DATO' SRI MOHD NAJIB BIN TUN HJ ABD RAZAK v Tan Sri Ahmad Terrirudin Bin Mohd Salleh (W-01(IM)-456-07/2024)

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LEMBAGA PENGAMPUNAN BAGI WILAYAH-WILAYAH

MENTERI DI JABATAN PERDANA MENTERI

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KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Kuala Lumpur Di Dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Malaysia (Bahagian Rayuan & Kuasa-Kuasa Khas) No. Permohonan Untuk Semakan Kehakiman: WA-25-136-04/2024 Antara Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Bin Tun Hj Abd Razak (No. K/P: 530723-06-5165) …

Menteri Dalam Negeri 2. Komisioner Jeneral Penjara 3. Peguam Negara Malaysia 4. Lembaga Pengampunan Bagi Wilayah-Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, Labuan Dan Putrajaya 5.

Ketua Pengarah Bahagian Hal Ehwal Undang-Undang Di Jabatan Perdana Menteri 7. Kerajaan Malaysia … Responden-Responden CORAM AZIZAH BINTI NAWAWI, JCA AZAHAHARI KAMAL BIN RAMLY, JCA MOHD FIRUZ BIN JAFFRIL, JCA JUDGMENT (MINORITY) Introduction [1] This appeal is against the decision of the learned High Court Judge dated 3 July 2024, dismissing the Appellant’s leave application to commence judicial review proceeding, essentially seeking an order of mandamus to compel all or any of the Respondents to do the following acts:

answer and/or confirm the existence of an Addendum Order dated 29 January 2024 decreed by His Majesty Seri Paduka Baginda Yang Di-Pertuan Agong XVI (“His Majesty YDPA XVI”), a supplementary order to the Main Order dated the same, which ordered the Appellant to serve the reduced term of imprisonment under house arrest or to terms to the equivalent effect;

(ii) should the Addendum Order exists, the Appellant is to be removed from the Kajang prison facility to his known residence(s) in Kuala Lumpur where the Appellant would continue to serve his imprisonment sentence under house arrest;

(iii) to provide an original version or copy of the Main Order dated 29 January 2024; and

