The Affidavit affirmed by Mr. Yong Yoke Keong (landowner of Lot 13840) on 28.12.2018 and filed in the Land Reference for lot 13840. [16] As stated earlier, this appeal is premised upon errors of law as canvased by the Appellant. It is trite and we agree with the Appellant’s submission that the law does not bar the Appellant from appealing against the decision of the High Court, especially when it involves questions of law on the manner in which compensation was arrived at. The Federal Court in the recent case of Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor v. Nusantara Daya Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 1 speaking through Mary Lim FCJ had provided the much needed explanation on the scope of section 49 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 in particular on the approach to construe that section. There the Federal Court took the view that the section must be construed strictly and provided the reasons for that approach. It is unnecessary for us to repeat the same and that judgment deserved reading in full. What is important, in our view, is the following paragraphs:- [40] Once again, what is a question of law within the context or for the purpose of s. 49(1). The answer to this seemingly innocuous question, to some extent, may be found in the reference case that formed part of Semenyih Jaya; that is, Amitabha Guha. This case found its way back to the Federal Court recently in Amitabha Guha & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2021] 3 CLJ 1. To avoid confusion, we shall refer to this as "Amitabha Guha No. 2". … [51] As a starting point, we would adopt the general proposition as set down in Amitabha Guha No. 2, that "In a general sense, a question of law is an issue involving the interpretation of law (statutes or legal principles) and the application of the law to the facts of each individual case", but with a strong rider and only to that extent. This general proposition must be appreciated, understood and applied in the context of the proviso to s. 49(1), ruled by this court in Semenyih Jaya to be a valid provision of law, that s. 49(1) limiting the right of appeal does not violate arts. 13 and 121(1B) of the Federal Constitution - see paras. [165] to [173]. [52] This general proposition also is not to be taken as suggesting, even for the slightest moment, that s. 49(1) is to be given a liberal reading so as to render nugatory the clear intent of precluding appeals from decisions of the High Court on compensation. This proposition is not to be read as allowing in any way, what in pith and substance, are appeals on compensation. After all, as explained in Semenyih Jaya: ... a right of appeal is statutory... it simply means that when conferred by statute, the right of appeal becomes a vested right. Correspondingly, the jurisdiction of the court to hear appeals is also conferred by statute (see Auto Dunia Sdn Bhd v. Wong Sai Fatt & Ors [1995] 3 CLJ 485; [1995] 2 MLJ 549); Wan Sagar Wan Embong v. Harun Taib [2008] 5 CLJ 14; [2008] 4 MLJ 473). [150] A fortiori, the nature of the appeal depends on the terms of the statute conferring that right. It is a matter of construction to be given to the provisions conferring the right to appeal. Legislative intention can also be found by examining the legislation as a whole. Limiting the right to bring an appeal is a way of encouraging finality. If an examination of the language and policy of the Act granting the right of appeal concludes that Parliament intends to limit an appeal, the court must give effect to it. [17] We find that upon close scrutiny the questions of law posed are real questions and not by any means dressed up to pass the muster of section 49 and accordingly proceeded to determine the same. [18] We should like to mention too that whilst there is no mathematical formula to determine the amount of compensation and it is not an exact science, the process by which the amount of compensation is arrived at is very much a subject of scrutiny. It is also trite law that, under paragraph 1 of the First Schedule to the Land Acquisition Act 1960, in determining the market value, the court will always be guided by the comparable method adopted by both parties’ valuers and subsequently the assessors - Zawasima Sdn Bhd v Superintendent of land & Surveys Kuching Division (2006) 7 MLJ 488. [19] Before us, the Appellant had submitted that the learned JC and the assessors did not take cognizance of and/or completely disregarded the thorough analysis and evidence adduced by the appellant, which shows that comparable 1 (“R1”) and comparable 2 (“R2”) are sale transactions which were transacted under “special circumstances” and not the “best comparable to value the Scheduled Land”. [20] For ease of reference, the table of a summary of R1 and R2 is as follows: Respondent’s Valuers’ Comparable No 1 (R1) Respondent’s Valuers’ Comparable No 2 (R2) Lot No Lot 13839 Lot 13840 Mukim Sungai Buloh Sungai Buloh Daerah Petaling Petaling Transaction date 15.12.2016 04.06.2014 [21] It is pertinent to note that there is no dispute that R1 and R2 are neighbouring lots. [22] The Appellant had submitted that the special circumstances under which R1 and R2 were transacted render both transactions unsuitable to be adopted as comparable and thus ought to have been disregarded. It was transacted at a price much lower (around 50% lower) than the market value of similar properties with similar characteristics in the vicinity. It was sold under special circumstances, as the previous landowner had no other option but to sell R1 at a much lower price due to financial constraints at the material time on the condition that the price consideration was paid in cash terms (refer to Appellant’s Rebuttal Report at pages 257, Jilid 2B of ROA). [23] Based on the common comparable and the proof of market value for residential land in Mukim Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, the appellant submitted that the market value should be between RM1,883.62 psm @ RM174.99 psf to RM6,458.40 psm @ RM600.00 psf. [24] Having carefully studied the Appellant valuer’s contemporaneous documents, such as a statutory declaration from the director of the previous landowner and the notice of assessment of ad valorem stamp duty, we are satisfied that the Scheduled Land was in fact sold to the appellant at lower market value due to the previous landowner’s financial constraints. Consequently, that comparison is not suitable in determining the market value of the scheduled land. [25] We are also of the considered view that, in a similar vein, R2 cannot be used as a comparison as it was also transacted under special circumstances. [26] Thus, by taking into account that comparable the process of valuation cannot be said to be without flaws. ISSUE II [27] They are three (3) common comparable sale transactions among the sale transactions adopted by the Appellant’s valuer and Respondent’s valuer. The Appellant’s valuer compared the scheduled land to five (5) sale transactions, whereas the Respondent’s valuer compared the scheduled land to seven (7) sale transactions as per table below: - Appellant’s Valuer’s Comparable Sale Transaction Respondent’s Valuer’s comparable Sale