. DW3 demonstrated difficulty in assessing factual matters, particularly when shown the injury photographs marked as Exhibits P4(a) to P4(d). When referred to these exhibits during cross-examination, DW3 speculated that the injuries may have been caused by “kena panas”, despite clear visual indicators of laceration. The relevant exchange is reproduced below : Rujuk eksibit P4(a). Adakah ini Encik lau? : Ya : Rujuk eksibit P4 (c-d). Setuju ada kecederaan pada perut? : Tidak : Kenapa tidak? : Tidak pasti : Setuju kesan tersebut boleh disebabkan oleh objek yang keras? : Tidak : Kenapa tidak setuju : Sebab saya nampak macam kena panas. : Sekiranya seseorang kena pukul menggunakan objek yang keras, dia bukan macam ini. Setuju? : Tangan lebam dan tangan patah S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw : Tidak setuju? : Tidak setuju : Kalau saya katakan gambar lebam, setuju? : Setuju : Kalau saya katakan lebam disebabkan besi setuju? : Tidak setuju : Sewaktu kejadian, encik tidak nampak apa di sebalik baju Encik Lau dan rawatan. Tak tahu ada kecederaan. Setuju? : Setuju (paragraphs 2795 to 2820 at page 92 to 93 of the Notes of Evidence) [125] Based on the above, this Court finds that DW3’s testimony lacks corroboration. His inability to acknowledge visible injuries and his speculative explanation diminish the probative value of his evidence. His testimony does not raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case K. DECISION AT THE END OF THE TRIAL [126] Having regard to all the foregoing reasons and after considering the notes of proceedings, notes of evidence, all the exhibits tendered in court and the written submissions filed by both parties, it is the court’s finding that the accused failed to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case for the offence of Voluntarily Causing Hurt by Dangerous Weapons or Means punishable under section 324 of the Penal Code. [127] This court finds that the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. [128] Accordingly, this court finds the accused guilty and convict him under section 324 of the Penal Code. L. MITIGATION [129] In mitigation, the learned Defence Counsel submitted that the accused has no prior criminal record and is an active member of the community. He holds the position of Deputy Division Chief of Bentong, serves as a committee member of the local mosque, and is also the Head of the UMNO Tras Branch. He is currently gainfully employed and operates a business. The accused is married and has four children, all S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw of whom are still pursuing their studies at university. It was also submitted that the accused had acted out of frustration due to repeated disturbances on his land. [130] The Defence further prayed that the Court considers imposing a fine as the appropriate sentence. In support of this, it was submitted that the accused had shown himself to be a trustworthy individual, having never breached the terms of the Bon Keamanan previously imposed on him. He had also cooperated fully throughout the four-year pendency of this case, which reflects his respect for the legal process. Accordingly, the Defence humbly urged the Court to impose a minimal fine. M. AGGRAVATING FACTORS [131] The prosecution submits that the maximum sentence should be imposed on the accused, having regard to the seriousness of the offence. The accused has been convicted under section 324 of the Penal Code, in which imprisonment is the primary punishment prescribed, as it is mentioned first in the section. Section 324 of the Penal Code provides for a custodial sentence of up to 10 years, and the offence also falls within the statutory interpretation of a serious offence. [132] The prosecution further submits that the weapon used, a besi kuku kambing is inherently dangerous and capable of inflicting fatal injuries. It was used to strike the victim on the abdomen and arm, areas which, if struck with sufficient force, could result in death or severe bodily harm. The injuries caused in this case inflicted trauma upon the victim. [133] The Court is also urged to take into consideration the prolonged duration of this case. The charge was initially brought in 2020, and the matter has only now concluded at the defence stage. Over this extended period, the case has been handled by multiple Magistrates and Deputy Public Prosecutors, reflecting the time and costs spent for this case.. [134] The prosecution further submits that public interest must outweigh the personal circumstances of the accused. A maximum sentence should be imposed to send a clear and deterrent message that the use of a dangerous weapon to cause injury is a serious criminal act which, upon conviction, must be met with an appropriate custodial sentence. [135] Accordingly, the prosecution prays that a term of imprisonment be imposed on the accused. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw N. SENTENCING i. The accused is a first-time offender, aged 51, and the sole breadwinner for his wife and four children [136] It is trite law that, in sentencing, the Court must give due consideration to whether the accused is a first-time offender. This factor often carries significant weight in determining the appropriate sentence. [137] In the present case, learned Defence Counsel has informed the Court that the accused is a first offender. During the prosecution’s submission on aggravating factors, no criminal record or prior conviction was tendered by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor. Accordingly, the Court accepts that the accused has no previous convictions. [138] This Court also has taken into account the accused’s age, being 51 years old, and his role as the sole provider for his wife and four children. These personal circumstances are relevant mitigating factors that the Court must weigh in the exercise of its sentencing discretion. Public Interest [139] In determining the appropriate sentence, the Court must give due consideration to the element of public interest. This principle was succinctly articulated in the High Court case of PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256 