(iv) to provide an original version or copy of the Addendum Order dated 29 January 2024. The Background Facts [2] From the submissions of parties, the background facts disclosed that on 4 July 2018 and 8 August 2018, the Appellant was charged in the Kuala Lumpur High Court bearing Criminal Suit No(s): WA- 45-2-07/2018; WA-45-3-07/2018; and WA-45-5-08/2018, commonly known as the ‘SRC cases’ where he was found guilty of all charges. [3] On 30 July 2020, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the learned High Court Judge. His appeal was dismissed by this Court on 8 December 2021. Consequently, the conviction and sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment and RM210 millions of fine against him were affirmed by this Court. [4] On 8 December 2021, the Appellant appealed to the Federal Court against the decision of this Court. On 23 August 2022, his appeal against both conviction and sentence was dismissed by the apex court. [5] Following the decision of the Federal Court to affirm both the conviction and sentences imposed on the Appellant, the Appellant was brought to Kajang Prison to serve his imprisonment sentence. The Appellant remained under the jurisdiction of the 2nd Respondent hitherto. [6] On 1 September 2022, the Appellant through his solicitors Messrs Shafee & Co, filed a petition to His Majesty YDPA XVI for a complete and/or full pardon against the conviction and sentence of the SRC Case pursuant to, inter alia, Article 42 of the Federal Constitution. [7] Subsequently, on 18 October 2022 and 20 April 2023, the Appellant filed further petitions to His Majesty YDPA XVI consideration. [8] On 2 February 2024, the 4th Respondent under the purview of the 5th and the 6th Respondents announced that His Majesty YDPA XVI had convened the 61st Pardons Board for the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya. The initial date of 8 December 2023 was then adjourned to the 15 January 2024. This was subsequently adjourned to 29 January 2024. During this sitting of the Pardons Board on 29 January 2024, the imprisonment term of the Appellant was reduced to six (6) years (from twelve (12) years) and the fine was reduced to RM50 million (the ‘Pardons Order’): - [9] On 12 February 2024, the Appellant claimed to have received clear and reliable information that in addition to the Pardons Order dated 29 January 2024, His Majesty YDPA XVI had issued an addendum order (the “Addendum Order”) stipulating that the Appellant be allowed to serve the reduced sentence of his imprisonment under "home arrest," instead of incarceration in Kajang Prison. [10] The Appellant then instructed his solicitors to confirm the details of the Addendum Order with the Attorney General of Malaysia (3rd Respondent) by way of a letter dated 14 February 2024. [11] Vide a letter dated 22 March 2024, the matter was referred to the Minister of Home Affairs (1st Respondent), inter alia, on the existence and enforcement of the Addendum Order. Similarly, the matter was also brought to the attention of the Pardons Board for the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan, and Putrajaya, the Minister in the Prime Institutional Reform and the Director-General of the Legal Affairs (the 4th, 5th and 6th Respondents respectively), on 29 March 2024. [12] On 19 February 2024, the Appellant’s solicitors also requested the original copy or a copy thereof of the Pardons Order from the Kajang Prison. [13] Consequently, on 1 April 2024, the Appellant filed the Leave Application in court seeking several mandamus orders. Judicial Review [14] In addition to its original and appellate powers, the High Court in Malaysia has additional powers under section 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (“CJA”), as listed in the Schedule of the CJA. Paragraph 1 of the Schedule incorporates the common law prerogative orders, which make up the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. Paragraph 1 provides wide powers to the High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority orders in the nature of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto or any orders for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part II of the Federal Constitution or for any purpose. [15] Judicial review is the process where the High Court supervises administrative and discretionary actions or decisions made by tribunals, persons or bodies charged with quasi-judicial functions, public acts or duties. The intention behind this jurisdiction is to protect against abuse and to ensure that the actions and decisions of these bodies or persons are in accordance with the law. [16] In SIS Forum (Malaysia) v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (Intervener) [2022] 3 CLJ 339, the Federal Court held as follows: "Judicial review is a core tenet of the rule of law which is inextricably linked to the notion of constitutional supremacy in a democratic form of Government. This was because a core feature of the rule of law is the doctrine of separation of powers, a corollary to which is the concept of check and balance. Judicial review - whether constitutional review or statutory review - is a fundamental aspect of check and balance and is the vehicle through which the judicial branch of Government can perform its constitutional function vis-a-vis the other branches of Government. The judicial power of the Federation which includes judicial review (constitutional and statutory) is vested by constitutional design solely in the two High Courts." Leave application [17] The procedural aspects of a judicial review application are governed by the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”). Judicial review proceedings under Order 53 of the ROC 2012 consist of two stages, the leave stage and the substantive stage. The first stage requires the applicant to get the court’s permission (leave) through an ex parte application. The second stage begins once leave is granted. The applicant must then give notice of the hearing using Form 110. In this regard, the Federal Court in Wong Kin Hoong & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 CLJ 193 stated as follows: "the procedure relating to the filing of a judicial review application is set out in O. 53 of the RHC. An application for judicial review is a two-stage process. The first stage is the leave application and the second stage is the hearing of the substantive application arguments on its merits, should leave be granted." The purpose of leave application [18] The purpose of the leave application is for the court to ascertain if the application is clearly without merit, that the application is frivolous. For example, the court can refuse leave if the applicant has no real interest in the matter, if the application is filed out of time, or if it is against someone who cannot be sued, in matters enjoining judicial immunity or non-justiciability. (see Dr Amir Hussein bin Baharuddin v Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 3 MLJ 298; Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v. Zaid Mohd Noh [1997] 2 CLJ 11 (SC); Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Ors v. Menteri Tenaga, Air dan Komunikasi & Anor [2014] 2 CLJ 525; Ravindran v. Malaysian Examinations Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168, SC; Wong Kin Hoong & Anor (suing for themselves and on behalf all of the occupants of Kampung Bukit Koman, Raub, Pahang) v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 CLJ 193 FC; Haji Salleh Bin Jafaruddin v Datuk Celestine Ujang & Ors.[1986] 2MLJ 412) [19] This was what this Court held in the case of Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 927: "(1) Applications for leave under O. 53 are made - and they must be made - through a two-stage process. The High Court should not go into the merits of the case at the leave stage. Its role is only to see if the application for leave is frivolous. If, for example, the applicant is a busybody, or the application is made out of time or against a person or body that is immunised from being impleaded in legal proceedings then the High Court would be justified in refusing leave in limine. So too will the court be entitled to refuse leave if it is a case where the subject matter of the review is one which by settled law (either written law or the common law) is non-justiciable, eg, proceedings in Parliament. (paras 5 & 10)" Principles for granting leave [20] To determine whether leave ought to be granted or not, the Federal Court in the case of WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ 478; [2012] 4 MLJ 296 has provided the following guidance: "At the leave stage, on a quick perusal of the material available, if the court thinks that subsequently at the substantive hearing stage an arguable case may be disclosed, and the relief sought may be granted, leave should be granted...Without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie, unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.” [21] Therefore, based on the materials presented, the court will grant leave if the applicant can show that there is an arguable case. In other words, there must be a reasonable basis to further examine the matter and consider granting the reliefs requested at the substantive stage. Thus, it is the function of the court in exercising its power to grant leave for Judicial Review to sieve through the application before it and determine that the application is not frivolous and vexatious and that there is an arguable case to merit further argument on the substantive motion. [22] In summary, the principles that the court must consider when deciding on a leave application for judicial review is to grant leave if there is a point that deserves further examination with full evidence and legal arguments. The court will dismiss the application if there is clearly no arguable case. Role of Attorney General at leave stage [23] The involvement of the Attorney General at the leave stage is expressly provided under Order 53 of the ROC 2012 which requires the applicant to serve the leave application, statement and affidavit on the Attorney General. Order 53 Rule 3(3) of the ROC 2012 provides as follows: “(3) The applicant must give notice of the application for leave not later than three days before the hearing date to the Attorney General’s Chambers and must at the same time lodge in those Chambers copies of the statement and affidavits.” [24] At the leave stage, the Attorney General was served not as a putative respondent, but in his official capacity under Order 53 rule 3(3) of the ROC 2012. When the Attorney General appears at leave stage, the Attorney General is not appearing on behalf of the putative respondents. While he has the option not to appear, once he chose to do so, through the Senior Federal Counsel, the court is obligated to hear him. At this stage, the court does not evaluate the merits of the case; its role is only to filter out baseless applications and determine if there is an arguable case. The role of Attorney General at the leave stage is only to assist the Court in sieving out frivolous applications by appraising the Court of any particular features of the case that would disqualify leave being granted. [25] Therefore, there exists a valid legal basis for the requirement that the applicant must serve the cause papers on the Attorney General. This requirement is based on the principle that judicial review serves as a key instrument of public law, intended to regulate the actions of public bodies through proceedings instituted before the High Court exercising its original jurisdiction. Given that matters involving public bodies inherently raise issues of public interest, and that the Attorney General is constitutionally recognized as the guardian of public interest, this procedural rule designates the Attorney General as a nominal party to all judicial review proceedings. The underlying objective of this requirement is to afford the Attorney General an opportunity to examine the application and determine whether his intervention is necessary. (see Kanawagi a/l Seperumaniam v. Dato’ Abdul Hamid bin Mohamad [2004] 5 MLJ 495, HC: Messrs Tai Choi Yu & Co, Advocates (suing as a firm and Tai Choi Yu as sole proprietor) v. Arifin bin Zakaria & Anor [2020] 5 MLJ 207) [26] Indeed the role of the Attorney General is to protect public authorities and institutions by stopping clearly baseless claims early, without requiring them to become involved in court cases, and to prevent disruption to public administration. In Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 656, this Court held as follows: “[12] The respondents’ argument on this point, we would say, was premised on the ground that the appellant had no locus standi to appeal as the appellant was not a party to the proceedings. In our opinion, the appellant had locus standi and also a special right to appeal in the public interest. The appellant was undeniably a party at the leave application. His presence was required by law without being made a party to the proceedings. The relevant provision is found in O 53 r 3(3) of the Rules of Court 2012 which states: The applicant must give notice of the application for leave not later than three days before the hearing date to the Attorney General’s Chambers and must at the same time lodge in those Chambers copies of the statement and affidavit. This provision, in our judgment, makes it mandatory, as evident by the use of the word ‘must’, for the applicant to give notice of the application to, and at the same time lodge the statement and affidavit in, the Attorney General’s Chambers. A failure to comply with the mandatory requirement to serve the cause papers on the attorney general would result in the application being dismissed. It also makes the attorney general the party representing the public interest at the point when the leave application is heard, hence, when he appears before the court at that stage, the court has to recognise his presence and has no jurisdiction not to hear him. The putative party, the EC, is not a party at that particular point. The appellant’s position as guardian of public interest at this stage would necessarily include the right to appeal against an order granting leave. [13] Thus, in as much as the court had no jurisdiction not to hear the appellant when he appeared before the High Court at leave stage, the appellant should, as a necessary corollary, have the right to appeal to this court against the decision of the High Court to grant leave and when he does, this court has to hear him on the appeal…” (emphasis added) [27] At this preliminary leave stage, the Attorney General was served not as a putative respondent, but in his official capacity as the Attorney General pursuant to Order 53 rule 3(3) of the Rules of Court 2012. The law does not impose any obligation on the Attorney General to file an affidavit in reply at the leave stage. In Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow (as secretary of Persatuan Kebajikan dan Amal Liam Hood Thong Chor Seng Thuan) [2019] 1 MLJ 307, this Court held as follows: “[16] On this first issue, we wholly agreed with the learned SFC that the law does not require the attorney general to file any affidavit in reply at the leave stage. At the leave stage, the attorney general in this appeal was served not in his capacity as a respondent but in his capacity as the attorney general under O 53 r 3(3) of the Rules of Court 2012. He could choose not to appear but when he appeared, through the learned SFC, the court had no jurisdiction not to hear him. The court was not concerned with the merit of the application as the leave stage was merely to sieve out frivolous application and to see whether the applicant had an arguable case.” (emphasis added) Interlocutory applications [28] Before the hearing of the substantive appeal, we have to deal with two (2) Motions filed by the Appellant. Motion Dated 3 December 2024 [29] The motion dated 3 December 2024 is filed pursuant to Section 69 of the CJA and Rule 7 of the Rules of the Court Appeal 1994 (“RCA”) and/or in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court for the following reliefs/orders: -

