Dato’ Hj Saadon Bin Othman … v 1. ) Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Kumpulan Pengurusan (No. 1) (WA-25-164-06/2017)

LEMBAGA TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM KUMPULAN

2.

3.

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ... RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN Grounds of Decision Azizah Nawawi, J Application [1] This Court had granted leave to the Applicant to proceed with judicial review proceedings under Order 53 Rules of Court 2012 (the “ROC 2012”), seeking an order of Certiorari to quash the decision of the 1st Respondent in a meeting No. 7 of 2016 dated 19.10.2016 that decided that the Applicant was guilty of misconduct and was sentenced with a three (3) months deferment of salary movement (“Decision”) pursuant to regulation 38(d) of the Peraturan-Peraturan Awam (Kelakuan Tatatertib) 1993 (the “1993 Regulations), on the grounds that it is null and void. The rest of the prayers had been dismissed by this court. [2] Having considered the application, this Court has dismissed the application with costs. 4 The Salient Facts [3] The Salient Facts (in Bahasa Malaysia) are as follows:

Pada masa material, Pemohon merupakan Pegawai Tadbir dan Diplomatik (PTD) Gred Utama C (Memangku) yang bertugas sebagai Setiausaha Bahagian di Bahagian Khidmat Pengurusan dan Aset, Kementerian Dalam Negeri KDN.

(ii) Satu laporan telah diterima oleh Tan Sri Dr. Ali bin Hamsa, Ketua Setiausaha Negara, yang juga merupakan Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Awam Kumpulan Pegurusan (No. 1) (Responden Pertama) yang menyatakan bawa Pemohon telah berkelakuan yang membolehkan tindakan tatatertib diambil ke atas Pemohon, iaitu telah melakukan kesalahan datang lewat ke pejabat mengikut waktu bekerja yang ditetapkan sebanyak 22 kali.

(iii) Setelah menimbangkan segala maklumat yang diterima, Pengerusi Responden Pertama mendapati kesalahan tatatertib yang dilakukan oleh Pemohon adalah daripada jenis yang patut dikenakan tindakan tatatertib tidak dengan tujuan buang kerja atau turun pangkat di bawah peraturan 36 Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993.

(iv) Seterusnya satu surat Tindakan Tatatertib Tidak Dengan Tujuan Buang Kerja Atau Turun Pangkat bertarikh 1.7.2016 5 telah dikeluarkan kepada Pemohon di mana Pemohon telah dimaklumkan pertuduhan yang dikenakan terhadapnya.

Pemohon juga telah diberikan peluang untuk membuat representasi bertulis dalam tempoh 21 hari daripada tarikh penerimaan surat tersebut

(vi) Pemohon kemudian telah mengemukakan representasi beliau melalui surat bertarikh 19.8.2016.

(vii) Setelah menimbang dengan teliti representasi Pemohon dan fakta kesalahan tatatertib yang dikatakan telah dilakukan olehnya, Responden Pertama dalam mesyuarat pada 19.10.2016 mendapati dan memutuskan bahawa Pemohon bersalah atas kesalahan tatatertib yang dikatakan telah dilakukan olehnya sebagaimana dipertuduhkan.

(viii) Atas dapatan bersalah tersebut, Responden Pertama seterusnya menjatuhkan hukuman “Tangguh Pergerakan Gaji Selama 3 Bulan” terhadap Pemohon mengikut subperaturan 38(d)Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993.

(ix) Pemohon juga telah dimaklumkan untuk membuat rayuan ke atas keputusan Responden Pertama dan Pemohon telah menfailkan rayuan tersebut.

Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam yang telah bersidang pada 27.2.2017 telah menimbangkan rayuan 6 Pemohon dan mendapati rayuan tersebut tidak mempunyai asas yang kukuh. Justeru itu, Lembaga Rayuan telah menolak rayuan Pemohon dan mengesahkan keputusan Responden Pertama. [4] Aggrieved by the decision of the 1st Respondent, the applicant has filed this application to challenge the said decision. The Findings of the Court [5] In T. Ganeswaran v Suruhanjaya Polis DiRaja Malaysia & 1 lagi [2005] 3 CLJ 302, the Court of Appeal, in a matter of reviewing the decision of the disciplinary body, had held as follows: “Mengenai perkara ini ingin kami merujuk kepada keputusan House of Lords di dalam kes Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141 yang menyatakan: Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made, and, therefore the court is not entitled on an application for judicial review to consider whether the decision itself was fair and reasonable. Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision - making process. Unless the restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view under the 7 guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. Menyentuh soal yang sama di dalam kes Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v. Universiti Sains Malaysia [1988] 1 CLJ 559; [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 390, Edgar Joseph Jr. J (beliau ketika itu) di dalam penghakimannya menyatakan: I would at the outset say that in considering these applications I have kept in the forefront of my mind the basic principles to be distilled from a number of cases upon which courts will review decisions of public authorities and inferior tribunals. The basic principles may be stated thus:

judicial review applies to any body of persons having legal authority derived from public law to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects whether that right is derived from statute or from the common law;

the High Court is not a Court of Appeal from the body under review;

the High Court limits itself to determining whether the public authority or inferior 8 tribunal has acted lawfully, rationally and with due regard to proper procedures;

the court will not substitute its judgment or discretion for the judgment or discretion of the body under review;

facts determined by the body under review are rarely open to review in the High Court;

the High Court will intervene unless there is express statutory direction to the contrary;

if there is an established appeal procedure from the decision of the body under review the court usually prefers this course to be followed;

only activities of a public nature can be the subject of judicial review…” [6] Bearing in mind the above principles, I will now deal with the issues raised by the applicant. The main issue raised by the applicant is that the charge in disciplinary proceedings should refer to the Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Pindaan) 2002 (the “2002 Amending Regulations”) and not the 1993 Regulations. The applicant‟s submission in paragraph 11 and 14 of his Written Submission read as follows: 9 “11. Oleh itu, Pemohon berhujah bahawa memandangkan kertas pertuduhan tersebut adalah salah, cacat dan mengelirukan, maka keputusan yang duputuskan daripada pertuduhan yang cacat tersebut hendaklah diketepikan dan dibatalkan. Pemohon menegaskan bahawa pertuduhan hendaklah dibuat mengikut Akta 246 Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Pindaan) 2002 dan bukannya Akta 395 Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai awam (Kelakuan dan tattertib) 1993. …

Pada 20.06.2002, Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Pindaan) 2002 telah mula berkuatkuasa. Di dalam Perkara 7 dan 8 di dalam PPPA (K&T) (Pindaan) 2002 jelas menyatakan bahawa Peraturan-Peraturan Ibu telah dipinda dangan menggantikan Bahagian IV dan V dengan Bahagian IV dan V di dalam PPPA (K&T) (Pindaan) 2002. Oleh itu peraturan yang terpakai adalah Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Pindaan) 2002.” (emphasis added) [7] The 2002 Amending Regulations is to amend certain provisions of the 1993 Regulations. Thus the amended provisions under the 2002 Amending Regulations will be incorporated into the 1993 Regulations. The 2002 Amending Regulations is merely to amend the 1993 Regulations, not to repeal the 1993 Regulations. Therefore, all disciplinary actions must be made pursuant to the 1993 Regulations, and refer to the relevant amended provisions of 10 the 1993 Regulations, not the 2002 Amending Regulations. Therefore, I find that there no illegality in the charges made pursuant to the 1993 Regulations. In Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis Kontijen Kuala Terengganu & 2 Yang Lain lwn Mohd Faizal Guna bin Abdullah [Rayuan Sivil No: T-01-335-2009], a similar issue was raised, that is whether it is the 1993 Regulations or the 2002 Amending Regulations that is applicable in the disciplinary charges. The High Court held that the charges should have been formulated under the 2002 Amending Regulations, not the 1993 Regulations. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which held as follows: “8. Hakim perbicaraan telah bersetuju dengan hujahan tersebut di atas dan telah berkata: “Saya mendapati bahawa terdapat 2 kesilapan yang jelas berhubung pemakaian PPPA 1993 di sini.Pertamanya sepertimana yang dinyatakan di atas semasa tindakan diambil Peraturan tersebut tidak lagi wujud kerana telah dipinda pada tahun 2002 dan digantikan dengan Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) (Pindaan)(PPPA (Pindaan) 2002) mulai berkuatkuasa pada 20.6.2002. Pada hemat saya dalam keadaan kes ini,Responden sepatutnya menggunapakai PPPA (Pindaan) 2002 dan bukannya PPPA 1993 terhadap Permohon. Kegagalan untuk berbuat demikian menimbulkan kekeliruan Pemohon.” 11

Dalam hal ini kita tidak tak agak-agak untuk menyatakan bahawa Hakim perbicaraan yang bijaksana ternyata telah tersilap dalam memutuskan bahawa PPPA 1993 lagi tidak lagi wujud semasa tindakan tatatertib itu dimulakan.Tiada apa-apa dalam PPPA (Pindaan) 2002 yang boleh ditafsirkan atau disifatkan telah memansuhkan atau membatalkan PPPA 1993 tetapi ia hanya bertujuan meminda PPPA 1993 itu sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan dalam peraturan-peraturan yang meminda tersebut (amending regulations). Kesan dan pentafsiran peraturan-peraturan yang meminda telah diperuntukkan dengan nyata dalam seksyen 90 Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967 yang berbunyi:

“Construction of amending regulations Where regulations amend other regulations, the amending regulations, shall, in so far as consistent with the tenor thereof, and unless the contrary intention appears, be construed as one of the amended regulations”

