Dato' Ting Sie Chuong v Puan Sri Datin Paduka Wong Sui Chuo (WA-22NCvC-307-05/2025)

PUAN SRI DATIN PADUKA WONG SUI CHUO [NRIC NO.: 470606-13-5222]

DATUK TING SIE PING [NRIC NO.: 681005-13-5569]

DATO’ SRI TING SIE HUOONG [NRIC NO.: 710615-13-5769]

DATO’ BOBBY TING SIE CHING [NRIC NO.: 801031-13-5443] ...DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

This Court is confronted with three interrelated interlocutory applications: 03/07/2026 15:10:58 WA-22NCvC-307-05/2025 Kand. 53

(a) Enclosure 11 – Plaintiff's application under Order 14A and Order 33 of the Rules of Courts 2012 (“ROC 2012”);

(b) Enclosure 17 – Defendants' application under Order 14A and Order 33 ROC 2012; and

(c) Enclosure 12 – Defendants' application to strike out under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012.

Although framed differently, all three applications invite the Court to determine, at an interlocutory stage, issues touching upon:

(a) the effect of the deceased's bankruptcy;

(b) the effect of the Sarawak grant of representation issued by Amanah Raya;

(c) the Plaintiff's standing to seek relief;

(d) the interaction between the Probate and Administration Act 1959 ("PAA 1959"), the Insolvency Act 1967 (“IA 1967”) and the Administration of Estates Ordinance (Sarawak); and

(e) the alleged operation of res judicata arising from the Kuching proceedings.

The Court therefore considers the three applications together. B. ENCLOSURES 11 AND 17 – ORDER 14A ROC 2012

The Court accepts the well-established principle that Order 14A ROC 2012 is intended to permit determination of a pure question of law or construction where the material facts are not in dispute and where the answer will substantially dispose of the action.

Order 14A ROC 2012 states: “ORDER 14A DISPOSAL OF CASE ON POINT OF LAW Determination of questions of law or construction (O. 14A, r. 1)

(a) such question is suitable for determination without the full trial of the action; and

(b) such determination will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein.

Order 14A should be read with the provisions for summary judgment under Order 14. In other words, it is designed to expedite the disposal of an action at the interlocutory stage, and the threshold issue is whether the disposal of the proposed preliminary issue will result in substantial savings of time and costs.

In the case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn. Bhd. [2008] 2 MLJ 812, it is stated as follows: “Order 14 rule 1A was introduced to enable the court to effect summary disposal of cases by determining any question of law or construction arising in any cause or matter at any stage of the proceedings. This is an implementation of a recent and present movement towards a speedy solution to civil disputes where oral evidence is unnecessary. The new procedure should be put to use in cases where all relevant and necessary evidence is documentary.”

However, Order 14A ROC 2012 is not intended to substitute a full trial where the legal questions are inextricably intertwined with disputed facts.

In the present case, notwithstanding the parties' attempts to formulate their respective applications as pure questions of law, the Court finds that the issues identified cannot realistically be determined in isolation from a number of unresolved matters.

In the applications before this Court, among others, the Court notes that there remains a dispute regarding:

(a) the true legal effect of the grant issued by Amanah Raya pursuant to the Administration of Estates Ordinance (Sarawak);

(b) whether that grant precludes or affects an application brought under the PAA 1959;

(c) the nature and status of the assets identified in the Statement of Claim;

(d) whether such assets properly form part of the deceased's estate;

(e) the extent of the Plaintiff's interest in the estate;

(f) the legal consequences flowing from the deceased's bankruptcy; and

(g) the scope and effect of the findings made in the Kuching proceedings.

These matters are intertwined with factual and legal questions that cannot be satisfactorily disentangled for determination under

In the circumstances, the Court is unable to conclude that the matters raised are merely abstract questions of statutory construction capable of determination without a fuller appreciation of the factual matrix.

Accordingly, the Court is not satisfied that either Enclosure 11 or Enclosure 17 falls within the proper ambit of Order 14A ROC 2012 and both applications are therefore dismissed. C. ENCLOSURE 12 – ORDER 18 RULE 19 ROC 2012

Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 states: “Striking out pleadings and endorsements

(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that—

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case maybe;

(b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious;

(c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or

(d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court,

(e) and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.”

The threshold for striking out remains a high one. It is well settled that the jurisdiction under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 is a draconian jurisdiction which must be exercised sparingly and only in plain and obvious cases. The Courts have repeatedly emphasised that the jurisdiction under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 is a drastic jurisdiction and ought only to be exercised in plain and obvious cases where the pleading is clearly unsustainable.

As reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, the jurisdiction to strike out is a summary jurisdiction which must be exercised sparingly and only in plain and obvious cases.

In Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 MLJ 1, the Federal Court stated: “(3) ... However, whether the said evidence could or could not be obtained with reasonable diligence, whether it would have an important influence on the result of the trial, and whether it was presumably to be believed, were purely questions of facts which could only be determined at full trial where witnesses could be called to testify but not by way of affidavits evidence at the stage of summary proceedings of striking out under O 18 r 19 of the ROC as applied for by the appellant ...”

The Court should only strike out a pleading where it is plainly and obviously unsustainable. A pleading ought not to be struck out merely because it appears weak or because the Court considers that the party may ultimately face difficulties in succeeding at trial. So long as the pleading discloses an arguable cause of action or raises questions fit for judicial determination, the matter should ordinarily proceed to trial.

This Court is not presently concerned at this stage with whether the Plaintiff will ultimately succeed. It does not undertake a detailed evaluation of disputed evidence or resolve contested questions of fact and law. The Court merely considers whether the pleading discloses a cause of action which is plainly unsustainable.

The only question here is whether the action is plainly unsustainable, obviously untenable, frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise amounts to an abuse of process such that it should be terminated without a trial. Where the issues raised are arguable and require fuller examination, the proper course is for the matter to proceed to trial.

Having considered the Statement of Claim, the Court is unable to arrive at such a conclusion. The Plaintiff advances a pleaded case that:

(a) he is a beneficiary of the deceased;

(b) he seeks relief under the PAA 1959;

(c) the Sarawak grant does not foreclose the present relief;

(d) the IA 1967 does not extinguish the necessity for representation of the estate; and

(e) the present proceedings are not barred by res judicata.

Those propositions may ultimately succeed or fail. However, they are not frivolous, obviously unsustainable or bound to fail.

Indeed, the extensive submissions and authorities relied upon by both parties demonstrate that the issues raised are substantial and legally arguable. At this stage, the Court cannot conclude that the Plaintiff's claim is hopeless, plainly unsustainable or bound to fail.

It bears emphasis that an application under Order 18 rule 19 2012 is not intended to provide an alternative route for the Court to determine difficult or novel questions of law upon incomplete factual materials.

Where the pleadings disclose a legally recognisable cause of action and the issues raised involve substantial questions of statutory interpretation and their interaction, the proper course is ordinarily to allow the matter to proceed to trial unless the claim is plainly unsustainable.

The present case, in the Court's judgment, does not fall within that exceptional category.

The Court accepts that the Defendants' most substantial argument arises from the Kuching proceedings. This is, in my view, the Defendants' strongest point, but it is still insufficient at this interlocutory stage.

The Defendants contend that the Plaintiff is attempting to relitigate matters already determined by the High Court in Kuching.

The Kuching judgment appears to have struck out the earlier action substantially on grounds including:

(a) locus standi;

(b) Director General of Insolvency (“DGI”) sanction;

(c) defects in the trust claims; and

(d) jurisdictional limitations under the Sarawak Ordinance.

However, in my opinion, the present action is framed differently. The Court has carefully considered:

(a) the Kuching Grounds of Judgment;

(b) the parties' submissions;

(c) the comparative table subsequently filed by the Plaintiff; and

(d) the authorities cited on cause of action estoppel, issue estoppel and abuse of process.

At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not persuaded that the operation of res judicata is so clear and beyond argument as to justify summary disposal of the present action.

The Plaintiff relies heavily upon the distinction between:

(a) revocation/replacement of the Sarawak grant in the Kuching action; and

(b) an application for a grant under the PAA 1959 in the present proceedings.

This Court is of the view that whether that distinction ultimately defeats res judicata is a matter that should be decided after full ventilation of the facts and legal issues rather than summarily under Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012.

Further, the authorities cited by both sides demonstrate that issue estoppel requires precision as to what was actually decided and whether such a determination was fundamental to the earlier decision.

More importantly, the Court is not presently persuaded that the precise issue now raised before this Court has been shown, with the degree of certainty required for issue estoppel, to have been necessarily and conclusively determined in the Kuching proceedings. Whether the two proceedings are truly identical in substance remains a matter requiring fuller examination.

The Court is mindful that a plea of issue estoppel requires the earlier determination to be clear, precise and fundamental to the decision relied upon. Whether that threshold has been met is itself a matter that remains open to substantial argument on the present materials.

On the materials presently before the Court, I would be reluctant to conclude that the present action is plainly barred beyond argument.

The Plaintiff's position is that the Kuching proceedings concerned –

(a) revocation of the existing Sarawak grant;

(b) replacement of the administrator;

(c) allegations concerning trust assets;

(d) breach of duties by the administrator; and

(e) related declaratory reliefs and damages, whereas the present proceedings are framed as an application for a grant under the PAA 1959.

Whether that distinction ultimately succeeds is not the present question.

The present question is whether the Court can confidently conclude, without trial, that the precise issue now raised has already been finally and conclusively determined.

The Court is unable to do so.

Issue estoppel requires precision regarding what was necessarily decided in the earlier proceedings.

On the materials presently before the Court, that exercise requires a fuller examination than is appropriate within the confines of an Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 application. Hence, I would be reluctant to conclude that the present action is plainly barred beyond argument. Where the applicability of issue estoppel itself remains seriously arguable, the Court should exercise considerable caution before invoking Order 18 rule 19 ROC 2012 to terminate the proceedings

The Court therefore declines to strike out the action on the basis of res judicata.

Similarly, the Court is not persuaded that the deceased's bankruptcy conclusively disposes of the Plaintiff's claim. I would not determine at this stage that the deceased's bankruptcy automatically extinguishes the Plaintiff's right even to invoke the probate jurisdiction.

The Defendants contend that the estate remains vested in the DGI and that only the DGI may deal with the estate.

The Plaintiff's position is that the effect of bankruptcy concerns the administration and distribution of the estate and does not necessarily eliminate the need for representation of the estate. The Plaintiff further contends that the relevant statutory regimes are capable of operating harmoniously.

The resolution of that issue requires careful consideration of:

(a) the IA 1967;

(b) the PAA 1959;

(c) the Courts of Judicature Act 1964; and

(d) the Administration of Estates Ordinance (Sarawak).

The issue is plainly arguable and cannot be characterised as settled beyond legitimate controversy. It is therefore unsuitable for summary determination by way of striking out.

Hence, the Court is unable to conclude that the Defendants' interpretation is so plainly correct that the Plaintiff's action should be terminated without trial.

Therefore, the Court should allow the action to proceed in the ordinary course so that the factual foundation can be established, the precise nature of the assets can be determined, the legal effect of the bankruptcy can be fully examined, and the res judicata arguments can be determined on a complete record.

The Court is mindful that striking out is a draconian remedy because it permanently deprives a litigant of the opportunity to have his claim adjudicated on its merits. Such jurisdiction must therefore be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases. Having considered the pleadings, affidavits, submissions and authorities, the Court is not satisfied that the present action reaches that threshold. F.

Ultimately, what is striking about the present matter is that both sides invite the Court to determine far-reaching substantive rights through interlocutory procedures.

The Court is not persuaded that such an approach is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

The issues raised involve a complex interaction of probate law, insolvency law, jurisdictional questions, and estoppel principles.

In the Court's judgment, those issues should be determined upon a complete factual record rather than through competing interlocutory applications.

The Court emphasises that the dismissal of these applications should not be understood as a determination of the substantive rights of the parties. The Court merely concludes that the issues raised are not appropriate for summary disposal at this interlocutory stage.

Accordingly:

(a) Enclosure 11 is dismissed.

(b) Enclosure 17 is dismissed.

(c) Enclosure 12 is dismissed.

(d) Costs shall be costs in the cause. Dated: 3rd July 2026 ……………………………………………………………….. (YA PUAN MAHAZAN BINTI MAT TAIB) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Counsel for The Plaintiff : Saw Wei Siang Messrs. Nethi & Saw Advocates & Solicitors Counsel for The Defendant : Muhammad Nor Izzat & 1, 2 & 4 Amira Natasha Johari Messrs. Amar Syiimir Izzat & Sham Advocates & Solicitors