that this Court grants leave to the Appellant to adduce additional evidence in the form of: -

the affidavit affirmed by Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib, dated 2 December 2024; and

the Addendum Order, issued by His Majesty YDPA XVI stating that the Appellant is to serve his remaining reduced sentence under house arrest from 2 January 2024 until completion. [30] The grounds in support of this Notice of Motion are as specified in the Affidavit in Support of Muhammad Shafee Bin Abdullah. The brief grounds in support of the Motion are as follows: -

The additional evidence was not available during the High Court proceedings as the Appellant’s son, Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib, only obtained the Addendum Order after the High Court decision on 3 July 2024.

(ii) Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib only obtained His Majesty YDPA XVI’s approval to disclose the Addendum Order on 2 December 2024, and the former had affirmed an affidavit on the same day.

(iii) The criteria for adducing additional evidence have been satisfied as established in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745, namely: -

that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial (or appeal);

the evidence, would probably have an important influence on the outcome of the appeal, though it need not be decisive;

the evidence is credible and presumptively reliable, satisfying the standard required for admissibility, though it need not be incontrovertible.

(iv) The additional evidence will effectively disprove the High Court’s findings that the Appellant’s application for judicial review was devoid of merit, being predicated on pure hearsay and a speculative endeavour. It will demonstrate that: -

The Addendum Order does exist;

The Appellant’s application for leave for judicial review was meritorious; and

Leave for judicial review should have been granted. [31] The Addendum Order that the Appellant sought to be admitted as fresh evidence reads as follows: [32] In response to the Appellant’s first Motion, an affidavit was affirmed by Senior Federal Counsel, Donald Joseph Franklin on 3 January 2025 to exhibit the ‘Kenyataan Media’ issued by Istana Negara dated 3 January 2025, which reads: Amended Motion Dated 5 January [33] Subsequently, the Appellant filed the Amended Motion. The amended motion dated 5 January 2025 is for leave to adduce additional evidence in the form of: -

the affidavit affirmed by Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib, dated 2 December 2024;

the affidavit No. 2 affirmed by Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib dated 5 January 2025; and

the Addendum Order, issued by His Majesty YDPA XVI, stating that the Appellant is to serve his remaining reduced sentence under house arrest from 2 January 2024 until completion. [34] Under this amended Motion, the additional grounds relied by the appellant are as follows:

In spite of repeated attempts to obtain the additional evidence (i.e. copy of the Addendum Order) earlier, the Appellant was not successful in obtaining the same due to the sensitive nature of the additional evidence and the strict protocol of the matters involving the palace.

(ii) Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib only obtained the Kebawah Duli Paduka Baginda Sultan Pahang Al-Sultan Abdullah Ri’ayatuddin Al-Mustafa Billah Shah Ibni Almarhum Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al-Musta’in Billah (“KDPB Sultan Pahang”) and/or YDPA XVI’s approval to disclose the Addendum Order on 2 December 2024, and the former affirmed an affidavit on the same day. Prior to this date Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib was strictly not authorized to disclose the Addendum Order to anyone under the strict instructions of KDPB Sultan Pahang.

(iii) Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib had further obtained a letter by the KDPB Sultan Pahang/YDPA XVI on 5 January 2025 which is further confirmed by the Pengelola Bijaya Di-Raja of KDPB Sultan Pahang. This letter of confirmation was earlier sought by the Appellant and Mohamad Nizar Bin Mohd Najib to be released by the Palace of the KDPB Sultan of Pahang, but was not successful until the 5 January 2025 when there was a change of stand from the Palace. [35] Vide this amended Motion, the Appellant is also seeking to admit as fresh evidence, the letter issued by the Istana in Kuantan, Pahang, which reads: Decision on the motions [36] The application to admit fresh evidence is made under section 69(2) of CJA read with rule 7(2) of RCA. Section 69(2) CJA reads as follows: “69. Hearing of appeals ….

