Demurni Sdn Bhd v Zuihaimi Bin Ismail (PA-22NCC-1-01/2021)

P, in Enclosure 20, did not pray for an order or judgment that determines this suit. Since P did not specifically pray for such an order or judgment, when I determined Enclosure 20, I also held that P is at liberty to apply for judgment to be entered according to P’s prayers in its Statement Of Claim (which indorses the Writ).

P now files an application under Order 14A Rule 1(2) of the ROC to pray for final judgment to be entered against D for RM1.74 million, with S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 20 interest at 5% per annum on RM1.65 million or part of it from 15.10.2020 until full payment. I will refer to this follow-up application to enter judgment as “Enclosure 49”.

Should Enclosure 49 be allowed i.e. should judgment be entered against the Defendant (D)? ORDER 14A RULE 1(1) AND ORDER 14A RULE 1(2) [5] The terms of Order 14A Rule 1(1) and Rule 1(2) are unambiguous. The two sub-rules are set out here for reference (with my emphases added)— Order 14A. Disposal of case on point of law Determination of questions of law or construction (O. 14A, r. 1)

(1) The Court may, upon the application of a party or of its own motion, determine any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or matter at any stage of the proceedings where it appears to the Court that—

such question is suitable for determination without the full trial of the action; and

such determination will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein.

On such determination the Court may dismiss the cause or matter or make such order or judgment as it thinks just. [6] Under Order 14A Rule 1(1)—for Enclosure 20—I decided the question of law or construction of document posed in Enclosure 20, in P’s favour. D appealed against my decision to the Court Of Appeal. D’s appeal is waiting to be heard and determined. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 3 of 20 [7] My grounds for decision for Enclosure 20 is annexed to this judgment as Annexure A, for the convenience of reference. [8] Under Order 14A Rule 1(2)—for the present Enclosure 49—this judgment consitutes my decision on whether to enter judgment against D (since I found that answering the question of law or construction of document posed in Enclosure 20, would finally determine this entire suit). D’s ARGUMENTS AND MY FINDINGS [9] To oppose Enclosure 49, D mounts three arguments. Firstly, D argues that in Enclosure 49 and the affidavit in support of it, P failed to state that Enclosure 49 is made as a result of the “liberty to apply” that I gave P when I decided Enclosure 20 in P’s favour. [10] I find that this argument is misplaced. There is no procedural law requirement that P, when making an application to enter judgment premised on the “liberty to apply” given by the Court, must state that it is making the application under the Court-given “liberty to apply”. D has referred to no Rule Of Court or case law authority to compel P to do that. [11] I do not see any prejudice that is caused upon D. Surely D knows that Enclosure 49 is made from the liberty to apply given to P. D vigorously opposed Enclosure 20. D appealed against the decision made on Enclosure 20. D would have read the grounds of decision as well. [12] Secondly, D argues that Enclosure 49 is made under Order 14A of the ROC again, when it should have been made under Order 42 Rule 13 or Order 92 Rule 4 instead. D submits that Enclosure 49 is therefore defective. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 4 of 20 [13] I again find that this argument is similarly misplaced. One—D asserts that Enclosure 49 is defective because it stated an incorrect rule of court under which P applies. At the hearing of Enclosure 49, I asked D—what is the prejudice that D suffers as a result of P citing an incorrect Rule (assuming that it is an incorrect rule)? D’s counsel could not (at the hearing), and D did not (in his affidavit in reply), demonstrate any prejudice that is caused upon him. [14] Two—D asserts that Enclosure 49 should have stated that it is made under Order 42 Rule 13 of the ROC. But I find that Order 42 Rule 13 has little or nothing to do with asking for judgment to be entered against D, when the Court answers the question of law or construction of document in Ps' favour under Order 14A Rule 1(1). [15] Order 42 of the ROC is about “Judgment and Orders”. Order 42 Rule 13 is set out here, again for reference—

