Dahlan Bin Mohd Rasaid v Kelab Golf Negara Subang (BA-24NCvC-276-02/2026)

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: BA-24NCvC-276-02/2026 BETWEEN DAHLAN BIN MOHD RASAID ... PLAINTIFF AND KELAB GOLF NEGARA ... DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION

1. This Originating Summons concerns the validity of an internal disciplinary decision made by the Defendant, Kelab Golf Negara Subang (“KGNS” or “the Club”), against the Plaintiff, one of its members. The disciplinary proceedings arose from an allegation of dangerous play during a round of golf, and culminated in the suspension of the Plaintiff’s membership for three months from 11 September 2025 until 10 December 2025. 16/07/2026 09:58:20 BA-24NCvC-276-02/2026 Kand. 26 S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2

2. The Plaintiff seeks declarations that the decision communicated by the Defendant on 8 September 2025 was null and void, ultra vires and contrary to the Club’s Bye-Laws Governing Disciplinary Procedure. He also seeks the expungement of all disciplinary records, a written apology to be circulated to members and displayed at the Club, damages, aggravated and exemplary damages, costs and further relief.

3. The Defendant resists the application. It maintains that the Plaintiff was informed of the complaint, afforded an opportunity to answer it, heard by the Disciplinary Sub-Committee, invited to submit mitigation and permitted to exercise his right of internal appeal. The Defendant further contends that the Plaintiff’s complaints, properly analysed, relate principally to the merits and evidential assessment of the domestic tribunal rather than to any illegality or material denial of natural justice.

4. After considering the Originating Summons, the affidavits, the written submissions and the respective reply submissions, I dismissed the Plaintiff’s application with costs. These are my full reasons. B. MATERIAL BACKGROUND

5. At all material times, the Plaintiff was a member of KGNS. His relationship with the Club was governed by the Club’s constitution, S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 General Bye-Laws, Bye-Laws Governing Disciplinary Procedure and the applicable golf rules. The contractual character of that relationship is common ground between the parties.

6. On 14 September 2024, a complaint was lodged following an incident at Putra Golf Club. The complainants, Phang Chet Ping and Wong Tuck Wai, alleged in substance that a golf ball had been played while their group remained within range and that the ball had passed dangerously close to them. The complaint was characterised as one involving dangerous play.

7. The Plaintiff’s golfing group included Ismet bin Omar, Dato’ Syed Norulzaman and Dato’ Ramlee Abu Bakar. On 4 December 2024, the Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff requesting his explanation. On 13 December 2024, the Plaintiff furnished a written response together with a sketch. His companions also provided their respective accounts of the incident.

8. A disciplinary inquiry was held on 20 June 2025. The allegation against the Plaintiff was framed by reference to Rule 10(f) of the KGNS Golf Rules. By letter dated 2 July 2025, the Plaintiff was informed that he had not succeeded in exculpating himself and was invited to submit written mitigation. He did so on 17 July 2025. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4

9. By letter dated 22 July 2025, the Plaintiff was informed that his membership would be suspended for three months pursuant to Bye-Law 16(c). The Plaintiff appealed to the Management Committee on 28 July 2025. The Management Committee maintained the disciplinary decision, and the Plaintiff was informed of that outcome by letter dated 8 September 2025. The suspension took effect from 11 September 2025 until 10 December 2025.

10. The Originating Summons was filed on 4 February 2026, after the operative period of suspension had ended. The Plaintiff nevertheless submits that the matter remains a live controversy because the disciplinary record continues to affect his reputation and standing within the Club. I accept that the mere expiry of the suspension does not, without more, render the dispute academic. The substantive question remains whether the disciplinary decision was legally invalid. C. THE PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTIONS

11. The Plaintiff’s challenge is founded primarily on alleged non-compliance with the Club’s disciplinary procedure and an asserted breach of natural justice. His first and principal complaint concerns Bye-Law 7(c). S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5

12. Bye-Law 7(c) provides that, upon receipt of a complaint, the General Manager shall write to the member concerned “within 3 working days or as soon as practicable”, requiring the member to respond, and that the member shall respond in writing within fourteen days. The Plaintiff emphasises that the complaint was received on 14 September 2024 whereas the letter requesting his response was only issued on 4 December 2024, approximately eighty-one days later.