The further evidence may be given without leave on interlocutory applications, or in any case as to matter which have occurred after the date of the decision from which the appeal is brought.” [37] Rule 7(2) of the RCA states: “7 Power of Court to amend, admit further evidence, or draw inferences of fact …

Such further evidence may be given without leave on interlocutory applications, or in any case as to matters which have occurred after the date of the decision from which the appeal is brought.

Upon appeals from a judgment, after trial or hearing of any cause or matter upon the merits, such further evidence, save as to matters subsequent as aforesaid, shall be admitted on special grounds only, and not without leave of the Court.” Filing of Affidavits [38] The first issue raised by the Appellant is the failure of the Attorney General to dispute the Motion dated 3 December 2024 and the supporting affidavits. After the Appellant submitted the application for additional evidence, the Attorney General did not question the authenticity or accuracy of the Addendum Order, despite given another week to challenge the same by this Court. Learned Counsel submits that if the Addendum Order was fake or incorrect, then the Attorney General should have taken serious steps, such as filing a police report. This makes it reasonable to believe that the Addendum Order is genuine. The Appellant further submits that instead of taking a clear stance, the Attorney General has relied on a media release from the Istana Negara, which simply repeats the wording of Article 42 of the Federal Constitution. [39] However, I am of the considered opinion that the Attorney General is not in any position to respond to the affidavits affirmed in support of the two Motions. This is simply because at leave stage in the High Court and during the current appeal against the High Court decision to refuse leave, the Attorney General is not the putative respondent. At the leave stage (and during this appeal), the Attorney General was served not as a respondent but in his official capacity under Order 53 Rule 3(3) of the ROC 2012. There is clearly no legal requirement for the Attorney General to file an affidavit in reply at this stage. (see Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow (as secretary of Persatuan Kebajikan dan Amal Liam Hood Thong Chor Seng Thuan) [2019] 1 MLJ 307). Therefore, the principle in the case of Ng Hee Thong v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 282, cannot be invoked against the Attorney General in the circumstances of this appeal. Duty of Candour [40] It is also the submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the Government and the Attorney General had breached their duty of candour in both their conduct before and during the court proceedings. As a result, the Court has the authority to grant the Appellant the requested reliefs, specifically the recognition and enforcement of the Addendum Order. Learned Counsel relied on the Federal Court decision in Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and others [2023] 3 MLJ 829 wherein Nallini Pathmanathan FCJ held as follows: “[543] This duty of candour is a duty that public authorities should exercise, not least because they are expected to assist the court with ‘full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue which the court must decide’ and that this duty extends to disclosure of ‘materials which are reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision’. [544] We cite with approval from R (on the application of Bancoult (No 2) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2016] UKSC 35: DUTY OF CANDOUR [183] A respondent’s duty of candour in judicial review proceedings is summarised at p 125 of Fordham’s Judicial Review Handbook (6th Ed 2012): A defendant public authority and its lawyers owe a vital duty to make full and fair disclosure of relevant material. That should include (1) due diligence in investigating what material is available; (2) disclosure which is relevant or assists the claimant, including on some as yet unpleaded ground; and (3) disclosure at the permission stage if permission is resisted … A main reason why disclosure is not ordered in judicial review is because courts trust public authorities to discharge this self-policing duty, which is why such anxious concern is expressed where it transpires that they have not done so. [184] In R (on the application of Quark Fishing Ltd) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1409 at para 50 Laws LJ said, ‘There is a … very high duty on public authority respondents, not least central government, to assist the court with full and accurate explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue which the court must decide.’ The duty extends to disclosure of ‘materials which are reasonably required for the court to arrive at an accurate decision’ -

Graham v Police Service Commission [2011] UKPC 46 at para The purpose of disclosure is to ‘explain the full facts and reasoning underlying the decision challenged, and to disclose relevant documents, unless, in the particular circumstances of the case, other factors, including those which may fall short of public interest immunity, may exclude their disclosure - R (AHK) v Secretary of State for Home Department (No 2) [2012] EWHC 1117 at para 22.” [545] As expressed in R v Lancashire County Council, ex parte Huddleston [1986] 2 All ER 941 at p 945, it is for an applicant ‘to satisfy the court of his entitlement to judicial review and it is for the respondent to resist his application if it considers it to be unjustified. But it is a process which falls to be conducted with all the cards face upwards on the table and the vast majority of the cards will start in the authority’s hands’.” [41] Therefore, based on the case cited above, it is the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant that the law clearly states that public authorities have a duty of candour, meaning that they must help the court by providing complete and accurate information about all relevant facts. This includes sharing any materials the court reasonably need to make a fair and correct decision. [42] However, in the case of Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and others (supra) is distinguishable, as that case is already at the substantive stage, and not at leave application where the Attorney General is only the nominal party dealing with legal issues only. It must be reiterated that at leave stage, the Attorney General has no legal duty to file any affidavit to dispute the Appellant’s case. It is only after leave has been granted that the Attorney General, as the 3rd Respondent in this case, after being served with the cause papers, must then file an affidavit in response to any allegation of fact raised by the Appellant. The duty of candour only arise after leave has been granted and all the respondents who have been served with the cause papers must respond to the allegation of facts raised by the applicants accordingly. In fact, Order 53 r 6 ROC 2012 allows the parties to file for an application for discovery and inspection of documents after leave has been granted. Whether leave is an interlocutory application [43] It is also the submissions of learned counsel for the Appellant that an appeal from a dismissal of leave to commence judicial review proceedings is an interlocutory application. Therefore, pursuant to section 69(2) of CJA read with rule 7(2) of RCA, leave of the Court was not required for the admission of the affidavits and the Addendum Order. [44] The learned counsel relied on a recent decision of this Court in Krishnasamy Kuppusamy & Anor v Pengarah Hospital Sultanah Aminah & Ors and other Appeals [2024] 1 MLRA 344 wherein JCA Wong Kian Kheong held: “(1) The three striking out applications were interlocutory proceedings within the meaning of O 41 r 5(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012) from which the instant three appeals arose. Premised on Tokai Corporation v. DKSH Malaysia Sdn Bhd, O 41 r 5(2) of the ROC 2012 may be read with rule 4 of the RCA for the contents of Dr Selahuddeen's affidavit to be taken into account in the instant appeals. (paras 17-18)

