D Aman Crimson Management Corporation v Alvin Wong Tze Hoong (BA-22NCvC-359-09/2022)

ALVIN WONG TZE HOONG

WAKIL DIRI KEPADA CHEONG SIEW NGAN @ CHONG KOOI LAN

TEH KIM HUA

CRIMSON COMMERCIAL PARK SDN BHD [(NO. SYARIKAT: 199401030292 (315973-V)]

PENGARAH TANAH DAN GALIAN SELANGOR … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 14/07/2026 09:30:25 BA-22NCvC-359-09/2022 Kand. 179 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A.

This case is, in substance, a contest between the blueprint and the register. The “blueprint”, as relied upon by the Plaintiff, consists of the Development Order, the Approved Building Plans and the planning documents which, the Plaintiff says, contemplated a kindergarten facility within the D’Aman Crimson development. The “register”, as relied upon by the Defendants, records Parcel 52 as a separate strata parcel presently held by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. The task of this Court was therefore not merely to ask whether the route by which Parcel 52 reached the register was free from doubt. It was to determine whether the doubts, irregularities and concerns proved at trial were legally sufficient to undo or rectify the registered strata title.

The dispute concerns Parcel 52, also known as GERAN 98687/M1/2/52, situated within the D’Aman Crimson development in Ara Damansara, Petaling Jaya. The Plaintiff’s case is that Parcel 52 was approved as a kindergarten facility or “kemudahan” and should have formed part of the common property. The Defendants’ answer is that, whatever concerns may arise from the planning and subdivision history, Parcel 52 appears in the operative strata documentation and the land register as a separate strata parcel. The competing positions therefore required this Court to examine both the planning documents and the registered title, and to decide which carried legal consequence on the facts proved.

After full trial, this Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim against all Defendants and made no order as to costs. The formal judgment records that the trial proceeded on 3 November 2025, 6 November 2025, 1 December 2025, 10 December 2025, 12 December 2025, 20 January 2026, 21 January 2026 and 27 January 2026. Oral clarification was heard on 28 April 2026, and judgment was delivered on 14 May 2026 dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim with no order as to costs.

The Plaintiff has appealed against the whole decision. The Notice of Appeal states that the Plaintiff appeals against the decision dated 14 May 2026, namely the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claim and the order that there be no order as to costs. B.

The agreed facts identify the parties. The Plaintiff is the Management Corporation of D’Aman Crimson Condominium, certified as such on 7 July 2009. The 1st, 2nd (Deceased) and 3rd Defendants are the present registered proprietors of Parcel

The 4th Defendant, Crimson Commercial Park Sdn Bhd, was the developer of the project on the master title known as GERAN 98687, Lot 71517, Daerah Petaling, Mukim Damansara, Negeri Selangor. The 5th Defendant is the Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Selangor, and the agreed facts state that reference to the 5th Defendant includes reference to the State Authority under section 16 of the National Land Code.

D’Aman Crimson is a mixed strata development consisting of residential and commercial components. The dispute relates to one parcel only, but the questions raised are wider than a simple contest of possession. The Court had to consider the Development Order, the Approved Building Plan, the strata plan, the strata title, the later dealings with Parcel 52, and the legal protection given to registered title under the National Land Code.

The Plaintiff’s pleaded case was that Parcel 52 had been approved as a kindergarten facility under the Development Order and Approved Building Plan No. MPPJ/PJB/BP8795/98(IL), but that the 4th Defendant wrongfully caused it to be treated as a commercial or business parcel and transferred to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. The Plaintiff sought declarations that the transfer registered on 23 July 2010 was invalid, that Parcel 52 was common property vested in the Plaintiff, an order under section 417 of the National Land Code, injunctive relief, accounts, repayment of rental or income, damages and costs.

The parties agreed on four issues to be tried. First, whether Parcel 52 was meant to be common property under the Strata Titles Act 1985, the Town and Country Planning Act 1976, the Building and Common Property (Maintenance and Management) Act 2007 and the Approved Building Plan. Secondly, whether the 4th Defendant acted contrary to those statutes and the Approved Building Plan when Parcel 52 was sold or transferred. Thirdly, whether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants were bona fide purchasers and/or had an indefeasible title under section 340 NLC. Fourthly, whether the 5th Defendant failed to exercise due diligence when accepting the 4th Defendant’s Form 1 application dated 17 July 2008.