13. The Plaintiff submits that the use of the word “shall” is mandatory, relying upon Ma Hoa Trading Co Ltd v Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2021] 10 CLJ 460. He argues that an unexplained delay of eighty-one days cannot reasonably satisfy the alternative expression “as soon as practicable”, and that the breach is sufficient to invalidate the ensuing disciplinary process.

14. The Plaintiff also invokes Bye-Law 8(a), which contemplates completion of an investigation within thirty days, subject to an extension at the discretion of the panel. Since the inquiry was not held until 20 June 2025, the Plaintiff says that the investigation was unreasonably delayed and contrary to the purpose of the disciplinary procedure.

15. A further complaint concerns Bye-Law 9. The Plaintiff maintains that he did not receive a valid show cause notice and that the Defendant’s Replying Affidavit did not specifically address whether S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 such notice had been issued and served. Relying upon Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Berhad [1995] 1 CLJ 609, he submits that a material assertion not specifically controverted may be treated as admitted.

16. The Plaintiff also relies upon Adler Hilary Laisak v Samsung Engineering (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2025] ILRU 1723 and Hari Krishnan a/l Jeyapalan v Annathi @ Ananthi a/p Subramaniam [2024] 859 CLJU for the proposition that a person facing disciplinary action must receive adequate notice of the charge and a meaningful opportunity to answer it.

17. The Plaintiff next attacks the conduct of the inquiry. He says that two golfers from the complainants’ group were not called, while a caddy who was not on duty during the incident was called. He contends that the evidence of his own companions supported his version that the green had cleared before the shot was played. In those circumstances, he relies upon Bye-Law 12(c), which requires dismissal of the complaint if it is not substantiated or if there is doubt in the matter.

18. The Plaintiff further complains that the Defendant did not disclose the written investigation report, minutes, inquiry notes, witness statements, recordings and other materials said to have been considered by the Disciplinary Sub-Committee and the S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Management Committee. He argues that he was unable effectively to challenge the disciplinary findings without those documents.

19. In this regard, the Plaintiff relies on Vijayarao Sepermaniam v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia [2018] 9 CLJ 141, Vivekananda Narayanasamy v Maa-Medicare Kidney Charity Fund [2016] 4 ILR 600 and Darshan Singh v Farid Kamal Hussain [2004] 4 CLJ 410. Those cases are cited for the principle that access to materials relied upon by a disciplinary body may be integral to a meaningful right to be heard.

20. The Plaintiff also invites the Court to draw an adverse inference under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 from the Defendant’s non-production of the documents. Finally, he relies on Lee Mew Kwan v Royal Lake Club [2012] 8 CLJ 105, Florence Bailes v Dr Ng Jit Leong [1984] CLJU 133, Balachandran Mahesan v K.K. Lim [1987] CLJ (Rep) 70 and Law Nam Poh & Ors v Dato’ Lim Teong Wah & Ors [2014] 1 LNS 410 to submit that the Court may intervene where a club fails to comply with its own rules or acts in breach of natural justice. D. THE DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS

21. The Defendant’s principal answer is that the Plaintiff was afforded procedural fairness at every material stage. He received the substance of the complaint, furnished a detailed written response, S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 attended the disciplinary inquiry, presented his case, submitted mitigation and exercised his internal right of appeal.

22. In relation to Bye-Law 7(c), the Defendant argues that the phrase “within 3 working days or as soon as practicable” must be read as a whole. The expression “as soon as practicable” is said to be flexible and dependent upon the surrounding circumstances, rather than a fixed calendar period. The Defendant further submits that the Plaintiff has not established any actual prejudice caused by the delay.