(2)

the Additional Evidence, specifically, the Addendum was not available during the earlier proceedings and the Appellant has exhausted all means possible to obtain the Addendum through various correspondences even before the application for judicial review was filed;

(ii) the Additional Evidence would have an important influence in the result of this appeal; and

(iii) the Additional Evidence is credible. [50] Learned Counsel relied on rule 7(3A) of RCA, which states that the Court of Appeal has full discretionary powers to admit fresh evidence through oral examination, affidavits, or depositions. Such discretion is bound by the requirements laid down under (3A) as follows: “7. Power of Court to amend, admit further evidence, or draw inferences of fact

The Court shall have all the powers and duties, as to amendment or otherwise, of the appropriate High Court, together with full discretionary power to receive further evidence by oral examination in Court, by affidavit, or by deposition taken before an examiner or Commissioner.

Such further evidence may be given without leave on interlocutory applications, or in any case as to matters which have occurred after the date of the decision from which the appeal is brought.

Upon appeals from a judgment, after trial or hearing of any cause or matter upon the merits, such further evidence, save as to matters subsequent as aforesaid, shall be admitted on special grounds only, and not without leave of the Court.

At the hearing of the appeal further evidence shall not be admitted unless the Court is satisfied that:

at the hearing before the High Court or the subordinate court, as the case may be, the new evidence was not available to the party seeking to use it, or that reasonable diligence would not have made it so available; and

the new evidence, if true, would have had or would have been likely to have had a determining influence upon the decision of the High Court or the subordinate court, as the case may be.” [51] The power of the court to admit fresh, new or further evidence at the hearing of an appeal is governed by Rule 7 of the RCA 1994 and the test as set out in Rule 7(3A) of the RCA 1994 is a codification of the test laid down in Ladd v. Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745. Section 69(1), rr. 7(1) and (3A) have given statutory recognition to the principles enunciated in Ladd v. Marshall (supra): See Datuk Seri Panglima Mohd Sari Datuk Hj Nuar v. Vee Seng Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [2009] 6 CLJ 102 CA; Hue Ngee On v. Chai Woo Sien (Sebagai Pegawai Awam Persatuan Hakka Kulai, Johor) [2009] 5 CLJ 734 CA. [51] In Ladd v. Marshall (supra) Lord Denning at p. 748 laid down three conditions to justify the reception of fresh evidence in the following passage: “In order to justify the reception of fresh evidence or a new trial, three conditions must be fulfilled: first, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial: second, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, although it need not be decisive: third, the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, although it need not be incontrovertible.” [52] The principles in Ladd v Marshall has been accepted by our apex court in Chai Yen v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association [1980] CLJU 6; [1980] 1 LNS 6; [1980] 2 MLJ 142, where the Federal Court through the judgment of Chang Min Tat FJ said: "The principles to be applied for the reception of fresh evidence have been stated by Denning L.J. (as he then was) in Ladd v. Marshall at page 149: "To justify the reception of fresh evidence or a new trial, three conditions must be fulfilled: first, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; secondly that evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; thirdly the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible though it need not be incontrovertible." These principles as so stated have been consistently followed and have now received the approval of the House of Lords in Skone v. Skone & Anor. See also Leng Lan (f) v. S.M. Yesudian and Shaik Sahied bin Abdullah Bajarie v. A.R.A. Mootoo Carpen Chitty at page 21. Enough, we think, has been said to show that the applicant could not have satisfied the first requirement. Failure to satisfy this first requirement is sufficient for the dismissal of the application: Lau Foo Sun v. Government of Malaysia." [53] In Maxisegar Sdn Bhd v. Silver Concept Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 CLJ 238; [2005] 5 MLJ 1, this Court decided as follows: “[4] The poser of this court to grant leave to admit fresh evidence at the hearing of the appeal is governed by s. 69 (3) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and r. 7(3A) of the Rules Court of Appeal 1994 are generally known as the Ladd v. Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745 conditions. It is settled by various decided cases that the three conditions are cumulative and conjunctive in effect and are not disjunctive in that all the conditions must be fulfilled before such leave to admit fresh evidence be granted. The said three conditions were also referred to by Thomson LP in Lam Soon Cannery Co v. Hooper & Co [1965] CLJU 78; [1965] 1 LNS 78; [1965] 2 MLJ 148 at p 148 as follows: It is common ground that applications of this sort are regarded by this court with considerable circumspection and the principles that have been applied in relation to them are stated as follows by Lord Denning in the case of Ladd v. Marshall: To justify the reception of fresh evidence or a new trial, three conditions must be fulfilled: first, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; secondly, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; thirdly, the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed or in other words, it must be apparently credible, though it need not be incontrovertible. I pause to observe that these conditions are not alternative; they are cumulative. See also the judgment of Suffian FJ in Lau Foo Sun v. Government of Malaysia [1970] CLJU 56; [1970] 1 LNS 56; [1970] 2 MLJ 70 at p 71 and Chai Yen v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association [1980] CLJU 6; [1980] 1 LNS 6; [1980] 2 MLJ 142 at p 143.” [54] According to the test (Ladd v. Marshall), the following three conditions have to be satisfied cumulatively before an appellate court may exercise its discretion to admit fresh evidence for the hearing of the appeal:

the fresh evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the court of first instance;

(ii) the fresh evidence would probably have an important influence on the result of the appeal, although it need not be decisive; and