The Plaintiff called four witnesses: SP1 Zain Azly bin Abdul Rahman, an officer from MBPJ; SP2 Sivanesan a/l Subramaniam, a licensed land surveyor; SP3 Ang Kok Hooi; and SP4 Tew Swee Kiam. The Defendants called SD1 Alvin Wong Tze Hoong, SD2 Lee Ai Theng, SD3 Teh Min Chung, SD4 Chin Wing Wah and SD5 Aziz bin Haron. The Notes of Proceedings identify the witnesses and the dates on which they testified.

It was not disputed that the 4th Defendant had made a Form 1 application under the Strata Titles Act 1985. The 5th Defendant’s case summary states that the application was dated 17 July 2008, that it was approved on 25 November 2008, and that the strata register was opened on 7 July 2009. It also states that upon the opening of the strata register, common property in the subdivided building vested in the Plaintiff, and that a transfer was later registered on 23 July 2010.

The issue was therefore not whether the Plaintiff was the Management Corporation. It was. Nor was it disputed that common property vested in the Plaintiff upon the opening of the strata register. The dispute was whether Parcel 52 formed part of that common property notwithstanding that the strata documentation and register treated it as a parcel. C.

The Plaintiff submitted that Parcel 52 was a kindergarten facility, not an ordinary commercial parcel. It relied on the Development Order, the Approved Building Plan, the evidence from MBPJ and the evidence of its surveyor. The Plaintiff emphasised that only 68 business units were approved and that the kindergarten was not one of those units. Its written submission described Parcel 52 as having been originally approved as a kindergarten facility under the Approved Building Plan and Development Order, but unlawfully converted by the 4th Defendant into a commercial or business parcel.

The Plaintiff further submitted that its challenge was not confined to fraud under section 340(2)(a) NLC. In reply, the Plaintiff argued that its case engaged all three limbs of section 340, namely fraud or misrepresentation, registration by means of an insufficient or void instrument, and unlawful acquisition. The Plaintiff said the Form 1 application, strata plan and resulting title did not correspond with the approved development documents and could not be saved merely because registration had occurred.

The Plaintiff relied on Perbadanan Pengurusan Palm Spring @ Damansara v Muafakat Kekal Sdn Bhd & Ors (No.2) [2015] 5 MLRH 426, Ideal Advantage Sdn Bhd v Perbadanan Pengurusan Palm Spring @ Damansara and another appeal [2020] 4 MLJ 93, Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd v Waldorf & Windsor Joint Management Body [2014] 3 MLJ 467, and PJ Centrestage JMB v Cherish Springs Sdn Bhd & Ors [2024] MLJU 591. The Plaintiff submitted that those authorities show that a developer cannot carve out a facility approved or represented for the benefit of purchasers and thereafter sell it as a private parcel.

As against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants, the Plaintiff submitted that they were not bona fide purchasers. The Plaintiff relied on the description in the SPA that Parcel 52 was designated for kindergarten or childcare use, the disparity between the purchase price and the LHDN valuation, the difference between the area stated in the SPA and the area reflected in the strata title, and SD1’s failure to make further inquiry. The Plaintiff said those matters showed that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants had sufficient notice of irregularity and could not rely on the protection of section 340.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants denied wrongdoing. Their case was that they acquired Parcel 52 from Sen Lam Chun @ Tan Doeu Swan under an SPA dated 23 December 2009, and not as original purchasers involved in the Development Order, Approved Building Plan, strata plan, Form 1 application, or dealings with MBPJ, JUPEM or PTG. Their post-trial submission stated that they had no specific knowledge of the 4th Defendant’s alleged wrongdoing and that they acquired Parcel 52 as purchasers for value.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants further submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to plead and prove fraud with sufficient particularity against them. They relied on section 340 NLC and the authorities on deferred indefeasibility, including Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1, See Leong Chye @ Sze Leong Chye & Anor v United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd and another appeal [2021] 5 MLJ 759, Pushpaleela a/p R Selvarajah & Anor v Rajamani d/o Meyappa Chettiar and other appeals [2019] 2 MLJ 553, Bayangan Sepadu Sdn Bhd v Jabatan Pengairan dan Saliran Negeri Selangor & Ors [2022] 1 MLJ 701, and Malayan Banking Bhd v Mohd Affandi Ahmad & Anor [2024] 10 CLJ 501. These authorities appeared in the bundles relied upon by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

The 4th Defendant submitted that Parcel 52 was duly parcelised and registered as a strata parcel, and that the title remained valid and subsisting. The 4th Defendant also contended that the Plaintiff had not properly challenged the strata title itself and that the reliefs sought could not be granted without first defeating the registered title.