23. As regards Bye-Law 9, the Defendant states in its reply submissions that a show cause notice dated 31 January 2025 was in fact issued and reproduces the substance of the charge contained in that notice. The Defendant therefore maintains that the Plaintiff was fully aware of the case he had to meet.

24. In relation to the witnesses, the Defendant submits that the Plaintiff’s criticism concerns the weight and sufficiency of evidence, matters entrusted to the domestic tribunal. The Court should not sit as an appellate body and reassess which witness was more credible or whether another witness ought to have been called.

25. On disclosure, the Defendant contends that the Plaintiff did not file a formal application for discovery under the Rules of Court 2012. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 The Defendant also refers to obligations under the Personal Data Protection Act 2010, while accepting that the Act cannot defeat a lawful court order for disclosure. Newlake Development Sdn Bhd v Zenith Delight Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] MLJU 452 is relied upon in that context.

26. In response to the proposed adverse inference, the Defendant relies upon Riedel-De Haen AG v Liew Keng Pang [1989] 2 MLJ 400 and argues that the Evidence Act does not apply to affidavit evidence in the manner contended by the Plaintiff.

27. On the broader question of intervention, the Defendant relies upon Chan Kean Hin v Ong Ban Seang & Anor [2016] MLJU 979, Lee Tak Sun v Tunku Dato’ Seri Shahabudin bin Tunku Besar Burhanuddin & Ors [2013] 7 MLJ 157, Dato’ Hj Talaat bin Hj Husain v Chak Kong Yin [2004] 7 MLJ 295 and Dawkins v Antrobus. The Defendant says that, absent a material breach of the governing rules, bad faith or real denial of natural justice, the Court should respect the autonomy of the Club’s domestic disciplinary process. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 E. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

28. The issues for determination are:

(ii) whether the disciplinary process breached Bye-Law 8(a);

(iii) whether the Plaintiff was denied proper notice under Bye-Law 9;

(iv) whether the conduct of the inquiry, including the choice of witnesses, amounted to a breach of natural justice;

(vi) whether an adverse inference should be drawn; (vii whether the Court should intervene in the decision of the domestic tribunal; and

(viii) whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought. F. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

29. The authorities cited by both parties establish that membership of a club is contractual in nature. The constitution, rules and bye-laws constitute the contractual framework governing the rights and obligations of both the member and the Club. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11

30. The Court will not ordinarily interfere merely because a member disagrees with the factual findings or disciplinary sanction imposed by the Club. The Court is not an appellate disciplinary tribunal. Its function is to examine legality, jurisdiction, compliance with the governing rules and procedural fairness.

31. At the same time, the Club’s autonomy is not absolute. Lee Mew Kwan, Florence Bailes, Balachandran Mahesan and Darshan Singh demonstrate that the Court may intervene where the Club acts outside its powers, materially departs from its own rules, proceeds in bad faith or denies the member natural justice.

32. Conversely, Chan Kean Hin, Lee Tak Sun, Dato’ Hj Talaat and Dawkins v Antrobus emphasise that the Court should exercise restraint and should not substitute its own assessment of the evidential merits unless a material legal or procedural defect is established.

33. The principles advanced by the parties are not inconsistent. The controlling question is whether the Plaintiff has proved a breach sufficiently serious to affect the legality and fairness of the disciplinary decision. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 G. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Issue 1: Bye-Law 7(c)

34. It is undisputed that approximately eighty-one days elapsed between the date of the complaint and the General Manager’s letter of 4 December 2024. The delay was plainly significant. The Defendant did not provide a detailed factual account explaining each administrative or investigative step undertaken during that period.

35. Nevertheless, the legal consequence of the delay must be determined by construing the actual words of Bye-Law 7(c). The provision does not state only that the General Manager must act “within 3 working days”. It states that he shall act “within 3 working days or as soon as practicable”. Both limbs must be given meaning.