Dalam konteks pindaan di hadapan kami, PPPA 1993 adalah peraturan-peraturan yang dipinda (atau peraturan-peraturan ibu) dan PPPA (Pindaan) 2002 adalah peraturan-peraturan baru yang meminda Oleh itu, pada tarikh PPPA (Pindaan) 2002 mula berkuatkuasa, peruntukan-peruntukan baru yang bertujuan dimasukkan ke dalam PPPA 1993 (sebagai peraturan-peraturan yang dipinda) melalui pindaan tersebut akan menjadi sebahagian daripada, dan disifatkan 12 sebagai satu dengan, peraturan-peraturan yang dipinda itu.Kesimpulannya dengan pindaan tersebut segala prosiding Tatatertib dengan tujuan buang kerja atau turun pangkat hendaklah dimulakan mengikut prosedur yang ditetapkan di bawah peraturan 37 baru PPPA

1993.Kami mendapati tiada apa-apa salah aturan atau kecacatan dalam prosidur yang telah diikuti oleh perayu dalam prosiding tatatertib terhadap responden.” (emphasis added) [8] With regards to the application to challenge the merits of the disciplinary actions, the applicant takes the position that the charge against the applicant had not been proven,that the relevant letters were not signed by the Chairman of the 1st respondent, that he should have been given a warning before the initiation of the disciplinary proceeding and that he was not given an oral hearing. [9] The disciplinary charges against the applicant is premised on regulation 4 (2) (g) of the 1993 Regulations, which reads: “(2) An officer shall not-

be irresponsible;” [10] The applicant is said to be irresponsible because he was found to have been absent from duty for about 22 times in the months of December 2015 to February 2016. Regulation 23 reads: 13 “23. Absence from duty In this Part, "absence", in relation to an officer, includes a failure to be present for any length of time at a time and place where the officer is required to be present for the performance of his duties.” (emphasis added) [11] From the charge itself, the applicant was found to have come to the office late in the month of December 2015 (5 times), January 2016 (10 times) and February 2016 (7 times). The times that the applicant came to the office range from 8.31 am to 5.10pm. [12] The applicant had given a lengthy explanation (15 pages) in his letter of representation dated 19.8.2016 with regards to the reasons as to why he came to the office late. It is the submission of the applicant that the reasons that he had given are reasonable. However, the explanations given the applicant were not accepted by the 1st respondent, and the sentence imposed was a „Tangguh Pergerakan Gaji Selama Tiga (3) Bulan.‟ [13] On administrative matters, it is not for this court to state what should be the policies of the respondent when dealing with issues such as reasons for the late attendance of the employees in the office. The respondents would be in a better position to deal with such administrative matters. It is not for this court to decide if the reasons given are reasonable and/or acceptable. In Public Service Commission Malaysia & Anor v Vickneswary a/p RM Santhivelu (substituting M Senthivelu a/l Marimuthu, deceased) [2008] 6 CLJ 573, Tun Zaki CJ held at page 595C: 14 “[44] From these GOs, it can be clearly concluded that it is the disciplinary authority and not the court who is to decide whether the officer in his written representation has exculpated himself. The answer to Question (iii) must therefore be answered in the negative ie, that it is not the court but the disciplinary authority who is to decide this question of whether he has exculpated himself by his written representation.” (emphasis added) [14] The next issue raised by the applicant is that the letters issued by the 1st respondent (the show cause letter dated 1.7.20160 and the letter dated 9.11.2016 informing him of the 1st respondent‟s decision) must be signed by the Chairman of the 1st respondent. Instead, the letters were signed by Tan Sri Mohammad Zabidi Zainal, who signed the letters on behalf of the Chairman. Therefore, it is the submission of the applicant that this is against regulation 36 of the 1993 Regulations, which provides that the “Pengerusi Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib … hendaklah memaklumkan pegawai itu melalui Notis di bawah peraturan 52..” [15] I am of the considered opinion that the fact that the disciplinary letters were not signed by the Chairman of the 1st respondent does not nullify the disciplinary actions. In his affidavit affirmed on 26.10.2017, the Chairman of the 1st respondent, Tan Sri Dr. Ali bin Hamsa, states as follows: 15 “19. Saya menyatakan bahawa saya telah mengarahkan Tan Sri Mohamad Zabidi Zainal iaitu Ketua Pengarah Perkhidmatan Awam pada masa material yang juga anggota Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Kumpulan Pegurusan (No. 1) untuk menandatangai surat tersebut bagi pihak saya.