The 4th Defendant distinguished Palm Spring. It submitted that in Palm Spring, the Development Order expressly referred to “Kemudahan Umum Yang Disediakan” and specifically identified “Taska – Blok J”. The 4th Defendant submitted that the D’Aman Crimson Development Order used the word “kemudahan” and did not expressly state “kemudahan umum”, “kemudahan awam” or common property. The same distinction was also taken by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants in their further written submissions.

The 5th Defendant’s position was that the strata title was registered and issued based on the Form 1 application and information supplied by the 4th Defendant. D5’s case summary records that D4 submitted Form 1 dated 17 July 2008, that the application was approved on 25 November 2008, and that the strata register was opened on 7 July 2009. D. ISSUES, FINDINGS AND REASONS D1. Whether Parcel 52 was common property and whether the 4th Defendant’s parcelisation exercise was legally impugned

I deal with the first and second issues together because they arise from the same evidence. The first issue asks whether Parcel 52 was common property. The second asks whether the 4th Defendant acted contrary to the approved development documents and the relevant statutes when Parcel 52 was sold or transferred.

The Plaintiff bore the burden of proving the facts on which its claim depended. Sections 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950 place the legal burden on the party who asserts the existence of a fact and seeks judgment based on that fact. D4 relied on those provisions and on the ordinary civil standard of proof. I accepted that the burden remained on the Plaintiff throughout. The question was whether the evidence went far enough to justify the reliefs sought.

On the evidence, the Plaintiff had a real basis for complaint. SP1, an officer from MBPJ, gave evidence from the local authority’s records. He testified that the approved layout showed a total of 68 business units, being 34 units on one level and 34 units on the first floor. He stated that the kindergarten was not within that shop-lot configuration. When asked whether the kindergarten was categorised as a shop lot in the plan, his answer was “Tidak”. When asked who had ownership of the facilities approved according to the Development Order and Approved Building Plan, he answered that they were owned by D’Aman Crimson Management Corporation.

SP1’s witness statement also referred to the Approved Building Plan No. MPPJ/PJB/BP8795/98(IL), which showed an

Administrative/Management Office and a kindergarten at level He stated that, based on MBPJ’s records, there was no amendment to the Development Order and Approved Building Plan converting the kindergarten at level 1 into a business building. The Development Order required, among other matters, a kindergarten measuring the equivalent of two residential units, a reading room of 400 square feet and a multipurpose hall of 1,000 square feet.

I placed weight on SP1’s evidence because it came from MBPJ’s records. It supported the Plaintiff’s position that the approved commercial component was not open-ended. The approved commercial units were 68 in number. The kindergarten was dealt with separately in the approved development documents. It was not shown to be one of the ordinary shop or business units.

SP1’s evidence, however, also had limits. The Development Order did not expressly use the words “common property”. It also did not identify Parcel 52 by reference to its later strata parcel number. That is understandable because Parcel 52 came into being through the later strata process. Nevertheless, the absence of express language became important when the Plaintiff asked this Court to go beyond identifying irregularity and to make an order that would defeat or rectify an existing registered strata title.

SP2, the licensed surveyor called by the Plaintiff, supported the Plaintiff’s case on the original approved structure. His evidence, as summarised in the Plaintiff’s submissions, was that the approved commercial component consisted of only 68 business units and that the kindergarten was not categorised as one of those approved business lots. SP2 also took the view that Parcel 52 ought to be treated as common property by reference to the Development Order, the approved planning documents and the brochure.

SP2’s evidence was important because it showed that the Plaintiff’s case was not founded merely on the presence of the word “kindergarten”. The Plaintiff’s case was founded on the original approved structure of the development: 68 business units, a kindergarten facility, a reading room and other facilities. On that evidence, the kindergarten was not originally conceived as an ordinary commercial parcel available for sale in the same manner as the approved shop lots.