36. The expression “as soon as practicable” is not capable of precise mathematical definition. It does not prescribe a fixed outer limit expressed in days. It introduces a practical and fact-sensitive standard. The disjunctive word “or” indicates that the Bye-Law contemplates circumstances in which action may not be taken within three working days, but must nevertheless be taken as soon as reasonably workable in the circumstances. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13

37. I therefore reject the submission that every departure from the three-working-day period automatically nullifies the disciplinary process. At the same time, the alternative phrase does not confer an unlimited period. A delay may still be legally material if it is shown to be unreasonable in context or to have produced procedural unfairness.

38. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for this Court to make a positive finding that eighty-one days was an ideal or administratively satisfactory period. The more pertinent question is whether the Plaintiff has shown that the delay caused actual prejudice affecting the fairness of the proceedings.

39. On the evidence, the Plaintiff received the letter of 4 December 2024 and provided a detailed response on 13 December 2024. He identified the incident, the persons involved, his account of the position of the group ahead and supplied a sketch. His golfing companions also furnished their accounts.

40. There is no sufficient evidence that the delay caused the loss of material evidence, rendered a witness unavailable, impaired the Plaintiff’s recollection or prevented him from preparing his defence. He subsequently attended the inquiry, presented his position, submitted mitigation and appealed. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14

41. The delay may properly be criticised as administratively unsatisfactory. Administrative imperfection, however, is not synonymous with legal invalidity. The Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the departure was material and prejudicial. On the evidence, that burden has not been discharged. I therefore find that the delay under Bye-Law 7(c), viewed in the context of the proceedings as a whole, does not justify setting aside the disciplinary decision. Issue 2: Bye-Law 8(a)

42. The Plaintiff next complains that the inquiry was convened many months after the original complaint. Bye-Law 8(a), as described in the submissions, contemplates completion of the investigation within thirty days but permits an extension at the discretion of the panel.

43. The express power to extend time indicates that the initial period was not intended to operate as an absolute jurisdictional cut-off. That does not permit indefinite or arbitrary delay; the discretion must be exercised consistently with fairness and the object of the disciplinary procedure.

44. However, the Plaintiff has not identified concrete prejudice arising from the timing of the inquiry. He participated, gave his account and pursued the available internal processes. There is no S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 evidence that the passage of time deprived him of a witness, destroyed evidence or materially impaired his defence. Accordingly, the Plaintiff has not established that the timing under Bye-Law 8(a) rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair or unlawful. Issue 3: Bye-Law 9 and the Show Cause Notice

45. The Plaintiff contends that no valid show cause notice was issued. The Defendant’s original affidavit response may fairly be criticised for not addressing that allegation with the specificity that would have been preferable. A general assertion of compliance is not always an adequate answer to a specific factual allegation, and the Plaintiff’s reliance on Ng Hee Thoong is therefore understandable.

46. The Defendant subsequently relied upon a show cause notice dated 31 January 2025 and reproduced the substance of the charge in its reply submissions. It is unnecessary to determine every factual controversy concerning the manner in which the notice was communicated. Even assuming imperfections in form or proof of service, the decisive issue is whether the Plaintiff was, in substance, denied adequate knowledge of the case against him or a reasonable opportunity to answer it. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16

47. The totality of the material shows that the Plaintiff knew the incident forming the basis of the complaint. He had received the earlier complaint letter, furnished a detailed written explanation, attended the disciplinary inquiry and understood that the charge concerned an allegedly dangerous shot while the group ahead remained within range. He was informed that he had failed to exculpate himself, submitted mitigation and appealed against the suspension.