Setting aside or varying judgment and orders (O. 42, r. 13) Save as otherwise provided in these Rules, where provisions are made in these Rules for the setting aside or varying of any order or judgment, a party intending to set aside or to vary such order or judgment shall make an application to the Court and serve it on the party who has obtained the order or judgment within thirty days after the receipt of the order or judgment by him. [16] As for Order 92 Rule 4, I similarly find that it is not applicable to D’s argument, nor the context in which his argument is made. [17] Order 92 Rule 4 is about “Miscellaneous” matters. Order 92 Rule 4 is set out below, again for ease of reference— Inherent powers of the Court (O. 92, r. 4) S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ

For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. [18] Contrary to D’s argument, Order 92 Rule 4 provides that Courts have the inherent power “to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice”. Making an order permitting P to enter judgment against D, when the question of law or construction of document posed was determined in P’s favour, prevents an injustice. It would be unjust and unfair to answer the question of law or construction of document posed in P’s favour and yet not enter judgment against D, so that there is a determination (disposal) of the suit between the parties. [19] Thirdly, D argues that as Enclosure 49 is made under Order 14A again, the principle of res judicata applies to prohibit P from making the application to enter judgment. D submits that Enclosure 49 should be dismissed on this ground alone. [20] I find this argument untenable. One—I asked D for case law authority which instructs me or binds me, on the point that since Enclosure 49 is made under Order 14A again, to enter judgment, res judicata applies to defeat Enclosure 49. D did not, and could not, produce case law to support his argument. [21] Two—The principle of res judicata is that a party is prohibited from relitigating (rehashing) an issue in dispute between the parties which had already been determined. I am of the view that res judicata does not apply to assist D here. The issue that was already decided, which should not be canvassed for determination again, is the question of law or construction S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 6 of 20 of document that P posed in Enclosure 20. On the other hand, the issue of whether judgment should be entered against D according to the prayers in P’s Statement Of Claim is not yet determined. Hence, res judicata does not apply. [22] Three—in Enclosure 49, P states that it applies for judgment under Order 14A Rule 1(2) of the ROC. I reiterate that Order 14A Rule 1(2) provides that: “on such determination”, the Court may make “such order or judgment as it thinks fit”. [23] “On such determination” means the determination of the question of law or construction of document in the Enclosure 20 proceeding. I answered the question of law posed in P’s favour. I found D liable to P. Now that “such determination” is made on Enclosure 20, P consequentially applies for judgment against D. I find that there is nothing improper or prejudicial (to D) in P filing Enclosure 49 after the determination of Enclosure 20. CONCLUSION [24] For these reasons, I allow Enclosure 49—P’s application to enter judgment against D after the determination of the question of law or construction of document is answered in P’s favour. [25] I grant prayer 1 of Enclosure 49, which is to enter judgment against D (according to the Writ or the Statement Of Claim) to pay P damages in the sum of RM1.74 million with interest at 5% per annum on the sum of RM1.65 million, or part of it, from 15.10.2020 until the date of full settlement, with costs of RM15K. Since P prays for costs of this Enclosure S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 7 of 20 49 proceeding be in the cause, the costs of this proceeding is included in the RM15K costs that I order for the cause (the suit). Dated: 14 May 2025 KENNETH ST JAMES Judge Penang High Court Counsel/Solicitors: For the Plaintiff— Shamser Singh Thind [Messrs. SS Thind (Ayer Itam)] For the Defendant— Farhan Alia Ahmed Othman [Messrs. Zulhaimi & Co. (Butterworth)] Legislation referred to:

Order 14A Rule 1(1) of the Rules of Court 2012.

Order 14A Rule 1(2) of the Rules of Court 2012.

Order 42 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court 2012.

Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 8 of 20 ANNEXURE A DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI GEORGETOWN DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG GUAMAN NO: PA-22NCC-1-01/2021 ANTARA DEMURNI SDN. BHD. (NO. PEND. SYKT: 978810-H) …PLAINTIF DAN ZUIHAIMI BIN ISMAIL (NO. K/P : 661125-07-5005) …DEFENDAN JUDGMENT (ORDER 14A APPLICATION) PRELUSION [1] The Plaintiff (P) recorded a consent judgment against G.M.P. Masyhur Sdn Bhd (GMP). The Defendant is a director of GMP. [2] P enforced the consent judgment against GMP. In the process of enforcement, GMP recorded a consent order to pay the outstanding judgment debt by instalments. One of the terms of this consent order is that D guarantees the payment of GMP’s judgment debt to P. [3] GMP failed to pay. P sues D on the guarantee. P applies under Order 14A of the Rules Of Court 2012 to pose a question of law or construction of a document, to summarily determine the suit (P’s Order 14A Application) i.e. to enter judgment without a trial. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 9 of 20 [4] Should P’s Order 14A Application be allowed? THE TERMS OF ORDER 14A [5] My starting point is to note the terms of Order 14A and to ascertain the requirements under Order 14A. Order 14A is set out here— Order 14A. Disposal of case on point of law

Determination of questions of law or construction (O. 14A, r. 1)

The Court may, upon the application of a party or of its own motion, determine any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or matter at any stage of the proceedings where it appears to the Court that—

such question is suitable for determination without the full trial of the action; and

such determination will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein.

On such determination the Court may dismiss the cause or matter or make such order or judgment as it thinks just… [emphases added] [6] The Order 14A procedure is only effectively useful if two requirements are satisfied—

Suitability—it must be suitable for the question of law or construction of a document to be determined without a trial, which necessarily means that the facts which are required to answer the question of law or construction of the document are undisputed. In other words, it is suitable to use the Order 14A procedure when the facts needed to answer the question of law or construction posed are not in dispute i.e. agreed, are admitted, or are proven; and S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 10 of 20

Finality—determining (answering) the question of law or construction of the document will conclude the whole suit (the claim and the defence) with finality. There must be no remaining issue or question that must still be answered by the process of a trial. Put differently, after answering the question of law or construction posed, the parties cannot have any remnant issue that still needs a trial in order to answer it. [7] So, to effectively utilise the Order 14A procedure to obtain a Judgment or final Order, there are two requirements—(i) the questions posed must be suitable for determination without the full trial; and (ii) such determination will finally determine the entire case. THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACTS ACT [8] Next, I look at the pertinent provisions of the Contracts Act 1950 that directly bear upon P’s Order 14A Application. The pertinent provisions are sections 79, 80 and 81. They are set out below— Section 79. "Contract of guarantee", "surety", "principal debtor", and "creditor". A "contract of guarantee" is a contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a third person in case of his default. The person who gives the guarantee is called the "surety"; the person in respect of which default the guarantee is given is called the "principal debtor", and the person to whom the guarantee is given is called the "creditor". A guarantee may be either oral or written. [emphasis added] Section 80. Consideration for guarantee. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 11 of 20 Anything done, or any promise made, for the benefit of the principal debtor may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee. ILLUSTRATIONS

B requests A to sell and deliver to him goods on credit. A agrees to do so, provided C will guarantee the payment of the price of the goods. C promises to guarantee the payment in consideration of A's promise to deliver the goods. This is a sufficient consideration for C's promise.

A sells and delivers goods to B. C afterwards requests A to forbear to sue B for the debt for a year, and promises that if he does so, C will pay for them in default of payment by B. A agrees to forbear as requested. This is a sufficient consideration for C's promise.