SP2’s evidence also had to be weighed against the operative strata documents. He could identify the inconsistency between the Approved Building Plan and the later strata treatment. However, the approved strata documents and strata title did not identify Parcel 52 as common property. That distinction explains the outcome of this case. The Plaintiff made out a serious case on irregularity, but not every irregularity in the route to registration is enough to impeach the register.

The evidence of SP4 was considered in the same way. SP4’s evidence reflected the Management Corporation’s complaint that Parcel 52 should not have been treated as private property. SP4 disagreed with the suggestion that a facility such as a kindergarten could be treated as either private or common at the developer’s discretion. SP4 also relied on the price and size discrepancies as matters suggesting that the acquisition was suspicious. However, SP4’s evidence was weaker on the specific historical conveyancing transactions involving RMS Capital, PEM and Sen Lam Chun, and on the specific acts of fraud alleged personally against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

The evidence called by the 4th Defendant did not remove this Court’s concern. SD2, Lee Ai Theng, accepted under cross-examination that under planning law, a “kemudahan” required by planning permission is a facility for the benefit of the development and not merely an optional commercial unit. She also accepted that the Approved Building Plan came before the strata plan, and that the strata plan was prepared by the surveyor appointed by the developer.

SD2 also accepted that, according to the Approved Building Plan, the shop lots were 68 in number. When the strata plan was considered, the number of parcels included the kindergarten and management office, resulting in 70 parcels if those two were counted. This supported the Plaintiff’s complaint that the later strata arrangement did not sit comfortably with the approved development documents.

SD3, Teh Min Chung, was the licensed surveyor involved in the strata plan. His evidence was significant. He accepted that the kindergarten in the Approved Building Plan was identified as Parcel 52. He also accepted that it was not marked yellow as common property and that it was made an individual parcel on the developer’s instruction. When asked whether the developer provided any document from MPPJ showing that Parcel 52 should be identified as an individual parcel and not common property, SD3 said he could not remember.

SD3 further accepted that if the approved building plan designated a space as a kindergarten facility, it did not necessarily mean common property under the Strata Titles Act. That answer was legally relevant, but it also revealed the weakness in D4’s explanation. SD3’s evidence showed that the matter was treated as a “grey area” in which the developer proposed the parcelisation and the authorities later approved it. It did not show a clear contemporaneous approval converting the kindergarten into an additional commercial parcel.

SD4, Chin Wing Wah, gave evidence as a representative of D4. His evidence did not produce a satisfactory document showing that Parcel 52 had been approved from the beginning as ordinary commercial stock-in-trade. When asked whether he had records before the Court to show that the developer had treated Parcel 52 as stock-in-trade from the beginning, he said there should be such records, but he did not have them before the Court.

SD4 was also asked where the document was to show that Parcel 52 had been approved as a shop lot in the Approved Building Plan. His answer was that he did not think it was before the Court. He accepted that the Kebenaran Merancang mentioned “Tadika” and that the unit was specially allocated for “Tadika”, which was why the SPA specifically mentioned that the lot should be used as a kindergarten.

On this evidence, I find that the Plaintiff established a genuine and substantial grievance. The Development Order and Approved Building Plan contemplated a kindergarten facility. The approved business units were 68 in number. There was no satisfactory document before this Court showing how the kindergarten facility was validly converted into an additional commercial parcel.

That finding, however, is not the same as a finding that Parcel 52 must now be declared common property and the existing title rectified. The Plaintiff’s reliefs would affect a registered strata title. The Court therefore had to consider the planning documents together with the strata documents, the register, the lapse of time, the subsequent dealings, and the statutory protection of registered title.

Section 17 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 provides that upon the opening of the book of the strata register, common property vests in the management corporation. That proposition was not disputed. The Plaintiff became the Management Corporation, and common property vested in it. The question was whether Parcel 52 was part of that common property. The operative strata documentation treated Parcel 52 as a parcel. No strata title or strata document produced before this Court expressly identified Parcel 52 as common property vested in the Plaintiff.

I considered the Plaintiff’s authorities. Palm Spring, Ideal Advantage, Malaysia Land Properties v Waldorf & Windsor, and PJ Centrestage support the proposition that courts may scrutinise a developer’s conduct where facilities or amenities are alleged to have been wrongfully carved out and treated as private parcels. The Plaintiff’s reliance on those cases was therefore not misplaced.