(iii) the fresh evidence should be credible but need not be incontrovertible. [55] Having considered the affidavits affirmed in support of both motions, I am of the considered opinion that the application for fresh evidence have satisfied condition (ii) and (iii) of Ladd v Marshall (supra). I find that the proposed fresh evidence will have an important influence on the result of the appeal and that the fresh evidence is credible. [56] The only issue here is whether the fresh evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the High Court before the delivery of the decision on 3 July 2014. Reasonable diligence simply means the amount of effort, attention, and care that a person of ordinary prudence and intelligence would exercise under similar circumstances to obtain the Addendum Order. [57] The Appellant himself, in his Affidavit Verifying Facts of the Statement affirmed 29 March 2024 stated as follows: “Pada 12.02.2024, Pemohon telah menerima satu maklumat yang sahih sebagai tambahan kepada Titah Utama yang bertarikh 29.01.2024, Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia Sri Paduka Baginda Yang Di-Pertuan Agong XVI juga telah mengeluarkan satu Titah Adendum yang menyatakan bahawa Pemohon dibenarkan untuk menjalani hukumannya yang dikurangkan kepada “tahanan di rumah” dan bukannya kepenjaraan di Penjara Kajang.” [58] Therefore, as early as 12 February 2024, the Appellant had already received credible information that, in addition to the Pardons Order dated 29 January 2024, His Majesty the YDPA XVI had also issued an Addendum Order stating that the Appellant is allowed to serve his reduced sentence under “house arrest” instead of imprisonment at Kajang Prison. Since the Appellant knew that the Addendum Order was issued by His Majesty YDPA XVI as early as 12 February 2024, no efforts were shown as to whether the Appellant has tried to communicate with the Istana Negara or Istana Pahang on the Addendum Order. [59] An affidavit in support was affirmed by Mohd Nizar bin Mohd Najib, who is a member of the Pahang State Executive Council (“EXCO”), responsible for the portfolio of Investment, Industrial Development, Science, Technology, and Innovation. [60] In the affidavit affirmed by Mohd Nizar bin Mohd Najib on 2 December 2024, he has affirmed as follows in para (22): “3. Didalam tugasan rasmi saya, saya kerap bermesyuarat dan/atau bertemu dengan Kebawah Duli Paduka Baginda Sultan Pahang Al-Sultan Abdullah Ri’ayatuddin Al-Mustafa Billah Shah Ibni Almarhum Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah Al-Musta’in Billah (“KDPB Sultan Pahang”). KDPB Sultan Pahang juga merupakan Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong XVI (“YDPA XVI”) pada tempoh 31hb Januari 2019 hingga 30hb Januari 2024.” [61] Therefore, the deponent has affirmed that he had frequently attended meetings with KDPB the Sultan of Pahang, who was also His Majesty the YDPA XVI. In light of the deponent’s admission that he frequently holds meetings and engages with KDPB the Sultan of Pahang, it cannot be said that the fresh evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use during the hearing before the learned High Court Judge. This is further evidenced by the fact that the deponent only obtained the Addendum many months after the decision of the learned Judge. Again the deponent has failed to explain why he did not make any attempt to communicate with the Istana Pahang on the Addendum Order before the learned Judge delivered his decision on 3 July 2024. [62] In both affidavits, Mohd Nizar bin Mohd Najib tried to explain how he obtained the Addendum Order from the Pahang Palace. However, all these events happen after the delivery of the learned Judge’s decision. The meeting with KDPB the Sultan of Pahang on 4 August 20024, the meeting with the Comptroller of the Istana Pahang, Dato’ Hj Ahmad Khirrizal Ab Rahman on 17 August 2024 and on 4 January 2025 are events that happen after the decision of the High Court. All these events do not explain the reason why no attempt were made to obtain the Addendum Order before 3 July 2024, as the Appellant has already received credible information that His Majesty the YDPA XVI had also issued an Addendum Order. [63] Despite the fact that the Appellant hails from the state of Pahang where he was once the Menteri Besar, and the fact that his son is currently an executive member of the State Government, the Appellant has failed to explain how and why they failed to obtain the Addendum Order with reasonable diligence. I am of the considered opinion that the Appellant has failed to take sufficient steps in pursuing the Addendum Order from the Pahang Palace. This evidence could have been made available during the hearing if due diligence was taken. [64] For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered opinion that had the Appellant exercised reasonable diligence by contacting either Istana Negara or Istana Pahang, the fresh evidence now sought to be adduced at the hearing of this appeal could have been obtained during the hearing of the leave application before the learned High Court Judge. I therefore find that there is no merit in the Appellant's application to adduce the fresh evidence and the same was dismissed with no order as to costs. Substantive Appeal [65] With regard to the substantive appeal, the learned High Court Judge had dismissed the leave application and concluded that the Appellant had not established the necessary requirements for the issuance of a mandamus order and dismissed the application based on two (2) main reasons:

Hearsay Evidence: The affidavits provided by the Appellant contained hearsay evidence, which did not meet the minimum threshold of reliability. The affidavits were based on information from a third party, who did not affirm any affidavit to support the Appellant’s application. The learned Judge held that the affidavits lacked direct knowledge and were therefore inadmissible.