A sells and delivers goods to B. C afterwards, without consideration, agrees to pay for them in default of B. The agreement is void. Section 81. Surety's liability. The liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. . ILLUSTRATION A guarantees to B the payment of a bill of exchange by C, the acceptor. The bill is dishonoured by C. A is liable, not only for the amount of the bill, but also for any interest and charges which may have become due on it. P’s CLAIM AGAINST D [9] This is the cause that P pleads against D. D is the sole director of GMP. D is also the sole proprietor of the law firm (Zulhaimi & Co) which S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 12 of 20 represented GMP in the suit that P filed against GMP. That suit is Butterworth Sessions Court No. B52NCC-15-11/2015 (Suit 15). [10] In Suit 15, on 23.6.2016, the 1st Consent Judgment was recorded between P and GMP (1st CJ). In the 1st CJ, GMP agreed to pay P RM2 million by instalments. But after RM150K was paid, GMP stopped paying, leaving an outstanding judgment sum of RM1.85 million unpaid. [11] P commenced committal proceedings against GMP. Before the committal proceeding was determined, on 13.4.2018, GMP recorded the 2nd Consent Order between P and GMP (2nd CO). The 2nd CO restructured the payment of the judgment debt under the 1st CJ. Under the 2nd CO, GMP agreed to pay P the outstanding RM1.85 million by instalments (in the form of post-dated cheques given to P). [12] A further term of the 2nd CO obligates D, as the director of GMP, to: (i) guarantee that the payment of the post-dated cheques will not be stopped, and (ii) ensure that all the cheques are honoured when presented for payment. [13] But after another RM100K was paid, GMP again stopped paying, leaving the balance outstanding judgment sum unpaid. [14] P again commenced committal proceedings against GMP and to commit D to prison. And again, before the committal proceeding was determined, on 5.3.2020, GMP recorded the 3rd Consent Order between P and GMP (3rd CO). The 3rd CO restructured the payment of the balance outstanding judgment sum, again by instalments. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 13 of 20 [15] An additional term in the 3rd CO was that GMP must now pay interest on the balance outstanding judgment sum. [16] Another additional and pertinent term in the 3rd CO was that D gave a personal guarantee to P that GMP would pay the sums stated in the 3rd CO within the time stipulated for payment. This additional term is contained in paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO. [17] But after paying another RM10K, GMP again stopped paying, leaving an outstanding judgment sum of RM1.74 million unpaid, excluding interest. [18] P found that GMP owns a piece of land. But it is charged to Public Bank Berhad. P also found that the GMP owes Public Bank Berhad a sum that is higher than the value of the land. P found that GMP is not able to satisfy the balance outstanding judgment sum of RM1.74 million. P hence resorted to filing this suit against D, who guaranteed that GMP would pay the judgment sum in full. [19] P asserts that under the 3rd CO and applying section 79 of the Contracts Act 1950, D is the surety (guarantor); GMP is the principal debtor; and P is the creditor. [20] In P’s Order 14A Application, P posed a question of law (of whether D is a surety (guarantor)) and a question of the construction of a document (interpreting paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO on whether D is obligated by the personal guarantee that he gave—to pay P the balance outstanding judgment sum with interest). S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 14 of 20 THERE ARE NO DISPUTED FACTS THAT MAKE IT UNSUITABLE TO USE THE ORDER 14A PROCEDURE [21] Are there any disputed facts that make it unsuitable to use the Order 14A procedure in this proceeding? The answer is “No, there are none”. [22] In preparation for the hearing of P’s Order 14A Application, I directed both parties to file their respective Chronology Of Facts. The two Chronology Of Facts filed respectively by P and D disclose that there are a number of agreed facts between the parties. When I consider those agreed facts, I find that there are sufficient agreed facts to render it suitable to invoke the Order 14A procedure to determine this suit. THE UNDISPUTED (AGREED) FACTS THAT MAKE IT SUITABLE TO USE THE ORDER 14A PROCEDURE [23] The undisputed or agreed facts that render it suitable to invoke the Order 14A procedure to determine this suit are most of the material facts that P pleaded in their Statement Of Claim, including the following facts—

D is a director of GMP.

The 1st CJ was recorded, which obligated GMP to pay P RM2 million. After RM150K was paid, GMP stopped paying.