which cited the judgment of Hilbery J in Rex v. Kenneth John Ball 35 Cr App R 164 as follows: One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote the passage from the judgment of Hilbery J in Rex v. Kenneth John Ball 35 CR App R 164 as follows: In deciding the appropriate sentence, a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induced him to turn from a criminal to S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore fix the sentence for a particular offence but it fixes a maximum sentence and leaves to the court to decide what is, within that maximum the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe. [Emphasis added] [140] Based on the authority cited above, the public interest is best served when a sentence has a deterrent effect, whether it deters others from committing similar offences, discourages repetition by the offender, or encourages rehabilitation and reintegration into society. [141] In the present case, the accused struck the complainant using a besi kuku kambing, a weapon which, when used offensively, is capable of causing fatal injury. The strike was directed at sensitive areas the abdomen which could have resulted in serious harm or even death. In such circumstances, it is necessary to impose a deterrent sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offence and to serve public interest [142] This Court is also guided by the decision in Hossain v. PP [2008] 7 CLJ 560 where the High Court held: I will say that if parliament deems it fit that it may be fine or imprisonment or both, the court has a duty to consider first a fine for 1st offenders and not imprisonment. However, if imprisonment is intended to be imposed, the court must state its ground why fine was not imposed in particular. Courts do not have a general power to act arbitrarily on issues of sentencing in a manner to make the provisions of fine otiose and award imprisonment to 1st offenders when that is not the intention of parliament. Further, such imprisonment may also affect public purse and that may be a relevant consideration to be taken into account, when parliament says fine (deterrence plus it is a revenue) or imprisonment (deterrence but liability to the public). The question of revenue and liability to the public must be balanced on the whole in public interest to ensure that such offenders are deterred. Parliament has entrusted it to the court to decide what will be appropriate when it enacts provision for fine or imprisonment. This entrustment on the courts cannot be a subject of complaint by the prosecution in England under the common law. In respect of this area of law, learned author Christopher J. Emmins in his book 'A practical approach to criminal procedure' makes the following observation: S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw Second, the Court of Appeal does not attempt to prescribe the one right sentence for a particular case. Instead, their Lordships allow Crown Court judges a broad discretion, and, in general, only interfere to reduce a sentence if it is outside the range of sentences appropriate to the gravity of the offence when taken in conjunction with any mitigating factors. Third, there is no procedure which enables the Court of Appeal to pronounce a sentence too light. The prosecution cannot appeal against a sentence they consider over-lenient, while if the defence appeal (against conviction or sentence) the Court of Appeal has no power to increase sentence. The most their Lordships can do is state that, far from the sentence being too severe, they would, if they had been sitting in the Crown Court, have imposed a harsher penalty. [Emphasis added] [143] Based on the above authority, where the Penal Code prescribes fine or imprisonment or both, the Court has a duty to consider a fine for first-time offenders before resorting to imprisonment. If a custodial sentence is imposed, the Court must articulate its reasons for doing so, particularly where fine alone would not suffice. [144] Accordingly, this Court is bound to evaluate whether the imposition of a fine alone is appropriate and, if not, must provide clear grounds justifying the need for imprisonment. [145] In the present case, the accused struck the complainant once with a dangerous weapon. Having considered the nature of the weapon, the area struck, and the physical and emotional consequences to the victim, this Court finds that a fine alone would not adequately reflect the gravity of the offence. A combination of a custodial sentence and a fine is therefore appropriate to uphold public interest. [146] This Court sentences the accused to 3 days imprisonment and a fine of RM10,000, in default of which he shall undergo 6 months imprisonment, for the offence under section 324 of the Penal Code. The Court is satisfied that such a sentence adequately serves public interest by deterring others, discouraging future offending by the accused, and promoting accountability, while taking into account the accused’s status as a first-time offender. S/N GDJB6kspu06ftGG2dwVtqw O. CONCLUSION [147] Having regard to all the foregoing reasons and after considering the notes of proceedings, notes of evidence, all the exhibits tendered in court and the written submissions filed by both parties, it is the court’s finding that the accused fails to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case for the offence of Voluntarily Causing Hurt by Dangerous Weapons or Means punishable under section 324 of the Penal Code. [148] This court also finds that the prosecution has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. [149] Accordingly, this Court finds the accused guilty and convicts him of the charge. The Court then sentences him to 3 days imprisonment and a fine of RM10,000, in default of which he shall undergo 6 months imprisonment Dated: 18 July 2025 …………………………t.t.….…………………………. (QASIRATUL JANNAH USMANI BINTI OTHMAN) Magistrate Magistrate Court Bentong, Pahang Darul Makmur For the Prosecution-Tuan Muhammad Zamharir Bin Muhammad Zuhid, Deputy Public Prosecutor. For the Accused – Dato’ Abu Bakar and Encik K Harikrishnes Messrs. K.Harikrishnan & Co.