(ii) No Legal Duty: There is no provision in any written law or the Federal Constitution that imposed a legal duty on the respondents to confirm the existence or produce any order wherein the power of pardon is exercised. Mandamus can only be granted when a legal duty is imposed on an authority, which was not the case here. Hearsay evidence [66] Order 53 r 3 (2) ROC 2012 provides that an application for leave must be “supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and by affidavits verifying the facts relied on.” [67] It is also provided in Order 53 rule 4(2) ROC 2012 that the affidavits filed in support of the leave application will be the same affidavit used for the substantive application. [68] Therefore based on Order 53 rule 3(2) read with rule 4(2), the affidavits affirmed for the purpose of judicial review application cannot be based on hearsay evidence. [68] The learned Judge has correctly referred to the Supreme Court decision in Tuan Hj Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442; [1995] 3 CLJ 627, which had adopted the views of the learned authors of the book "Judicial Review'', namely, Michael Supperstone QC and James Gourdie QC. On the question of whether hearsay material may be referred to in the affidavit in support of the application for leave to commence a judicial review application, the following passage in the said book was approved. This is what was said: “On the last question whether hearsay material may be referred to in the affidavit in support of the application for leave, the learned authors have this to say at p 357 para 2, and we agree: It is not entirely clear whether the affidavit in support of the application for leave should be regarded as interlocutory in character or otherwise. This has a possible significance in terms of whether hearsay material may strictly be admitted. The application for leave itself is undoubtedly interlocutory; however, if leave is granted, the affidavit in support of the leave application is served together with the Notice of Motion and forms the first basis of the applicant's case in the substantive application. As a matter of practice, a degree of common sense should be exercised in selecting the identity of the deponent. In cases where the attack is on the reasoning of a written decision as disclosing an error of statutory construction, it may be that fairly formal affidavit in support from a solicitor instructed in this case, exhibiting the decision and other essential material would suffice. At the other extreme, in an Immigration case where the issue was whether as a matter of fact the immigrant was or was not an illegal entrant, it would be highly desirable if not essential to have direct evidence at the leave stage on the disputed facts from the immigrant himself.” (emphasis added) [69] The Supreme Court added as follows: “Having said that, we would add that for a lawyer drafting his application under O 53 r 1(2) to ensure that it contains substantial particulars of the facts and matters on which he intends to rely in support of his application. He should also ensure that his affidavit in support of his application is as detailed and comprehensive as the circumstances will permit, and it should exhibit all the documentary exhibits. which are truly relevant and upon which he intends to rely. The object of these steps is to ensure that the court has as complete a picture as is possible right from the start, of the case for the applicant who is seeking judicial review. In Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228, Ajaib Singh SCJ, speaking for the Supreme Court said this: The guiding principles ought to be that the applicant must show prima facie that the application is not frivolous or vexatious and that there is some substance in the grounds supporting the application. Moreover, as the application for leave is made ex parte, there is a duty of disclosure, imposed by law on the applicant, the breach of which may depending upon the importance of the non-disclosure the order for leave being set aside…..” (emphasis added) [70] As such I agree with the finding of the learned Judge that in judicial review cases, unlike other interlocutory applications, the same affidavit is used both to verify the facts and to support the main application. Therefore, as decided by the Supreme Court in Tuan HJ Sarip Hamid (supra), although applying for leave to review is an interim step, the affidavit may still need to be based on direct knowledge, depending on what the case is about. [71] Based on the factual matrix of this case, I agree with the learned Judge that in order to obtain leave under Order 53 rule 3(2) ROC 2012, the Appellant must file an affidavit that verifies the facts stated in the Order 53 statement. [72] However in the present case, the Appellant has filed two (2) affidavits to support his application. In the first affidavit, the Appellant averred as follows:

Paragraph 21: “.. His Majesty ... had also immediately or simultaneously issued an Addendum Order on the same day which was within the powers and jurisdiction of His Majesty ... The Addendum Order curiously was not announced by the 4th, 5th, and 6th Respondent or by any of the other Respondents when the announcement of the Main Order only was made. It must be impressed that the Addendum Order was already in existence since the 29.01.2024.”

(ii) Paragraph 22: “On 12.02.2024 the Applicant received clear information that in addition to the Main Order dated 29.01.2024, His Majesty ... had issued an Addendum Order stipulating that the Applicant be allowed to serve the reduced sentence of his imprisonment under the condition of ‘home arrest’ instead of confinement in Kajang Prison.” [73] In the second affidavit, the Appellant states as follows

Paragraph 4: “On 7.03.2024, I read articles in newspapers that YB Dato' Sri Ismail Sabri Bin Yaakob raised a query in parliament with regards to my house arrest and whether it was a component of the pardon order of His Majesty ... dated 29.01.2024.” [74] Nowhere in both the supporting affidavit affirmed by the Appellant refer to any source or basis for the information given that he had been given the Addendum Order. He merely states that he “received clear information” about the Addendum Order. As such, I agree with the learned Judge’s conclusion that his statements about the Addendum Order are purely hearsay and are therefore inadmissible. [75] In support of his application, a supplementary affidavit was affirmed by Dato’ Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid bin Hamidi (“Zahid Hamidi”) on 9.4.2024. In his affidavit, Zahid Hamidi simply states that he was informed by Dato’ Sri Utama Tengku Zafrul bin Tengku Abdul Aziz (“Tengku Zafrul”) on 30 January 2024 about the Addendum Order and was shown a photo of it, which he (Tengku Zafrul) claimed came from His Majesty YDPA. The said Addendum Order was dated 29 January 2024, bore the royal seal and signature, and Zahid Hamidi unequivocally confirmed the same to be a genuine royal prerogative. [76] I am of the considered opinion and I agree with the learned Judge that Ahmad Zahid’s affidavit clearly shows that he has no personal knowledge of the Addendum Order. His information came solely from Tengku Zafrul, who claimed to have seen and photographed the Order shown to him by His Majesty YDPA. Zahid Hamidi only viewed the photograph on Tengku Zafrul’s phone, and no copy of the photograph was produced, citing secrecy. I therefore agree with the learned Judge’s finding that Zahid Hamidi’s statements is purely hearsay and therefore inadmissible. [77] In another supporting affidavit affirmed by Dato’ Sri Haji Wan Rosdy bin Wan Ismail (“Wan Rosdy”) on 21 May 2024, the deponent states that he was informed by Tengku Zafrul that His Majesty YDPA XVI had reduced the prison sentence by 50% and set the fine at RM50 million. His Majesty YDPA XVI had also issued an Addendum Order allowing the Appellant to serve the sentence under house arrest at home instead of in prison. [78] I am of the considered opinion and I agree with the findings of the learned Judge that Wan Rosdy’s statements is purely hearsay and inadmissible. The affidavit affirmed by Wan Rosdy confirms that his knowledge of the Addendum Order is based entirely on information from Tengku Zafrul. Wan Rosdy has no personal knowledge of the Order, apart from what was told and shown to him on Tengku Zafrul’s mobile phone. [79] The irony in this case that is worth pondering is why did the Appellant objected to the affidavit filed by Tengku Zafrul. The importance of Tengku Zafrul’s affidavit is that he was the sole source of information in both Zahid Hamidi and Wan Rody’s affidavit on the existence of the Addendum Order. Without him, the applicant had no supporting evidence. Despite being the key source, Tengku Zafrul was not asked to file any affidavit on the Appellant’s behalf. Yet, when Tengku Zafrul tried to file an affidavit, there was strenuous objection to the same. [80] In conclusion, none of the affidavits concerning the existence of the Addendum Order were made by deponents with direct knowledge. The evidence relied upon was purely hearsay. Accordingly, the requirement of Order 53 r 3 (2) ROC 2012 for a proper verifying affidavit was not satisfied. Order of Mandamus [81] The remedy of mandamus is governed by Section 44 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 ("SRA") or Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the CJA. In this case, the application is brought under Order 53 ROC 2012 by way of judicial review. Therefore, the relief of mandamus must comply with Section 44 of the SRA, which is the applicable substantive law. [82] Section 44 falls under Chapter VIII of Part 2 of the SRA and concerns the enforcement of public duties. Section 44(1) reads: “ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC DUTIES