In Palm Spring, the development document expressly referred to “Kemudahan Umum Yang Disediakan” and specifically identified “Taska – Blok J”. The point of that case was that the taska was clearly within the list of public or communal facilities. The court was therefore able to treat the developer’s subsequent attempt to carve it out as wrongful. That principle is relevant, but the facts here differ. The D’Aman Crimson Development Order referred to “kemudahan”, but did not expressly say “kemudahan umum”, “kemudahan awam” or “common property”. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants emphasised this distinction in their further submission.

I do not hold that the absence of the word “umum” is decisive by itself. A developer cannot determine the legal character of a facility merely by labels. The Court must examine the documents as a whole. However, when the Court is asked to disturb a registered strata title many years after registration, the wording of the Development Order is material. The Plaintiff had stronger evidence that a kindergarten was required; it had weaker evidence that the kindergarten was expressly designated in the operative documents as common property.

Ideal Advantage was also considered. The Plaintiff relied on it for the proposition that a transaction contrary to the Development Order and the relevant planning and strata legislation may fall within the “insufficient or void instrument” limb of section 340(2)(b) NLC. I accept that legal proposition. A registration obtained by means of an insufficient or void instrument is not protected merely by registration. But whether an instrument is insufficient or void depends on the proven facts. In this case, the evidence did not go far enough to show that the instrument of transfer to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants was void or insufficient in law.

Malaysia Land Properties v Waldorf & Windsor and PJ Centrestage were also considered. Those cases show that sales brochures, representations to purchasers and approved plans may assist the Court in deciding whether a disputed area was intended to form part of common property. In the present case, the sales brochure and SPA structure did not expressly identify the kindergarten as a common facility available to purchasers in the same direct way. That was another material difference.

The SPA and brochure point is important. The Court accepted that the Development Order and Approved Building Plan contemplated a kindergarten. But the Plaintiff did not produce an SPA or brochure showing that the kindergarten was expressly represented to purchasers as one of the common facilities in the way seen in some of the authorities relied upon. That gap did not defeat the Plaintiff’s complaint entirely, but it weakened the case for the declarations sought.

The Court also took into account the passage of time and the dealings that occurred after registration. Parcel 52 had existed openly as a separate strata parcel for many years. There were prior dealings involving RMS Capital, PEM and Sen Lam Chun @ Tan Doeu Swan before the acquisition by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. The documentary bundles included the earlier sale and assignment documents in that chain.

The Plaintiff itself issued statements of account in respect of Parcel 52, treating the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants as persons liable for maintenance and related charges in respect of that parcel. Those statements do not prove ownership and do not defeat a statutory claim if the Plaintiff had otherwise made out its case. They do, however, show that the registered position had been acted upon for a long period.

My finding on the first and second issues is therefore a mixed one. I find that the Plaintiff raised a genuine and serious complaint. I also find that D4’s subdivision and parcelisation exercise gives rise to serious concern. The evidence did not satisfactorily explain how a kindergarten facility shown in the approved development documents came to be separately parcelised as Parcel 52. However, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff established a sufficient legal basis to declare Parcel 52 common property in a manner that defeats the existing registered strata title. D2. Whether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ registered title could be defeated under section 340 NLC

The third issue determines the outcome of the case. Even if D4’s conduct gives rise to serious concern, the Plaintiff still had to show a legal basis to defeat or rectify the registered title presently held by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

Section 340 NLC provides that a registered title or interest is indefeasible, subject to the exceptions in section 340(2). Those exceptions include fraud or misrepresentation to which the registered proprietor or his agent was a party or privy; registration obtained by forgery or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; and title or interest unlawfully acquired in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by written law. Section 340(3) then provides that where a title or interest is defeasible by reason of those matters, it may be set aside in the hands of a subsequent transferee, subject to the proviso protecting a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration.

In Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2 MLJ 1, the Federal Court confirmed the doctrine of deferred indefeasibility under section 340 NLC. The proviso to section 340(3) protects a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration. It does not protect an immediate purchaser whose registration falls directly within section 340(2). The case therefore required this Court to consider the chronology of the dealings and the position of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants within that chronology.