Setelah dinasihatkan Peguam Kanan Persekutuan, saya menegaskan bahawa tidak ada kewajipan bagi saya untuk menandatangani surat berkenaan di bawah Peraturan yang dirujuk Pemohon dan surat tersebut telah ditandatangani oleh Tan Sri Mohamad Zabidi Zainal bagi pihak saya selaku Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Kumpulan Pegurusan (No. 1).” [16] Therefore, the letters were merely to inform the applicant of the decision of the Chairman of the 1strespondent (Show Cause letter) and the decision of the 1st respondent. In Marzuki Abdul Aziz v Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [2003] 3 CLJ 315, a similar issue arises and the Court of Appeal held as follows: “As we have pointed out, the Deputy IGP has been delegated with all the powers to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant under the Instrument of Delegation, P.U.(B) 621. Vested with that power he had decided to issue the show cause letter, and 16 directed it to be sent to the appellant. This was the first letter. Upon receipt of the appellant's representations the Deputy IGP had deliberated upon them and decided that dismissal was the only punishment to meet the many instances of absence without leave on the part of the appellant. He had then directed that his decision to dismiss be communicated to the appellant and this was done through the second letter. Under these circumstances we say that the decision making process has been done by the one and only person who has been delegated to do so namely the Deputy IGP. The writing of the two letters does not form part of the decision making process as the two letters merely convey the directives and decisions of the Deputy IGP and form part of the administrative functions of the Deputy IGP for which an officer can be directed to execute.. The two letters were written on the police letter head and based on the opening words in the two letters as aforesaid, Abdul Aziz must have been a Senior Officer in the police force and the fact that his official status had not been identified on the two letters does not render the decision to dismiss made by the Deputy IGP to be contrary to law. Abdul Aziz does not feature in the decision making process. What he did was merely to convey the decisions of the Deputy IGP, administrative acts which do not fall within the 17 category of the decision making process.” (emphasis added) [17] The next issue raised by the applicant is that he should have been given a warning before the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. The applicant submits that his supervisor, Tuan Hj Zainal Abidin bin Abu Hassan, the Setiausaha Bahagian Kanan (Pengurusan), has failed in his duties to properly supervise the applicant. The applicant complained that Tuan Hj. Zainal had failed „tegur, pantau, tukar kad kuning kehadiran kepada warna lain atau diberikan surat tunjuk sebab sebab lewat hadir pejabat.‟ [18] I am of the considered opinion that the alleged lack of supervision does not exculpate the applicant from the disciplinary charges, and neither do they nullify the disciplinary proceedings. If any, the lack of supervision may form the basis of disciplinary proceedings against the supervisors. In any event, the issue of supervision is a management matter. Added to that, the applicant is a senior officer who should not be required to be monitored on late attendance at work. With regards to „Surat Pekeliling Am Bil. 11 of 1981 (Sistem Penggunaan Kad Perakam Waktu (Punch Card) Di Pejabat-Pejabat Kerajaan)‟, the said Circular is for administrative purposes and paragraph 2.1.4 of the Circular allows actions to be taken against the „pegawai/kakitangan yang selalu datang ke pejabat atau keluar dengan tidak mengikut waktu atau tanpa izin yang resmi kerana sebab-sebab tertentu.‟ There is nothing in the Circular or the 1993 Regulations that states that compliance with the Circular (specifically on the change of the punch card from yellow card, to green card and eventually the red card) is a 18 condition precedent before disciplinary actions can be taken under the 1993 Regulations. [19] The last issue raised by the applicant is that he was not given an oral right of hearing. However, the Federal Court in Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 CLJ 525 has settled the issue that there is no necessity to give an oral hearing, and that the requirement of fairness and natural justice is satisfied by giving an opportunity to make written representations under the General Order (1993 Regulations). Conclusion [20] Premised on the reasons enumerated above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no merit in the application and the same is dismissed with cost. (AZIZAH BINTI HAJI NAWAWI) JUDGE HIGH COURT MALAYA (Appellate and Special Powers Division 2) KUALA LUMPUR Dated: 28 June 2019 19 For the Applicant: Dato‟ Hazman Ahmad bersama Nadira Isyak, Omar Ismail Hazman & Co. Kuala Lumpur For the 1st- 4th Respondent: Tuan Khairul Nizam Mohd Kamal, Peguam Kanan Persekutuan, Putrajaya

T. Ganeswaran v Suruhanjaya Polis DiRaja Malaysia & 1 lagi [2005] 3 CLJ 302

Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis Kontijen Kuala Terengganu & 2 Yang Lain lwn Mohd Faizal Guna bin Abdullah [Rayuan Sivil No: T-01-335-2009]

Public Service Commission Malaysia & Anor v Vickneswary a/p RM Santhivelu (substituting M Senthivelu a/l Marimuthu, deceased) [2008] 6 CLJ 573

Marzuki Abdul Aziz v Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [2003] 3 CLJ 315

Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam Hospital Besar Pulau Pinang & Anor v Utra Badi K Perumal [2001] 2 CLJ 525