(1) A Judge may make an order requiring any specific act to be done or forborne, by any person holding a public office, whether of a permanent or a temporary nature, or by any corporation or any court subordinate to the High Court: Provided that

an application for such an order be made by some person whose property, franchise, or personal right would be injured by the forbearing or doing, as the case may be, of the said specific act;

such doing or forbearing is, under any law for the time being in force, clearly incumbent on the person or court in his or its public character, or on the corporation in its corporate character;

in the opinion of the Judge the doing or forbearing is consonant to right and justice;

the applicant has no other specific and adequate legal remedy; and

the remedy given by the order applied for will be complete.” [83] The principles for granting an order of mandamus have been set out by this Court in Peguam Negara Malaysia v Dr Michael Jeyakumar Devaraj [2011] 9 CLJ 645 and Mohamad Hassan Zakaria v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [2017] 10 CLJ 36. These cases confirm that all conditions for mandamus must be satisfied cumulatively, reaffirming the position stated by Sharma J in Koon Hoi Chow v Pretam Singh [1972] 1 MLJ 180; [1972] CLJU 56, that is to say:

An order under section 44 is in its nature an order of mandamus. It is a peremptory order of the Court commanding somebody to do that which it was his clear legal duty to do. The applicant seeking such an order must have a legal right to the performance of such duty by the person against whom the order is sought;

The prerequisites essential to the issue of an order under section 44 or of a mandamus are:

whether the applicant in the High Court has a clear and specific legal right to the relief sought;

(ii) whether there is a duty imposed by law on the public officer(s);

(iii) whether such duty is of an imperative ministerial character involving no judgment or discretion on the part of the public officer(s); and

(iv) whether the applicant has any remedy, other than by way of mandamus, for the enforcement of the right which has been denied to him.

These are the questions, but only some of the questions, which are necessary to be answered in every application for mandamus. The applicant must show not only that he has a legal right to have well defined as to be free from any reasonable controversy. The order cannot issue when the right is doubtful, or is a qualified one or where it depends upon an issue of fact to be determined by the public officer(s).” [84] On this issue, the learned Judge made the following findings: “[51] In the instant case, there is no provision in any written law or the Federal Constitution that imposes a legal duty on the part of the Pardons Board to confirm the existence or produce any order wherein the power of pardon is exercised. It was agreed by all parties at the outset that there is no written law concerning the Pardons Board. Mandamus can be granted only when a legal duty is imposed on an authority. [52] In MP Jain 'Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore' 3rd edn at pp. 652, 653 it is stated: The order of mandamus is a command issued by the High Court asking an authority to perform a public duty imposed upon it by law ... Mandamus can be granted only when (i) a legal duty is imposed on an authority, and it does not perform the same, and (ii) the applicant has a legal right to compel the performance of the public duty prescribed by law. Thus, the criteria for the granting of mandamus in the instant case is not satisfied. [53] As can be seen above and from the facts of the case, the applicant failed to show any failure on the part of the respondents, in particular, the Pardons Board, to perform any statutory duties compelled to them in law. For the foregoing reasons, I find that the applicant had failed to establish the necessary requirement under section 44(1) of the SRA.” [85] I am of the considered opinion that the learned Judge did not commit any error in the above findings. There is no provision in any written law or the Federal Constitution that imposes a legal duty on the Pardons Board to confirm or produce any order related to the exercise of the power of pardon. As there is no legal provision requiring the Respondent(s) to carry out the duty in question, the Appellant has no legal right to seek an order of mandamus regarding the Addendum Order. Therefore, the application is frivolous and vexatious and was correctly dismissed by the learned Judge. Conclusions. [86] For the above reasons, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Judge did not commit any error in his decision is dismissing the leave application. The appeal is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs. Dated : 10 June 2025 sgd (AZIZAH BINTI NAWAWI) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Parties Appearing: For The Appellant : Tan Sri Dato’ Sri Dr Muhammad Shafee Abdullah / Muhammad Farhan Shafee / Wan Mohammad Arfan Wan Othman / Syafiqah Sofian Farhan (Tetuan Shafee & Co) For The Respondents : SFC Shamsul Bolhassan / Ahmad Hanir Hambaly @Arwi / FC Ainna Sherina / Safiyyah Omar (Jabatan Peguam Negara)

SIS Forum (Malaysia) v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor; Majlis

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Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v. Zaid Mohd Noh [1997]

Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Ors v. Menteri Tenaga, Air dan Komunikasi & Anor [2014] 2 CLJ 525

Ravindran v. Malaysian Examinations Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168,

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Haji Salleh Bin Jafaruddin v Datuk Celestine Ujang & Ors.[1986]

Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 927

WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ 478; [2012] 4 MLJ 296

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Ng Hee Thong v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 282

Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Perbadanan Pengurusan Trellises & Ors and others [2023] 3 MLJ 829

Krishnasamy Kuppusamy & Anor v Pengarah Hospital Sultanah Aminah & Ors and other Appeals [2024] 1 MLRA 344

Ladd v. Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745

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Hue Ngee On v. Chai Woo Sien (Sebagai Pegawai Awam Persatuan Hakka Kulai, Johor) [2009] 5 CLJ 734 CA

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Maxisegar Sdn Bhd v. Silver Concept Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 CLJ 238; [2005] 5 MLJ 1

Tuan Hj Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442; [1995] 3 CLJ 627

Peguam Negara Malaysia v Dr Michael Jeyakumar Devaraj [2011] 9 CLJ 645

Mohamad Hassan Zakaria v Universiti Teknologi Malaysia [2017] 10 CLJ 36.

Koon Hoi Chow v Pretam Singh [1972] 1 MLJ 180; [1972] CLJU 56