In Pushpaleela a/p R Selvarajah & Anor v Rajamani d/o Meyappa Chettiar and other appeals [2019] 2 MLJ 553, the Federal Court emphasised the importance of the register. The register document of title is conclusive evidence that title is vested in the registered proprietor unless the title is shown to be defeasible under section 340. That principle is important here because Parcel 52 is registered in the names of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

See Leong Chye @ Sze Leong Chye & Anor v United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd and another appeal [2021] 5 MLJ 759 was also relevant. It confirms that the question whether a party is a subsequent purchaser must be determined by reference to the sequence of dealings and the facts proved. In this case, although the transfer document was registered from D4 to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants, the evidence showed a prior chain involving RMS Capital, PEM and Sen Lam Chun, and that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ purchase was pursuant to their SPA with Sen Lam Chun @ Tan Doeu Swan.

The Plaintiff submitted that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants were not bona fide purchasers. I considered that submission carefully. There were features in the evidence that caused concern. SD1 accepted that the SPA described the property as designated for use as a childcare or kindergarten. A letter from the purchasers’ solicitors dated 29 December 2009 referred to the transaction and recorded that the vendor was Sen Lam Chun @ Tan Doeu Swan and that the purchasers sought a direct transfer after issuance of the strata title.

SD1 was also cross-examined on the purchase price and valuation. He accepted that the purchase price was substantially lower than the LHDN valuation of RM580,000. He accepted that stamp duty was paid, and that he knew from the stamp duty process that the property had been valued at a higher figure than the purchase price. The exact difference in figures was not decisive. What mattered was that the Plaintiff relied on the disparity as one circumstance said to show lack of good faith.

SD1 was further cross-examined on the area discrepancy. The SPA referred to approximately 2,628 square feet, whereas the strata title was said to reflect an area substantially larger than that. When asked whether he inquired why he received such additional space, SD1 answered “No”. He also accepted that the transfer documents involved D4 and the purchasers, although he maintained that he had never met D4 and did not know the details of the earlier dealings.

SD1’s evidence on inquiry was not wholly satisfactory. He said he did not really compare the title with the SPA. He also said that the strata title did not state a kindergarten restriction and appeared to allow commercial or residential use. He explained that the kindergarten business was operated under the name Tadika Merah Ceria and under a Peter and Jane franchise.

I also considered the evidence that the kindergarten licence had initially been temporary and that the authorities did not at first recognise Parcel 52 as a kindergarten lot. SD1 accepted that to operate a kindergarten, licences were required, and that the remaining matter was to establish the unit as a kindergarten lot. He also accepted that the kindergarten business ceased around 2016, after the death of his mother-in-law and due to business competition.

These matters caused the Court to approach portions of SD1’s evidence with caution. The reference to kindergarten or childcare use in the SPA, the price issue, the area discrepancy and the limited inquiry made by SD1 were matters that invited suspicion. They were relevant to good faith and to the Court’s assessment of SD1’s evidence.

Suspicion, however, is not proof. The Court must decide the case on pleaded facts and proven facts. The Plaintiff still had to prove fraud, misrepresentation, absence of good faith, an insufficient or void instrument, or unlawful acquisition within the meaning of section 340.

The chronology remained important. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants were not shown to have prepared the Development Order, procured the Approved Building Plan, instructed the surveyors for the original strata subdivision, dealt with JUPEM, submitted Form 1 to PTG, or caused the kindergarten to be identified as Parcel 52. Their acquisition arose through the SPA with Sen Lam Chun @ Tan Doeu Swan. The Plaintiff’s case was strongest when directed at the 4th Defendant’s original subdivision and parcelisation exercise. It was weaker when directed personally against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

The prior chain of dealings also mattered. The evidence showed transactions involving RMS Capital, PEM and Sen Lam Chun @ Tan Doeu Swan before the acquisition by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. The fact that the eventual transfer was directly from D4 did not by itself prove that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants participated in D4’s original parcelisation exercise. It showed that after the strata title was issued, the transfer was effected in a way consistent with the prior chain and the request for direct transfer.

The Plaintiff also relied on SD1’s answer that he wanted to retain the parcel as private property. That answer did not advance the Plaintiff’s case very far. SD1 claimed ownership. It was therefore unsurprising that he wished to retain the parcel. The answer did not, without more, prove fraud, knowing participation or knowledge of illegality.