The 2nd CO was recorded. The payment of the judgment sum was restructured to be paid by way of post-dated cheques. A further term of the 2nd CO was that D guaranteed that the post-dated cheques would not be stopped and D ensured that all S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 15 of 20 the post-dated cheques were honoured when presented for payment.

The 3rd CO was recorded. The payment of the judgment sum was restructured again. Under paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO, D gave a personal guarantee that he would pay the outstanding amounts stated in the 3rd CO within the time given to pay them.

He appeared before the Sessions Court to record the 3rd CO. He also signed the draft 3rd CO to perfect it. (This means that D agreed to the terms and effect of paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO.) PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE 3RD CO CAN BE CONSTRUED WITHOUT A TRIAL [24] These are the words of paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO that D agreed to— “that ZUIHAIMI BIN ISMAIL (No. KP 661125-07-5005) gives a personal guarantee that the amounts stated in this Order will be paid by the Defendant (GMP) within the time given to pay them (bahawa ZUIHAIMI BIN ISMAIL (No. KP 661125-07-5005) memberi jaminan peribadi bahawa amaun-amaun yang dinyatakan dalam perintah ini akan dibayar oleh DEFENDAN pada masa yang ditetapkan)”. [25] I find that paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, such that it can be construed without the need for a trial of the suit. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 16 of 20 THE QUESTION POSED BY P IN ITS ORDER 14A APPLICATION [26] The question that P poses in P’s Order 14A Application, which P asserts will finally determine this suit, is: whether paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO creates a contract of guarantee under section 79 of the Contracts Act 1950 between P as creditor, D as guarantor (surety) and GMP as the principal debtor? [27] I find that answering this question of law and construction of paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO would finally determine this suit, because—if the answer is Yes, then D owes P RM1.74 million, with interest as prayed for in the Statement Of Claim, and a judgment against D can be entered accordingly. [28] If, on the other hand, the answer is No, then D does not owe P the money claimed, and P’s suit can be accordingly dismissed. THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION POSED [29] My answer to the question posed by P in P’s Order 14A Application is Yes, paragraph 6 creates a contract of guarantee under section 79 of the Contracts Act 1950 between P (as creditor), D (as guarantor), and GMP (as principal debtor). These are my reasons. [30] One—the undisputed (agreed) facts set out above, namely D gave a guarantee to P to pay the balance outstanding in the judgment sum if GMP defaults in paying it. [31] Two—I am of the view that paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO creates a guarantee by D to pay P GMP’s judgment debt under the 3rd CO. The terms of a consent judgment or consent order are akin to the terms of a S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 17 of 20 contract between the parties. The parties are bound by the terms of a consent judgment or consent order, and “the Court is duty bound to enforce the agreed terms” contained in it—Abdul Razak Sheikh Mahmood & Ors v Amanah Raya Berhad & Ors And Another Appeal [2018] 5 MLJ 125 (CA); [2018] 5 CLJ 273; [2018] 3 MLRA 529; [2018] AMEJ 0030. [32] Three—although D was not a party to Suit 15 where the 1st CJ was entered, D’s guarantee was the consideration for P to restructure the payment of the balance of the judgment sum for GMP to pay. [33] I find that under sections 79, 80, and 81 of the Contracts Act 1950, a contract of guarantee was created between P as creditor, D as guarantor, and GMP as the principal debtor whose debt D (as guarantor) must pay. The consideration for D to give the guarantee was the restructuring of GMP’s obligation to pay P the balance outstanding judgment sum. And D’s liability to pay, as the guarantor, co-exists with GMP’s liability to pay, as the principal judgment