D2D Bizhub Sdn. Bhd. v 1. ) Alpha Fintech Sdn. Bhd. (WA-22NCC-641-09/2024)

ALPHA FINTECH SDN. BHD. (Company No: 202001002827

KOH CHEE SIONG (NRIC No: 840621-04-5247) ... DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT Introduction [1] Before the court is the Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment pursuant to Order 14 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) against the Defendants for the sum of RM1,250,000.00 together with interest and costs. The application is made under Enclosure 7. Background Facts [2] The Plaintiff, D2D Bizhub Sdn. Bhd., is a company incorporated in Malaysia. The First Defendant, Alpha Fintech Sdn. Bhd., is also a company incorporated in Malaysia. The Second Defendant, Koh Chee Siong, is a director of the First Defendant. [3] It is the Plaintiff’s case that between May 2023 and July 2023, the First Defendant obtained and received a friendly loan amounting to RM1,250,000.00 from the Plaintiff. The Defendants dispute this and contend that they received funds from Geforce Hardware Wholesale, not from the Plaintiff. The Defendants further allege that they actually dealt with one “Zack Low” who they claim was from Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd, and not with the Plaintiff. [4] On 11.12.2023, a Settlement Agreement was signed by the First Defendant and the Plaintiff. According to this document, the First Defendant acknowledged receiving a friendly loan of RM1,250,000.00 from the Plaintiff and agreed to repay the amount in 4 monthly instalments from 15.12.2023 to 15.4.2024. The first three instalments were to be RM300,000.00 each, with the final instalment being RM350,000.00. [5] Under the Settlement Agreement, if the First Defendant failed to pay any instalment, it would be liable to pay late payment compensation at the rate of 18% per annum on the loan amount from the date the instalment was due until full settlement of the loan. [6] A Letter of Guarantee dated 11.12.2023 was signed by the Second Defendant, whereby he agreed to indemnify the Plaintiff against losses, injuries, costs, and expenses incurred by the Plaintiff due to the First Defendant’s default or failure to perform and/or comply with the Settlement Agreement. The Defendants now claim that this document was signed under duress. [7] No monthly instalments were made under the Settlement Agreement. The Plaintiff, through its solicitor’s letter dated 21.1.2024, terminated the Settlement Agreement and demanded payment of the amount stated in the agreement. [8] The First Defendant sent letters dated 24.1.2024 and 6.2.2024 to the Plaintiff’s solicitors requesting more time to make payment. These letters do not deny the existence of an obligation to pay the Plaintiff. [9] Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed a legal action against the Defendants through Civil Suit No. WA-22NCC-98-02/2024 (“Suit 98”) in the Kuala Lumpur High Court. [10] The parties then exchanged correspondence through their solicitors, with the Plaintiff’s solicitor sending a letter dated 19.4.2024 and the Defendants’ solicitor responding with a letter dated 30.4.2024. These letters document a settlement arrangement with the following terms: a) The Defendants would pay the Plaintiff RM1,250,000.00 in 8 instalments according to an agreed schedule; b) Post-dated cheques were to be provided to the Plaintiff; and c) If any instalment was not paid or any cheque was dishonoured: i) The Plaintiff would give written notice to the Defendants, and the Defendants would have 2 weeks to rectify the failure; ii) If the Defendants failed to do so, the entire Settlement Amount less any payments made, plus interest at 8% per annum calculated from 31.5.2024 until full payment, would become immediately due and payable; and iii) Upon receipt of the post-dated cheques, the Plaintiff would withdraw Suit 98. [11] Post-dated cheques were provided to the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff withdrew Suit 98. [12] The first post-dated cheque for RM28,000.00 dated 30.5.2024 was dishonoured when presented for payment. The Plaintiff, through its solicitor’s letter dated 16.7.2024, gave written notice to the Defendants to rectify the failure within 2 weeks. [13] The Defendants did not make the payment within the 2- week period. The Plaintiff subsequently filed this current action against the Defendants and now applies for summary judgment in Enclosure 7 for the sum of RM1,250,000.00, together with late payment compensation at the rate of 8% per annum on RM1,250,000.00 calculated from 31.5.2024 until full payment, costs on a solicitor-client basis, and interest at 8% per annum on costs calculated from the date of judgment until full payment. [14] The claim is brought against both Defendants jointly and severally, with the First Defendant being liable as the primary borrower and the Second Defendant being liable under his guarantee obligations. Respective Parties’ Submissions Plaintiff’s Submissions [15] The Plaintiff submits that it has fulfilled the requirements for obtaining summary judgment. The