48. The authorities cited by the Plaintiff establish that adequate notice is an indispensable element of natural justice. I accept that proposition. Natural justice, however, is concerned with real and practical fairness, not technical perfection. The Plaintiff was not disciplined for an undisclosed allegation. He knew the complaint and participated throughout. I therefore find that he has not established a material breach of Bye-Law 9 or a real denial of the right to be heard. Issue 4: Witnesses and the Evidential Merits

49. The Plaintiff complains that two golfers from the complainants’ group were not called, that evidence was received from a caddy who was not on duty and that the accounts of the Plaintiff’s companions supported his version. These matters are plainly relevant to the strength of the charge. They do not, without more, establish that the proceedings were unlawful. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17

50. A domestic disciplinary tribunal is not required to call every conceivable witness. The weight of testimony, relevance of witnesses and resolution of factual inconsistencies fall primarily within the evaluative function of the disciplinary body. This Court is not rehearing the golfing incident or determining afresh whether the ball passed over or near the complainants.

51. The Court’s role is to determine whether the process was so fundamentally unfair that the decision cannot stand. The Plaintiff was permitted to present his account and rely upon the explanations of his companions. There is no sufficient evidence that he was prohibited from identifying witnesses, prevented from producing material evidence or denied an opportunity to challenge the allegation.

52. The failure to call every witness whom the Plaintiff now considers material does not automatically constitute a breach of natural justice. Nor has the Plaintiff established bias, mala fides or malice in the selection or evaluation of witnesses. I therefore find that the complaints concerning the witnesses go principally to the merits and weight of evidence and do not warrant judicial intervention. Issue 5: Non-Disclosure of Documents

53. The complaint concerning the investigation report, notes, minutes, witness statements and related documents requires careful S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 consideration. Vijayarao Sepermaniam and Darshan Singh demonstrate that access to documents relied upon by a disciplinary authority may, in appropriate circumstances, be essential to an effective defence. I accept that principle.

54. The circumstances of the present case are, however, significant. The Plaintiff was given the substance of the complaint and participated in the inquiry before the disciplinary decision was made. His subsequent requests for a broad range of internal materials were made principally through correspondence. After commencement of these proceedings, he /did not invoke the procedural mechanisms available under the Rules of Court 2012 to seek a formal discovery order.

55. The Defendant’s reliance on the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 cannot operate as an absolute answer to a lawful discovery application. As recognised in Newlake Development, that Act cannot be used to avoid a valid order of Court. No such order, however, was sought or obtained in this case.

56. It would therefore be excessive to hold that the Defendant’s failure voluntarily to furnish every requested document automatically rendered the earlier disciplinary proceedings void. The Court must also distinguish between materials necessary to understand the charge and internal records subsequently sought to challenge the evaluative merits of the decision. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19

57. The Plaintiff knew the substance of the allegation and was able to answer it. The facts are therefore distinguishable from a case where the disciplinary authority relies upon a concealed allegation or report and the affected person has no meaningful opportunity to respond. I find that the non-disclosure complained of does not, without more, establish fundamental unfairness. Issue 6: Adverse Inference

58. The Plaintiff invites the Court to draw an adverse inference from the Defendant’s non-production of documents. The Defendant relies upon Riedel-De Haen and submits that the Evidence Act does not apply to affidavit evidence in the manner proposed.

59. It is unnecessary to determine a broader proposition than the case requires. Even assuming that the Court may consider the evidential significance of non-production, the circumstances do not justify the inference sought. No formal discovery application was pursued, issues of third-party data and scope were raised, and non-production does not necessarily establish that the documents would have been adverse to the Defendant.

60. The Court should be slow to infer the contents of unseen documents where procedural avenues to compel their production S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 were not utilised. I therefore decline to draw an adverse inference against the Defendant. Issue 7: The Proper Scope of Judicial Intervention

61. The Plaintiff is correct that a social club is not immune from judicial supervision. Lee Mew Kwan, Florence Bailes, Balachandran Mahesan, Law Nam Poh and Darshan Singh confirm that the Court may intervene where the Club breaches its rules or denies natural justice.