debtor—Chan Shek Hoh & Anor v Emzie Luba Services Sdn Bhd & Anor [2009] 8 MLJ 757 (HC); [2009] AMEJ 0077; [2009] CLJU 541; [2009] 9 MLRH 400—where the facts are similar and the High Court applied the definition of a contract of guarantee as set out in section 79. DEALING WITH D’s ARGUMENTS [34] First, D submits that this Suit (and P’s Order 14A Application) is no longer necessary because P has already filed committal proceedings against GMP, to enforce the 3rd CO. [35] I find that this argument is not cogent. D is not a party in Suit 15, where the 1st CJ was recorded. D was not obligated and hence not liable S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 18 of 20 to pay P the judgment sum recorded in Suit 15. However, under the 3rd CO, D guaranteed GMP’s payment of the balance outstanding judgment sum. This gave P a cause against D. P sues D for the guarantee that he made in the terms of paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO. P’s Order 14A Application poses a question that seeks an answer from the Court that the 3rd CO constitutes a contract of guarantee for D to pay P what GMP owes P. The question is suitably posed, and the answer finally determines the suit without the need for a trial. [36] Second, D argues that the parties never intended to create a guarantee, or that D never intended to give a guarantee. D also argues that the 3rd CO does not contain words that make D liable to pay GMP’s judgment debt to P. [37] On both scores, I find D’s argument untenable. Paragraph 6 of the 3rd CO is unambiguous in its terms. It provides that D gives a personal guarantee for the amounts that GMP is liable to pay P within the time limit to pay. It is nothing short of D promising to pay GMP’s debt to P under the 3rd CO. [38] Further, if paragraph 6 does not create in D a liability to pay P if GMP defaults in paying the judgment sum to P, then there is effectively no value to the terms of paragraph 6. There would have been no need and no reason to include paragraph 6 in the terms of the 3rd CO at all. [39] Fourth—D argues that paragraph 6 merely creates an obligation to guarantee that GMP pays the judgment sum, but does not create an obligation to actually pay the judgment sum on behalf of GMP. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 19 of 20 [40] I find that this is an argument about a non-existent distinction. The words of paragraph 6 do not create an obligation to give a guarantee. The words of paragraph 6 straightaway create a guarantee. D gave a guarantee that he would pay GMP’s judgment debt to P. D made a promise to pay GMP’s debt if GMP failed to pay it. And so if GMP fails to pay P the judgment sum, D is liable to pay it. THE RESULTANT JUDGMENT OR ORDER THAT SHOULD BE MADE [41] For these reasons, I find that the question posed in P’s Order 14A Application is a suitable question to ask for determination. I find that the facts that are necessary to answer the question posed are undisputed and indisputable. And I find that answering the question posed will finally determine P’s entire claim against D without the need for a trial. [42] I answer the question posed in favour of P and against D. [43] I order that P is at liberty to apply for judgment to be entered against D according to P’s prayers in the Statement Of Claim. [44] As for costs, I order D to pay P costs of RM7K by 9.9.2024. Costs are subject to the allocatur. Dated: 30 October 2024 KENNETH ST JAMES Judicial Commissioner Penang High Court S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ Page 20 of 20 Counsel/Solicitors: For the Plaintiff – Shamser Singh Thind [Messrs SS Thind (Ayer Itam)] For the Defendant – Farhan Alia Ahmed Othman [Messrs Zulhaimi & Co. (Butterworth)] Legislation referred to:

Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012.

Section 79 of the Contracts Act 1950.

Section 80 of the Contracts Act 1950.

Section 81 of the Contracts Act 1950. Cases referred to:

Abdul Razak Sheikh Mahmood & Ors v Amanah Raya Berhad & Ors And Another Appeal [2018] 5 MLJ 125 (CA); [2018] 5 CLJ 273; [2018] 3 MLRA 529; [2018] AMEJ 0030.

Chan Shek Hoh & Anor v Emzie Luba Services Sdn Bhd & Anor [2009] 8 MLJ 757 (HC); [2009] 9 MLRH 400; [2009] AMEJ 0077; [2009] CLJU 541. S/N mWxpvhRndU2zvi7ylDCmlQ