Plaintiff contends that the burden of proof shifts to the Defendants once the Plaintiff has shown that the Defendants have entered an appearance and the Plaintiff has sworn an affidavit stating that the Defendants have no defence. [16] The Plaintiff argues that the Defendants are estopped from raising issues related to the friendly loan agreement that have already been resolved through the settlement in the previous suit. The Plaintiff emphasises that the Defendants did not file a defence before the parties entered into settlement in the previous suit, and the issues they are now raising were never brought up at that time. [17] The Plaintiff maintains that the documentary evidence clearly shows that the Defendants acknowledged the debt. The Settlement Agreement explicitly states that the First Defendant received a friendly loan of RM1,250,000.00 from the Plaintiff, and the Defendants never denied this in their correspondence with the Plaintiff’s solicitors before the first action was filed. [18] The Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence to demonstrate that it instructed the Defendants to pay interest to any third party, including Golden Empire Management. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendants’ allegations of illegality are unsupported by any credible evidence and are merely afterthoughts to avoid repayment of the loan. Defendants’ Submissions [19] The Defendants argue that estoppel cannot override matters of illegality. [20] The Defendants contend that the Second Defendant was forced to sign the Settlement Agreement under duress, pointing to a police report lodged immediately after the signing of the agreement on 11.12.2023. [21] The Defendants raise three fundamental issues that they argue merit trial: the disputed loan amount of RM1.25 million, the identity of the actual lender, and the illegality of the loan arrangement. [22] The Defendants submit that there is no evidence showing any direct payment from the Plaintiff to the Defendants, and that the evidence instead shows that payments came from GeForce Hardware Wholesale, while repayments were made to Golden Empire Management. They claim to have already repaid approximately RM323,000.00 to Golden Empire Management. The Defendants further allege that they actually dealt with one “Zack Low” from Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd rather than with the Plaintiff, and that it was this “Zack Low” who instructed them to make payments to Golden Empire Management. [23] The Defendants argue that the loan arrangement is illegal because it allegedly involved an interest rate of 5% per month, which is evident from the transaction records. They argue that this indicates an illegal money lending operation rather than a legitimate friendly loan. Analysis and Findings of the Court Whether the Plaintiff Has Satisfied the Requirements for Summary Judgment [24] The Plaintiff submits that it has fulfilled the requirements for obtaining summary judgment under Order 14 of the ROC

The affidavit in support of the application states that in the deponent’s belief, the Defendants have no defence to the claim. [25] The Defendants argue that they have raised triable issues that necessitate a full trial, including the validity of the Settlement Agreement, the identity of the actual lender, and the alleged illegality of the loan arrangement. [26] The requirements for summary judgment under Order 14 of the ROC 2012 were set out in Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying (trading as KH Trading) & Anor [2006] 2 MLJ 685 (FC), where the court held that the plaintiff must show that: a) The defendant has entered an appearance; b) The statement of claim has been served on the defendant; and c) The plaintiff’s supporting affidavit complies with Order 14 Rule 2 of the ROC 2012, where the deponent states his belief that the defendant has no defence to the claim. [27] In this case, it is undisputed that the Defendants have entered an appearance and that the statement of claim has been served on them. The Plaintiff’s affidavit in support of the application also complies with Order 14 Rule 2 of the ROC 2012, as the deponent states his belief that the Defendants have no defence to the claim. [28] The burden of proof therefore shifts to the Defendants to raise triable issues that warrant a full trial. This principle was established in Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, where the Supreme Court held that under an Order 14 application, the duty of a judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party and denied or disputed by the other in an affidavit. The court must determine whether the issues raised are triable. [29] I therefore find that the Plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for summary judgment under Order 14 of the ROC 2012. The question now is whether the Defendants have raised triable issues that warrant a full trial. Whether Estoppel Applies in This Case [30] The Plaintiff submits that the Defendants are estopped from raising issues in relation to the friendly loan agreement that has already been resolved through the settlement in Suit