I next considered the pleading and proof of fraud. In Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLJ 1, the Federal Court held that the standard of proof for fraud in civil proceedings is on the balance of probabilities. That does not remove the need to plead and prove the facts constituting fraud. Authorities such as Ting Ling Kiew & Anor v Tang Eng Iron Works Co Ltd [1992] 2 MLJ 217 and Wong Yew Kwan v Wong Yu Ke & Anor [2009] 2 MLJ 672 support the settled requirement that fraud must be pleaded with sufficient particulars. These authorities were relied upon in the parties’ bundles.

In this case, the Plaintiff pleaded illegality, impropriety and breach of statutory provisions in relation to the subdivision and parcelisation process. Those allegations were mainly directed at D4’s conduct. The allegations personally directed against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants were broader and less particularised. The evidence did not prove that they were parties or privies to fraud or misrepresentation. It also did not prove that they had actual knowledge that Parcel 52 had been unlawfully carved out from common property.

The Plaintiff was correct to submit that the case was not only about fraud. Section 340(2)(b) and section 340(2)(c) may apply even where fraud is not proved. A title may be defeasible where registration was obtained by forgery or by means of an insufficient or void instrument, or where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired in the purported exercise of statutory power. But those grounds must still be established on the evidence.

I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff proved that the registration of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ title was obtained by means of an insufficient or void instrument. The Plaintiff proved serious concerns about the consistency between the approved development documents and the later strata subdivision. But the strata application went through the statutory process, the strata register was opened, the strata title was issued, and Parcel 52 was thereafter dealt with as a parcel. The Court was not shown a sufficient legal basis to hold that the instrument of transfer to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants was void.

I am also not satisfied that the Plaintiff proved unlawful acquisition by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants within section 340(2)(c). That provision concerns title or interest unlawfully acquired in the purported exercise of statutory power or authority. The Plaintiff’s strongest argument under this limb concerned the developer’s conduct and the processing of the strata application. It did not prove that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants themselves unlawfully acquired the title by exercising or purporting to exercise any statutory power.

I considered the Plaintiff’s reliance on Ideal Advantage in this context. The case shows that a transaction in breach of the development approval and relevant statutes may, in a proper case, support a finding of an insufficient or void instrument. But the present case is not the same on the evidence. The Development Order did not expressly identify the kindergarten as “kemudahan umum”; the SPA and brochure did not expressly represent it as a common facility in the same direct way; and the evidence did not prove that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants were involved in or had actual knowledge of D4’s original parcelisation exercise.

The authorities relied upon by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants, including Bayangan Sepadu and Malayan Banking Bhd v Mohd Affandi Ahmad & Anor, were also considered. Those authorities recognise the importance of the register and caution against imposing an unlimited duty on every purchaser to investigate the entire history of a registered title where the register itself does not reveal the alleged defect. That principle does not protect fraud. It does, however, answer the Plaintiff’s submission that SD1’s failure to make deeper inquiry, by itself, was enough to defeat good faith.

I, therefore find that the Plaintiff has not proved fraud, knowing participation or absence of good faith on the part of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants. I also find that the Plaintiff has not proved that the transfer to them was void, or that their title was unlawfully acquired, in a manner sufficient to defeat the registered title.

The result on section 340 is this. The Court’s concern about D4’s conduct does not, without the required proof, defeat the registered title presently held by D1, D2 and D3. The register is protected unless the case is brought within the statutory grounds for defeasibility. On the evidence before this Court, those grounds were not established. D3. Whether the 5th Defendant failed to exercise due diligence and whether relief under section 417 NLC should be granted

The fourth agreed issue concerns the 5th Defendant. The Plaintiff submitted that the 5th Defendant failed to exercise due diligence when accepting and approving the 4th Defendant’s Form 1 application dated 17 July 2008. The Plaintiff argued that the Form 1 application should have been checked against the Development Order and Approved Building Plan, and that the inconsistency concerning the kindergarten should have been detected.

I accept that the evidence raises questions about the strata process. If the Development Order and Approved Building Plan contemplated a kindergarten facility, and if the approved business units were 68, it is troubling that Parcel 52 later appeared as a separate parcel. SD5’s evidence and D5’s case summary showed that the strata title was issued based on the information and documents submitted by D4 through the strata process.

