Delight House Management (KL) Sdn Bhd v Chew Choi Ting (JA-22NCvC-44-03/2025)

This is the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant, its former employee, for alleged fraud, breach of confidence, breach of 19/05/2026 13:09:13 JA-22NCvC-44-03/2025 Kand. 62 S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw employment contract, misappropriation of monies, and client solicitation.

The trial was held on 26.2.2026. The Plaintiff called three witnesses—

SP1 Wong Cheng Keat (Managing Director);

SP2 Tai Cheau Wei (Finance Director) and

SP3 Ng Yan Kiong. The Defendant called herself as the sole witness (SD1).

I pause here to put on record regarding the conduct of the trial. During the cross-examination of SD1 by the Plaintiff's counsel, the Defendant's counsel repeatedly interrupted the questioning, objected without proper basis and at one point accused this Court of being "unfair", an accusation for which he subsequently apologised. I had on multiple occasions during the trial warned the Defendant's counsel to refrain from interrupting and to allow the cross-examination to proceed, reminding him that he would have his opportunity to re-examine the witness. Despite these repeated warnings, the interruptions continued, necessitating further intervention by this Court.

I find it necessary to place on record the following. It is a fundamental principle of advocacy and courtroom decorum that counsel must not interrupt opposing counsel's cross-examination of a witness except to S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw raise a legitimate objection on a point of law or procedure. Cross-examination is the right of the cross-examining party and it is for the witness and not for the opposing counsel to answer the questions put. If a witness does not understand a question, the witness may say so. If a question is improper, counsel may object and state the basis of the objection. What counsel may not do is to persistently interject, coach the witness by suggesting the question is confusing, or otherwise disrupt the orderly flow of cross-examination. Above all, counsel must at all times respect the court and its proceedings. The right of audience before this Court is a privilege, not an entitlement and it carries with it the obligation to conduct oneself with courtesy, restraint and respect for the authority of the Court and the judicial process.

I further observe that the interruptions occurred at critical junctures of the cross-examination, particularly when SD1 was being questioned about her knowledge of the tenant's payments into her personal account, her relationship with Wayne Tseng and the circumstances surrounding her departure. Whilst I make no adverse finding against the Defendant based solely on her counsel's conduct, the pattern of interruptions at key moments is a matter I have taken note of in assessing the overall evidence. I would also add that such conduct, if repeated, may prompt this court to exercise its inherent powers to ensure the proper administration of justice.

The parties filed written submissions and reply submissions together with a bundle of authorities and this Court now delivers its decision and the grounds of the decision.

The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant, whilst employed, secretly worked with Aqua White Home Sdn Bhd (“Aqua White”), a competing property management company managed by the Plaintiff’s former Chief Operating Officer, Wayne Tseng, to divert 23 client units from the Plaintiff to Aqua White.

The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant dishonestly misappropriated RM5,100.00 in tenant rental monies from unit Meridin B-29-05 by channelling payments through her personal bank account.

The Plaintiff originally claimed special damages of RM1,649,046.06, together with exemplary and punitive damages of RM100,000.00. During trial, the claim was reduced to RM955,875.63.

The Defendant denies all allegations and raises, inter alia –

there is no privity of contract between the Defendant and the Plaintiff as the employment contract was with Asia Pacific

the Defendant did not solicit or poach any clients;

the Defendant did not misappropriate any monies; and

the claimed damages are speculative and unsupported.

The Plaintiff is a property management company providing services to foreign investors, predominantly Taiwanese nationals, who own residential properties in Johor Bahru. The Defendant was employed from 15.9.2015, initially as a Sales Admin Senior Executive and was subsequently promoted to Sales Admin Manager. In her role, the Defendant was responsible for managing the Plaintiff's property portfolio in the Johor Bahru region, which included dealings with tenants and property owners across developments such as Iskandar Residence, Meridin Medini, Grand Medini and SOVO.

The Employment Contract contained, inter alia, Clause 13 (Confidentiality), Clause 14 (Business Ethics), Clause 16 (Termination Due to Misconduct) and Clause 21 (Part-time Job Prohibited). The Defendant also signed a letter of indemnity. The Plaintiff alleges that the confidential information at issue comprises client contact details, property ownership information, rental amounts payable, outstanding sums due to the Plaintiff and property maintenance costs, all of which were entrusted to the Defendant in the course of her duties as Sales Admin Manager.

The parties agreed upon twelve issues for trial (Enclosure 16) as follows – S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw Issue 1 : Whether the Defendant was employed by the Plaintiff's predecessor APIP Realty Sdn Bhd or by Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd? Issue 2 : Whether the letter of indemnity dated 15.9.2015 (erroneously dated 14.9.2015) was issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff's predecessor APIP Realty Sdn Bhd or Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd? Issue 3 : Whether the Defendant breached the terms of her employment contract dated 15.9.2015 (erroneously dated 18.9.2015)? Issue 4 : Whether the Defendant solicited any of the Plaintiff's clients with concealment, malice and/or fraud while still being employed by APIP Realty Sdn Bhd or Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd (as the case may be)? Issue 5 : Whether the Defendant dishonestly misappropriated the Plaintiff's monies? Issue 6 : Whether the Plaintiff allowed tenants to make payments into the personal bank accounts of its employees? Issue 7 : Whether the Defendant received the Show Cause Notice dated 9.4.2024? S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw Issue 8 : Whether the Defendant remained an employee of APIP Realty Sdn Bhd or Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd (as the case may be) while serving the notice period under her letter of resignation dated 11.3.2024? Issue 9 : Whether the Defendant is liable in the tort of breach of confidential information to the Plaintiff? Issue 10 : Whether the Defendant is liable in the tort of deceit to the Plaintiff? Issue 11 : Whether the Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff the damages pleaded in paragraphs 35 to 37 of the Statement of Claim? Issue 12 : Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs prayed for in paragraph 38 of the Statement of Claim?

For convenience, in this judgment, I shall address each issue in the course of these grounds, grouped thematically –

Issues 1, 2 and 8 concern the employment relationship;

Issues 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 concern the substantive allegations;

Issue 6 concerns the company’s practice regarding personal bank accounts; and

Issues 11 and 12 concern damages and reliefs.

Before addressing the substantive issues, I deal with the Defendant’s preliminary objection regarding the late introduction of documents marked ID1 (sample letters of appointment for rental and property management) and ID2 (payment slips from tenant). These documents were not disclosed prior to trial, were not included in any agreed bundles and were introduced only during the testimony of the Plaintiff’s witnesses.

I expressed strong disapproval of this conduct during the trial itself, stating that parties cannot tender documents “by instalment at the midst of the trial” and that such conduct amounted to an attempt to “correct everything, complete everything” via a later witness.

I agree with the Defendant’s reliance on Christopher ak Bandi @ Josny v Tumbung ak Nakis & Anor (Jamil bin Sindi, third party) [2016] 4 MLJ 100, where the Court of Appeal held that “litigants through their respective counsel must understand that they must put their house in order before a case goes to trial” and “conducting one’s case by instalment must not be allowed”. Similarly, in Item Industrial Engineering Sdn Bhd & Ors v Bank Utama (M) Bhd [2015] 3 MLJ 254, the Court of Appeal held that documents filed at the last minute during trial should not be considered where counsel has adopted a S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw “lackadaisical attitude in the preparation of his case”. [See : also Chin Moi Yen & Ors v Chai Weng Sing & Ors [2016] MLJU 868].

I have considered the Plaintiff's reliance on the curative powers of this Court under Order 1A and Order 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 as discussed in Gary Lim Ting Howe v. Lim Pang Cheong & Ors [2015] 9 CLJ 227 and the principles in Hatara (M) Sdn Bhd v Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) & Anor [2010] 4 MLJ 17. I have also considered the Plaintiff's submission that the Defendant confirmed the contents of ID2 in cross-examination and that ID1 was previously classified as a Part B document by the Defendant's solicitors in the related action against Jason Foo. The difficulty with the Plaintiff's position is that the curative powers of this Court exist to do justice between the parties and where documents are tendered piecemeal during trial to repair gaps in earlier witnesses' evidence, the prejudice to the opposing party is structural and not curable simply by allowing cross-examination on the documents after they are sprung. The Defendant's solicitors had no notice that ID1 and ID2 would be tendered and could not prepare any rebuttal evidence or call any contrary witnesses. The Plaintiff's argument that the Defendant suffered no prejudice because she confirmed ID2's contents is, with respect, beside the point. The prejudice lies in the unfair sequencing of the trial, not in the substantive accuracy of the documents.

Accordingly, I attach no evidential weight to ID1 and ID2.

This is the threshold issue. The Employment Contract dated 15.9.2015 was executed between the Defendant and Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd (“Asia Pacific”). This fact is not in dispute. SP1 agreed under cross-examination that the Letter of Appointment was issued by Asia Pacific, that the indemnity was to Asia Pacific, and that Asia Pacific is a separate and distinct entity from the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff seeks to bridge this gap through –

a Letter of Transfer dated 1.7.2017;

the assertion that APIP Realty is the old name of the Plaintiff which bought Asia Pacific’s business;

the Defendant’s salary, EPF and SOCSO were paid by the

SD1's confirmation under cross-examination in response to a compound question by Plaintiff's counsel which put to her that her "true employer is APIP", to which she answered "Yes".

I observed that the Letter of Transfer is problematic –

SP1 was not the signatory, was not the maker and had no personal knowledge of it;

the signatory, Tseng Chih Wei, was not called to testify;

the Defendant’s signature appears only on page 748, not page 747;

the date column is empty; and

there is no content spillover between pages. In this regard, I accept the Defendant's reliance on Mahmood bin Ooyub v Li Chee Loong & other appeals [2020] MLJU 1868, where the Court of Appeal observed that a signing page should always have at least a line flowing over from a previous page so as to avoid the accusation that it could have been added onto the main agreement when it was not part of the main agreement.

I also observed that SD1’s admission was elicited through a compound leading question bundling multiple disputed propositions. An isolated answer to such a question does not constitute a clear and unequivocal admission of a legal relationship where the underlying premises are in dispute.

However, it is agreed that salary payments to the Defendant were made by the Plaintiff (Agreed Fact No. 2) and that the Defendant's S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw resignation letter was addressed to APIP Realty (Agreed Fact No. 4). SP1 further testified that EPF employer contributions, SOCSO payments, bonuses and allowances were also paid by the Plaintiff, supported by payment records at CBD(1) pp. 24 - 27 and CBD(3) pp. 741 - 746. The Defendant did not dispute these payments as a matter of fact, but contended that they were made pursuant to a Real Estate Agency Consultancy Agreement dated 1.4.2019 between Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd and the Plaintiff (then known as APIP Realty Sdn Bhd) and that the mere payment of payroll items is not legally determinative of the employer-employee relationship.

Whilst I accept that the existence of the Consultancy Agreement provides a possible commercial explanation for the payments, the Defendant has called no witness to explain its operation and the cumulative effect of the payments, the resignation addressed to APIP, and SD1's qualified acknowledgment of APIP as her employer is sufficient to establish the requisite nexus for standing.

I note that SP1 admitted under cross-examination that he had not managed the Plaintiff company or Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd prior to 2024. Any testimony by SP1 regarding the Defendant's alleged conduct during the period 2015 to 2024 is therefore based on second-hand information and should be accorded reduced evidential weight.

Accordingly, my finding on Issue 1 is as follows. Whilst the Employment Contract was executed between the Defendant and Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd and not the Plaintiff, the payment of salary by the Plaintiff (Agreed Fact No. 2), the further S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw payment of EPF, SOCSO, bonuses and allowances as established by SP1's evidence, coupled with the Defendant's resignation letter being addressed to APIP Realty (Agreed Fact No. 4) and SD1's acknowledgment that APIP was her true employer, establishes a sufficient nexus between the Defendant and the Plaintiff's group of companies. I find that the Defendant was, for all practical purposes, employed within the Plaintiff's group. Issue 1 is answered accordingly. However, the deficiencies in the Letter of Transfer and SP1's lack of first-hand knowledge are matters that I take into account when assessing the weight of the Plaintiff's evidence on the remaining issues.

Issue 2 asks whether the letter of indemnity dated 15.9.2015 (erroneously dated 14.9.2015) was issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff's predecessor APIP Realty Sdn Bhd or to Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd.

The indemnity letter is found at page 13 of Bundle A1. On its face, the letter is addressed to and signed in favour of Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd. SP1 agreed under cross-examination that this was the case. The Plaintiff did not dispute this.

Under the indemnity, the Defendant covenanted to perform and observe the stipulations of the terms and conditions of the letter of appointment and to keep the company indemnified against all actions, S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw proceedings, claims, demands, penalties, costs, damages, charges and expenses arising from non-observance of those terms and conditions.

The Plaintiff seeks to rely on this indemnity as a basis for the Defendant's liability in this action. However, the indemnity, like the Employment Contract, was executed between the Defendant and Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd, not the Plaintiff and not APIP Realty Sdn Bhd. There is no evidence of any assignment or novation of the indemnity from Asia Pacific to the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, Issue 2 is answered in the same terms as Issue 1 : the letter of indemnity was issued by the Defendant to Asia Pacific International Property Sdn Bhd. To the extent that I have found a sufficient nexus for standing purposes under Issue 1, the same applies here. However, the same reservations regarding the weight of the Plaintiff's evidence apply equally. Issues 3, 4 and 9 : Breach of Contract, Solicitation and Breach of

I address Issues 3, 4 and 9 together as they are intertwined. The Plaintiff’s case rests on the allegation that the Defendant breached Clauses 13 (Confidentiality) and 14 (Business Ethics) of the Employment Contract by secretly working with Wayne Tseng and Aqua White to divert clients, using confidential information obtained during employment.

The primary evidence relied upon is a Line Group Chat at pages 28 - 35 of COBD(1), dated 17.4.2024, involving Wayne Tseng, the Defendant, a client named Xu Ling Ling and others. The Plaintiff also relies on the circumstantial timing of 23 client departures.

SP1, the Plaintiff’s own Managing Director and principal witness, made critical admissions under cross-examination which fundamentally undermine these allegations –

First, SP1 agreed that the Defendant did not make any conversation with the client in the Line Group Chat. All communications were conducted by Wayne Tseng.

Second, SP1 agreed that Wayne Tseng already had the client’s contact at all material times and that the group chat was created by Wayne Tseng.

Third, SP1 agreed that the Plaintiff has “not produced any other documents to show that the defendant has actually stolen your clients”. When pressed, SP1 agreed: “despite your disagreement, there was no direct evidence at all to show that”.

Fourth, the group chat was created on 17.4.2024. Even on the Plaintiff’s case, the Defendant was terminated on 14.4.2024. The chat post-dates the employment. The Defendant could not have been acting in breach of employment obligations when no longer employed.

On this point, section 28 of the Contracts Act 1950 [Act 136] provides that every agreement restraining anyone from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business is void. In Millennium Medicare Services v. Nagadevan Mahalingam [2016] 2 CLJ 36, the Court of Appeal applied section 28 of Act 136 to void a post-termination restraint clause in a partnership agreement, holding that section 28 of Act 136 is general in its terms and unequivocally declares all agreements in restraint of trade void pro tanto except in the specified exceptions. The same principle applies with equal force to post-employment restraints. The Defendant was entitled to pursue employment with Aqua White after her employment ended.

Further, the Plaintiff’s reliance on circumstantial timing is insufficient. SD1 testified that more than 100 tenants left over 10 years, averaging 10-19 per year. SP1’s assertion of “less than 5 per year” was unsupported by documentary evidence and SP1 only joined in 2024 with no first-hand knowledge of historical patterns.

I have considered the Plaintiff's argument that it defies logic for clients dissatisfied with the Plaintiff's services to migrate to Aqua White if those same clients are still being serviced by the Defendant. Whilst the point has some superficial appeal, it is not direct evidence of solicitation. The clients may have moved for any number of reasons, i.e. Wayne Tseng's existing relationships with them (as evidenced by SP1's admissions discussed above), dissatisfaction with the Plaintiff's commercial terms or the voluntary exercise of choice. Without testimony from the clients themselves, the Court cannot reason backwards from their movement to a conclusion of inducement by the Defendant.

I also note that SP1 confirmed under cross-examination that the Plaintiff has commenced a separate but substantially similar action against another former employee, Jason Foo, based on the same allegations. This pattern of identical claims against multiple employees is a matter the Court takes into account when assessing the Plaintiff's credibility and the reliability of its allegations.

Further, I note the Plaintiff listed two Taiwanese property owners, Hsu Ling-Ling and Lu Ming-Kuang, on its witness list but chose not to call them. No witness statements were filed. Under section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56], I draw an adverse inference. The Federal Court in Mohammad Azanul Haqimi bin Tuan Ahmad Azahari v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 220 affirmed that wilful withholding of available evidence entitles the court to presume it would be unfavourable to the withholding party. In FGV Prodata Systems Sdn Bhd v NEC Corp of Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Anor (Shinryu Co Sdn Bhd, third party) [2026] MLJU 93, the court applied section 114(g) of Act 56 where a party failed to call material witnesses.

Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the Defendant breached the Employment Contract, solicited clients or committed a breach of confidence. Issues 3, 4 and 9 are answered in favour of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant dishonestly misappropriated RM5,100.00 in tenant rental monies from unit Meridin B-29-05 by channelling rental payments through her personal bank account. The Plaintiff's case is that the tenant deposited RM14,500.00 into the Defendant's personal bank account between March 2023 and March 2024, but only RM9,400.00 was remitted to the Plaintiff, leaving a shortfall of RM5,100.00. The Defendant, on the other hand, maintained that the total sum deposited was RM16,000.00, which was settled in full to the Plaintiff, a fact acknowledged by the Plaintiff in its own Statement of Claim.

Two critical facts undermine this allegation. First, it is undisputed that all monies were returned to the Plaintiff. SP1 agreed during cross-examination that the Plaintiff is "not making any claim on any stolen money against the defendant". SP2, the Plaintiff's Finance Director, similarly agreed that the Defendant "has not deprived the Plaintiff from this amount and you have not claimed this amount from the Defendant in this case". If the Plaintiff genuinely believed that a criminal act of misappropriation had occurred, one would expect a police report to have been lodged. No police report was produced.

Second, the Plaintiff's evidence regarding the timing and circumstances of the tenant's payments is entirely hearsay. SP2 admitted she did not speak to the tenant directly. She heard from SP3 (Ng Yan Kiong), who in turn heard from the tenant. SP3, when cross-examined, admitted that he did not witness the tenant make any S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw payment to the Defendant, he did not verify the bank slips with the bank and the bank slips were given to him by the tenant. SP3 agreed he was "not in any position to give any evidence on this document because you are simply not the maker of it". SP3 further agreed that "the only witness that is able to testify this document here would be the tenant himself".

The Plaintiff chose not to call the tenant to testify despite the tenant being the sole person with direct knowledge of the payments, when they were made, how much was paid and to whom. Under section 114(g) of Act 56, I am entitled to presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. I draw an adverse inference against the Plaintiff for this failure. The tenant's evidence was not merely desirable. It was indispensable to the Plaintiff's case on misappropriation, and the Plaintiff has offered no explanation for the tenant's absence.

I have considered the Plaintiff's submission, based on Namasiyiam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor [1987] 2 MLJ 336 and Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492, that adverse inference under section 114(g) of Act 56 ought not to be drawn where the party has produced sufficient other evidence. The principle is well established. However, the present case is not one where the Plaintiff has produced sufficient other evidence on the misappropriation allegation. The tenant's evidence is not merely confirmatory; it is the foundational evidence on the timing and quantum of payments. The Plaintiff's other witnesses (SP1, SP2, SP3) had no direct knowledge of the payments and gave evidence that was, as I have found, hearsay. The S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw principle in Namasiyiam and Munusamy is therefore not engaged on the facts.

As held by the Federal Court in Yong Choo Kiong v Public Prosecutor [2025] MLJU 3214, hearsay evidence, being evidence based on what a witness has heard from another person rather than from direct knowledge, is inadmissible and carries no probative value when adduced to prove the truth of its contents. The Plaintiff's evidence on the timing and quantum of the tenant's payments falls squarely within this prohibition.

The Plaintiff's reliance on the principle in Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] MLJ 220, that a statement is not hearsay when it is proposed to establish the fact that it was made, is misplaced. The Plaintiff's purpose in adducing SP2 and SP3's evidence was precisely to prove the truth of the tenant's statements regarding the timing and quantum of payments, not merely to establish that the statements were made. The evidence is therefore hearsay and inadmissible for the purpose relied upon.

Additionally, SP3 agreed during cross-examination that the documents in ID2, which the Plaintiff sought to rely upon as proof of the tenant's payments, were "forged". This is a remarkable admission by the Plaintiff's own witness and further destroys any residual evidential basis for the misappropriation allegation.

I also note the sequence of events as established in evidence –

the Defendant informed the Plaintiff on 26.3.2024 that the tenant had outstanding rent but had promised to pay by 10.4.2024;

the payment was confirmed on 9.4.2024 through SP3; and

the Defendant returned the monies to the Plaintiff on 14.4.2024, merely four days after the promised date. This sequence is inconsistent with dishonest misappropriation and more consistent with a delay in the ordinary course of rental collection.

Accordingly, I find the Plaintiff has failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the Defendant dishonestly misappropriated any monies belonging to the Plaintiff. Issue 5 is answered in favour of the Defendant.

Issue 6 asks whether the Plaintiff allowed tenants to make payments into the personal bank accounts of its employees. This issue is significant because the Plaintiff's allegation of misappropriation (Issue 5) is premised on the assertion that the Defendant acted contrary to company policy by receiving tenant rental payments into her personal account.

I observed that all three of the Plaintiff's witnesses, SP1, SP2 and SP3, used identical language in their respective witness statements to describe a "financial policy" which allegedly prohibited employees from using their personal bank accounts to collect rental from tenants. The use of identical language across three separate witness statements is itself troubling and suggests a coordinated rather than independently recollected account.

However, when tested under cross-examination, this alleged financial policy crumbled entirely. SP1 agreed that the employment documents, specifically pages 6 to 13 of Bundle A1, which contain the terms and conditions of employment, do not contain any prohibition on employees using personal accounts to collect rental. SP1 was asked directly : "nothing in paragraph 14 here says that an employee cannot use their personal account to collect rental from the tenants. Agree?" SP1 answered : "Yes, I agree".

SP2 and SP3 similarly agreed under cross-examination that there was no documentary basis for this alleged policy. No policy document, circular, memo or internal directive was produced before this Court. The Plaintiff's attempt to rely on unsigned tenancy agreements (which contain the Plaintiff's bank account details for tenant payments) as evidence of such a policy is misconceived. These tenancy agreements are between the landlord and the tenant. The Defendant is not a party to them, and they do not constitute an internal company policy directed at employees.

Moreover, the unsigned nature of these tenancy agreements renders them of no evidential value. In STT Technologies Sdn Bhd v S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw Government of Malaysia & Ors [2023] MLJU 3130, the Court held that unsigned and self-generated documents "are all self-serving document with no verification at all" and cannot constitute valid legal documents to establish a claim.

SP2 further admitted that certain documents in the bundle (pages 61 to 66) were entirely blank, containing no names, signatures, or details of any parties. These blank documents, tendered by the Plaintiff as part of its case, are incapable of proving any contractual relationship or entitlement.

The Defendant, on the other hand, pleaded and testified that it was the company's standard practice to allow tenants to deposit rental payments into employees' personal bank accounts first, before the amounts were transferred into the company's bank account. This practice was not challenged by the Plaintiff with any contrary documentary evidence. No issue had been raised regarding this practice during the Defendant's entire employment of nearly ten years.

Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiff has not established the existence of any financial policy prohibiting the use of personal bank accounts by employees for the collection of tenant rental payments. The fact that three witnesses used identical language to describe a non-existent policy undermines the Plaintiff's credibility on this issue and by extension, on the related allegation of misappropriation. Issue 6 is answered in favour of the Defendant.

The Defendant testified that she never received the Show Cause Notice dated 9.4.2024. She explained that it was sent via email but she does not check her email every day, as pay slips were also sent by email and she similarly did not notice those.

The Plaintiff produced no evidence of service of the Show Cause Notice, no registered post receipt, no email delivery confirmation, no read receipt and no acknowledgment of receipt by the Defendant. The burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the notice was served and received.

I further note that the Show Cause Notice was purportedly issued on 9.4.2024, after the Defendant had already tendered her resignation on 11.3.2024 and was in the process of serving her notice period. The timing raises questions as to the true purpose of the Notice.

In the absence of any evidence of service, I find that the Plaintiff has not proved that the Defendant received the Show Cause Notice. Accordingly, Issue 7 is answered in favour of the Defendant.

The Defendant tendered her letter of resignation on 11.3.2024, stating her last day of employment would be 25.4.2024. The Defendant's S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw position, as set out in her post-trial submissions, was that her actual last working day was 4.4.2024, after taking into account her unused annual leave, which was with her employer's knowledge and without objection. I note in passing that SD1's witness statement at Q14 records the date as 3.4.2024, but nothing in this judgment turns on the one-day discrepancy.

The Plaintiff, for its part, issued an undated letter of termination which it says was delivered to the Defendant on 14.4.2024.

As I have observed at paragraph [40] above, the group chat was created on 17.4.2024, after the Defendant's employment had ended on any version of events. The significance of this for Issue 8 is as follows.

The Plaintiff's claims are premised on alleged breaches of obligations arising from the employment relationship. Once that relationship ended, the Defendant could no longer be said to be acting in the capacity of an employee or in breach of employment obligations. Furthermore, post-employment restraints are void under section 28 of Act 136, and the Defendant was fully entitled to pursue lawful employment elsewhere, including with Aqua White.

Accordingly, I answer Issue 8 as follows : the Defendant was no longer an employee by 17.4.2024 and any activity after the termination of her employment cannot constitute a breach of employment obligations.

I have addressed Issue 9 together with Issues 3 and 4 above. For the avoidance of doubt, I reiterate that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that the Defendant used, disclosed or misused any confidential information belonging to the Plaintiff. SP1 agreed under cross-examination that no documents were produced to show the Defendant improperly used confidential information. The only evidence tendered, the Line Group Chat, shows Wayne Tseng, not the Defendant, conducting all client communications. The Defendant was merely added to the group by Wayne Tseng. There is no evidence of any transfer or disclosure of confidential client information by the Defendant to any third party. Issue 9 is answered in favour of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff invokes the tort of deceit, relying on the formulation in Panatron Pte Ltd & Anor v Lee Cheow Lee & Anor [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435, as approved by the Malaysian courts in Victor Cham & Anor v Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359. The essential elements of the tort of deceit are –

a representation of fact made by the defendant;

made with the intention that it be acted upon by the plaintiff;

the plaintiff in fact acts upon the false statement;

the plaintiff suffers damage as a result; and

representation made with knowledge that it is false. It must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true.

I find that none of these elements have been established.

As to the first element, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant made a false representation by concealing her involvement with Aqua White. However, the Defendant's resignation letter dated 11.3.2024 stated personal reasons for leaving, a shorter commute and more family time. In cross-examination, SD1 acknowledged that Wayne Tseng had approached her with an offer to join Aqua White before 11 March 2024. However, in re-examination, she clarified that she had not decided to join Aqua White at the time of her resignation. The two are not inconsistent. Being approached with an offer is not the same as accepting it. The Plaintiff has not identified any specific false statement of fact made by the Defendant in her resignation letter.

As to the second element, there is no evidence that the Defendant intended the Plaintiff to act upon any representation. The resignation letter was a straightforward notice of resignation, not an inducement for the Plaintiff to take or refrain from any action.

As to the third element, the Plaintiff has not established that it acted upon any false statement to its detriment. The client departures, which the Plaintiff relies upon as evidence of damage, have not been shown to be causally linked to any representation by the Defendant, as opposed to the independent actions of Wayne Tseng or the voluntary decisions of the clients themselves.

As to the fourth element, the Plaintiff's claim for damages is, as I have found, speculative and unsupported. The Plaintiff has not called any of the 23 affected clients to testify that the Defendant induced them to leave. In the absence of such evidence, causation of damage is not proved.