62. The Defendant is equally correct that Chan Kean Hin, Lee Tak Sun, Dato’ Hj Talaat and Dawkins v Antrobus require the Court to distinguish review of legality from an appeal on the merits. The Court may examine jurisdiction, knowledge of the case to be met, opportunity to answer, bias, bad faith, manifest unfairness and the materiality of any departure from the rules. It should not ordinarily decide afresh which witness was more credible or whether the committee ought to have preferred the Plaintiff’s version.

63. The Plaintiff’s procedural complaints are not wholly devoid of substance. The delay could have been better explained. The Defendant’s affidavit could have addressed the show cause notice more specifically. The handling of requests for documents could have been more transparent. But the Court’s task is not merely to S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 identify administrative imperfections. It is to determine whether those imperfections produced illegality or fundamental unfairness.

64. Viewed in its entirety, the Plaintiff knew the complaint, answered it in writing, participated in the inquiry, presented his position, submitted mitigation and pursued an internal appeal. He has not shown that the delays or alleged procedural imperfections deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself. Nor has he established bias, mala fides, malice or conduct outside the Defendant’s disciplinary jurisdiction.

65. The threshold for judicial intervention has therefore not been crossed. H. RELIEFS

66. The declarations that the disciplinary decision was null and void and ultra vires must fail because the Plaintiff has not established the necessary illegality or material breach of natural justice. The consequential request that all records be expunged likewise has no independent foundation.

67. The order sought compelling the Defendant to issue, circulate and display a written apology would be exceptional. It would ordinarily require a clear finding of wrongful conduct, bad faith or reputational S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 injury arising from an unlawful decision. No such finding has been made.

68. The claims for damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages must also be dismissed. The Plaintiff has not established an actionable wrong independent of the unsuccessful challenge to the disciplinary decision, nor is there a sufficient evidential basis for the assessment of any alleged loss I. CONCLUSION

69. The Defendant’s disciplinary powers were required to be exercised consistently with the Club’s Bye-Laws and the principles of natural justice. The delay of approximately eighty-one days was significant and was not explained in detail. However, Bye-Law 7(c) does not impose only an inflexible three-working-day deadline; the phrase “or as soon as practicable” introduces a flexible and fact-sensitive standard.

70. I do not find that eighty-one days was an ideal or administratively satisfactory period. The dispositive point is that the Plaintiff failed to prove that the delay caused actual prejudice or rendered the subsequent proceedings fundamentally unfair.

71. Similarly, even if imperfections existed concerning the show cause notice, the evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiff knew the S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 allegation, answered it, attended the inquiry, submitted mitigation and appealed. His complaints concerning witnesses relate primarily to the weight and sufficiency of evidence before the domestic tribunal. The non-disclosure of internal documents, in the absence of a formal discovery application and in the circumstances of this case, did not automatically invalidate the proceedings.

72. Having considered the evidence in its entirety, I am not persuaded that the Plaintiff has established illegality, procedural impropriety or a material breach of natural justice sufficient to justify judicial intervention. The Plaintiff’s case substantially invites the Court to reconsider the factual merits of the disciplinary decision. That is not the proper function of this Court.

73. There is therefore no sufficient basis to interfere with the Defendant’s disciplinary decision. J. ORDERS

74. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons is dismissed. All declarations and consequential reliefs sought by the Plaintiff are refused. The claims for an apology, damages, aggravated damages and exemplary damages are dismissed. S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24

75. Costs shall follow the event. The Plaintiff shall pay costs of RM3,000.00 to the Defendant, subject to allocatur. The Plaintiff’s Originating Summons is dismissed with costs to the Defendant. Dated this 15th day of July 2026 -sgd- ........................................ Asmah binti Musa Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel for the Plaintiff: Ms. Deepinder Kaur (Ms. Kamaldip Kaur with her) Messrs. David Lingam & Co Counsel for the Defendant: Mr. Kow Yew Chong (Mr. Justin Leong Chee C’Jun and Ms. Amila Huda binti Ahmad with him) Messrs. Lee & Koh S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 S/N JCgM68qwMUq4gceqhtpMBQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal