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Page 1 of 13 MALAYSIA IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM CIVIL SUIT NO. JA-22NCC-74-08/2021 BETWEEN DELTA CORP SHIPPING PTE LTD (Singapore Company No: 201821635E) …PLAINTIFF
JA-22NCC-74-08/2021
High Court of Malaysia29 Jan 2023
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“nt agreed in the said Fixture Recap Contract, to refer any diputes for Arbitration in London. [4] In the plaintiff’s submission it was stated that: “1. It is settled law that under Section 10(1) of Arbitration Act 2005, the stay pending arbitration is mandatory unless it falls within three exceptions illustrated above,”
“Civil Procedure (White Book) 2018 edition states: “Order 69 has been redrafted to reflect the complete change in the arbitral regime following the enforcement of the Arbitration Act 2005 (Act 646). The Arbitration Act 2005, which came into force on March 15, 2006, repealed the old Arbitration Act 1952 (Act 93) and adop”
“roceeding. A stay pending arbitration may be granted of proceedings upon an application by a non-party to the court proceedings: Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd v City Properties Sdn Bhd & Anor [2007] AMEJ 0194; [2008] 1 MLJ 233, HC. A party to an arbitration agreement may be able to stay proceedings brought again”
“MCR 579. Once an order for stay under s 10(1) has been made and sealed, the court will be functus officio and cannot revisit the order: Uba Urus Bina Asia Sdn Bhd v Quirk & Associates Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] AMEJ 0151; [2016] 4 CLJ 468, HC. **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document vi”
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Page 1 of 13 MALAYSIA IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM CIVIL SUIT NO. JA-22NCC-74-08/2021 BETWEEN DELTA CORP SHIPPING PTE LTD (Singapore Company No: 201821635E) …PLAINTIFF
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MICHAEL LWEE WAN THOO (Singapore Passport No.: E4781154D)
2
MOHAMMED NOBAB KHAN (Bangladesh Passport No.: K1209400E)
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AAA SHIPPING INTERNATIONAL (M) SDN BHD (Company No.: 201701040764 (1254937-W))
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CENTRAL CONTROL INTEGRATED SERVICES SDN BHD (Company No.: 200601012937 (732688-A)
5
SYNC CONGLOMERATE SDN BHD (Company No.: 20160100974 (1180632-K)) …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF DECISION (Enclosure 108) Page 2 of 13 Introduction [1] The 5th defendant in this case applied via enclosure 108 for a stay of the proceedings in this matter on the ground that there was an agreement to refer any disputes to arbitration. After hearing counsel I dismissed the application. My reasons now follow. [2] The 5th defendant’s prayers in enclosure 108 were: “1. That this Honourable Court allow the stay of this whole action and/or proceeding in this suit;
2
This action/proceeding shall be referred to Arbitration;
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An Interim Order that all proceeding including the necessity to file and serve the Fifth Defendant’s Statement of Defence to be stayed temporarily pending disposal of this application.” [3] The grounds of the application were as follows: i. The said Fixture Recap Contract which was entered by the Plaintiff and 5th Defendant on 30 May 2021 which form the basis of this claim filed by the Plaintiff contains a Arbitration Clause which was agreed by the Plaintiff and 5th Defendant which provides that, the said Fixture Recap Contract is subject to English Law and Arbitration in London, United Kingdom as such, any disputes in this matter should be referred for Arbitration in London; ii. At all material times, the said Fixture Recap Agreement which is in the possession of the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff ought to have full knowledge of the Arbitration Clause referred by the 5th Defendant in this application Page 3 of 13 since the said Fixture Recap Contract is the basis for the Plaintiff’s claim filed herein, and iii. The Plaintiff had wrongly filed this action in this Honourable Court despite both Plaintiff and the 5th Defendant agreed in the said Fixture Recap Contract, to refer any diputes for Arbitration in London. [4] In the plaintiff’s submission it was stated that: “1. It is settled law that under Section 10(1) of Arbitration Act 2005, the stay pending arbitration is mandatory unless it falls within three exceptions illustrated above, which are: a. arbitration clause is null and void; b. inoperative; or c. incapable of being performed a)
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The Plaintiff agues that the Defendant’s application for stay of proceeding pending arbitration should not be entertained by this Honourable Court as the Fixture Recap which contains the arbitration clause is null and void.
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This is due to the fact that the Fixture Recap was entered by the Fifth Defendant when the company was dissolved and does not exist. The non-existent of the Fifth Defendant at the time of the contract causes the element of contract, which is the parties to the contract, is not fulfilled, and thus causes the contract to be void. b) THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IS INCAPABLE OF BEING PERFORM
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To begin with, neither the Fifth Defendant nor the First Defendant who is the Fifth Defendant’s Director (who has been a party to this suit since day one), had ever disputed the invoice issued by the Plaintiff and in fact the Fifth Defendant had actually made part payments for the invoices issued by the Plaintiff through the Third Defendant and another company named SeaAsia Navigation Sdn Bhd.
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The Plaintiff submits that mere refusal to pay cannot amount a dispute. This principle was laid down by the Federal Court in Tan Kok Cheng & Sons Realty Co. Sdn Bhd v Lim Ah Pat (T/1 Juta Bena) [1995] 3 MLJ 273: “Mere refusal to pay is not a dispute. See the cases of Elf Petroleum SE Asia Pte Ltd v Winelf Petroleum Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 177 and KSM Insurance Bhd v Ong Ah Ba & Anor [1986] 1 MLJ 237, both decisions by VC George J. I am of the view that when a claim is admitted it does not call for arbitration. When the amount owing is admitted there is no dispute to be referred to arbitration. This is just a mere refusal to pay. (Emphasis added)” c) THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE IS NOT SPECIFIED IN THE
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Clause 11 of the Fixture Recap state as follows: “11. THE CONTRACT TO BE GOVERNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ENGLISH LAW, GENERAL AVERAGE IN LONDON AS PER YEAR 2016, ARBITRATION IN LONDON, BIMCO/PIRACY CLAUSE 2013 TO APPLY, CONWARTIME 2013 TO APPLY, BIMCO BUNKER NON-LIEN CLAUSE FOR TIME CHARTER Page 5 of 13 PARTIES, BIMCO COVID-19 CREW CHANGE CLAUSE FOR TIME CHARTER PARTIES 2020.”
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The above clause only mentioned “arbitration in London” without specifying which arbitration institute that the parties should refer to.
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Based on the international Council for Commercial Arbitration website, there are 10 arbitration institute which based in London and at least 5 arbitration institute which they can submit to.” [5] The Malaysian Civil Procedure (White Book) 2018 edition states: “Order 69 has been redrafted to reflect the complete change in the arbitral regime following the enforcement of the Arbitration Act 2005 (Act 646). The Arbitration Act 2005, which came into force on March 15, 2006, repealed the old Arbitration Act 1952 (Act 93) and adopts with some modifications the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”). The new Order 69 contains elements from the English Civil Procedure Rules 1998, Part 62 and RC Order 69 (Singapore). However, unlike Singapore which has a dual arbitration regime for arbitrations held in Singapore, the Arbitration Act 2005 provides “a single reference point for both domestic and foreign arbitrations as well as to promote consistency between international and domestic arbitral regime…The move from the ‘English model’ to the Model Law also reflects an appreciation of the need to adopt an arbitral regime that reflects worldwide consensus on principles and practices of international arbitration”: Aras Jalinan Sdn Bhd v Tipco Asphalt Public Co & Ors [2008] 4 AMR 533; [2008] 5 CLJ 654, HC.
Preamble
Pursuant to the newly enacted s 41B of the Arbitration Act 2005, all court proceedings should be heard in chambers unless otherwise ordered. The court may make an order to have the proceedings heard in open court upon the application by a party, or on its own motion if satisfied that the proceedings ought to be heard in open court. Stay of proceedings—Unlike the 1952 Act, the 2005 Act provides in s 10 for a mandatory stay of court proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed: Duta Wajar Sdn Bhd v Pasukhas Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] 5 MLJ 27, CA; Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 394, CA. A stay will be ordered even when the validity of the arbitration agreement is challenged, or where one party alleges that the dispute does not fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement, as this is a matter which should be determined by the arbitral tribunal at first instance: TNB Fuel Services Sdn Bhd v China National Coal Group Corp [2013] 4 MLJ 857, CA; Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 5 AMR 635; [2015] 5 AMR 30; [2016] 5 MLJ 417. Arbitration clauses will be interpreted broadly, taking into consideration the commercial reality and purpose for which the contract was entered into: Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 5 AMR 635; [2016] 5 MLJ 417, FC; Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Berhad [2015] 5 AMR 30, CA. Section 10 of the 2005 Act also provides that a stay of the proceedings shall be ordered and the parties required to refer the matter to arbitration when the defendant had not taken “any other steps in the proceedings”: Albilt Resources Sdn Bhd v Casaria Construction Sdn Bhd[2010] 3 AMR 721; [2010] 3 MLJ 656, CA. In Borneo Samudera Sdn Bhd v Siti Rahfizah Mihaldin & Ors [2008] 6 MLJ 817; [2008] 5 CLJ 43, CA, it was held that an Page 7 of 13 alternative prayer for security for costs which was made in the event that the High Court did not grant the applicant’s primary relief for a stay does not constitute submission to jurisdiction or a step in the proceeding. “An application, which is made in the event that the specific application for a stay is unsuccessful, is not a step in the proceedings”: Comos Industry Solution GmbH v Jacob and Toralf Consulting Letrikon Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 573; [2012] 4 AMR 493, CA. However, a request for an extension of time to file a defence has been held to be a step in the proceedings and a waiver of the arbitration clause: Winsin Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Oxford Talent (M) Sdn Bhd [2009] 4 AMR 562; [2010] 3 CLJ 634, HC. In Chut Nyak Isham bin Nyak Ariff v Malaysian Technology Development Corp Sdn Bhd [2009] 6 MLJ 729, HC, it was held that arbitral proceedings take precedence over any court proceeding. A stay pending arbitration may be granted of proceedings upon an application by a non-party to the court proceedings: Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd v City Properties Sdn Bhd & Anor [2007] AMEJ 0194; [2008] 1 MLJ 233, HC. A party to an arbitration agreement may be able to stay proceedings brought against a non-party: Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 MLJ 394, CA; Srivenkateswara Constructions v Union of India AIR 1974 AP 278 (DB). The inclusion of third parties in an action who are not subject to an arbitration agreement will not be a ground to refuse a stay of proceedings: AV Asia Sdn Bhd v MEASAT Broadcast Network Systems Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 AMR 193; [2011] 8 MLJ 792, HC; Pembinaan San Yu Sdn Bhd v Pembinaan Legenda Unggul Sdn Bhd & 5 Ors [2016] 2 AMCR 579. Once an order for stay under s 10(1) has been made and sealed, the court will be functus officio and cannot revisit the order: Uba Urus Bina Asia Sdn Bhd v Quirk & Associates Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] AMEJ 0151; [2016] 4 CLJ 468, HC. Page 8 of 13 Malaysian courts can grant a stay of proceedings pending arbitration even when the seat of arbitration is outside Malaysia.” [6] In the book Law and Practice of Arbitration in Malaysia Second Edition 2019 by Grace Xavier and Joanne Long the learned authors state: “A court may be justified in refusing a stay only in plain and obvious cases, where a reasonable tribunal, without undertaking a meticulous examination of the merits, is bound to hold that the issues raised by a defendant are frivolous or vexatious. Where there was in existence an agreement to arbitrate, and the conditions set out in section 6 of the Act were satisfied, then a court should favour the grant of a stay. The court’s residual discretion to refuse a stay was limited to cases involving fraud, or where there was no dispute that fell to be determined within the arbitration clause. Where the court is satisfied that a question of fraud had been successfully invoked by the defendant, then a stay would be refused. An arbitrator’s powers did not extend to decide on questions of fraud. However, a mere allegation of fraud would not of itself amount to a ground for refusing a stay. A stay would be refused if the arbitration clause relied on was an attempt to oust the court’s jurisdiction. A party opposing an application for a stay of proceedings must show proof that there was a clear agreement to arbitrate. By submitting to have the dispute resolved by arbitration, the parties had agreed to confer upon the arbitrator the power to resolve the dispute. As such the parties ought to be held to their bargain. In the case of Thamesa Designs Sdn Bhd & 3 Ors v Kuching Hotels Sdn Bhd the court held that the parties to the proceedings before the learned judge had never questioned its jurisdiction and had, by their conduct, waived their rights to go to arbitration. It was, therefore, too late for the respondents to raise an issue in the face of the arbitration clause in the said contract that Page 9 of 13 the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. As further observed by Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ at pp 2093–2094 (AMR): “On the question of the jurisdiction of the court, it seems clear to us that the parties to the proceedings before the learned judge had never questioned its jurisdiction. On November 10, 1987, the Kuching High Court made an order that the issue whether there was any debt due or accruing due, if any, and what amount, to the judgment debtor from the garnishee be tried. The parties then went ahead with the hearing. It would, therefore, be too late for the respondents/garnishee to raise an issue in the face of the arbitration clause in the said contract that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. If an authority is required on this point, we need only refer to the decision of this court in Newacres Sdn Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd. In that case, the appellant raised a preliminary objection on clause 23 of the joint-venture agreement which provided for reference to arbitration in the case of any dispute or difference with regard to any clause, matter or thing whatsoever or the operation or consideration thereof or any matter connected with the agreement, or the rights, duties or liabilities of any of the parties. Jemuri Serjan CJ (Borneo), in delivering the judgment of the court and after considering the full citation of authority, addressed the issue in the following manner (at p 481): The real question for our determination is whether in the face of the provision of clause 23 the respondent is entitled in law to go to court instead of referring the dispute to arbitration, considering that it does not contain the “ Scott v Avery clause”. Dobb’s case (1935) 53 CLR 643 itself would provide an answer to this case, Page 10 of 13 particularly the part of the judgment which reads as follows: “What no contract can do is to take from a party to whom a right actually accrues, whether ex contractu or otherwise, his power of invoking the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce it. ( Kill v Hollister (1746) 1 Wils 129;. Thompson v Charnock 101 ER 1310; Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co [1922] 2 KB 478 .) Accordingly, a contract providing for arbitration did not, apart from statute, prevent the institution of an action or suit, even although an actionable breach of contract was committed by the refusal to refer. (In re Smith & Service and Nelson & Sons (1890) 25 QBD 545 at p 544, per Bowen LJ). But if, before the institution of an action, an award was made, it governed the rights of the parties and precluded them from asserting in the courts the claims which the award determined. By submitting the claims to arbitration, the parties confer upon the arbitrator an authority conclusively to determine them. That authority enables him to extinguish an original cause of action.” This observation clearly supports the proposition that the respondent can still go to court, provided before the institution of an action, no award had been made by an arbitrator. In any case, clause 23 is never intended to oust the jurisdiction of the court under any circumstances, and we agree that in this case it is not the appellant’s case that the court’s jurisdiction was thus ousted. From what we have said earlier on in the judgment it is indisputable that the appellant did not object to the recourse to court by the Page 11 of 13 respondent but went along throughout, not only filing affidavits in reply to the affidavits of the respondent when they filed the issues as ordered by Razak J but also filing the statement of defence and counterclaim. Such a conduct must, by its very nature, amount to a waiver of the rights of the parties to go to arbitration. Neither did the appellant have recourse to s 6 of the Arbitration Act 1952 (Act 93) to apply for a stay of the proceedings thereby reinforcing the argument that it had abandoned its rights to go to arbitration, but submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court. In any event, even if the appellant were to apply for stay of the proceedings in the High Court under s 6 of the Arbitration Act 1952, his application would fail for the reason that he had taken various steps in the proceedings, and even had agreed for the case to be set down for trial 30 days from the date of the High Court order dated June 19,
1987
Stay may also be refused if the other party had shown by his actions that he was submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. The New Zealand case of Pathak v Tourism Transport Ltd is often cited as authority for the proposition that a request for further and better particulars is a step in the proceedings. The plaintiff there had filed proceedings in court seeking interim relief with reference to an arbitration agreement. After the application for the interim relief had been settled, the plaintiff applied for a stay of the court proceedings and for an order to refer the dispute to arbitration. However, upon a closer reading of the case, it was observed that the court there was influenced by the fact of multiple actions being taken by the plaintiff/applicant, that included not just seeking further and better particulars of the defence but also providing further particulars of their statement of claim, verifying list of documents, filing a memorandum setting out a summary of plaintiff’s claim, attending directions conference before the Master and also inspecting documents contained in the defendant’s list of documents. It was in that context that the High Court in New Zealand held that there Page 12 of 13 was a delay in applying for stay and that significant steps have been taken in the proceedings such that the plaintiff is said to have elected to submit the dispute to the court.” Conclusion [7] Based on what has been adumbrated above, I dismissed enclosure 108 to stay this action in this court as the arbitration clause is null and void as well as incapable of being performed since there is no dispute between the parties. Dated: 5th April, 2023 -Signed- (ASLAM B ZAINUDDIN) Judge High Court in Malaya Johor Bahru Note: This judgment is subject to correction of typographical errors, grammatical mistakes and editorial formatting, if any. Page 13 of 13 COUNSEL For the Plaintiff: Raja Saidatul Akhma Raja Lope (Nur Amira Binti Ismail, Muhammad Syafiq b. Md Nawawi with her) Messrs. Rahayu & Partnership, Advocates & Solicitors, Suite A-17-17, Menara UOA Bangsar, 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1 59000 Kuala Lumpur For the First and Fourth Defendant (D1 & D4): David Ragumaren Messrs. G Ragumaren & Co Advocates & Solicitors No. 56-1, RGA Chambers Jln. Telawi, Bangsar Baru 59100 Kuala Lumpur For the Second and Third Defendant (D2 & D3): M. Indrani Messrs M. Indrani & Associates 2570A, Persiaran Raja Muda 41000 Klang Selangor For the Fifth Defendant (D5): Sri Nagavarnan a/l Subramaniam Messrs. Rizal, Many & Logan Advocates & Solicitors No. 5A, Jln. Taman Subang Jasa 1, Seksyen U6 40150 Shah Alam
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