As to the fifth element, there is no evidence that the Defendant made any representation knowing it to be false, or recklessly without caring whether it be true or false. Her stated reasons for resignation, a shorter commute and more family time, are entirely consistent with her undisputed personal circumstances. The Plaintiff has shown nothing to suggest fraudulent intent or recklessness as to truth.

Accordingly, the tort of deceit is not made out. Issue 10 is answered in favour of the Defendant.

Having found against the Plaintiff on the substantive issues, damages do not arise. Nevertheless, I observe the following.

The claim was reduced from RM1,649,046.06 to RM955,875.63 during trial, demonstrating the original claim was inflated. SP1 and SP2 admitted –

no 10-year tenancy agreements existed;

no property consignment agreements existed;

no exclusivity clauses existed;

owners could sell anytime; and

on renewal, the Plaintiff was entitled only to 0.5 months’ rental.

SP1 agreed he was “not entitled to the full 10 years of commission rental” and “not entitled to the sales commission as claimed”. The tenancy agreements (pages 182 - 538) are unsigned and, as I have found at paragraph [59] above, carry no evidential weight.

I further note that the Plaintiff failed to produce notices of termination for two of the 23 units, Meridin Medini B-26-03 and Meridin Medini B- 26-04. SP1 admitted under cross-examination that these documents were not in the bundle before the Court. When asked to produce them, SP1 stated : “Our company have the records, maybe don't have a document”. The absence of evidence for these two units further undermines the Plaintiff's damages claim.

The Plaintiff prays in the alternative for nominal damages of RM100,000.00, citing Delpuri-Harl Corp JV Sdn Bhd v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor [2014] 1 LNS 1075 and SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 464. However, nominal damages presuppose an established cause of action. Since the Plaintiff’s claims fail on liability, there is no basis for any award.

As for the Plaintiff's claim for exemplary and/or punitive damages of RM100,000.00, the Plaintiff relies on Tradewinds Properties Sdn Bhd v Zulhkiple bin A Bakar & Ors [2019] 1 MLJ 421 and Sambaga Valli a/p KR Ponnusamy v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors and another appeal [2018] 1 MLJ 784, which apply the two categories from Rookes v Barnard [1964] 1 All ER 367. The Plaintiff invokes the second category, where the Defendant's conduct has been calculated to make a profit exceeding the compensation payable. On the evidence before me, no such conduct has been established. The Plaintiff has not proved that the Defendant made any profit at all, let alone a profit calculated to exceed any compensation payable. Accordingly, this claim is also dismissed.

Under section 101 of Act 56, the burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff. This burden has not been discharged. S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw

For the reasons set out above, I find as follows –

On the threshold issue of employment (Issues 1 and 2), there was sufficient nexus to give the Plaintiff standing, but the weakness of the transfer documentation affects the weight of the Plaintiff’s evidence on the substantive issues;

On breach of contract, solicitation and breach of confidence (Issues 3, 4 and 9), the Plaintiff has failed to prove its case. There is no direct evidence of client poaching. The Line Group Chat evidence shows Wayne Tseng, not the Defendant, as the actor. The group chat post-dates the employment;

On misappropriation (Issue 5), the money was returned, the evidence is hearsay and the Plaintiff is not claiming the amount;

On the financial policy (Issue 6), no such policy existed in evidence;

On the Show Cause Notice (Issue 7), the Plaintiff has not proved service;

On employment during notice period (Issue 8), the Defendant was no longer employed on 17.4.2024;

On the tort of deceit (Issue 10), the elements are not made out; S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw

On damages (Issues 11 and 12), the claim is speculative and unsupported.

The Plaintiff’s claim is hereby dismissed with costs fixed at RM100,000.00 to be paid to the Defendant, subject to the allocator fees. Dated : 13 April 2026 -signed-Dr Noradura Binti Hamzah Judicial Commissioner High Court Civil 2 Johor Bahru Solicitor for the Plaintiff : : Michael a/l Anthony together with Stanley Chong Messrs. Michael & Co. Solicitor for the Defendant : : Lum Pei Ying Messrs. Enho Grace & Partners S/N QoDpHuwd/kuSinqIUcU6xw