However, the claim against D5 was not a free-standing public law challenge to the strata approval. It was tied to the Plaintiff’s claim for declarations, rectification and transfer of Parcel 52 as common property. Since the Plaintiff has not established the underlying entitlement to defeat or rectify the registered title presently held by D1, D2 and D3, no consequential order can properly be made against D5.

Section 417 NLC is procedural and consequential. It permits the Court to direct the Registrar or relevant land authority to do what is necessary to give effect to a judgment or order relating to land. It does not itself create the substantive right to cancel, transfer or rectify a title. Since the Plaintiff has not established the substantive basis for the declarations or rectification sought, no order under section 417 NLC is made.

The claim against the 5th Defendant is therefore dismissed. This finding should not be read as an endorsement of every step in the strata process. It only means that the Plaintiff has not established the legal foundation necessary for the Court to grant the relief sought against D5.

The Plaintiff’s prayers were founded on the central contention that Parcel 52 is common property and that the registered title presently held by D1, D2 and D3 should be defeated or rectified. Since that contention has not been established to the required standard, the declaratory reliefs are refused.

The prayer for a declaration that the transfer of Parcel 52 is invalid is refused. The prayer for a declaration that Parcel 52 constitutes common property vested in the Plaintiff is refused. The prayer for rectification or transfer under section 417 NLC is refused.

The prayers for injunctive relief are also refused. The Plaintiff has not established the proprietary basis necessary to restrain D1, D2 and D3 from dealing with Parcel 52 as registered proprietors.

The prayers for accounts, repayment of rental or income, and damages are refused. Those prayers depend on the Plaintiff first proving that Parcel 52 belongs to it or is vested in it as common property. That has not been proved in a manner sufficient to defeat the registered title. E.

Although the Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed, I do not consider this an appropriate case to award costs against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is a Management Corporation which brought the action in respect of what it contended to be a development facility or amenity. The complaint was not frivolous.

The Court has accepted that the Plaintiff raised serious concerns about the approved development documents and the manner in which Parcel 52 came to be parcelised. The Plaintiff failed not because the complaint was baseless, but because the evidence and the law did not justify defeating the registered title presently held by D1, D2 and D3.

The findings are therefore mixed. The Plaintiff failed to obtain the declarations, rectification, injunction, accounts and damages sought. At the same time, the Court has recorded serious concern about D4’s subdivision and parcelisation exercise.

The Court also takes into account the communal nature of the dispute. The Plaintiff brought the action as the Management Corporation of the development and in respect of what it said was the loss of a facility intended for residents. In those circumstances, each party shall bear its own costs.

There shall be no order as to costs. F.

The Plaintiff proved a genuine and serious concern about Parcel 52. The Development Order and Approved Building Plan contemplated a kindergarten facility. The approved commercial units were 68 in number. The evidence did not provide a satisfactory explanation as to how the kindergarten facility came to be treated as a separately parcelised private parcel.

However, the Plaintiff did not prove a legal basis sufficient to declare Parcel 52 common property in a manner that would defeat the existing registered strata title. The operative strata documents and strata title treated Parcel 52 as a separate parcel. The title had existed and been acted upon for many years. Several transactions had taken place. The Plaintiff itself had treated D1, D2 and D3 as parcel proprietors for purposes of maintenance and related charges.

The Plaintiff also did not prove fraud, knowing participation or absence of good faith on the part of D1, D2 and D3. Nor did it prove that their registered title was liable to be defeated under section 340 NLC on the basis of an insufficient or void instrument or unlawful acquisition.

The claim against the 5th Defendant also fails because the Plaintiff did not establish the underlying entitlement required for rectification or consequential orders under section 417 NLC.

For these reasons, the Plaintiff’s claim against all Defendants is dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs. Dated 8 July 2026 -sgd-ANITA BINTI HARUN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN To the parties’ solicitors: For the Plaintiff : Parma a/l Chandravevah (Messrs Parma’s Chamber) For the 1st-3rd Defendants: Yap Wen Han (Messrs H L Lee & Co.) For the 4th Defendant : Reeve Lim Chun Loong & Nga Ching Sim (Messrs Lim Brothers) For the 5th Defendant : Namirah Hanum Binti Mohamed Albaki (Pejabat Tanah Dan Galian,