(b) Where an advocate and solicitor is adjudicated a bankrupt or a receiving order is made against him, the practicing certificate, if any, of that advocate and solicitor shall be suspended forthwith, until the consent of the Bar Council to reinstate it is obtained.” [15] It is thus clear that once an advocate and solicitor is adjudicated a bankrupt he cannot practise until the consent of the Bar Council to reinstate is obtained. 9 [16] In the case of Legal Services Commissioner v David John Walter [2011] QSC 132, the Supreme Court of Queensland inter alia states as follows: “In my opinion, the giving of legal advice, at least as part of a course of conduct and for reward, can properly be said to lie at or near the very centre of the practice of law, and hence the notion of acting or practising as a solicitor..” [emphasis added] [17] The above case had been cited by both learned High Court Judge in her Grounds of Judgment and by learned counsel for the respondent/intervener in his written submissions. [18] As found by the leaned High Court Judge, the appellant had admitted that the “yuran guaman dated 18.8.2007 and 6.8.2007” were payment for the drafting of the written submission in the Magistrates’ Court, while the receipt dated 4.3.2011 was for the outstanding fees for the High Court matter. This shows that the appellant was giving legal advice for reward and this can be said “to lie at or near the very centre of the practice of law” and hence amount to practising law. Although we agree that mere giving of advice would not tantamount to practising law, 10 but the giving of advice for fees or reward would definitely bring to that conclusion. [19] On the last issue, we also have no issue with the decision of the Federal Court in Dinesh, supra; which inter alia stated that the DC, in recommending the punishment to be meted out, ought to give brief reasons as to why the DC had recommended the particular punishment meted out. However, our attention was drawn to the DC Report in this instance, at pages 171 to 174 of Rekod Rayuan. In the report, we found the DC had clearly explained at length the reason of its recommendation on the punishment imposed. Therefore there was definitely no basis for the appellant to aver that the DC had failed to give reasons on its recommendation on the punishment imposed. [20] At the end of his oral submissions the appellant had also urged this court to draw adverse inference as the complainant did not attend the proceedings before the DC to give evidence. On this, we do no better but to reproduce the decision of the learned High Court Judge: “[11] These issues are with regard to the proceedings before the DC. It is not in dispute that the Complainant was not present during the proceedings before the DC. On the hearing on 15.1.2016, the DC 11 had relied on the complaint filed by the Complainant, the documents given the appellant, and then proceeded to hear the evidence of the appellant. In the DC’s findings, the DC held as follows: “5. Despite having sent the notices to the Complainant, he failed to turn up on the bearing date. Therefore, we proceeded to hear the merits of the complaint, pursuant to Rule 22 Legal Profession (Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994.” [12] Rule 22 of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Investigating Tribunal and Disciplinary Committee) Rules 1994 (“1994 Rules”) reads as follows: “22. Absence of parties before Disciplinary Committee Where on the date fixed for hearing and investigation of the complaint of the complainant or the advocate or solicitor concerned or both fail or fails to attend before the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Committee may, upon being satisfied that the notice of hearing has been posted to the person or persons concerned, proceed to hear and investigate the 12 complaint in the absence of such person or persons without further notice to such person or persons and make its determination and recommendation to the Disciplinary Board.” [13] Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that rule 22 of the 1994 Rules allows the DC to proceed with the hearing against the appellant in the absence of the Complainant. [14] On the appellant’s complaint that no witness was called and that he was not given an opportunity to cross examine the Complainant, I agree with the intervener that from the DC’s Notes of Proceedings, the appellant did not raise any objection nor did he request for an adjournment of the hearing on the basis that the Complainant was absent. With regards to the allegation that the appellant was denied the opportunity to be heard, the Notes of Evidence before the DC clearly shows that the appellant was given the opportunity to be heard. Indeed, the DC had accepted his evidence that he was the only one from the firm to be involved with the Complainant, and therefore three other parties have been discharged by the DC from the charges of the acts of misconduct.” 13 [21] We found no reason to disagree with the decision of the learned High Court Judge as quoted above. Conclusion [22] We had perused the Records of Appeal and considered the submissions of the parties. We were of the considered view that the appellant had failed to show us how and where the learned High Court Judge had gone wrong in Her Ladyship’s decision. We therefore found no reason to disturb her Ladyship’s decision. Consequentially, we dismissed this appeal with no order as to costs. sgd Dated: 13 Mac 2020 ( ZALEHA BT YUSOF ) Judge Court of Appeal Perayu: DARSHAN SINGH KHAIRA No. 82 (Tingkat Satu) Lebuh Bishop 10200 Georgetown Pulau Pinang Responden/Pencelah/Dan/Atau Peguamcaranya: OH TEIK KENG & PARTNERS Peguambela & Peguamcara 24-1, Jalan 2/96a Taman Cheras 56100 Kuala Lumpur