The Plaintiff contends that in reliance on the settlement, it withdrew the previous action, and the Defendants did not raise any issues regarding the validity of the loan agreement at that time. [31] The Plaintiff argues that once parties have entered into a settlement, they are estopped from reopening issues that have been settled. [32] The Defendants argue that estoppel cannot override matters of illegality. They argue that estoppel, being an equitable principle, cannot operate to defeat clear statutory provisions of law. [33] I acknowledge the principle that estoppel generally cannot be used to validate an illegal transaction. However, this principle only applies where there is clear evidence of illegality. The Defendants rely on Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 to support the proposition that courts cannot knowingly enforce unlawful agreements, where the Privy Council stated that “It is well established as a general principle that the illegality of an agreement sued upon is a matter of which the court is obliged, once it is apprised of facts tending to support the suggestion, to take notice ex proprio motu and even though not pleaded... for clearly, no court could knowingly be party to the enforcement of an unlawful agreement.” Even so, the key requirement established in that case is that the court must be “apprised of facts tending to support the suggestion” of illegality, emphasising that illegality must be established through evidence rather than merely alleged. [34] In the present case, the Defendants have not provided any credible evidence to establish that the loan transaction was illegal. They have merely made assertions without any supporting evidence from independent sources. Their allegations of illegality appear to be an afterthought, raised only after they defaulted on their payment obligations. [35] In contrast, the documentary evidence shows that the Defendants acknowledged the debt and sought time to pay it. The First Defendant’s letter dated 24.1.2024 stated that “we have recently engaged in discussions with the individuals responsible for D2D BIZHUB SDN BHD, namely Mr. Chew and Mr. Low. During our discussions, we anticipate that the partial payment will be made in the upcoming month, February 2024.” The First Defendant’s subsequent letter dated 6.2.2024 further acknowledged that “our Maybank loan has been successful and approved. We anticipate that the partial payment will be made in the upcoming month, April 2024.” These letters did not raise any issues regarding the validity of the loan or allege any illegality, and in fact acknowledged the indebtedness and merely requested more time to make payment. [36] The Defendants cited the cases of Silver Corridor Sdn Bhd v Gallant Acres Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] 5 MLJ 1 (FC), Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and Other Appeals [2023] 3 MLJ 829 (FC), and Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd v Port Kelang Authority [2025] MLJU 320 (FC) to support the argument that estoppel cannot override matters of illegality. However, all involved instances where illegality was either clearly established or where the transaction on its face appeared to contravene statutory provisions. [37] In Silver Corridor, the illegality was clearly established where the Federal Court found that twelve sale and purchase agreements contravened s 293 of the Companies Act 1965 read with s 52 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 because the court determined that “the impugned SPAs had not been entered in good faith and had not been supported by valuable consideration”, and that the transactions fell within the two-year period prior to winding up proceedings. The court specifically stated that the transactions were “void against the liquidator of the first plaintiff” and held that “[e]stoppel, being an equitable principle cannot operate to defeat clear statutory provisions of law” where such specific statutory contraventions were proven on the evidence. [38] In Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur, the illegality arose from established contraventions of the Federal Territory (Planning) Act 1982 where the Federal Court found that the Datuk Bandar's exercise of discretion in granting the development order was “fundamentally flawed as it contravenes s 22(4) of the FT Act” because the development order improperly converted land designated under the KL Structure Plan as “open space and green area for public use” to mixed development, which was “bad in law” and “not in conformity with the FT Act”. The court concluded that this “renders such exercise an illegality” and held that “estoppel is ineffective in the face of statute or the law…Put another way, estoppel cannot override the law” where statutory provisions were directly contravened. [39] In Kuala Dimensi, the case involved an agreement that was found to be legally defective under section 26 of the Contracts Act 1950 for want of consideration, establishing the illegality on the transaction's face. The Federal Court reiterated that estoppel cannot operate “against a statute or protect against illegality”, particularly where the agreement was fundamentally flawed from the outset due to legal deficiencies in its formation. [40] That is not the case here, where the Defendants have merely made allegations without any substantive evidence. [41] In Samanda Holdings v Sakullah Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors [2006] 4 MLJ 381, the High Court comprehensively addressed the doctrine of estoppel in the context of settlement agreements. The case involved a plaintiff who had entered into a deed of settlement and subsequently sought to continue with its original action. The High Court set out the requirements for estoppel, holding that “[t]wo requirements must be present before the doctrine of estoppel is invoked. There must be the existence of inducement and detriment.” The court further emphasised that “the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine” and that “[t]here must be sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and the detriment asserted. The issue of detriment must be judged at the moment when the person who has given the assurance seeks to go back on it.” In the present case, the Plaintiff was induced to withdraw its previous action based on the settlement agreement, and it suffered detriment as a result when the Defendants defaulted on the agreed payment terms. The principles of estoppel therefore apply to prevent the Defendants from reopening issues that have been settled. [42] I also note the decision in Obata Ambak Holdings Sdn Bhd v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] 9 MLJ 212 (HC), where the plaintiffs had previously signed settlement agreements accepting liquidated and ascertained damages from the defendant developer, but subsequently attempted to reopen their claims for additional liquidated damages based on a later Federal Court decision. The court applied the doctrine of estoppel and held that: “settlement agreements signed by the plaintiffs are conclusive proof of the terms which they have settled upon. Neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow them to do so. Waiver of rights is a direct result of the settlement letters signed by the plaintiffs in Suit 301 and Suit 305.” [43] In the circumstances, I find that the Defendants are estopped from raising issues related to the validity of the loan agreement that have already been resolved through the settlement in the previous suit. The Defendants’ attempt to reopen these issues is an abuse of the court process and should not be entertained. Whether There Are Triable Issues Concerning the Identity of the Lender and Loan Amount [44] The Plaintiff contends that the identity of the lender and the loan amount are not triable issues. The Settlement Agreement explicitly states that the First Defendant received a friendly loan of RM1,250,000.0 from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff also points out that the Defendants’ own correspondence with the Plaintiff’s solicitors acknowledged the Plaintiff as the lender. [45] The Defendants argue that there is a genuine dispute regarding the identity of the lender and the loan amount. They claim that they did not receive any loans directly from the Plaintiff but from GeForce Hardware Wholesale. The Defendants specifically allege that they dealt with one “Zack Low” who they claim was from Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd, and not with the Plaintiff. They also assert that they only received RM1,125,000.00 in total, not RM1,250,000.00 as claimed by the Plaintiff. [46] I have carefully considered the evidence before me and find that there are no triable issues concerning the identity of the lender or the loan amount. [47] The Settlement Agreement, which was signed by both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant as guarantor, clearly identifies the Plaintiff as the lender and the loan amount as RM1,250,000.00. This is a formal legal document that was voluntarily entered into by the parties. The Defendants now claim that this document was signed under duress and coercion by one “Mr. Chiew” who they allege was sent by “Zack Low” of Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd. [48] Moreover, the Defendants’ own correspondence with the Plaintiff’s solicitors, specifically their letters dated 24.1.2024 and 6.2.2024, acknowledged the debt to the Plaintiff and did not raise any issues regarding the identity of the lender or the loan amount. [49] The Defendants’ assertion that they received the loans from GeForce Hardware Wholesale rather than the Plaintiff is contradicted by the documentary evidence. The Plaintiff has explained that it requested GeForce Hardware Wholesale to disburse the funds to the Defendants on its behalf, but this does not change the identity of the lender. [50] In Abercrombie & Fitch Co & Anor v Fashion Factory Outlet KL Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 127, a trademark infringement case where the plaintiffs applied for summary judgment after establishing clear evidence of infringement through trap purchases and enforcement raids, but the defendants raised bare defences without substantiating evidence, the High Court held that “Triable issue means issue raised by the defendants which is fit to be tried. The defendants must provide answers on oath which constitute evidence that they have defence which is fit to be tried. Denial in a defence does not constitute evidence... A mere bare assertion by the defendants would not be sufficient.” In the present case, the Defendants have not provided any credible evidence to support their assertions regarding the identity of the lender or the loan amount. [51] I am therefore satisfied that there are no triable issues concerning the identity of the lender or the loan amount. Whether There Are Triable Issues Concerning the Alleged Repayments [52] The Plaintiff denies that the Defendants have made any repayments towards the loan. The Plaintiff asserts that it never instructed the Defendants to make any payments to Golden Empire Management, and any payments allegedly made to this entity have nothing to do with the loan from the Plaintiff. [53] The Defendants claim that they have already repaid approximately RM323,000.00 to Golden Empire Management, which they allege the Plaintiff instructed them to pay. More specifically, the Defendants allege that one “Zack Low,” whom they claim to have dealt with instead of the Plaintiff, instructed them to make these payments to Golden Empire Management. They argue that these payments should be credited against the loan amount. [54] I find that there are no triable issues concerning the alleged repayments. The Defendants have not provided any evidence to show that the Plaintiff instructed them to make payments to Golden Empire Management or that any payments allegedly made to this entity were in relation to the loan from the Plaintiff. There is no documentary evidence establishing any connection between the Plaintiff and “Zack Low” or Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd, or authorising “Zack Low” to collect payments on behalf of the Plaintiff. [55] The mere assertion that payments were made to Golden Empire Management is insufficient to establish a triable issue without any evidence linking these payments to the loan from the Plaintiff. The Defendants have not produced any receipts, acknowledgements, or other documents from the Plaintiff confirming that payments made to Golden Empire Management were to be treated as repayments of the loan. [56] In fact, the Settlement Agreement, which was entered into in December 2023, acknowledged the full loan amount of RM1,250,000.00 as being due and payable. If the Defendants had made any repayments prior to this date, one would expect the Settlement Agreement to reflect a reduced amount. The fact that it does not suggests that no repayments had been made or acknowledged by the Plaintiff. [57] In Renofac Builder (M) Sdn Bhd v Chase Perdana Bhd [2000] MLJU 752, a construction contract dispute where the plaintiff claimed RM1,125,385.00 for completed building and renovation works but the defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to exhibit the main contract and raised several triable issues including liquidated and ascertained damages, the High Court held that “the duty of the court is quite onerous in the extreme. The court must be vigilant and must view in prospective at the whole scenario in order to ascertain whether the defendant has a real or what is commonly known as a bona fide defence.” While the court in Renofac granted unconditional leave to defend, it emphasised the need for defendants to demonstrate a “real” or “bona fide” defence. In the present case, the Defendants’ assertion that they made repayments to Golden Empire Management on the Plaintiff’s instructions lacks any foundation - there are no receipts, correspondence, or any other documentary proof linking these alleged payments to the loan from the Plaintiff or showing any direction from the Plaintiff to make payments to this third party. [58] I therefore find that there are no triable issues concerning the alleged repayments. Whether There Are Triable Issues Concerning the Alleged Duress [59] The Plaintiff denies that the Settlement Agreement was signed under duress. The Plaintiff contends that for duress to vitiate a contract, it must involve a criminal element or pure economic duress of a serious nature, neither of which is present in this case. [60] The Defendants claim that the Second Defendant was forced to sign the Settlement Agreement under duress. They allege that one “Mr. Chiew,” who they claim was acting on behalf of “Zack Low” from Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd, along with several others, forced the Second Defendant to attend at the office of the law firm Tetuan Kit & Associates to sign the Settlement Agreement. They refer to a police report lodged by the Second Defendant immediately after signing the Settlement Agreement on 11.12.2023, and intimidating notices allegedly placed on the Defendants’ office premises. [61] I have carefully considered the evidence before me and find that there are no triable issues concerning the alleged duress. [62] The police report referred to by the Defendants does not provide any specific details of the alleged duress. It merely states that the Second Defendant was asked to pay money owed and subsequently went to a law firm to sign a settlement agreement. This falls far short of establishing duress in the legal sense. [63] Moreover, the Defendants’ subsequent conduct contradicts their claim of duress. After allegedly being forced to sign the Settlement Agreement in December 2023, the Defendants did not take any legal action to set aside the agreement on the grounds of duress. Instead, they sent letters to the Plaintiff’s solicitors in January and February 2024, acknowledging the debt and requesting more time to make payment. This conduct is inconsistent with a claim of duress. Moreover, there is no evidence linking the alleged “Mr. Chiew,” “Zack Low,” or Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd to the Plaintiff or establishing that these individuals or entities were authorised to act on behalf of the Plaintiff. [64] Even when the Plaintiff filed Suit 98, the Defendants did not raise the issue of duress but instead entered into a further settlement agreement in April 2024. It is only now, after defaulting on this second settlement agreement, that they are raising the issue of duress. [65] The law on duress is well-established. In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, the plaintiffs had entered into a guarantee and indemnity agreement with the defendants after threatening to abandon the main share sale transaction unless the defendants provided such protection. The defendants subsequently refused to honour the guarantee when the share price fell below the guaranteed level. The issue before the Privy Council was whether the defendants’ promise of indemnity was unenforceable on the grounds that it was extracted by duress, with the defendants arguing that they had entered into the guarantee agreement under duress from the plaintiffs’ threat to walk away from the transaction. The Privy Council rejected this contention, holding that there must be a coercion of will which vitiates consent and mere commercial pressure is not enough. The court further stated that “In determining whether there was such a coercion of the will, it is material to inquire: whether the person allegedly coerced protested; whether he had an alternative course available to him as a legal remedy; whether he was independently advised; and whether after entering the contract he took steps to avoid it.” On the facts, the court found that although the defendants had been subject to commercial pressure to enter into the guarantee agreement, this did not amount to duress as the defendants had considered the matter thoroughly, chose to enter into the guarantee agreement to avoid litigation, and thought that the risk of the guarantee was low. In the present case, the Defendants have not provided any credible evidence of coercion or pressure that would amount to duress in the legal sense. [66] As for the intimidating notices allegedly placed on the Defendants’ office premises, there is no evidence linking these notices to the Plaintiff. In any event, even if such notices were placed by or on behalf of the Plaintiff, they would not, without more, constitute duress in the legal sense. [67] I therefore find that there are no triable issues concerning the alleged duress. Whether There Are Triable Issues Concerning the Alleged Illegality [68] The Plaintiff denies any illegality in the loan arrangement. It maintains that it provided a friendly loan to the Defendants without charging any interest, except for the late payment compensation stipulated in the Settlement Agreement, which was at the rate of 18% per annum, and later reduced to 8% per annum in the subsequent settlement. [69] The Defendants claim that the loan arrangement is illegal because it allegedly involved an exorbitant interest rate of 5% per month, which they argue indicates an illegal money lending operation rather than a legitimate friendly loan. Specifically, the Defendants allege that “Zack Low” from Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd imposed this interest rate and collected payments through Golden Empire Management. They refer to details in their affidavit evidence which they claim show that deductions were made from the loan amounts for interest payments. [70] I have carefully considered the evidence before me and find that there are no triable issues concerning the alleged illegality. [71] The Defendants’ allegations of illegality are not supported by any credible evidence. They have not provided any loan agreements, receipts, or other documents showing that the Plaintiff charged interest at the rate of 5% per month or any other rate that would contravene the Moneylenders Act

The Plaintiff has addressed the issue of its connection to Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd, acknowledging that Chong Kian Ming is a director of both companies, but maintains that the loan was provided by the Plaintiff directly, not by Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd or any individual named “Zack Low.” [72] The Defendants’ claim that deductions were made from the loan amounts for interest payments is a mere assertion without any supporting evidence that these deductions were made on the Plaintiff’s instructions or for the purpose of interest payments. The Plaintiff has explained that it requested GeForce Hardware Wholesale to disburse the funds to the Defendants on its behalf, but there is no evidence that any deductions were made for interest payments. [73] In any event, the law on illegality requires that the illegality be established rather than merely alleged. In Keng Soon Finance, the Privy Council stated that the court is obliged to take notice of illegality only when it is “apprised of facts tending to support the suggestion.” In the present case, there are no facts before me that would tend to support the suggestion of illegality. [74] The Defendants cited Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 6 MLJ 818 ), Lee Kuan Gen v Tan Sri Dato’ Seri M Mahadevan a/l Mahalingam and other appeals [2024] 1 MLJ 825 ), and Mahmood bin Qoyub v Li Chee Loong and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 755 ) to establish three key propositions: (i) that loan agreements with exorbitant interest rates are illegal and void ab initio; (ii) that when a transaction is tainted with illegality, “the loss lies where it falls” and the court will not assist in recovery of even the principal sum; and (iii) that illegal moneylending transactions cannot be saved through a subsequent settlement agreement. However, these cases are distinguishable because in each of them, there was clear evidence of excessive interest rates or other illegality established through documentation or admission. That is not the case here, where the Defendants have merely made allegations without any substantive evidence to support their claim of a 5% monthly interest rate or any illegal moneylending scheme. [75] I also note that the Settlement Agreement, which was signed by both the First Defendant and the Second Defendant as guarantor, makes no mention of any interest charged on the loan, other than the late payment compensation at the rate of 18% per annum (later reduced to 8% per annum) in the event of default. This rate is not excessive and does not contravene section 17A of the Moneylenders Act 1951, which provides that interest for secured loans shall not exceed 12% per annum and interest for unsecured loans shall not exceed 18% per annum. [76] Moreover, the Defendants’ own correspondence with the Plaintiff’s solicitors, specifically their letters dated 24.1.2024 and 6.2.2024, acknowledged the debt to the Plaintiff and did not raise any issues regarding illegality or excessive interest rates. It is only after defaulting on the second settlement agreement that the Defendants are raising these issues. [77] In these circumstances, I find that there are no triable issues concerning the alleged illegality. The Defendants’ allegations of illegality appear to be an afterthought, raised only to avoid their payment obligations, and are not supported by any credible evidence. Conclusion and Order [78] Having considered the evidence and submissions before me, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff has established its case for summary judgment. The Defendants have failed to raise any triable issues that would warrant a full trial. [79] The documentary evidence clearly shows that the Defendants acknowledged the debt of RM1,250,000.00 to the Plaintiff and undertook to repay it in instalments. Their subsequent default on this undertaking entitles the Plaintiff to judgment for the full amount, together with interest and costs. The Defendants’ allegations concerning “Zack Low,” Vanta Credit Sdn Bhd, and alleged exorbitant interest rates appear to be afterthoughts, unsupported by contemporaneous documentation or other credible evidence. [80] The Defendants’ allegations of duress and illegality are not supported by any credible evidence and appear to be afterthoughts, raised only to avoid their payment obligations. Their claim to have made repayments to Golden Empire Management is similarly unsupported by any evidence linking these alleged payments to the loan from the Plaintiff. [81] In the circumstances, I hereby allow the Plaintiff’s application for summary judgment with costs. The Defendants shall pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM1,250,000.00, together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum calculated from 31.05.2024 until the date of full payment and costs on a standard basis of RM4,000.00. 8 July 2025 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Loke Yuen Hong with BL Chong (Messrs HL Foo & Co) For the Defendants: Eng Khin Hock with Afiqah Razak (Messrs Stephen & Co)